Forthcoming National Interest Article on COIN

[Ken White]

I think Steve was suggesting that there's nothing wrong with getting rid of the government and leaving. If they replace their government with a worse one, we take it out again. That would be preferable to nation building.

In Iraqi we've already removed the government, so leave and return if the new boss is same as the old boss.

It made sense to me. Less KIAs, less time, less money: probably more chaos, but Steve's willing to pay that price. (Me too.) Gian eats soup with a spoon. You get to see your kid a little more often.

that the action MUST be based on the specific situation. There are times when a reinvasion would be more costly to everyone including us that would a bit of nation building. In war there just is not a 'one size fits all' model.

Take Iraq. We leave and a clone rises to power. I don't think the US is quick enough to react immediately and remove the clone -- and said clone isn't really the issue, its what that nation has been or is doing that creates the problem that causes military action -- and thus, the clone gets to cement his power and build up his forces (conventional or IW is immaterial). The reinvasion will almost invariably be harder than was the initial invasion.

The question is then will that reinvasion be more costly in net terms than would departing and returning if necessary. If it is to be more costly, then it makes little sense to leave, knowing you will have to return.

Take a nation other than Iraq in the future. Ideally, before going in we'd decide on what needs to occur. If a an incursion and immediate redeployment can teach a lesson, then that's what we should do. OTOH, if it is likely to do little more than raise the hate and discontent level and probably will have to be repeated, then a more lasting effort should be undertaken. Too many variables to adopt a policy that says "We will always do this" -- though there is nothing wrong with a policy that says "If you do X, here's what's probably going to happen..."

Absolutes in geopolitics are dangerous...

[Rank amateur]

Why wouldn't we care;

I don't want to speak for the good doctor, but "they can build their country better than we can" is a good answer. Reagan's answer "Government isn't the solution, it's the problem" is even more applicable to the situation in Iraq is a pretty good answer too. "Nothing could be worse than the status quo, and even if it is, we could reestablish the status quo pretty quickly" is a good answer. "Because as long as AQI isn't there, no one will attacks us from Iraq," is a pretty good answer too.

simplistic solution which could and very likely would cost the US more both in blood and treasure.

To be succinct, the suggestion is that this equation is incorrect. Nation building is incredibly expensive; failed states aren't automatically a threat. (I guess Steve's example is that staying in Iraq proved to be far more expensive than leaving Somalia, even when you consider all the downsides we received from leaving Somalia, and there were undoubtedly some.) Reagan leaving Lebanon would be another example. Though, of course, I'd be very interested in the opinion of anyone who thought they could prove that your equation is correct. We don't want to spend more blood and treasure than we need to.

simplistic solution which could and very likely would cost the US more both in blood and treasure.

To be succinct, the suggestion is that this equation is incorrect. Failed states aren't automatically a threat. Though, of course, I'd be every interested in anyone who thought they could prove that you equation is correct. We don't want to spend more blood and treasure than we need to.

The reinvasion will almost invariably be harder than was the initial invasion.

With due respect, that's not the issue. The original invasion costs are "sunk." The question is whether re invading is cheaper than staying.

Absolutes in geopolitics are dangerous...

Agreed, but extremists do have a tendency to cling to them.

[Ron Humphrey]

Though, of course, I'd be every interested in anyone who thought they could prove that you equation is correct. We don't want to spend more blood and treasure than we need to.

I reviewed my posts from this thread and although I responded to and asked questions about somethings I don't remember nor see which EQUATION I recommended. I would be grateful if you could remind me.

Perhaps something I posted elsewhere

[Ken White]

. . .
With due respect, that's not the issue. The original invasion costs are "sunk." The question is whether re invading is cheaper than staying.

The 'sunk costs' are paid, gone forever -- staying, at this point is cheaper (though I suggest that is a really bad choice of words) than would be reinvading. Go back to your earlier flawed casualty calculation and do what I suggest -- then you can probably assess the reinvasion cost at 4 to 5x, minimum, in casualties -- then do the math on again moving a force to the ME...

You might also ponder why, when we'd planned on leaving in 90 days or so after we got there, the decision was made in Early May of '03 to stay; what caused that turnabout?

Can you gaurantee that won't happen again...

Agreed, but extremists do have a tendency to cling to them.

True -- and we should learn from their mistake instead of doing the same thing.

[Rank amateur]

I reviewed my posts from this thread and although I responded to and asked questions about somethings I don't remember nor see which EQUATION I recommended. I would be grateful if you could remind me.

Perhaps something I posted elsewhere

I know your presenting your case from a minimization of US casualties perspective but there are considerations far beyond that simplistic of a solution which could and very likely would cost the US more both in blood and treasure.

I'm assuming that the above meant" leaving would be more expensive than staying" which I consider to be an equation. X > Y. I apoligize if I misunderstood your meaning.

You might also ponder why, when we'd planned on leaving in 90 days or so after we got there, the decision was made in Early May of '03 to stay; what caused that turnabout?

Or I could cheat and ask for the answer. I don't know.

[SteveMetz]

You might also ponder why, when we'd planned on leaving in 90 days or so after we got there, the decision was made in Early May of '03 to stay; what caused that turnabout?

I've probably spent as much time pondering that precise question as anyone on earth. I think it was a combination of:

• We were surprised at how badly busted Iraq was when got there
• Chalibi and his crowd were revealed as frauds once we got there
• The President was persuaded by Powell that the US had a moral obligation to fix the place (credit to Don Snider for this observation)
• The President was seduced by Cheney/Wolfowitz/Feith/Kristol et al argument that with a bit of effort, it would be relatively easy to fix the place up and make a shining example of it

Feith's recent claim that the plan was to be in and out and it was torpedoed makes me want to gag. I'm just a lowly worm and not a senior official, but it sure seems from my perch that that would be the kind of thing that someone should have thought through before the 3rd ID was manning checkpoints in Martyr's Square. I guess former administration officials will gravitate to the "Gee that never occurred to us" explanation if the "we were stabbed in the back one" doesn't get traction.

[Ken White]

I've probably spent as much time pondering that precise question as anyone on earth. I think it was a combination of:

• We were surprised at how badly busted Iraq was when got there
• Chalibi and his crowd were revealed as frauds once we got there
• The President was persuaded by Powell that the US had a moral obligation to fix the place (credit to Don Snider for this observation)
• The President was seduced by Cheney/Wolfowitz/Feith/Kristol et al argument that with a bit of effort, it would be relatively easy to fix the place up and make a shining example of it

Feith's recent claim that the plan was to be in and out and it was torpedoed makes me want to gag. I'm just a lowly worm and not a senior official, but it sure seems from my perch that that would be the kind of thing that someone should have thought through before the 3rd ID was manning checkpoints in Martyr's Square. I guess former administration officials will gravitate to the "Gee that never occurred to us" explanation if the "we were stabbed in the back one" doesn't get traction.

I think the last item on your list was the driver but that the other three were certainly a part of the problem. Those are all the apparent motives, there may or may not be anything else. If there is, I'd bet it related to the neighbors. It'll come out eventually...

Feith was and is dangerous but I'm inclined to believe most in DoD thought it was to be a quickie and wanted it that way (for a number of vastly different reasons). I suspect the decision to stay lay between Bush, Cheney, Powell and Rice. Whatever it was, the first weekend in May did it. Bremer went in and the rest is history. Sadly.

You are, of course all too correct in that most of what happened was totally predictable and I'd add that much of it could have been prevented or deflected. 'Nough egg on this one for everyone's face including those who were behind 20 plus years of ignoring some needed skills in the Army and several Generals who should have been more forceful in their surfacing of problems. The scary thing is that so few understand the nuances that the wrong lessons can be 'learned.'

[Ken White]

. . .
Or I could cheat and ask for the answer. I don't know.

know. However, I suspect the reasons are, at a minimum, the items Steve laid out above. IMO, the fact that there was such a change is more important than the why (simply because the 'why' could be later proved to be a decision based on flawed information) and regardless, the fact that it occurred altered many things. I forgot to mention in the response to Steve that I also suspect there was a slick sales job by Bremer involved somewhere. Still, I think it's worth pondering though I admit I have nothing to base that upon other than a gut feel...

[Rank amateur]

OK. I learn a lot here. So putting it all together Steve's recommendation is "Next time, do what we were going to do before Cheney and his friends screwed everything up."

Or did I miss some of the nuance?

[SteveMetz]

OK. I learn a lot here. So putting it all together Steve's recommendation is "Next time, do what we were going to do before Cheney and his friends screwed everything up."

Or did I miss some of the nuance?

To me the big issue is the relationship of leadership and expertise. After 9/11 administration policymakers were convinced that since the experts had missed that one, they weren't to be trusted on anything. So they ignored them. It was pure hubris right out of a Greek tragedy or Lear.

[Rank amateur]

To me the big issue is the relationship of leadership and expertise. After 9/11 administration policymakers were convinced that since the experts had missed that one, they weren't to be trusted on anything. So they ignored them. It was pure hubris right out of a Greek tragedy or Lear.

An age old issue. It's not limited to the military. Lots of CEOs have brought down their company by forcing their experts to do things the expert insisted wouldn't work.

The main reason I respect Powell so much, is because he got the war he wanted in Gulf War I.

I'm paraphrasing Sun Tzu, but he said the expert should be in charge of war and should refuse orders from the sovereign. Lots of people interpret the NIE as the experts learning there lesson. Would you agree?

Surround and isolate the leader with the stupid idea seems to me to be one of the few effective approaches for the expert. (When he was Secretary of State, Powell was surrounded and isolated. He didn't get the war he wanted.)

[selil]

It is the one of the oldest tales "The president has no clothes". Well something like that.

[Rank amateur]

The issue probably has more to do with group think and the leader's ego than any other issue. You might want to research Hewlett Packard's take over of Compaq. The CEO rammed that through against a lot of objections. It was a disaster. She got fired, electronic spying; lot of interesting stuff. A lot has been written about it.

[Tom Odom]

To me the big issue is the relationship of leadership and expertise. After 9/11 administration policymakers were convinced that since the experts had missed that one, they weren't to be trusted on anything. So they ignored them. It was pure hubris right out of a Greek tragedy or Lear.

Steve

I would also add serendipity in that it offered a window of vulnerability for those waiting to do the NeoCon sales pitch. Simply put, you can't trust the experts as they missed it last time; since those same experts had discounted neo con theory in the past, they were probably wrong then as well. I know that in 1990-1993. the Iraqi National Congress was considered a bad joke in intel channels and Chalabi was a key guy. Then in 2002 he suddenly becomes a darling of those propsing regime change. Fundamentally I believe you are absolutely correct in that knowledge and expertise was viewed as a negative.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

"As insurgents, they are
respected and feared. But when the insurgency ends, most return to marginalization, becoming simply one more uneducated denizen of society’s bottom tier. Thus, it is less political objectives driving insurgents than deep psychological needs."

This is a very well trodden path, thanks to the likes of the late Cathy Goldsmith and the very much alive Dr. Myriam Hasham, but most people constantly under estimate it's importance.

About 2 years I had lunch with a former member of the Provisional IRA, who served 14 years for murder. Without prompting he told me he joined the IRA because he thought it was cool, exciting, got him laid, and got him free drinks! There is ample evidence from Sierra Leone, Algeria, the PLO and Northern Ireland being a terrorist/fighter can easily become more important than the cause.

I am no more mystified as to why young Pakistanis join AQ than I am why young African Americans join the LA Cryps or the Bloods. The moment a terrorist group, criminal gang or Insurgent army become "losers", their recruiting and support base dry up.

As a less then humorous aside I believe the top bad guy in that very bad Kevin Costner movie, "The Postman" was a former Photo-copy machine engineer, who found being a Warlord got him the respect he craved.

[SteveMetz]

This is a very well trodden path, thanks to the likes of the late Cathy Goldsmith and the very much alive Dr. Myriam Hasham, but most people constantly under estimate it's importance.

However well-trodden in the academic literature, our new counterinsurgency doctrine misses it. Like previous doctrine, it treats insurgency as a purely political and economic phenomenon--votes and jobs will fix it. The forthcoming interagency manual is likely to follow that theme.

[Penta]

The comment re the PIRA guy you provided, Will, leads me to one simple question:

If guys join groups like the PLO, the Provos, etc. to get laid, get free beer, etc...

Wouldn't it be better to just provide brothels to the ISF as an incentive of service and then watch our former adversaries swarm to join up?

(I'm kidding, but...really...If they join the insurgents for reasons that are that simple...Why not compete on that level?)

[SteveMetz]

The comment re the PIRA guy you provided, Will, leads me to one simple question:

If guys join groups like the PLO, the Provos, etc. to get laid, get free beer, etc...

Wouldn't it be better to just provide brothels to the ISF as an incentive of service and then watch our former adversaries swarm to join up?

(I'm kidding, but...really...If they join the insurgents for reasons that are that simple...Why not compete on that level?)

I have seriously (well, as seriously as I can get) suggested that women's empowerment and video games would go a long way toward quelling insurgency.

But if you look at actual plans we concoct, they're absurd. We try and fund economic development. So what kind of a job is an illiterate former child soldier going to get? A demeaning, bottom of the barrel one. So he will go from being "respected" when he had a gun to being a bottom feeder.

This is the same mistake we often make when we try and break up criminal gangs. I mean, watch the Sopranos--most of those guys don't make huge amounts of money. But they did feel, in their warped minds, that they are "respected." In reality, they confuse being feared with being respected. But given that they do, any counterinsurgency plan which doesn't offer a substitute form of respect doesn't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world.

But for us Americans, it's easier to kill people than to figure them out (just as it's easier to throw our home grown gang bangers in jail than to alter the conditions that gave rise to them). So that's what we build our counterinsurgency strategy on.

[Rex Brynen]

However well-trodden in the academic literature, our new counterinsurgency doctrine misses it. Like previous doctrine, it treats insurgency as a purely political and economic phenomenon--votes and jobs will fix it. The forthcoming interagency manual is likely to follow that theme.

I think its important to recognize that a variety of sets of overlapping factors play a role in insurgent recruitment:

1. issues of grievance/social justice (that is to say, political-ideological determinants);
   
2. communal self-protection (amid ethnic/tribal/clan warfare)
   
3. economic marginalization, unemployment, and the possible lure as insurgency-as-income or enrichment;
   
4. psycho-social factors (alienation, prestige, need for belonging, insurgents-as-gang-members)

The precise mix varies between conflicts, over times, and even within and across groups in a given conflict. The trick, whether as insurgent or counterinsurgent, is to work out which are most operative, and craft strategies accordingly.

I also think its not important to underestimate #1 in many conflicts. I would argue that it was the primary recruitment factor for European WWII resistance movements, as well as much of Hizbullah and Hamas. On the other hand, in much of West Africa, it is largely devoid of meaning, regardless of whatever grand-sounding revolutionary names and "ideologies" armed groups might proclaim. In the case of the IRA I think all four were at work, in fairly equal measure.

[Rank amateur]

I think its important to recognize that a variety of sets of overlapping factors play a role in insurgent recruitment:

1. issues of grievance/social justice (that is to say, political-ideological determinants);
   
2. communal self-protection (amid ethnic/tribal/clan warfare)
   
3. economic marginalization, unemployment, and the possible lure as insurgency-as-income or enrichment;
   
4. psycho-social factors (alienation, prestige, need for belonging, insurgents-as-gang-members)

That's the problem with what Steve called "the Isreali strategy"

1. It creates grievances. No one likes being crushed, or believes that they deserve to be crushed.
2. People feel that they need to protect themselves from it.
3. It ruins the economy. (Unless it stops right away. I imagine that cement workers in Lebanon are pretty busy right now.)
4. Anyone who stand up to the "crusher" is going to be perceived as manly and cool; the local John Wayne.