Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[selil]

Since defense of one's position, whether it's a possibility or a prediciton, is a time-honored tradition in military academies and civilian educational institutions, I'm looking forward to hear Galrahn's take on what technical requirements must be in place in order for any nation, including Iran, to convert enriched uranium supplied by Russia to HEU for use in a warhead, should Iran desire to do that in the future.

Ah an epistemological mistake in the process of science. We are not in the testing or instruments phase of our discussion. We are in the hypothesis generation phase.

We can't say whether Iran has the capability 100 percent, and we most certainly can't say that they can't refine nuclear materials.

What can we say (y'all will have to help me here):

We know that Russia has given them power generation level nuclear fuel (3.9 percent pure).

Weapons grade fuel requirements are in the 99th percenatile (99.99999 percent pure or lower I imagine).

Refinement processes so far only exist in tier 1 countries (and I guess North Korea).

Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials. Knowledge of how to do something, and capability of how to do something not being the same thing.

The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).

Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.

Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb.

Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot. That is the issue with jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready. We need more facts on currency of the situation and less discussion on the end result. How is it currently occurring, what is the situation, then we can tear apart the points for and against a point. But, we need the common point to argue about first. We're not there yet.

[Stan]

wants to have a possy(term used very loosely)
And I'm sure any mob boss would tell you those aren't as much fun as one would like. Kinda like family. You have to feed em , cloth em, Shelter Em, and worst of all you actually have to take responsibility for their actions because your where the buck stops

Yepper ! I'm more than certain having watched them for years, it's turf. Hell, they hung those buds out to dry over 'financial' issues til the time was right. Now with a green light from intelligence, time to proceed unabated

The larger cycle of homies. People you dont really know but you greet them at least when you see them.

[JeffC]

Ah an epistemological mistake in the process of science. We are not in the testing or instruments phase of our discussion. We are in the hypothesis generation phase.

In this case, considering how far afield this thread has gone, and how many posts have been deleted for straying off-topic, I think that asking folks to defend their "hypothesis" is both valid and timely.

We can't say whether Iran has the capability 100 percent, and we most certainly can't say that they can't refine nuclear materials.

But we can say what equipment Iran or any nation would require in order to produce HEU. We can also say how much HEU is needed; how large a cascade operating over how long a period is needed to create that amount; what the requirements are (facility-wise) to maintain such a cascade.

This is a valid consideration because the entire membership of the GCC has expressed an interest in building nuclear power plants within their own nations borders. Perhaps if more people knew how technically challenging it was to convert nuclear fuel for military use, future threats debates about a nuclear-powered Middle East could be even more helpful to all who participate.

What can we say ....

By "What can we say" I'm assuming that you mean "What do we know to be true". Is that correct?

Refinement processes so far only exist in tier 1 countries (and I guess North Korea).

That depends on how you define "Tier 1". I would not put Pakistan, India, and North Korea in the same category as the U.S., Britain, and France, for example. And for weapons use or energy use? There are only 9 nations that possess nuclear weapons, while 30 nations utilize nuclear energy.

Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials.

Are you including this as a "known" fact? If so, I'd be interested in seeing your source for it.

The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).

This sounds like it should be in the conjecture column, rather than the "known fact" column.

Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.

Again, while this "may" be true, it also may not be true, so it doesn't qualify as a "known fact".

Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb.

Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.

I'm sorry, but the logic of your last statement has escaped me. How do you make the jump from your personal opinion that it's inevitable that Iran will one day possess nuclear weapons to declaring all discussion on that point "moot"?

That is the issue with jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready. We need more facts on currency of the situation and less discussion on the end result. How is it currently occurring, what is the situation, then we can tear apart the points for and against a point. But, we need the common point to argue about first. We're not there yet.

I can certainly agree on the need for more facts. And I look forward to reading your reply to my above-mentioned points before I concede your point about "jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready".

[selil]

But we can say what equipment Iran or any nation would require in order to produce HEU. We can also say how much HEU is needed; how large a cascade operating over how long a period is needed to create that amount; what the requirements are (facility-wise) to maintain such a cascade.

Johnson, C., “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium". 1997 CRS

Page not given. “Plutonium is considered weapons-grade if it contains at least 93 percent Pu-239. Fuel-grade plutonium contains from seven to less than 19 percent Pu-240, and power reactor-grade plutonium contains levels of 19 percent and greater Pu-240.1' Distinguishing plutonium by its grade, however, obscures the fact that all grades are weapons usable. Less than six kilograms of plutonium, about the size of a baseball, is needed to make a bomb.l2”

We do know the amount and likeliness of that grade being made. The recent NIE gave a substantial view into the issues. We know that any amount of fuel can create a dirty bomb, with not nearly the bang, but just as effective psychologically.

Page not given “Concerns have been raised that converting U.S. weapons plutonium to commercial reactor fuel could undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, which discourages the civil use of plutonium throughout the world. Plutonium is created in all of today's commercial reactors and can be chemically separated from other elements of spent fuel to make new fuel or weapons. Opponents of the MOX option contend that widespread commercial use of plutonium for fuel would increase the risk of plutonium diversion for weapons.”

Of course there is a lot of already created plutonium around the world ready to be refined from a much higher state than you might expect. Guarded by the lowest bidder and subject to guards falling asleep on the job.

Page not given “Unlike the United States, Russia has not made a specific declaration of excess plutonium. Unclassified sources estimate Russian holdings of approximately 200 tons, with 30 tons separated for civilian purposes and never designated for weapons use.l6 To achieve equal levels of military plutonium stockpiles, a goal the United States and Russia share, Russia will need to declare more than 100 tons of weapons plutonium surplus as well as the 30 tons of civilian material, according to DOE.l7”
[BREAK]

[selil]

As I said the fuel already exists and is available but how in the heck would it get here, there, or somewhere that we don’t want it?

By "What can we say" I'm assuming that you mean "What do we know to be true". Is that correct?

I’m saying that somebody in this thread, the NIE, or publicly available literature has said any of the following statements within the context of the original post.

That depends on how you define "Tier 1". I would not put Pakistan, India, and North Korea in the same category as the U.S., Britain, and France, for example. And for weapons use or energy use? There are only 9 nations that possess nuclear weapons, while 30 nations utilize nuclear energy.

Quentin, M,. “The evolution of nuclear export control regimes: From export control list to catch-all clause”, 2005, Atoms for Peace: An international journal Vol 1, No 1, 2005

Page 79 “The Wassenaar Arrangement dual-use list is divided into a basic list (Tier 1) containing nine categories of items and two annexes (Tier 2) containing, in the first, a number of sensitive items and in the second case, a number of highly sensitive items. All transfers of dual-use list items are submitted to an export authorisation.”

My fault for not using clear language. I’m thinking of those nations that have the apparent agreements to handle fissionable tools and materials without censure by the International community. Of course the issue has become that many items get dumped into dual use categories. Thus making that list fairly useless for discussion. Of specific interest is the fact that materials are not the only issue. In fact there are other rating systems in place already that look at topics, discussions, etc.. That are also based on tier system such as this document at LANL. I think though we can find a point of agreement in that there are four categories of nuclear nations; non-nuclear; nuclear energy only; nuclear weapons only; energy and nuclear energy capable.

How we split the tiers apart is less important I think than we can describe the various faces of the differing tiers. When I’m talking about Tier 1, I’m talking about those nations that currently have the capability to create and build nuclear weapons not simply possess them.

Are you including this as a "known" fact? If so, I'd be interested in seeing your source for it.

As to my statements “The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).” & Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.”

Rensselear, L., “Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy”, Updated October 22, 2002, CRS

Page 2 “ …Nevertheless, concerns remain that more investment by itself will not translate into increased effectiveness against serious proliferation episodes, especially those organized by well-placed nuclear insiders and corrupt officials in response to a lucrative offer from states or groups of concern.”

Page 6 “The diminished economic circumstances of Russia’s nuclear workers were in themselves a source of proliferation concern. In addition, the lifting of Communist political controls, the opening of borders and the ushering in of a market economy made the potential theft and sale of nuclear materials both thinkable and possible. The result was an emergent traffic in radioactive substances of various descriptions, some of which found their way into international smuggling channels.”

Page 7 “Yet literally hundreds of thefts of radioactive substances have occurred at nuclear enterprises and industrial installations across the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. Traffickers in such materials have looked for buyers abroad – mostly in Europe, where radioactive seizures are commonplace.”

Page 12 “Also, the case can be made that aspiring nuclear states prefer to manufacture fissile ingredients of atomic weapons independently rather than pursuing the risky and difficult course of acquiring them abroad. Hence, their purchasing strategies focus on the means of production. For instance, Iran’s attempts to obtain gas centrifuge enrichment and laser isotope separation technologies from Russia have been well-publicized."

Page 22 “Difficulties arise in trying to monitor the effectiveness of U.S. programs in deterring or stopping nuclear smuggling from the NIS. The GAO has noted, with respect to the MPC&A programs, that “DOE has not established a means to systematically measure the effectiveness of the security systems that it has installed at Russian nuclear sites.” Measures of effectiveness are not the same as measures of performance.”


In a nutshell you don’t have to worry about the Iranians getting the knowledge, skills and abilities, they can just import the talent from people who already have the skills. It is also likely that the raw materials are not only available but that those who have them are not motivated to keep fissionable materials out of the Iranians hands. That being said the literature suggests that if the Iranians really wanted a nuclear weapon they might only have to ask. It was mentioned earlier in a thread about soviet missiles suddenly showing up. It is almost impossible to stop proliferation unless there is a better option provided to the rogue state.

I'm sorry, but the logic of your last statement has escaped me. How do you make the jump from your personal opinion that it's inevitable that Iran will one day possess nuclear weapons to declaring all discussion on that point "moot"?

As to my statement “Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb. Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.”

If you have a hypothesis all things being equal, and you have another hypothesis at least one thing is not equal. I only need one contrary example. We have a situation where a perfect storm is required to keep proliferation from occurring. One small chink in that armor and we lose that point. I only need one example to nullify the hypothesis (refute).

I can certainly agree on the need for more facts. And I look forward to reading your reply to my above-mentioned points before I concede your point about "jumping to testing and refuting before you're ready".

I think we’re worried about the wrong things. On the one hand nuclear is the method to break the beast of foreign oil. Nuclear is the cleanest energy in modern PBR systems. In comparison to coal nuclear looks like free energy. Situations like the drought in Atlanta could be solved by nuclear energy desalinating seawater and providing almost limitless water to the reservoirs of Atlanta. Texas is looking at adding 25 nuclear reactors ASAP. Europe is creating more nuclear facilities.

The specter of [url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1662889.ece=nuclear floating power plants[/url] and the security risks of fissionable materials of any grade making it into the chains of crime are staggering.

As many articles in the literature say the nuclear genie is out of the bag. As I say the politics of high handed political machismo will no longer work to stop proliferation. The very concept and foundations of small wars follow the uncorking of that genie in the restricted warfare aspects that follow the nuclear age.

Agree or disagree I think if we examine the facts and we have looked at just a set of them non-proliferation was a great idea but it is “moot” as a policy point now.

[JeffC]

Johnson, C., “Nuclear Weapons: Disposal options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium". 1997 CRS

This address Plutonium disposal, not the technical requirements of completing a nuclear fuel cycle, which was my point. It's not as simple as simply buying the plans for a P2 centerfuge, as some have inferred, for example. If you're interested in debating the availability of Russian stockpiles, that might make for an interesting new topic and thread on its own, but I think it's off-topic for the subject of this thread.

[JeffC]

As I said the fuel already exists and is available but how in the heck would it get here, there, or somewhere that we don’t want it?

How available it is, is debatable. If it was so easy to get, why haven't we seen, at a minimum, the use of a dirty bomb by any terrorist groups?

I’m saying that somebody in this thread, the NIE, or publicly available literature has said any of the following statements within the context of the original post.

OK, then it's a mix of fact and opinion. I'm not sure how much value that offers the discussion, though.

When I’m talking about Tier 1, I’m talking about those nations that currently have the capability to create and build nuclear weapons not simply possess them.

OK, now I see what you mean't by "Tier one". I mis-understood.

As to my statements “The materials, machinery, knowledge, skills, and capabilities will not forever elude the Iranians (or any entity so wishing the big boom).” & Weapons grade materials may be on the weapons black market already from a variety of resources.”

Rensselear, L., “Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy”, Updated October 22, 2002, CRS

Thanks for the reference. That looks interesting. However, my query as to your source was for your statement "Refinement processes and tolerances for a device are vastly understated in most intelligence materials."

In a nutshell you don’t have to worry about the Iranians getting the knowledge, skills and abilities, they can just import the talent from people who already have the skills.

It is also likely that the raw materials are not only available but that those who have them are not motivated to keep fissionable materials out of the Iranians hands. That being said the literature suggests that if the Iranians really wanted a nuclear weapon they might only have to ask. It was mentioned earlier in a thread about soviet missiles suddenly showing up. It is almost impossible to stop proliferation unless there is a better option provided to the rogue state.

And yet, even though this has been a long-standing goal of Iran for fifty plus years, they have yet to achieve it thanks to a variety of factors, and pending final verification by the IAEA. Which implies that either the Iranians don't want it (does anyone really believe that?) or that it's not nearly so easy to get as your evidence suggests.

As to my statement “Add to that or refine those statements of "fact" or conjecture as you will. We can the hypothesize that A) The Iranians will get the "a" bomb, B) The Iranians will not get the "a" bomb. Personally I can't make a case for "B" at all. Therefore all conjecture over the "when" is moot.”

If you have a hypothesis all things being equal, and you have another hypothesis at least one thing is not equal. I only need one contrary example. We have a situation where a perfect storm is required to keep proliferation from occurring. One small chink in that armor and we lose that point. I only need one example to nullify the hypothesis (refute).

So you're equating the "all things being equal" hypothesis to your statement that Iran will get the A bomb? If so, you have yet to prove that statement true. As I said earlier, Iran has not achieved that goal in over 50 years. That doesn't portend well for the arguments that it's both easy and inevitable.

Agree or disagree I think if we examine the facts and we have looked at just a set of them non-proliferation was a great idea but it is “moot” as a policy point now.

You can have nuclear power reactors for energy use without creating nuclear weapons. There are 30 nations that currently have nuclear power for energy. The 9 that have nuclear weapons (and in WIDELY varying amounts) don't make the case that it's an all or nothing proposition. In fact, just the opposite is the more reasonable and apparently likely scenario.

[Stan]

Although I don't fully agree with this article, F. B. Smith, Santa Rosa, Calif. and Miles Pomper (Editor, Arms Control Today) strike some interesting points. Some of their assumptions would have me worried sick if one of the two ever went into office (far too 'right from center' as a former SWC member opined for my 'too left from center' politically-charged American lifestyle)

The thoughtful commentary by ex-CIA chief and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger regarding the National Intelligence Estimate's stunning reversal on Iranian nuclear proliferation is right on the mark ("Stupid Intelligence on Iran," op-ed, Dec. 19).

As Mr. Schlesinger points out, it's well known that it's a short, easy path from uranium enrichment (the hard part) to an operable nuclear weapon (the easy part -- it's just a simple pipe bomb). Thus Iran continues full-bore developing the hard part right under our noses.

If President Bush can't overcome the NIE's intelligence "estimates," his hands will effectively be tied, leaving it solely up to Israel to challenge Iran's nuclear weapons capability.

I agree with much of the thrust of what James Schlesinger wrote in his commentary. The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear programs -- and even more so the press coverage of that assessment -- did not give sufficient weight to the danger posed by Iran's uranium enrichment program (nor its missile programs I would add) in its narrow emphasis on an apparent 2003 halt in Iran's weaponization activities.

However, Secretary Schlesinger is inaccurate and misleading in his analysis of the factors that may have led to Iran's 2003 decision.

Much more at the link...

[Galrahn]

What evidence is there to support that theory? What's required to be in place and operating (technical details please) in order for your prediction to occur?

It isn't really a prediction as it is an observation. All indications point to Iran appearing to be remarkably patient.

My observations on the particulars of what we have heard have been shaping my perspective. It is theory, I do not have 'special insight' on this subject.

1st, it was stated in the NIE that the Iranians stopped working on thier weapon program in 2003. Many people jumped on this information to imply the Iraq invasion was the reason Iran ceased its weapon program.

However, it was also in 2003 that the IAEA got wind of the AQ Khan connection, we just didn't hear about it publicly until 2004. From what we gathered from the Lybians, AQ Khan delivered just about all the technical knowledge needed for weaponization, meaning Iran could afford to suspend military research at that time having achieved all discoveries necessary until such tmie they were in possession of the physical capabilities.

That would lead to centrifuges, enrichment, and other activities all of which are legal and part of a civilian nuclear program. I for one am not worried about the LW reactor Iran is partnered up with Russia on, in fact I'd question if Iran wanted a weapons program at all if they were building all LW reactors.

It is the work on the heavy water reactor near Akak, and the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz that concerns me. That is the part of the program that represents the next step if you were building from the data supplied by AQ Khan, and btw, despite our objections, both are legal.

The way I see it, the civilian program can carry the Iranians almost to the finish line if they indeed got everything we suspect the recieved from AQ Khan. They have no reason to take chances with the IAEA or US right now, because everything they are doing is both legal and required before the next steps of weaponization.

Their patience is what I find remarkable. At this rate, they can finish all the challenging aspects of their nuclear program legally, in front of our face, and leave themselves months away from a nuclear weapon.

[JeffC]

It isn't really a prediction as it is an observation. All indications point to Iran appearing to be remarkably patient.

My observations on the particulars of what we have heard have been shaping my perspective. It is theory, I do not have 'special insight' on this subject.

1st, it was stated in the NIE that the Iranians stopped working on thier weapon program in 2003. Many people jumped on this information to imply the Iraq invasion was the reason Iran ceased its weapon program.

However, it was also in 2003 that the IAEA got wind of the AQ Khan connection, we just didn't hear about it publicly until 2004. From what we gathered from the Lybians, AQ Khan delivered just about all the technical knowledge needed for weaponization, meaning Iran could afford to suspend military research at that time having achieved all discoveries necessary until such tmie they were in possession of the physical capabilities.

I think that you're conflating what the Khan network sold to Libya with what it sold to Iran. From the evidence I've read here and here, Iran only purchased old P1s and plans for P2 centerfuges. Eventually, Iran will cooperate with the IAEA and we'll know for sure what the state of those centerfuges are. My guess is that the P1's are a mess, and the P2's were never successfully built.

[Stan]

The way I see it, the civilian program can carry the Iranians almost to the finish line if they indeed got everything we suspect the recieved from AQ Khan. They have no reason to take chances with the IAEA or US right now, because everything they are doing is both legal and required before the next steps of weaponization.

Their patience is what I find remarkable. At this rate, they can finish all the challenging aspects of their nuclear program legally, in front of our face, and leave themselves months away from a nuclear weapon.

Technically speaking, I'm having a hard time with "months away" from a weapon. Mathmatically, going from 3.62% to 90% enriched uranian is exactly how long when they do not have the right equipment or ability to accomplish said ?

We need a rocket scientist on the board

[selil]

Technically speaking, I'm having a hard time with "months away" from a weapon. Mathmatically, going from 3.62% to 90% enriched uranian is exactly how long when they do not have the right equipment or ability to accomplish said ?

We need a rocket scientist on the board

The guys not far off thinking months: (link)

1 megawatt-day (thermal energy release, not electricity output) of operation produces 1 gram of plutonium in any reactor using 20-percent or lower enriched uranium; consequently, a 100 MW(t) reactor produces 100 grams of plutonium per day and could produce roughly enough plutonium for one weapon every 2 months

[Stan]

The guys not far off thinking months: (link)

Thanks, Sam.

A bit of a long read, but seems to be just as much evidence for, as against.

The point of this discussion is, not to contend that a nuclear explosive device could not be made from reactor-grade plutonium, or that reactor-grade plutonium is unattractive for potential proliferants, but rather to note that the argument about the efficacy of reactor-grade plutonium has obscured the case for a more rigorous approach to plutonium having an isotopic composition much closer to that actually used in nuclear weapons.

No offense, but I'd like a member from the DOE to comment

[selil]

No offense, but I'd like a member from the DOE to comment

Good luck on that. I believe that would be Q-clearance stuff. You'll have to find it open source.

[JeffC]

The guys not far off thinking months: (link)

Good find on that summary article for Plutonium production. From the same article comes this clarifying section :

Reactors are generally purpose-built, and reactors built and operated for plutonium production are less efficient for electricity production than standard nuclear electric power plants because of the low burnup restriction for production of weapons grade plutonium.

The types nuclear fission reactors which have been found most suitable for producing plutonium are graphite-moderated nuclear reactors using gas or water cooling at atmospheric pressure and with the capability of having fuel elements exchanged while on line. Several distinct classes of reactor exist, each optimized for one purpose, generally using fuel carefully chosen for the job at hand.

This, of course, begs the question, what kind of reactor are the Russians building for Tehran at Bushehr?

From GlobalSecurity.org:

In January 1995, Russia and Iran signed a contract under which Russia would provide one VVER-1000 [aka WWER-1000] 950-1,073 MWe (electrical) light water reactor at Bushehr. The VVER-1000 reactor would be similar in configuration to Unit Four of the Russian Balakovskaya plant at Balakovo, Saratov. The Russian reactors will be installed in the original structures designed for the German 1,200-1,300 MWe reactors. Since the horizontal VVER-1000 steam generators are larger than the original German design, the project will require an enlargement of the existing reactor building, though the finished reactor dome will still resemble the German design.

Though Soviet-designed nuclear power plants differ from Western nuclear power plants in many respects, including safety systems -- only the VVER-1000 design has a containment structure like that of most nuclear power plants elsewhere in the world. Although it shares a basic engineering concept with its counterparts in the United States, France and Japan, the Soviet VVER pressurized water design is very different. VVER is an acronym for Vodo-Vodyannoy Energeticheskiy Reactor (water-cooled, water-moderated).

The VVER-1000 design was developed between 1975 and 1985 based on the requirements of a new Soviet nuclear standard that incorporated some international practices, particularly in the area of plant safety. The evolutionary design incorporates safety improvements over earlier VVER-440 Model V213 plants, including a steel-lined, pre-stressed, large-volume concrete containment structure similar in function to Western nuclear plants. Four primary coolant loops (providing multiple paths for cooling the reactor), each with a horizontal steam generator (for better heat transfer), this design is more forgiving than Western plant designs with two, three or four large vertical steam generators.

This type of reactor, a Light Water reactor, is one of the least efficient ways of producing weapons-grade Plutonium and, in fact, doesn't produce the correct type of Plutonium anyway.

Simply put, the reactor at Bushehr is the wrong kind of nuclear reactor for producing weapons-grade fissile material. It will produce the wrong kind of plutonium (all uranium-fueled nuclear reactors produce some plutonium as a byproduct, but only one isotope is desirable for weapons). It can be operated only in the wrong way with regard to yielding plutonium, and it is the wrong kind of reactor as well, in the sense that a facility such as Iran's is easily amenable to close surveillance, not lending itself at all to any covert diversion—of even the wrong kind of plutonium.

This isn't to say that Iran shouldn't be closely monitored. It should be. Nor am I suggesting that Iran doesn't want nuclear weapons. They've wanted them for a very long time. The only point that I'm hoping to make with this information is that the facts do not support a rapid development path towards acquiring nuclear weapons. A lot of very tough obstacles have to be overcome, and a lot of eyes, including those of Iran's neighbors in the Middle East, are watching to ensure that that doesn't happen.

[JJackson]

A less rosy view of the difficulties of making a bomb using Pu239 with significant Pu240 contamination. If you are in no great hurry you could just wait Pu240 has a shorter half-life (you will need to be patient thought - allow 10,000 years or so depending on starting isotope mix).

(from Appendix 2 of http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.u...trikeswork.pdf )

The use of plutonium produced in a civil nuclear-power reactor to
fabricate nuclear weapons

In a civil nuclear reactor, generating electricity, plutonium is inevitably produced. Reactor-grade plutonium
(R-Pu) will generally consist of 60% of the isotope plutonium-239, 24% plutonium-240, 9% plutonium-241
and 1% plutonium-238. Plutonium produced in plutonium-production reactors - used to produce
plutonium specifically for nuclear weapons (W-Pu) - will generally consist of at least 93% of plutonium-239
and less than 7% plutonium-240.
Eminent and highly competent physicists, with extensive knowledge of the characteristics and production
of nuclear weapons such as Richard L. Garwin,41 Theodore Taylor, J. Carson Mark, Harold M. Agnew,
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and Michael M. May have stated that effective nuclear weapons can be
fabricated from reactor-grade plutonium.
Carson Mark, the head of the Theoretical Division at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for many years, stated:
“The difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward type are not appreciably
greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to be met for the use of weapons-grade plutonium”.42
The US Department of Energy has also warned about the weapon-usability of R-Pu,43 as did Hans Blix when
he was Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.44
In fact, as Matthew Bunn of Harvard University explained at an International Atomic Energy Agency
conference in Vienna in June 1997, it may actually be easier for a terrorist group or a small country to make
a nuclear weapon from R-Pu than from W-Pu because no neutron generator would be required to initiate
the explosion.45 A neutron from spontaneous fission of Plutonium-240 would initiate it instead.
A major difference between reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium is that the critical mass
(the minimum amount needed to sustain a fission chain reaction and produce a nuclear explosion) of a
bare sphere of R-Pu is thirteen kilograms compared with ten kilograms for W-Pu (both for alpha-phase metal
with a density of 19.6 grams per cubic centimetre). This means that about 30% more R-Pu is needed
than W-Pu to fabricate a nuclear weapon.
Iran’s experiments with plutonium
If plutonium is produced in the heavy water reactor planned at Arak and used to produce nuclear weapons,
it will be necessary to chemically separate the plutonium from the irradiated reactor fuel elements. Similarly,
if Iran decided to use plutonium produced in the Bushehr nuclear-power reactor in nuclear weapons, it would
need to separate the plutonium from the unused uranium and fission products in the fuel elements.
Therefore, the experiments performed by the Iranians in plutonium separation are significant.
The Iranian government acknowledged to the IAEA that it irradiated uranium dioxide targets with neutrons
in the Tehran Research Reactor and subsequently chemically separated the plutonium produced in the targets.
According to the Iranians, only a small amount of plutonium was separated.
Removing plutonium from spent reactor fuel elements (known as reprocessing) is straightforward chemistry.
The elements are very radioactive and adequate shielding against radiation is required. The PUREX (an acronym
standing for plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction) process is the standard chemical method for
reprocessing. Unused uranium, plutonium, and fission products are separated from each other and
from the fission products.

Edit: Sorry about the formating when cut and pasted. Please read from the original .pdf - whole document is worth reading. N.B. Obviously predates the start of shipments of 103 tonnes of fuel to Bushehr which would have serious implications for any kind of airstrikes.

[JJackson]

What I should also have mentioned from the same report

If operated to generate electricity, the Bushehr reactor will produce about 250 kg of plutonium per year. If diverted for military use, this amount of Plutonium would be enough to build between 40 and 50 nuclear weapons a year. There would be enough plutonium in four irradiated fuel assemblies to produce a nuclear weapon.

[JeffC]

What I should also have mentioned from the same report

What your quote doesn't show are the footnotes for those statistics. Here's the quote from the .pdf that you cited with the footnotes intact (in parens):

The Bushehr reactor will use low enriched uranium (about 3.5%in uranium-235) as fuel. The core of the reactor will hold about 103 tonnes of uranium contained in 193 fuel assemblies. If operated to generate electricity, the Bushehr reactor will produce about 250 kg of plutonium per year.(19) If diverted for military use, this amount of plutonium would be enough to build between 40 and 50 nuclear weapons a year.(20) There would be enough plutonium in four irradiated fuel assemblies to produce a nuclear weapon.(21)

Now all three of those footnotes are attributed to the same source, which is "Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions" by Henry Sokolski and Patricia Clawson, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

I found that document on the Net, and it includes language like the following: "Too much has been made of the difficulty of reprocessing light water reactor (LWR) fuel, especially by a country with Iran’s industrial base." And that's in the opinion of Henry Sokolski, former Bush 41 appointee and military aide to Dan Quayle, as well as a visiting scholar at the Heritage Foundation. In other words, he's not a nuclear physicist, nor does he have a degree in science. He has an M.A. from the Univeristy of Chicago, and he's clearly writing with an agenda.

This is a complex subject. I'd be happy if more people would just recognize that and not be too hasty in jumping to conclusions about what Iran can do, or will do with a technology that even the experts can disagree about.

[Watcher In The Middle]

just technical, they are mostly economic. Got to be able to afford it. That's why this article is so extremely interesting (and the timing is even more so):

Inflation Fuels Anger Toward Ahmadinejad
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI – 2 days ago

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — A sharp rise in inflation has provoked fierce criticism of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — not only from his reformist opponents, but also from senior conservatives who helped bring him to power but now say he is mismanaging the economy.

Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a populist agenda promising to bring oil revenues to every family, eradicate poverty, improve living standards and tackle unemployment. Now he is being challenged for his failure to meet those promises.

Reformists and even some fellow conservatives say Ahmadinejad has concentrated too much on fiery, anti-U.S. speeches and not enough on the economy — and they have become more aggressive in calling him to account.

In a rare gesture, Ahmadinejad admitted last week that inflation existed but blamed it on his predecessors, the conservative-dominated parliament, state-run media and bank managers who misused their power and printed too many bank notes.

"Inflation has its roots in the past," Ahmadinejad said in a televised speech.

His comments were denounced from all sides, with economists and some fellow conservatives saying it is his policies that have led to higher prices.

Ahmadinejad's critics point out that more than 80 percent of Iran's government revenues come from crude exports and that inflation has risen under him despite sharp increases in oil prices to near $100 per barrel currently.

The growing discontent comes less than three months ahead of crucial parliamentary elections slated for March 14.

Hard-line conservatives gained control of the parliament in the February 2004 elections after the country's constitutional watchdog barred thousands of reformists from running. But in local municipal elections a year ago, the president's allies suffered a humiliating defeat after a majority of the seats were won by reformists and anti-Ahmadinejad conservatives.

Central Bank of Iran figures for November showed prices of basic commodities and services rising at a 19 percent while overall inflation is running at a 16.8 percent rate annually — double the pace it was when Ahmadinejad took office in 2005. But independent economists and experts put the inflation rate well above 30 percent.

Link

You see a news article like this one, it's a "Message sender" in every sense. It's a real simple one - "It's the economy, stupid".

If you are an oil producer (Iran) who is flying flat out producing at $100 per Bbl., and you've got these type of inflationary economic problems due to self-inflicted runaway currency issues, you are cruising for unbelievably serious problems down the road (because economic conditions are unlikely to improve from where they are currently), and spending boatloads of cash on a nuclear program isn't helping.

I'm wondering if this article isn't the lead act in a play by the power structure to "explain" to President Ahmadinejad that he's had his time tweaking the "Great Satan" and all the Western power establishment, but ok, that's done, and now it's time to get back to internal business or he's gone.

From the above article:

...government increased liquidity, or the amount of money in circulation, from $72.3 billion in 2004 to $148.9 billion...

Btw, if those are real numbers on the money supply for Iran, that's just nuts. That's huge problems, and doing it in just 36 months.

[Ron Humphrey]

just technical, they are mostly economic. Got to be able to afford it. That's why this article is so extremely interesting (and the timing is even more so):



Link

You see a news article like this one, it's a "Message sender" in every sense. It's a real simple one - "It's the economy, stupid".

If you are an oil producer (Iran) who is flying flat out producing at $100 per Bbl., and you've got these type of inflationary economic problems due to self-inflicted runaway currency issues, you are cruising for unbelievably serious problems down the road (because economic conditions are unlikely to improve from where they are currently), and spending boatloads of cash on a nuclear program isn't helping.

I'm wondering if this article isn't the lead act in a play by the power structure to "explain" to President Ahmadinejad that he's had his time tweaking the "Great Satan" and all the Western power establishment, but ok, that's done, and now it's time to get back to internal business or he's gone.

From the above article:


Btw, if those are real numbers on the money supply for Iran, that's just nuts. That's huge problems, and doing it in just 36 months.

but I got a huge feeling there is going to be a lot more than him changing in the near future, and watching those who most ardently supported him in the recent past; distance themselves may be a key give away on what and how that change will happen.