Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[Entropy]

This seems a very strange statement. Why is a nuclear reactor only able to burn fuel supplied by the country that built it? If it were true I would have thought someone (IAEA,EU or US) would have pointed out that Iran's self-sufficiency arguments were fatuous before now and arguments based on the logic of building long range missiles would not be needed.

My understanding is that most who sell reactors stipulate a fuel-supply agreement as well because it brings in a continuous stream of revenue over the long term.

As for Iran's self-sufficient arguments, they have been brought up many times. Iran has very poor uranium reserves which will be exhausted within a couple of decades. Some DOE scientists wrote a paper on the economics of Iran's nuclear program, a summary of which can be found here.

[JJackson]

My understanding is that most who sell reactors stipulate a fuel-supply agreement as well because it brings in a continuous stream of revenue over the long term.

As for Iran's self-sufficient arguments, they have been brought up many times. Iran has very poor uranium reserves which will be exhausted within a couple of decades. Some DOE scientists wrote a paper on the economics of Iran's nuclear program, a summary of which can be found here.

Researchers from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory issued the report, The Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, in March. It examines Iran’s nuclear program and alternative energy investments strictly on their economic merits.

And there in lies the problem.
If you are living in an unfettered global market place and can pop out and buy what you need when you want this kind of analysis makes sense. In the Shah’s time Iran lived in this world and bought the worlds toys, as the Saudis do today. We bought their oil and they bought our oil extraction and refining technologies, nuclear reactors and weapons. Dump the tyrant and become an Islamic state and you have a problem no spare parts and all that investment leaves you with a half built German reactor, lots of shiny military hardware you can not use to the full when Iraq attacks – because you can not repair or replace – and an oil industry that’s aging hardware needs sanctioned spares. Iran’s solution – DIY. Build up your Universities, engineering capacity do as much as you can in house. This is a nation that is building their own fighter jets and does not want to be beholden to the whim of any external power if it can avoid it. The memory of the Iraq war is burned deep; self sufficiency is a matter of national security and both the US and Iran seem willing spend what ever it takes where that is concerned.
As to ore reserves even if they are not going to be self-sufficient indefinitely they will be long enough to settle the ‘is all this aimed at building a bomb’ debate and after that there are plenty of countries they can buy from - assuming sanctions are lifted or circumventable. If they get totally stuck we have some very nice second hand kit just up the road from me including reprocessing facilities and a fast breeder reactor (Sellafield).

[Stan]

I got to wonder if there's anything more to this than future energy deals as Entropy points out. Smoke and mirrors ?


Westinghouse wins Ukraine fuel supply deal

The new contract includes special terms to protect both the supplier and the buyer, national electricity utility Energoatom. Should Energoatom fail to gain regulatory approval for the use of Westinghouse fuel assemblies on a large scale, the American firm could terminate the contract with no penalty. On the other hand, if Westinghouse failed to meet technical standards, Energoatom could cancel.

In reaction to the announcement, Russia's Rosatom released a series of expert comments which roundly denounced the move. The various dignitaries agreed the contract was technically dubious and could be a negotiation tool during talks between Energoatom and TVEL for the remainder of nuclear fuel supplies. Furthermore they linked it to Ukraine's relationship with the European Union and its desire to join the Nato defence pact.

Chechenov Hussein, a member of the Russian Federation Commission on Natural Monopolies' subcommittee on atomic energy, said such contracts 'will bring Ukraine more harm than good.' He continued: 'I think this is a political decision not backed by economic and scientific considerations. The operation of a nuclear power plant involves the use of sophisticated, interconnected technology which can not introduce anything foreign.'

[Stan]

A quick and revealing read. It would appear that Iran is a long way from doing anything that would produce electricity, yet alone weapons grade materials.

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor

In the USA, reactor builders have not been awarded a single new contract since 1973 that was not subsequently cancelled. In Western Europe - with the exception of France - reactor builders waited a quarter of a century before receiving a contract for a new plant in 2004. Now they have one at Olkiluoto in Finland.

Almost half of these projects have been plodding along for 18 to 30 years now. As far as a number of them are concerned, no one believes they will ever generate electricity - in fact, the normal term for such projects is "abandoned". The remaining plants that are expected to be completed in the near future are almost all in East Asia, and are being built under conditions that have little or nothing to do with a market economy. In short, the order situation for nuclear power plants is calamitous. All the more so when one considers the competition.

The decades of decline in the nuclear power industry have by no means come to a halt. There is a single new construction site in the USA and Western Europe combined, namely on the Baltic Sea coast of Finland. This site is treated in more detail below.

The major drawback of these studies is that they convince no one except their authors and publishers - and certainly not potential funders of new plant projects. This is the main reason for the unprecedented degree of uncertainty about what exactly a new generation of nuclear power plants would cost.

Hardly any reliable data is available on the large cost blocks, especially construction, waste disposal and decommissioning, or for that matter on operations and maintenance. One reason for this is because analysts greet nearly all published estimates with a high degree of scepticism. After all, these figures generally come from vendors seeking to build power plants, who therefore tend to set their estimates on the low, rather than high, side or from governments, associations and lobbyists trying to sway reluctant public opinion by holding out the incentive of supposedly low electricity costs.

[Entropy]

Well, there are more reasons than just economic for fuel supply agreements. Since most of the world's fuel supply comes from the 5 nuclear-weapons-states, they want to control the fuel because of proliferation concerns. All such agreements include provisions for return of spent fuel to the providing country. Additionally, historically there have been few nations with the capability to produce fuel that is economically competitive. This is beginning to change, though we'll have to see what happens when the massive Russia-Kazakh project comes online and floods the market.

As for Iranian self-sufficiency that is the perception Iran would like to project, but it's not quite the reality. For example, Iran is not building it's own fighter jets, it's taking old jets and modifying them.

Personally, I find it strange that Iran is pouring billions of dollars into nuclear infrastructure while it imports gasoline - spending a fifth of its income on those imports along with gasoline subsidies. If the price of oil were to precipitously drop, Iran would face a true energy crisis as it could no longer pay for imports and subsidies as well as all the other aspects of government funding. If the US wants "regime change" it might try to get oil back down to $30 a barrel for 4-5 years and watch the Iranian economy implode.

[Stan]

From The Economist print edition - Is there still time for a miracle?

MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, Iran's ebullient president, enjoys a boast. He particularly likes to crow on what he calls national nuclear day: the anniversary of the first production two years ago of low-enriched uranium to fuel yet-to-be-built civilian nuclear reactors. (That is Iran's description; others suspect weapons intent.)

Meanwhile, Iran hopes to convince the world that pressing for suspension of enrichment is pointless. Two retired American diplomats, William Luers and Thomas Pickering, agree. They propose instead helping Iran's enrichment effort, in a sort of joint venture, in the hope that inspectors may keep better track of the uranium that way. But teaching Iran the (militarily useful) enrichment skills it still lacks hardly seems the way to build confidence that its nuclear work is peaceful.

In any case, though Iran suggests it is racing ahead, the first 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz have not worked that well. The new ones can spin up to three times faster but will be tricky to operate. Between the NIE report, which reduced any temptation by America to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, and these technical problems, may there be time for diplomacy?

Meanwhile Israel, most threatened by Iran's rockets and claimed nuclear prowess, has just had its first “strategic dialogue” with Britain; talks with America have intensified. Despite the diplomatic activity, for Israel the clock still ticks.

[Stan]

Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Senate Finance Committee

Pros and Cons of S970

The merit of the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act is that it is designed to tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran for refusing reasonable compromises over the nuclear issue and to encourage other major international players to do the same. The bill recognizes the reality that only a broad set of diplomatic, political and economic measures – imposed by a wide coalition of states – has any hope of changing Iranian behavior.

Iran’s development of a nuclear enrichment capability will, in all honesty, be difficult to prevent. But I believe the only way to halt or even limit it involves presenting Iran with an enhanced set of incentives and disincentives to change its cost-benefit analysis of the issue. Some of the measures in the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act (S970) help to advance this goal in constructive ways. I do have reservations, however, about some aspects of the bill (addressed below) and would urge Congress to be particularly careful about measures that could divide the international community or lead to legal challenges from U.S. allies or partners. A major legal clash with allies – at the World Trade Organization or elsewhere – over efforts to contain Iran would divide the international community and undermine, rather than bolster, the recent progress made towards strengthening multilateral sanctions.

Efforts to increase the price Iran must pay for pursuing this program – which is the worthy objective of S970 – remain the best option, largely because all the other options are so bad. Acquiescing to Iran’s activities without responding would tilt Iran’s cost-benefit analysis of building a nuclear weapon in favor of doing so.

The policy option at the other end of the spectrum – military force – is equally unpalatable. Targeted U.S. air strikes probably could destroy many of Iran’s critical nuclear facilities and set back the program for a number of months or years. But U.S. intelligence about Iran is far from perfect, and even the known elements of the Iranian program are dispersed at multiple sites around the country, protected by extensive air defenses, often located near civilian areas, and sometimes buried under thirty feet of dirt and reinforced concrete. Air strikes against the nuclear program, therefore, would not be “surgical” but rather widespread, sustained, and likely to kill a number of Iranian civilians.

Much more at the link...

[marct]

A rather useful page on sources of uranium and fuel production is available here. The distribution of Uranium production is quite interesting.

[Entropy]

Yeah, that's a good chart, but it doesn't address enrichment so only tells part of the story. Most power reactors use LEU and so require uranium enrichment. A list can be found here - scroll down to the relevant section. For example, Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia are the three biggest uranium suppliers, but none of them have enrichment or fabrication facilities to make the LEU fuel most of the world uses. One of Russia's goals is to become the largest fuel supplier and to achieve that it recently penned a deal with Kazakstan to enrich Kazakh uranium in a new facility in Russia for export, primarily to the third world. If and when it's completed as planned, it has the potential to increase world supply by almost 10%.

[bourbon]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA, 26 May 2008. (PDF)

F. Summary

26.The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

27.The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme. Iran has agreed to address the alleged studies. However, it maintains that all the allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.

28.The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions, which remain outstanding. Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension. Iran’s responses to the Agency’s letter of 9 May 2008 were not received until 23 May 2008 and could not yet be assessed by the Agency. It is essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications and access outlined in this report without further delay. It should be emphasised, however, that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

29.Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP and the installation of both new cascades and of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR–40 reactor.

30.The Director General urges Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including the Additional Protocol, at the earliest possible date.

31. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

[Ron Humphrey]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA, 26 May 2008. (PDF)

Thanks for posting it

I think this part is interesting too

26.The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

(emphasis added)

Has the agency been able to verify anything to do with any NON-declared nuclear material?

[JJackson]

while I have not read it all yet it seems much like the previous ones and they are being pressed to account for the 'plans' supplied by an anonymous source which they claim are fabricated. Either they are lying or an unfriendly intelligence service is muddying the waters how do you tell which?

Ron have you any reason to believe they have any non-declared nuclear material?
Would the US like to prove they have no aliens at area 51 (and never have had)?

[Ron Humphrey]

while I have not read it all yet it seems much like the previous ones and they are being pressed to account for the 'plans' supplied by an anonymous source which they claim are fabricated. Either they are lying or an unfriendly intelligence service is muddying the waters how do tell which?

Ron have you any reason to believe they have any non-declared nuclear material?
Would the US like to prove they have no aliens at area 51?

Anyone who wants can come see 51, ( the key is will you really remember if you saw anything by the time you leave.

Something about us and toys we just gotta play with them

on the other matter ,
I like poker, Do you like poker
only one thing that gets my gander like nothing else and thats cheaters .
We got a guy who comes to play every week for a while and always does real well, problem is one night he gets caught with an Ace up his sleeve.
Well you can guess he wasn't invited next time.

Now if he wants to play with us again the likelihood that we require him to prove that he isn't hiding any cards is gonna be about 230%

[JJackson]

but I wondered is it Iran who has been telling fibs and western intelligences agencies that are pure as the driven snow, or the other way around or is it just possible that neither are above a little skulduggery? Sorry all obviously MI6, the CIA or Mossad would be incapable of doing anything underhand (being on the good-guy team) so it must be Iran.

[Ken White]

All of the above. So?

[Entropy]

Has the agency been able to verify anything to do with any NON-declared nuclear material?

From both a technical and legal sense the IAEA is only able to definitively verify the absence of non-declared material when the additional protocol (AP) to the NPT is in force. Iran has signed but not ratified the AP and is currently not implementing it, though it did for about two years from 2004-2006.

The crux of the situation is that acceding to the AP is ultimately voluntary since it's not part of the NPT. IOW, Iran cannot be forced to adopt the AP. However, the Agency cannot fully clear Iran of its past deception without implementation of the AP along with some additional transparency measures the Agency has continually asked Iran for, so there is an impasse.

[Steve Blair]

All of the above. So?

Concur. C it is. And that and $1.25 or so will buy you a crappy cup of overroasted Starbucks coffee....

[Entropy]

but I wondered is it Iran who has been telling fibs and western intelligences agencies that are pure as the driven snow, or the other way around or is it just possible that neither are above a little skulduggery? Sorry all obviously MI6, the CIA or Mossad would be incapable of doing anything underhand (being on the good-guy team) so it must be Iran.

That depends on what you mean by underhanded. As I noted above, there is currently a legal dispute over exactly what Iran is required to do to account for its past clandestine activities. Most countries are on the US side, but not everyone.

When the MEK-supplied laptop came into the hands of US intelligence, I was initially skeptical and questioned it's provenance. However, the latest IAEA report shows the laptop is not the only source of information on Iran's weaponization activities (emphasis added):

16. At follow up meetings in Tehran on 28–30 April and 13–14 May 2008, the Agency presented, for review by Iran, information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project (See Annex, Section A). This included information which Iran had declined to review in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, paras 35, 37–39 and 42). This information, which was provided to the Agency by several Member States, appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent. The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.

Iran has claimed all along the information on the laptop was fabricated, but if there are multiple sources from multiple member nations pointing the same direction, then that damages the fabrication argument.

[JJackson]

Ken the 'so' is we are already fighting one war because Iraq could not prove a negative and I don't want to go there again. I took Ron's post to imply they were not declaring materials (sorry Ron if it was not your intention to sow that seed of doubt) which I wanted to challenge. If anyone has evidence great, else show me the aliens.

[JJackson]

That depends on what you mean by underhanded. As I noted above, there is currently a legal dispute over exactly what Iran is required to do to account for its past clandestine activities. Most countries are on the US side, but not everyone.

When the MEK-supplied laptop came into the hands of US intelligence, I was initially skeptical and questioned it's provenance. However, the latest IAEA report shows the laptop is not the only source of information on Iran's weaponization activities (emphasis added):



Iran has claimed all along the information on the laptop was fabricated, but if there are multiple sources from multiple member nations pointing the same direction, then that damages the fabrication argument.

I had noticed that but had assumed that if the evidence was fabricated the fabricators would be reasonable competent and the documents would look credible and would be 'found' by various sources preferably not only by those who seemed to want to pick a fight with Iran anyway. The ability to leak convincingly seems to be in most governments skill sets. I have no clearance so I am never going to see the documents so it is all down to trust and as mine has been abused before so I am looking for a smoking gun this time around.