Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
Not really. All I said was that when we believe there is an extant threat, we disrupt the threat (with partners whenever possible) then leave rather than trying to transform the place from which the threat emerged into something it is not.
That makes sense. Just so long as the threat is certain and the damage to be done, grave - otherwise you may end up doing more harm than good. There is certainly a place for striking an enemy - such as Al Qaida and the Taleban in Afghanistan, but it just has to be one of a number of strategic possibilities. If it were the preferred one though, or even formed the basis of a strategy based upon pre-emption, removing what are perceived to be potential threats before they become actual ones, that's looking for trouble - even if it seems to work in the short-term.


JJackson:


On a more Utopian note what do you think would be the effect of the US reducing its military expenditure to a point where its forces were only equal to Western Europe (as a block with similar GDP and population), any savings to be diverted into an enormous hearts and minds operation. What could you do with that kind of budget? Reduce subsidies to US producers of cotton and rice which would kick start agriculture in some of the world’s poorest countries and shame Europe and Japan into following. A foreign aid budget that would make friends for the US all over the world. The US provides Israel with a subsidy of about $500/cap/year that kind of money extended to the Palestinians’ along with real pressure on Israel to give up enough land to make a viable state would do more to reduce the risk of Islamic terrorism than any size of military. Is a stockade always the best way of protecting your population? Might making friends with them ‘injuns not be a better bet in the long run?
If the US Armed Forces were not engaged in Iraq, the military budget could not be reduced by much, if any, in order to be diverted to other projects. Contrary to much popular opinion, the US military has never really recovered from the budget cuts of the 1990's, and much of the new equipment that has been acquired in recent years, along with equipment procured much earlier, is either worn-out, is wearing out sooner than planned, or just plain needed to be replaced even before the present set of wars. And that does not take into consideration the fact that pay and benefits (and housing, etc.) for many American troops has actually been cut-back in places in recent years - for which the troops themselves suffer.

The size of the US defence budget is admittedly enormous, and much of its is gobbled up by bureaucracy, interminable development contracts that fail to pan out, etc., - but that is money that properly needs to be spent elsewhere within the military. Hundreds of old F-15s that still form the Air Force's background are grounded because of age-related issues, and very few F-22 are likely to ever be bought to replace them; the Army has not bought a new tank since 1992; and the Navy can't even keep many of the ships it has in service, having to decommission its minehunters built in the 80's and 90's (useful in a place like the Gulf), and not even being able to afford reaching a fleet size half that of the 600-Ship Navy that was sought in the 80's. And none of this even goes into spare parts, facilities and infrastructure, various (but vital) odds and ends, and above all, training. Many US troops do not get as much training as many of their Commonwealth counterparts. Basically, much of the US defence budget would already have been spoken for even if much of the waste was cut out.

NATO countries would have to make up for a large reduction in US military capabilities, and take on major missions with at most modest US support in lots of dangerous places - like the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, parts of Africa, etc., - if the US military were to be brought down to EU-level proportions.

You have a point about the Israel v. Palestine subsidy issue.

As a de facto Imperial Power, the US may lack some of Britain's strategic acumen when the latter was at the top of its game, but for all its faults, some serious, it is perhaps the mildest and most constructive such Great Power we could have.