I've been following the discussions on Iraq and the COIN doctrine from my desk and computer in the International Zone (I want to say in the bowels, but I do have a window). While I'm definitely not doing tactical stuff, I've had the opportunity to get out and listen to what BCT and battalion commanders are saying on the ground.
I guess I need to go back and re-read the COIN manual. What I see are commanders making the pragmatic decisions along kinetic (kill/capture) and non-kinetic lines (support services, support local security efforts, support local governance). I don't sense that the new COIN doctrine has shied people away from military action, its just they may be viewing it from a more comprehensive lens--and its not that the commanders before did any less, its just that there's been some more thought and doctrinal guidance put into place over the elapsed time.
With regards to the Awakening and whether we caused it or we were just lucky, I'd say yes to both (and recall which type of General Napoleon would have rather had). I don't think that you can discount our presence in Iraq, and in Anbar, fighting over the past years. It was a part of the calculation that tribal leaders made when they decided to fight AQI. it wasn't the only factor, but I think it ranks pretty high up there--as I've seen it written, they realized that we were the really strong tribe in the region and we weren't going away.