Roy Gutman's OpEd in yesterdays Post-Bulletin (Rochester, Minnesota) had a rather unique conclusion regarding the NIE, Iran and HUMINT.

U.S. intelligence can be spectacularly right -- or wrong

This brings us to Iran. The Bush administration could have deduced months ago that Iran had no active nuclear weapons program. The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reached that conclusion by talking with Iranian officials, sending in inspectors and verifying the facts.

Under the mullahs, Iran is a notoriously difficult country for recruiting top-level spies. True, there are phone intercepts, satellite images and walk-in defectors. But human, on-the-ground contact is best facilitated by having an embassy, full diplomatic relations and a program of exchanges and visits. The IAEA did that. While an IAEA inspection regime is not infallible, it is, when supplemented by intelligence (and journalism), the most plausible way to monitor any threat from Iran.

Reporters and the public ought to view intelligence findings and National Intelligence Estimates as a starting point for an investigation rather than the conclusion to it. Until we can examine the sources and methods on which such findings are based and understand the context in which those sources are operating, we should treat such pronouncements with caution.