Forthcoming National Interest Article on COIN

[SteveMetz]

Isn't this highly likely to lead to anarchy/failed state/growing extremism and other undesirable consequences?

Probably but what I was suggesting was that adverse effects of becoming mired in an internal war are often worse that the undesirable consequences of state failure. I think we have accepted the notion that failed states are this huge threat without really thinking it through.

Look at it this way--which would pose a greater danger to the United States: Somalia the way it is today or a major U.S. military presence trying to stabilize Somalia? Contrast that with Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

So in that sense it's a valid comparison.

However, we did have a very real national interest at stake in a forceful response to the Airplane drivers. The failures of Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton to properly respond to a series of totally typical Mid Eastern based probing attacks against the US or its interests for 20 straight years prior to the workup by said airplane drivers almost unarguably led directly to that attack in 2001.

Thus we're in Afghanistan because it was in the national interest even if being in the country, per se, is not in the national interest.

Thus, I suggest it is not a totally valid comparison.

[SteveMetz]

So in that sense it's a valid comparison.

However, we did have a very real national interest at stake in a forceful response to the Airplane drivers. The failures of Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton to properly respond to a series of totally typical Mid Eastern based probing attacks against the US or its interests for 20 straight years prior to the workup by said airplane drivers almost unarguably led directly to that attack in 2001.

Thus we're in Afghanistan because it was in the national interest even if being in the country, per se, is not in the national interest.

Thus, I suggest it is not a totally valid comparison.

I think there are times we need to intervene, but it doesn't necessarily follow that we should stay and try to fix things that are bad broke. We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy. It would be a mental adjustment for Americans because we have this obsession with relatively quick and decisive resolution to security problems. Well, I think we need to get over that. The places that are the most trouble today are so screwed up that fixing them just isn't worth the effort.

And, on the Afghanistan issue, let the record show that October 2000, I wrote the op ed which I've attached. It was rejected at 11 newspapers and hence never published.

[Ken White]

press ran screaming out of their buildings when it appeared.

Pity it didn't get published.

I think there are times we need to intervene, but it doesn't necessarily follow that we should stay and try to fix things that are bad broke.

I agree. That's why I shuddered when Powell made the alleged pottery barn comment. My solution is that we break things well, let's stick to that -- don't go unless it's necessary, if it is, then go, destroy heavily and then leave, rapidly -- while dropping there lots of little cards that say "Now behave or we'll be back." Then mail the UN a check for the cleaning crew (okay, we need to do that in a softer, more cooperative and collegial manner but I'm trying to save space here with just the high points...).

...We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy. It would be a mental adjustment for Americans because we have this obsession with relatively quick and decisive resolution to security problems. Well, I think we need to get over that. The places that are the most trouble today are so screwed up that fixing them just isn't worth the effort.

Again agree but there are, I think, two problems. Both could be overcome with a little education, I believe. The first is that the western world believes -- and our opponents will use -- the pottery barn bit. The second is that so do many Americans. The second could be changed fairly easily for most Americans who cling to that model; simply point out the cost and ask them to do a cost-benefit comparison. There would still be a few who objected vociferously but not all that many. Americans as a collective are pretty pragmatic.

The first is a harder nut to crack. When you're the 800 pound gorilla, you don't get a lot of sympathy but I believe that if we state that will be the norm and the gradually ease into it over a few years (or incursions), it can fly. Certainly few if any are going to offer to help.

Now, all we need is ten years or so of foreign policy continuity...

Re: the places most screwed up; Yeah, and Tom Barnett isn't helping.

Everyone one of those places is where the Brits and French drew lines on the map -- and the NKVD /MVD / KGB worked on for years. I envision all these old retired spooks watching CNN in Ekaterineburg and chuckling a lot...

[tequila]

I envision all these old retired spooks watching CNN in Ekaterineburg and chuckling a lot...

Considering how many Russians died due to American weapons in Afghanistan, I'm pretty sure they are laughing very hard at our current troubles in the same place.

However, we did have a very real national interest at stake in a forceful response to the Airplane drivers. The failures of Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton to properly respond to a series of totally typical Mid Eastern based probing attacks against the US or its interests for 20 straight years prior to the workup by said airplane drivers almost unarguably led directly to that attack in 2001.

Conflating terrorist attacks from Iranian Shi'i revolutionaries, Shi'i Hizbullah fighters waging primarily a civil war, and various Sunni Islamist radicals into a some sort of singular "probing" is problematic at best.

My solution is that we break things well, let's stick to that -- don't go unless it's necessary, if it is, then go, destroy heavily and then leave, rapidly -- while dropping there lots of little cards that say "Now behave or we'll be back." Then mail the UN a check for the cleaning crew (okay, we need to do that in a softer, more cooperative and collegial manner but I'm trying to save space here with just the high points...).

That's what we tried to do in Afghanistan in 2001, except NATO got stuck with the bill instead of the UN. Doesn't seem to be really working that well.

We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy.

Steve - the Israelis don't seem to be doing particularly well with that strategy, beyond the fact that their strategic situation is completely different with our own. Constantly venturing forth to bust up enemies and leaving shattered countries in our wake is not a long-term strategy - it will only encourage, in the end, our enemies to strike from places they wish destroyed, watch as we do their work for them, and then recruit from the rubble. "Butcher and bolt" really didn't, in the end, work for the Brits in the NWFP - that's why they went to a "political agent" strategy at the end.

[SteveMetz]

Steve - the Israelis don't seem to be doing particularly well with that strategy, beyond the fact that their strategic situation is completely different with our own. Constantly venturing forth to bust up enemies and leaving shattered countries in our wake is not a long-term strategy - it will only encourage, in the end, our enemies to strike from places they wish destroyed, watch as we do their work for them, and then recruit from the rubble. "Butcher and bolt" really didn't, in the end, work for the Brits in the NWFP - that's why they went to a "political agent" strategy at the end.

Really? They're solvent. Not mired anywhere right now they don't want to be. As secure as can be expected considering they're surrounded by enemies.

See, the difference--and Steve Biddle kind of turned this light on for me--is we operate under the delusion that everyone except a few bad people likes us so we can, working through local partners, win "hearts and minds." The Israelis don't. That leads to very different conclusions about the appropriate strategy. I am more and more leaning toward the alternative.

[tequila]

Really? They're solvent. Not mired anywhere right now they don't want to be. As secure as can be expected considering they're surrounded by enemies.

See, the difference--and Steve Biddle kind of turned this light on for me--is we operate under the delusion that everyone except a few bad people likes us so we can, working through local partners, win "hearts and minds." The Israelis don't. That leads to very different conclusions about the appropriate strategy. I am more and more leaning toward the alternative.

Solvency is assisted when the U.S. provides a quarter of Israel's defense budget.

Not mired anywhere? Does this map look familiar?

And the whole "bust them up and leave" strategy looks decidedly less steady after the latest affray in Lebanon, when Hizbullah proved it could both take and land punches with the IDF.

The Israeli strategy also is predicated on what is, in essence, a reactive and defensive posture towards the region. Israel cannot directly influence any of its neighbors and has no pretensions to do so. The U.S., as strategic superpower, is economically and militarily involved with hundreds of nations and actors. Withdrawing from this into a Fortress America setup would require a massive institutional reset on the part of the U.S. and indeed a substantial cultural shift. It's hard to see this happening.

[Ken White]

Considering how many Russians died due to American weapons in Afghanistan, I'm pretty sure they are laughing very hard at our current troubles in the same place.

Uh, well, that was the point. That and all the other fault lines where few to no Russians died and we are today over-involved...

Conflating terrorist attacks from Iranian Shi'i revolutionaries, Shi'i Hizbullah fighters waging primarily a civil war, and various Sunni Islamist radicals into a some sort of singular "probing" is problematic at best.

Not at all as hopefully you'll find out in the ME. It is not a monolith but the methodology and the willingness to learn from the actions of others and piggyback on them -- or steal them outright is a long standing tradition.

That's what we tried to do in Afghanistan in 2001, except NATO got stuck with the bill instead of the UN. Doesn't seem to be really working that well.

Sure it is. Working out okay, that is. Some folks in NATO may not be doing their share but there's absolutely nothing new in that, been a problem since the inception. Afghanistan was always going to take an incredibly long time and a lot of effort simply because the start point was so low. Coming along better than I thought it would. Getting NATO involved was a good foreign policy effort on the part of the Admin.

Steve - the Israelis don't seem to be doing particularly well with that strategy, beyond the fact that their strategic situation is completely different with our own. Constantly venturing forth to bust up enemies and leaving shattered countries in our wake is not a long-term strategy - it will only encourage, in the end, our enemies to strike from places they wish destroyed, watch as we do their work for them, and then recruit from the rubble. "Butcher and bolt" really didn't, in the end, work for the Brits in the NWFP - that's why they went to a "political agent" strategy at the end.

Steve can of course answer for himself but I suggest that if you bust up a couple -- really bust them up, not just piddle around as we did in Korea and Viet Nam the message will take.

Said piddling contributed to our woes today; the folks in the ME saw it as a fatal weakness and their penchant is to take advantage of weakness. Couple those flawed wars with our failure to respond adequately to the probes from the ME and their perception was a nation in severe decline. We may be declining but it's not that severe. So far...

Also, if you'll note, the majority of the wars in which we've been engaged for the last 232 years got started because the opponents thought we either would not fight or would be easy to beat...

It's too late to apply that methodology to Afghansistan or Iraq, we have no choice but to continue there but war is not fun and games -- if it is going to be done, it should be done correctly. "Limited war" is a myth. Trying to be nice invariably kills more on both sides including civilians and causes more damage than just slamming in and getting it done. Invariably.

"Butcher and bolt" will not work against a group of non-state actors (as in the NWF) but it will work against nations. For the strategy Steve suggests and with which I agree for most -- not all -- cases and for those non-state actors, all that's required is an improved Intelligence and Special operations capability. We can do that; whether we will or not remains to be seen.

[Rank amateur]

If necessary, we go do that every few years.

I've never understood why no one says that we can reinvade Iraq if things truly go to hell following our withdrawal. At that point, more people might be willing to help too.

[Ken White]

few years and they'll tell you we can re-invade in a few years.

They'll also tell you that if we leave too early, we will have to do that and it will be far worse then than it is now if we have to go back...

All the comments from JJ and Walrus aside, we won't get any more help in the future than we did in the past. None except for the British and the Australians are putting anywhere near enough money into their Armed Forces -- and the British are dropping steadily -- why should they as long as we'll carry the load...

[Rank amateur]

we won't get any more help in the future than we did in the past.

I don't know about that. The Saudis would probably pick sides in a civil war. I believe we had less that 200 fatalities invading and about 3,600 occupying. The math seems fairly simple.

[Ken White]

I don't know about that. The Saudis would probably pick sides in a civil war. I believe we had less that 200 fatalities invading and about 3,600 occupying. The math seems fairly simple.

The basic problem with your comment is that the Saudi Army and National Guard are not strong on combat capability. That said, if they did and were in better shape in the future, would they be with us or agin us?

Math and war are a bad mix, should generally be avoided. Most 'metrics' have little bearing on the actual happenings and they prove little clarity. Particularly when as in the example you use where the time factor and the type of combat are discounted. Take the time period of the attack (officially 18 Mar to 1 May, 44 days) and any like period of the aftermath * and compare numbers. That isn't totally valid for several reasons but it's a far more valid comparison than is the one you cite.

I'd also note that those who predict a tougher fight if it has to be done again are talking about the invasion phase only...

Why would we invade and presume no post-invasion casualties? Are you now a convert the Steve's "Go in, break it thoroughly, then leave" strategy? Good!

* I say aftermath rather than "occupying" because while we may have been de jure occupiers in the eyes of many we haven't been effectively since the CPA stood down in June 2004 and absolutely not since the Maliki government stood up in May 2006. Not to mention that we have never been de facto occupiers, didn't have enough people to do that.

[selil]

None except for the British and the Australians are putting anywhere near enough money into their Armed Forces -- and the British are dropping steadily -- why should they as long as we'll carry the load...

I say this in jest but I just gotta say it.

Since having a big army is obviously so disrespected by the Europeans why not close our bases in Europe and bring our military home? Why should the United States be subsidizing security of Europe (European military welfare?).

The United States could spend that money saved on bigger aircraft carriers or some other more mobile form of force projection. We can sell the bases back, strip them, and let Europe worry about itself.

Yeah I know good luck on that.

[Rank amateur]

Are you now a convert the Steve's "Go in, break it thoroughly, then leave" strategy? Good!

It makes sense to me. Let the neighbors clean up the mess. If they screw it up, take two. And we wouldn't necessarily need to reinvade the entire country. Grab the oil fields: desert is good terrain for our conventional equipment. Shut off the flow of money to whoever is getting it. Make them do x, y and z if they want their oil royalties again. Or do whatever makes the most sense: no more "go in light" BS. Send enough forces to do the job, or scale back the job to fit the number of forces available.

[Ken White]

... Or do whatever makes the most sense: no more "go in light" BS. Send enough forces to do the job, or scale back the job to fit the number of forces available.

"Aye, there's the rub..."

The first option isn't available, the second won't solve the problem.

[Rank amateur]

"Aye, there's the rub..."

The first option isn't available, the second won't solve the problem.

Are we talking about the same problem? I thought the problem was we want to remove Person X, we don't really care what happens next.

[Ken White]

Are we talking about the same problem? I thought the problem was we want to remove Person X, we don't really care what happens next.

I thought we were talking about potentially having to go back to Iraq if we left too early; no issue of "remove person X" at all in my mind.

Removing persons is almost never a reason to invade anyone; it was'nt in either theater in WW II and it wasn't in Iraq -- Saddam's removal was a by product and political theater, little more.

[Rank amateur]

I thought we were talking about potentially having to go back to Iraq if we left too early; no issue of "remove person X" at all in my mind.

I think Steve was suggesting that there's nothing wrong with getting rid of the government and leaving. If they replace their government with a worse one, we take it out again. That would be preferable to nation building.

In Iraqi we've already removed the government, so leave and return if the new boss is same as the old boss.

It made sense to me. Less KIAs, less time, less money: probably more chaos, but Steve's willing to pay that price. (Me too.) Gian eats soup with a spoon. You get to see your kid a little more often.

[Steve Blair]

I say this in jest but I just gotta say it.

Since having a big army is obviously so disrespected by the Europeans why not close our bases in Europe and bring our military home? Why should the United States be subsidizing security of Europe (European military welfare?).

The United States could spend that money saved on bigger aircraft carriers or some other more mobile form of force projection. We can sell the bases back, strip them, and let Europe worry about itself.

Yeah I know good luck on that.

I'd buy that for a dollar!

[Ron Humphrey]

I think Steve was suggesting that there's nothing wrong with getting rid of the government and leaving. If they replace their government with a worse one, we take it out again. That would be preferable to nation building.

In Iraqi we've already removed the government, so leave and return if the new boss is same as the old boss.

It made sense to me. Less KIAs, less time, less money: probably more chaos, but Steve's willing to pay that price. (Me too.) Gian eats soup with a spoon. You get to see your kid a little more often.

I know your presenting your case from a minimalization of US casualties perspective but there are considerations far beyond that simplistic of a solution which could and very likely would cost the US more both in blood and treasure.

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Are we talking about the same problem? I thought the problem was we want to remove Person X, we don't really care what happens next

Why wouldn't we care; can we simply assume that any results would be limited to the area in which that took place, or would it be more likely that those who see the opportunity to use the ensuing chaos do so and utilize it to become a greater threat.

And if you take that one step further which doesn't seem that far fetched to do so, how long do you suppose before you are worrying about the fact that that child you get to see so much more now may face localized terror in their own lives vs only hearing the story of your battles.


Originally Posted by Rank amateur

I've never understood why no one says that we can reinvade Iraq if things truly go to hell following our withdrawal. At that point, more people might be willing to help too.

Somehow I'm not sure that the American idea of do over is the best approach when addressing societies where fighting comes second nature to even the young.

Originally Posted by Steve

I think there are times we need to intervene, but it doesn't necessarily follow that we should stay and try to fix things that are bad broke. We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy. It would be a mental adjustment for Americans because we have this obsession with relatively quick and decisive resolution to security problems. Well, I think we need to get over that. The places that are the most trouble today are so screwed up that fixing them just isn't worth the effort.

If this is truly that cut and dry what reason do we have for doing anything except making sure our supply lines for products we buy are in place. It seems like it's either isolationist or interventionist full blown. Does this really have to be the case.
-I think isolationist in the sense that one can provide for ones needs without over dependency on others is OK but anything more than that I think you run into a whole lot of problems in todays global environment.

It just doesn't make sense to think that the world will merrily fall apart and pull together on its own without disturbing the tranquility of sleeping giants.

This does not however mean that the giants don't deserve a break every once in a while.