Forthcoming National Interest Article on COIN

[SteveMetz]

The editor butchered it.

[Ken White]

note your interesting corollary of flawed COIN efforts and our flawed cities.

The linkage that occurs to me is the US Congress...

[Gian P Gentile]

Ditto to what Ken said; very good piece.

I especially liked it because it places limits on what American military power can realistically accomplish. This is an especially important point for policy makers to consider.

But ref the other thread on Coin I still disagree with your premise that we should treat, when we do get involved in them, counterinusrgency wars as something other than war. I think that in so doing this you actually make it easier for policy makers to violate the analysis that you provide in this article because by telling people that it is not war but something else it somehow creates the idea that people wont die and it will be easy.

[Ken White]

. . .
...I think that in so doing this you actually make it easier for policy makers to violate the analysis that you provide in this article because by telling people that it is not war but something else it somehow creates the idea that people wont die and it will be easy.

Particularly since, from a national perspective, I suspect we are generally unwilling to support the length of time, political dexterity and depth of commitment required to prevail (as Steve does point out)...

And COIN is never easy; relatively simple as conflicts and the TTP go; yes. Easy; No, never.

[Ron Humphrey]

The editor butchered it.

I like the article overall and I can buy most of it.

I do have a question though about your statement regarding concerns of interference or puppetry by other large interests being unfounded or not having come to fruition.

Although it's true the whole world didn't go communist on us during the cold war there was quite a bit a expansion which was of issue, Right?

Also can we really say today that if we're not involved someone else won't get involved instead?

[SteveMetz]

I like the article overall and I can buy most of it.

I do have a question though about your statement regarding concerns of interference or puppetry by other large interests being unfounded or not having come to fruition.

Although it's true the whole world didn't go communist on us during the cold war there was quite a bit a expansion which was of issue, Right?

Also can we really say today that if we're not involved someone else won't get involved instead?

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

[Ron Humphrey]

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

If we look at South America wasn't the whole thing certain groups of leaders going after other groups of leaders in order to forestall expansion?
I'm afraid to go to much into detail considering I don't remember where I read what and when

I can go with the premise of establishing precedence to bring more bite to our bark though

[SteveMetz]

If we look at South America wasn't the whole thing certain groups of leaders going after other groups of leaders in order to forestall expansion?
I'm afraid to go to much into detail considering I don't remember where I read what and when

I can go with the premise of establishing precedence to bring more bite to our bark though

But in Latin America we eschewed massive direct involvement in counterinsurgency. We provided fairly significant counterinsurgency support. I have no problem with that. What I take issue with is reaching the conclusion that if a partner regime is not able to manage and execute a counterinsurgency campaign on its own, we'll come in and do it for them. What I'm suggesting is that a regime that is too incompetent or unpopular to defend itself is a bad bet. What we tend to do is demonize the insurgents so as to convince ourselves that this bad bet is worth making.

[Ron Humphrey]

But in Latin America we eschewed massive direct involvement in counterinsurgency. We provided fairly significant counterinsurgency support. I have no problem with that. What I take issue with is reaching the conclusion that if a partner regime is not able to manage and execute a counterinsurgency campaign on its own, we'll come in and do it for them. What I'm suggesting is that a regime that is too incompetent or unpopular to defend itself is a bad bet. What we tend to do is demonize the insurgents so as to convince ourselves that this bad bet is worth making.

I would think we're pretty much in agreement then.
Honestly I'm pretty sure the plans were never to go in and do what we are doing now, but you make a mess you have to clean it up, and any time there is major change in a countries leadership there is going to be a mess.

The overarching concern you have may be somewhat a moot point in the long run but I guess considering politics and its ability to screw things up it's probably good to get out the no-go recommendations ahead of time

[Granite_State]

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

But isn't "failed states" the new "WMD", the thing we're supposed to be most scared of? It's certainly become the main justification for why we're still in Iraq.

[Rank amateur]

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

Nice to see my thoughts expressed by someone people might actually listen to. We might want to add, "Bomb the hell our of your palaces, party headquarters, army, secret police etc." Since new regimes will understand the US reluctance to take causalities, they are much less likely to call our bluff if we threaten bombing which we can do without causalities.

Phrased differently, we need a strategy of "tough love."

Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?

[SteveMetz]

Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?

Funny thing (well, not I mean funny like I'm a clown, not like I amuse you, I make you laugh) but I was just writing a section on that. I was arguing that President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."

But here's what I tried to suggest: our conundrum is that to get the public and Congress to support involvement in counterinsurgency in the first place, we have to overstate the threat and the extent of American interests. Americans don't want their sons and daughters dying for something that is peripheral. That then limits our strategic flexibility because it creates the impression that disengagement would be disastrous. It would be a defeat.

To me, that is just one more reason why the United States is ill equipped to undertake major counterinsurgency operations. My solution is that we no longer "do" counterinsurgency, but we do peace enforcement/stabilization. Two strategic and political advantages of that: it makes it easier to disengage when the costs exceed the expected benefits (while Clinton's withdrawal from Somalia and Reagan's withdrawal from Lebanon may, as commonly believed, give al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and others the impression that the United States can be influenced by terrorism, they were probably the right moves). So long as we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war, that means that one side (the side we support) is "right" and the other is "wrong." Americans don't like ties.

Second, casting the activity as peacekeeping/stabilization rather than counterinsurgency (with its Cold War overtones) will make it easier to attract multinational support.

[selil]

.....President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."

Steve are you actually Al Gore? I'm listening to "Assault on reason" on my 2 hour commute each way to school. He said almost those exact words... eeery. No moral or political value attached just scary.

[Rank amateur]

Funny thing (well, not I mean funny like I'm a clown, not like I amuse you, I make you laugh) but I was just writing a section on that. I was arguing that President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."

But here's what I tried to suggest: our conundrum is that to get the public and Congress to support involvement in counterinsurgency in the first place, we have to overstate the threat and the extent of American interests. Americans don't want their sons and daughters dying for something that is peripheral. That then limits our strategic flexibility because it creates the impression that disengagement would be disastrous. It would be a defeat.

To me, that is just one more reason why the United States is ill equipped to undertake major counterinsurgency operations. My solution is that we no longer "do" counterinsurgency, but we do peace enforcement/stabilization. Two strategic and political advantages of that: it makes it easier to disengage when the costs exceed the expected benefits (while Clinton's withdrawal from Somalia and Reagan's withdrawal from Lebanon may, as commonly believed, give al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and others the impression that the United States can be influenced by terrorism, they were probably the right moves). So long as we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war, that means that one side (the side we support) is "right" and the other is "wrong." Americans don't like ties.

Second, casting the activity as peacekeeping/stabilization rather than counterinsurgency (with its Cold War overtones) will make it easier to attract multinational support.

As a marketing guy, this positioning makes sense. Am I correct in assuming that you're focused on countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan?

[Ken White]

Nice to see my thoughts expressed by someone people might actually listen to. We might want to add, "Bomb the hell our of your palaces, party headquarters, army, secret police etc." Since new regimes will understand the US reluctance to take causalities, they are much less likely to call our bluff if we threaten bombing which we can do without causalities.

I think that the "US reluctance to take casualties is restricted to about a third of the population -- the most visible and vocal third, to be sure -- and that they are joined in this concern only on occasion and that occasion is whne the casualty causing effort is either taking too long (Steve's three years, my two...) or is obviously not doing well. The remaining third is comfortable with the casualties.

I'd like to suggest that the respective 'thirds' are immutably the same people but they are not. A great deal of objection is ideology based. Look no further than Kosovo and Iraq, respectively, to see who goes to which third.

Apply that rule of thumb to any war we've ever been including the current efforts and you see the American people will accept massive casualties if results are being produced; if there are no good results in their belief then the tolerance starts to slip. You can even review the domestic history in WW II -- after the summer of '44, tolerance for the war started downward precipitously.

As a corollary and an aside, that same two years (or three) applies to those fighting; after a couple of years, it gets really old. That really need to be considered. Troop run down or wear out can have really adverse consequences...

Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?

Just by leading and accepting that 30% will ALWAYS exist; that's been true in every war from the American Revolution forward (again to WW II -- the nation was not as unified on that as many now like to believe). The key is not that 30%, it's the 30% in the middle, the swing vote as it were. As long as they see 'progress' of a sort, they will vary from 'tolerate' to 'support' and that gives the Admin of the day about 60%. That's enough for government work.

All that does not even address the chimera of "bomb" -- that just flat doesn't work, it NEVER has (the Serbs in Kosovo didn't start coming undone until the KLA was in on the ground). That aspect of Air Power (a power which I support and respect) is a very dangerous myth -- as the Israelis found out last year.

[Rank amateur]

(the Serbs in Kosovo didn't start coming undone until the KLA was in on the ground). That aspect of Air Power (a power which I support and respect) is a very dangerous myth -- as the Israelis found out last year.

You make two important points.

1. Finding someone else to be the boots on the ground works extremely well. (Even Rumsfeld couldn't screw up the first few weeks in Afghanistan.)

2. I agree that for certain tasks, soldiers are absolutely necessary, but Hezbollah hasn't launched an attack into Israel since the war which supports my point: if the objective is deterrence, a ground war isn't always necessary. (With all the work Hezbollah has done rebuilding, they don't want it all destroyed again over minor disagreements and airpower can easily destroy bridges, buildings etc.)

[Ron Humphrey]

I think that the "US reluctance to take casualties is restricted to about a third of the population -- the most visible and vocal third, to be sure -- and that they are joined in this concern only on occasion and that occasion is whne the casualty causing effort is either taking too long (Steve's three years, my two...) or is obviously not doing well. The remaining third is comfortable with the casualties.

I'd like to suggest that the respective 'thirds' are immutably the same people but they are not. A great deal of objection is ideology based. Look no further than Kosovo and Iraq, respectively, to see who goes to which third.

Apply that rule of thumb to any war we've ever been including the current efforts and you see the American people will accept massive casualties if results are being produced; if there are no good results in their belief then the tolerance starts to slip. You can even review the domestic history in WW II -- after the summer of '44, tolerance for the war started downward precipitously.

As a corollary and an aside, that same two years (or three) applies to those fighting; after a couple of years, it gets really old. That really need to be considered. Troop run down or wear out can have really adverse consequences...



Just by leading and accepting that 30% will ALWAYS exist; that's been true in every war from the American Revolution forward (again to WW II -- the nation was not as unified on that as many now like to believe). The key is not that 30%, it's the 30% in the middle, the swing vote as it were. As long as they see 'progress' of a sort, they will vary from 'tolerate' to 'support' and that gives the Admin of the day about 60%. That's enough for government work.

All that does not even address the chimera of "bomb" -- that just flat doesn't work, it NEVER has (the Serbs in Kosovo didn't start coming undone until the KLA was in on the ground). That aspect of Air Power (a power which I support and respect) is a very dangerous myth -- as the Israelis found out last year.

I've been thinking something along those lines but couldn't get it together in my head to write down.

[slapout9]

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

Steve, Colonel Warden gave almost that exact speech during the workshop on SMART Wars. This is somewhat the basis of his decapitation strategy. The Air Force and the Army should get drunk togather and eat some of your BBQ and I think they might find out that their thinking is not always as differant as people assume.

[Ron Humphrey]

Steve, Colonel Warden gave almost that exact speech during the workshop on SMART Wars. This is somewhat the basis of his decapitation strategy. The Air Force and the Army should get drunk togather and eat some of your BBQ and I think they might find out that their thinking is not always as differant as people assume.

Does this come down to what we can do vs will do and concern oevr who will make that decision?

[slapout9]

Ron, I think that has a lot to do with it.