Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[JJackson]

JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined. The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country. The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.

I have one - an agenda that is - and it is to attack claims that make it look as if Iran is either close to developing a weapon, or a particularly great danger if it had one. I personally am far more concerned about Israel and the US being nuclear powers than Iran joining the club. For those reading my posts in the future it may be helpful to know I think the five original nuclear 'haves' are in breach of the NPT for failing to move towards disarmament fast enough, not being willing to share technology with states they have ideological problems with while helping non signatories who they view as friends (India). Furthermore were I Iranian I would want to develop a nuclear weapon as I would not trust the US & allies not to attack my country on false charges - a la Iraq - and would view nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent against a country with overwhelming conventional might and a doctrine of the use of preemptive force. Fear of the US, and its long term intentions, is also the reason I have reversed my view that my country (the UK) should not replace its deterrent.

This is a complex subject. I'd be happy if more people would just recognise that and not be too hasty in jumping to conclusions about what Iran can do, or will do with a technology that even the experts can disagree about.

[Ron Humphrey]

JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined. The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country. The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.

I have one - an agenda that is - and it is to attack claims that make it look as if Iran is either close to developing a weapon, or a particularly great danger if it had one. I personally am far more concerned about Israel and the US being nuclear powers than Iran joining the club. For those reading my posts in the future it may be helpful to know I think the five original nuclear 'haves' are in breach of the NPT for failing to move towards disarmament fast enough, not being willing to share technology with states they have ideological problems with while helping non signatories who they view as friends (India). Furthermore were I Iranian I would want to develop a nuclear weapon as I would not trust the US & allies not to attack my country on false charges - a la Iraq - and would view nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent against a country with overwhelming conventional might and a doctrine of the use of preemptive force. Fear of the US, and its long term intentions, is also the reason I have reversed my view that my country (the UK) should not replace its deterrent.

I would like to respond in as elegant a style as you have in your post I'm afraid I would just flub it up and in the process lose whatever point I might be trying to make.

That said; How would you define agenda

And then in relation to that exactly which counterpoints would you offer to substantiate your opinion that there would not be any danger of Iran possessing nuclear weapons.

I may be mistaken but it seems somewhat hard to understand how proliferation is something which should be important enough for the original five "Haves" as you put it to be required to have followed through on disarming yet the statement that with or without for a country (IRAN) which has not and by most world leaders standings should not have one comes out.

I do confuse easily however so if you could lay it out in laymans, assistants terms

(NOTE: even Irans "friends" and most of their neighbors don't want them to have it)

[JeffC]

JeffC, firstly thanks for chasing down the footnotes and I would wholeheartedly agree that we all should be very careful about agendas on everything and particularly on anything to do with Iran.

You're welcome, although it isn't always an "agenda" that's at fault. It might just be faulty evidence (which is a lot harder to spot).

On the whole I liked the Oxford groups report and found it very un-neocon and the main block in my first post about Plutonium contamination seemed to be using nuclear physicists as its source (although I am not in a position to judge their academic credentials or politics) the second post with the dubious providence was to give an indication of how much Pu might theoretically be recovered from a Bushehr LWR if Iran were that way inclined.

As Stan pointed out several times, we really need a nuclear physicist to help sort out theory from fact, and fact from opinion.

The point I would take from all of this is that once Iran, or any country, has a working nuclear reactor and a reasonably advanced industrial base if they wish to withdraw from the NPT and join the club they are free to do so and the only thing that can stop them is a war of aggression by another country.

I'm of the camp that believes that Tehran is essentially a rational actor and will bow to global economic pressure. Any military action performed against Iran will be a LOSE-LOSE for everyone involved due in part to the global economic repercussions of closing the Straits of Hormuz, as well as hostile counter-actions by China (who I don't believe would support any military strike against Iran except in the most extreme circumstances).

The thing I find most worrying is not that the Oxford group quoted a US Army report but that a US Army report included assessments of reactor nuclear isotope yields based - and their weapons potential - on a non-scientist political appointee; now that really is scary.

I don't think I'd consider an SSI report as an official U.S. Army doc. They solicit articles from civilians and academia, according to their website.

I have one - an agenda that is

Well, I'd probably call that your opinion rather than your agenda. As posters, we all have opinions, but we don't all have agendas. I could be wrong in my definition, but I typically ascribe an agenda to someone who has an ulterior motive where they profit or benefit in some way.

[Surferbeetle]

All,

I offer a couple of websites for your reading pleasure (and make no claims what-so-ever about them) .

Hopefully this one is not so out there (www.fas.org, nuclear weapons tab, resources tab )....

http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?...Desc=Resources

Global Security, good on some things, however......

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...-airstrike.htm

Hmmm.....

http://pundita.blogspot.com/2007/12/...-official.html

[JJackson]

That said; How would you define agenda?

Ron:

Mea culpa. If you are feeling charitable you might accept I was employing poetic licence as I shifted the meaning between "we all should be very careful about agendas" (Political) and "I have one - an agenda that is" (Business - list of things to be discussed). Although my meaning may fall between the two in that I would like to discuss these things because I am unhappy with some of the more hawkish views I have seen and want the issues aired.

On the proliferation issue I wish to be quite clear, I do not want Iran to have the bomb; in-fact I don't want anyone to have one. My problem is that I would like the US, UK & the other original 'haves' to occupy the moral high ground, lead the way to disarmament and not create an environment which leads to proliferation. I do not think this has been occurring; on the contrary I believe US foreign policy is having exactly the opposite affect and is the cause of massive destabilisation and uncertainty globally with attendant pressure on non nuclear states to go nuclear. The UK is a minor player but has disastrously pandered to the US's wishes giving a veneer of legitimacy when it should have fought hard against the US. The US/EU3 position is hypocritical and without justification under the NPT. By singling out Iran, basically because we have a historical beef, when we do not hold other nations up to the same standards we weaken the treaty and our position. The US is trying to get sanctions against Iran and the existing sanctions have already caused havoc to their economy. They have been threatened with military action and still are by Israel. Yet Israel is widely accepted to have a bomb and are threatening to attack Iran just for the suspicion they may try and follow suit yet they are not under an economic blocked. Ignoring the niceties of international law, which is moot if you don't have the muscle to enforce it, there is no natural justice in the US's position. Until the US, and its allies, at least attempt to implement international treaties in an evenhanded manner - or if they can't manage that at least be a little less blatantly partisan - there is no hope for the NPT or much else in terms of global stability. The US's military supremacy is letting it get away being a global bully.

So to answer the question 'How would you offer to substantiate your opinion that there would not be any danger of Iran possessing nuclear weapons.' I don't think there would be 'no danger' I just don't think there would be any more danger than that posed by Pakistan, Israel or the US. I have selected those three as examples as of the existing nuclear states I would view as being no greater threat than Iran. I have no reason to believe Iran would view a bomb as an offencive weapon, I would expect it to feel safer as it would act as a deterrent to the US and Israel. Israel I fear as it seems quite comfortable projecting its military might into other states territory, it is also sufficiently paranoid to feel it needs to use its weapons early if it was not getting things all its own way. Pakistan I fear because it has a long term enemy in India that is beyond it militarily and industrially capacity to match conventionally and the US because it has tactical nuclear weapons and seems to believe that accepted norms in international law and behaviour do not apply to it.

Jeff:

I am in complete agreement with your assessment of Iran's intentions and the chances of anything 'good' emerging from a military intervention. As to the nuclear physics; it isn't all that complicated as physics or chemistry for that matter. Where it all gets murky is as engineering. Setting aside the question of intention most of the questions regarding Iran's capabilities resolve around how close they are to solving engineering problems like keeping their cascades operating and increasing their efficiency. The real question is IMHO to do with intentions; they can eventually workout the technical problems. If all else fails they could just keep the existing Natanz cascades running until they had enough HEU, everything else is to do with time. The aim should be not to keep threatening them and boxing them into a corner so they feel they need a bomb.

[Surferbeetle]

JJ,

I too wish that people and countries would just do the ‘right thing’. However we as humans have been happily running around wacking each other over various juicy scraps since Australopithecan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australopithecus ) days and I foresee no changes to this strategy of ours. Our collective history documents that the victors of our conflicts continually use ‘better’ clubs and tactics.

If we were to accept that humans are hard wired to find and exploit resources, I think we can construct a resource centric model (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm ) which predicts that future actions in the Middle East (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_east ) and the Caucasus Region ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus ) will continue to be driven by the needs of the Great Powers. This is not to say that other resource rich parts of the world ( http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0406/feature5/ ) do not merit the same model, I am just limiting things to our general geographical area of discussion. ***The map link towards the bottom left of the National Geographic website is one that helps me to get a scale of things***

Nuclear war is certainly a deterrent to the actions of the Great Powers. Various authors do a better job of assessing and addressing this than I can, so I will list a few that have caught my eye. Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (www.amazon.com ) is one I continually come back to, with his question of whether America can “…preserve a reasonable balance between the nations perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments…” Lawrence Freedman in the book Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age makes a strong statement with his observation that “…the nuclear strategist had still failed to come up with any convincing methods of employing nuclear weapons should deterrence fail that did not wholly offend common sense…” Robert D. Kaplan evidences a good grasp of our continual drift towards entropy in his book The Coming Anarchy.

As an engineer I prefer systems with the least amount of variables and moving parts possible. As a solider I note that ‘effective leadership’ in times of chaos is a rarity. As a student of history I note that periods of stability allow for mankind to make improvements in his condition.

Pandora’s box has been opened; my vote is for non-proliferation and a balance of power. That opinion and five bucks will get you a latte.

Cheers,

Steve

[Stan]

Head of IAEA to visit Iran in attempts to clear up questions about Tehran's nuclear past

VIENNA, Austria: The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency will visit Tehran this week in attempts to add momentum to his agency's investigation of Iran's past nuclear activities and to seek additional knowledge of present programs, the IAEA said Monday.

IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei will visit Friday and Saturday "with a view of resolving all remaining outstanding issues and enabling the agency to provide assurance about Iran's past and present activities...

There has been growing impatience on the part of the U.S. and its allies about the pace of the IAEA's probe into Iran's past nuclear programs.

But diplomats accredited to the agency, who demanded anonymity because their information was confidential, told The Associated Press recently that the agency had run into unspecified obstacles, and that Iranian officials were now talking about March as the new deadline — something they said the United States and its allies would be unlikely to accept.

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 31 Jan 08: Iran's Nuclear Programme: As The Enrichment Machines Spin On

If you are locked eyeball to eyeball with an adversary as wily as Iran, it does not make much sense to do something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends. But that, it is now clear, is precisely what America's spies achieved when they said in December that, contrary to their own previous assessments, Iran stopped its secret nuclear-weapons programme in 2003.

Iran's jubilant president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, immediately called the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) a “great victory” for his country. Subsequent events suggest that he was right. Western diplomats are despondent and international efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium and working on plutonium have been thrown into confusion.

Already difficult diplomacy has got harder. The steadily pumped up pressure that led to two United Nations sanctions-bearing resolutions, in December 2006 and March 2007, calling on Iran to suspend the offending work, suddenly deflated. Unprecedented, if grudging, co-operation from Russia and China at the UN Security Council had been about to lead to a third, tougher resolution. But the NIE produced an abrupt softening in the positions of the Russians and Chinese. The draft America, Britain, France and Germany had to settle for when all six foreign ministers met last week in Berlin is a feebler one, designed to shore up their fraying unity rather than set Iran quaking in its boots.....

[Watcher In The Middle]

...Just isn't selling.

"Wonderland" (Washington, DC) doesn't care, and doesn't care to care. Imagine a whole bunch of arms control types sitting by the side of the road with a busted limo wailing to high heaven, saying "Yes, we are still important".

Now, add to the chorus, all the European types who were critical every step of the way saying "Those crazy Americans, who knows what they will do". Well, now it's "Where are the Americans?"

Real Simple: We are back home, and it's back to politics as usual (mostly domestic politics, with a little bit of Iraq, and maybe some China). And unless there's a dramatic change, it will be that way all the way through March, 2009 (confirmation hearings).

Bottom Line: The 2007 NIE "solved" Iran's nukes issues until it doesn't. Iran's going to have to "prove" one way or another where they are going, but any substantive changes in any direction regarding Iran are going to be on the shelf.

The Economist article reminds me of a rejoinder saying "America, get back in the game, but this time, do it our way". Hate to drop it to them, but the US pols aren't at all interested, and are unlikely to be anytime soon. The 2007 NIE settled the issue for them, as far as they are concerned.

For the pols to get concerned again, Iran is going to have to prove that the 2007 NIE is flat out wrong in it's assessments. Nitpicking on bits & pieces here and there in the 2007 NIE isn't going to do it. And anyway, why would Iran want to prove that the 2007 NIE is wrong?

[Stan]

Iran General Staff fear U.S. attack while Bush in power

"The threat from the U.S. has existed ever since the Islamic Revolution in Iran [in 1979]. And the threat only got worse during the Bush presidency era," the General Staff said in a statement.

"While Bush is in power, that is throughout 2008, U.S. military action against the Islamic Republic is still likely..."

Russia concerned over Iran's work to develop long-range missile

Russia is concerned over Iran's attempts to develop a long-range ballistic missile following the recent launch of a research rocket into space...

Losyukov said the test demonstrated the advances the Islamic Republic had made in ballistic missile technology that "raise suspicion towards Iran about its possible desire to create a nuclear weapon."

Long-range ballistic missiles are generally designed to deliver nuclear weapons because their payload is too limited for conventional explosives to be efficient. They have a range of 2,500-5,000 kilometers (1,600-3,100 miles).

"Long-range missiles are one of the components of such a [nuclear] weapons system. Naturally, this raises concern," he said.

Iran says space program poses no threat to peace

A spokesman for Iran's government gave assurances on Tuesday that the country's achievements in space technology and research pose no threat to peace and stability in the world.

Gholam-Hossein Elham's comments come a day after Tehran's successful launch of the Explorer-1 research rocket, which is reportedly capable of carrying a satellite into orbit, and the unveiling of the country's first domestically built satellite, named Omid, or Hope.

"The launch of the Explorer rocket into space was conducted strictly for scientific purposes," the spokesman told a news conference in Tehran. "Our achievements in space research, as well as our progress in nuclear research, serve peace and justice."

Iran's official news agency IRNA said the Omid advanced research satellite was designed to operate in a low earth orbit and provide a variety of scientific data. It may be launched by March 2009.

[Galrahn]

Stan, it is noteworthy I learn about that news here instead of flashed all over google news or drudge.

As I look back on the NIE, I find that it delivered more than what was in the writing. I observed the testimony of the writer the other day who didn't expect the public consumption reaction and would have preferred a more serious tone, but all that really tells me is that the spooks haven't taken their eye off the ball.

I don't know if the change in tone between the US and Iran was intended or not, but from my POV the most important aspect of the NIE in the sphere of public consumption was to change the tone between the US and Iran so public rhetoric doesn't interfere with private discussion. If that was an intended side effect of the NIE release, well done.

[JJackson]

The great thing about the unclassified NIE summary was its brevity and that it got the coverage that it did. Agenda based Op-eds and think-tank reports were able to stir up near hysterical fear about Iran's capabilities and intentions but the NIE was able to re-focus the discussion based on reality - or at least the intelligence communities best estimate of same. The brevity meant there was a much greater chance of the document being accessed by a wider public; the more usual access being via second hand media interpretation with selected quotes. People seem rarely to read original documents these days despite the internet making so many of them available, they will spend much longer watching news on, or reading the analysis of, something like an IAEA report or Kyoto protocol than it takes to read the documents.

[Stan]

Stan, it is noteworthy I learn about that news here instead of flashed all over google news or drudge.

As I look back on the NIE, I find that it delivered more than what was in the writing. I observed the testimony of the writer the other day who didn't expect the public consumption reaction and would have preferred a more serious tone, but all that really tells me is that the spooks haven't taken their eye off the ball.

I don't know if the change in tone between the US and Iran was intended or not, but from my POV the most important aspect of the NIE in the sphere of public consumption was to change the tone between the US and Iran so public rhetoric doesn't interfere with private discussion. If that was an intended side effect of the NIE release, well done.

Would have to agree with you, Galrahn. I spend more time reading here than most news sources. I have a few favorites, but none with the scope, depth and experience herein.

This blog, Sources and Methods came recommended and must admit, I liked the refreshing change and/or point of view.

[Jedburgh]

WMD Insights, Feb 08:

Iran’s First-Generation Chemical Weapons Evaporate, as Certainty Declines in U.S. Intelligence Reports

....The assessment that Iran possessed a secret CW stockpile and was seeking to enhance its quantity and quality through the acquisition of technical knowledge, precursor chemicals, and process equipment from abroad was regularly reinforced by new revelations of Iranian imports of dual-use chemicals and process equipment. The fact that the significance of these imports and attempted purchases depended on the presumed existence of a covert CW program was frequently overlooked. Since 2003, however, the U.S. intelligence community has progressively reduced the scope and certainty of its claims regarding an Iranian CW program, and U.S. officials have made fewer references to the existence of such a program. This shift in publicly stated assessments appears to have gone largely unnoticed and there has been little change in the judgments and assessments of members of Congress, NGOs, or private think tanks on the issue.

The primary objective of this essay is to outline the changing public statements of U.S. intelligence agencies regarding Iran’s CW program. Several possible explanations for the changes will be offered and some tentative conclusions drawn. At this time it may be difficult or impossible to draw firmer conclusions about the changes without access to classified intelligence assessments and records of the internal debates associated with the preparation of the unclassified public documents and statements. Although biological and chemical weapons are often discussed together, for the sake of clarity, this article will confine itself to CW assessments and will not address changes in assessments of Iran’s biological warfare activities and intentions.....

[Jedburgh]

IMINT & Analysis, 20 Feb 08: Iranian Missile Silos

There has been a great deal of recent open-source reporting dealing with a purported missile site near Tabriz in northwestern Iran. While these reports may or may not be true, they have all failed to note the presence of another missile facility in the region. The difference is that this facility can be identified with much greater certainty: this facility houses Iran's first missile silos.....

[JJackson]

While his report to the board has not been released into the public domain ElBaradei has done a Q & A which can be found at the link below.

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Multi...208/index.html

[Jedburgh]

While his report to the board has not been released into the public domain....

Here's the report, dated 22 Feb 08:

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

[Stan]

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - The working group of the Luxembourg International Conference on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe held its first meeting in Moscow.

... attended by Russian and American experts on nuclear non-proliferation and devoted to Iran's nuclear program.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has elevated it to the rank of national priority, and it has already become a global headache.

Why does Tehran need its own uranium-enrichment program if Iran's uranium ore deposits are so scarce? They are sufficient for providing a limited amount of enriched uranium for research, but this is about all. Moreover, any nuclear reactor exported to Iran can only use the fuel of the supplier country.

So, why does Iran need enriched uranium?

There are more serious grounds to assume that Iran has been consistently trying to acquire nuclear weapons. For example, it is stepping up the production of medium- and long-range missiles. Why would Iran need carriers with a range of 2,000 km-6,000 km, if it cannot equip them with nuclear warheads? Using one warhead against area targets is simply absurd if it is conventional rather than nuclear.

Experts reviewed all potentialities of this carrot-and-stick policy.

Experts also considered another option - perhaps it is time to recognize that Iran is a nuclear power. In this case, Iran will have to join relevant international agreements, the world community will closely watch it, and apply to it completely different deterrents.

In the next few days, the Luxembourg forum will publish its Moscow proposals on Iran's nuclear file for the UN Security Council.

[JJackson]

Moreover, any nuclear reactor exported to Iran can only use the fuel of the supplier country.

So, why does Iran need enriched uranium?

This seems a very strange statement. Why is a nuclear reactor only able to burn fuel supplied by the country that built it? If it were true I would have thought someone (IAEA,EU or US) would have pointed out that Iran's self-sufficiency arguments were fatuous before now and arguments based on the logic of building long range missiles would not be needed.

[Stan]

Hmmm, could it be something so minor as measurements in inches versus metrics, or is our fuel something like high octane being pumped into a Russian Lada

This recent article points to potential problems with Westinghouse selling Ukraine fuel rods, and even leads the reader to believe our fuel rods may be inferior to that of Russia's

Ukraine’s nuclear authorities are playing with fire

Although diversification is a noble goal, the operation of nuclear power plants is highly complicated. Safety alone should encourage Ukraine to use nuclear fuel for which its nuclear power plants were designed, i.e. fuel made in Russia.

Khusein Chechenov, a member of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee on nuclear energy, said, “It was a political decision taken without due regard for economic or scientific considerations.”

According to him, the contract is a mistake made deliberately to spite Moscow.

Westinghouse’s fuel assemblies are 25% more expensive than those provided by Russia’s TVEL Corporation and their quality is questionable.

Experts say that the use of Westinghouse assemblies in Russian-made reactors will considerably increase the risk of an accident at the Yuzhnoukrainsky nuclear power plant.

Finland has recently decided to continue buying Russian fuel for its Russian-built reactors and declined Westinghouse’s offer, and the use of American fuel at the Temelin plant in the Czech Republic nearly caused an accident. Accordingly, Czech authorities have decided to use Russian technologies despite political considerations.

The management of the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary entrusted the cleaning of fuel assemblies at its second block to the French-German company Framatome ANP. The use of an “alien” technology resulted in the malfunction of 30 fuel assemblies and almost caused an accident. The Hungarian authorities called on Russian specialists for help, who managed to remedy the situation only three and a half years later.