This is part of what I was thinking about when saying that Israel couldn’t keep it up forever. Their overall strategy has become progressively more dependant on factors they can not control.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
A) I do believe that the Middle East is different, so the issue really isn't a world wide one.
B) It isn't hate/love. It's who gets to live where: an issue that's been unresolved for at least 1,600 years, admitting that we're firmly on one side and admitting that we can't convince people that we aren't firmly on one side with spin or democracy or another else.
C) It doesn't have to be fear. But instead of pretending to be a honest broker, we behave like a police man. (A police man who's only real concern is protecting one piece of turf.) To combine you and Steve, "If Arab leader does X,Y and Z, lightening will strike. If not, we'll buy your oil."
Last edited by Rank amateur; 12-13-2007 at 02:42 PM.
This is part of what I was thinking about when saying that Israel couldn’t keep it up forever. Their overall strategy has become progressively more dependant on factors they can not control.
Indeed. The Romans resorted to a more or less similar series of strategies to deal with external threats. But for the Western part of the Empire (and with serious but not fatal consequences for the Eastern part), that all failed in the end as the Roman economy started a long decline beginning in the 3rd Centruy (although Constantine did stabilize the situation for a time). Coupled to the collapse of the Roman birthrate, also occurring by the 3rd Century, and the large influx of immigration in general and barbarians in particular, and reliance upon units of Foederati became necessary from the late 4th century in order to make up for the lack of Roman manpower for the Legions.
Subsequently, the Roman preference for striking the enemy first in his own territory and then withdrawing, increasingly had to give way because of growing military weakness to allowing the enemy to actually penetrate and occupy portions of the Empire itself (not unlike much of Chinese practice over the millenia vis a vis the barbarians) before attempting the destruction of the invading forces. This of course resulted in progressive destruction of population, tax-base, and above all, the loyalty of the population to the Roman state. The Roman state proved increasingly incapable of protecting their lives and property, so local loyalties increasingly passed into acquiescence to the barbarians.
In sum, the Israeli Option is a short-term fix at best, and if the birthrate is low and the economy is unsound, it is unsustainable and has served only to aggravate the animosity of the enemy.
An alternative, that has already been suggested on another thread, is the resort to a strategy of engaging client-states. Preserve your own treasure and your own freedom to use military force by engaging local powers on your behalf. Subsidy (within reason) is a great deal cheaper and more efficient than bearing the burden entirely oneself. It also tends to enlist local expertise as a matter of course - though it may also engage local animosities as well. The client-state system has its dangers also - Iran being one example of this.
A key to successful resort to client states is being in a position of strength to begin with, vis-a-vis the actual or prospective client states. It is also important to be careful about whom you support, and how. If you are intent on engaging a prospective ally to be a client state, you have to be choosy. Much easier said than done in reality. There must also be a reasonable prospect for engaging the Government of a prospective client-state in internal self-reform to the extent that it is possible. This may requires decades of patience and stable policy on the part of the "Great Power" concerned. It may not work, but even attempting such is preferable to standing by more or less helplessly and watching a client-state sliding into implosion.
For the US to establish a worthwhile system of client-states, and within a strategy with emphasis on the resort to said, would take many years, and would require the US to recoup the military strength and the freedom to use its forces that it has lost through war in Iraq. Use of force results in loss of force; conservation of force results in ability to use force. Otherwise, operating from a relative position of weakness, the US may find any client-states that it may engage able to exploit that weakness, and the political concessions and cost of subsidies may become self-defeating.
The Israeli Option, while it is tempting and appears to offer benefits and efficiencies in the short term, is unsustainable and self-defeating in the long-term. Especially if you have a low birthrate and an unsound economic basis.
Last edited by Norfolk; 12-13-2007 at 04:08 PM.
Geez, the Romans got a 300 year run out of it. I'd take that.
With our low birth rates and, in the Israeli case - and in our case, we'll see -, an unsound economic basis, we may not have 300 years.
2 points
Steve--
You are right that any survey is a snapshot in time. But string them together over time and it is more like a moving picture. That said, I do not disagree with the philosophical point but I think that the application of available survey research data would provide a more nuanced starting point. As I said before, I don't think that the 2 approaches are necessarily mutually exclusive although they probably are so in any particular country at any given point in time. Which leads me to my second point:
Gian--
You are correct to point out that IO - or better stated, PSYOP - depends on performance on the ground. Unlike commercial advertising where the problem is to convince people that your aspirin works better than the other guy's, the PSYOP problem is to convince people that "aspirin" works at all. If that can be demonstrated then sophisticated and simple techniques for getting the message out will work. If not, then no technique will work over the long haul to sell the "snake oil."
Cheers
JohnT
Maybe this is my depressive nature manifesting itself, but...
Why bother?
In my young life, it's basically been a constant that:
1. The world hates us. (Us being America, Americans, so forth) This is unlikely to ever change, because even if we did accede to some demands, what is being demanded is, in a lot of cases, changes to the way the American people think and believe - seemingly to be imposed from Washington. (One sees this in the way Europeans deal with the US, in the way Middle Easterners deal with the US...In the way everybody deals with the US.)
2. The world would like nothing better than for us to pull back. Except that when we do, they freak out.
3. We're damned if we do, damned if we don't. In all cases.
So, maybe it's just me, maybe it's a generational thing, but...Why bother?
Europeans or Arabs think we're some bullying superpower?
Hell, they hardly know what one looks like. If we're going to be prejudged, may as well actually be the bully.
Y'think we're in a war to (destroy your religion/steal your resources/steal your markets/dominate the planet/impose Christian fundamentalism everywhere)?
No, we're not...But if you insist, we can certainly do that.
Way I see it, we're screwed already, so what have we got to lose in making the world be careful what they wish for?
--
And after that venting, I will note: I don't believe that. Not completely.
I'd be saddened to see the US actually follow that path, of "You have absolutely no idea what fear is".
But when I put a finger to the pulse of American opinion, I do sense that sort of hopelessness, of "Oh, screw it".
And I've not seen anybody here address that - that we're feeling even more hopeless and gloomy than even an Israeli strategy, hopeless and gloomy enough to have a strategy of "To hell with the world, you can all go FOAD."
Maybe it's the weather lately...But I see no point in even a hint of optimism.
Yeah, the world hates us. Yeah, they want us to go away.
But we're assailed if we actually ponder doing so.
And we're screwed no matter what we do, so why care anymore?
John
Sitting off in the corner, hugging himself and rocking, wishing he was as blissfully ignorant as his peers.
In my own defense, the Mitchell Report is going to reveal that I was juiced when I made the post that started this thred.
Penta - My recommendation: stop watching Fox News, and actually visit some foreign countries. Really, it's not that bad out there.
Norfolk - Both economic and population statistics even for the late Empire (especially the former) are far too unreliable to really make those kind of sweeping judgments as to what caused the decline of the Western Empire. I notice that there is no discussion of the role of political breakdown amongst the Roman political elite in your thesis, or the general inability of a preindustrial bureaucracy to efficiently manage such a farflung and infrastructurally challenged empire. Also, really, where's the evidence for imminent or even approaching civilizational collapse, unless you're one of those modern T. Lothrop Stoddard types?
Except not France. That would simply reinforce the attitude described.
Actually, I see the world moving to a form of détente. Cheap, effective, easily imitated asymmetric tactics like IEDs make it difficult and expensive for us to invade other countries. Our conventional superiority makes it cheap and easy for us to break stuff they need: bridges, parliament buildings, generating stations, airports, the leader's family, etc.
The two main problems are that some of the bad guys have no interest in self preservation and a lot of people on our side want destruction instead of being content with containment.
Some good points Tequila, but I was not intending to present a comprehensive thesis for the decline and fall of the Roman Empire (at least its Western portion). I was limiting myself to alternative strategic approaches and the causes that many historians have identified as contributing to the disintegration of Roman military power over the course of the 3rd to 6th centuries AD. You are quite right that economic and population statistics are unreliable, but we have nothing better in their place. We have to work with what we have.
As to the role of political breakdown, political breakdown had occurred during the 3rd century, resulting in the Empire's collapse in 284 AD and subsequent reconstruction by Diocletian. But the failure of his constitutional mechanism, the Tetrarchy, and the rise of Constantine, civil wars that occurred in the late 4th century, Theodosius' reign as the last sole Emperor, and the splitting of the Roman polity into factions allied with particular barbarians (such as the party that opened one of the gates to Rome to Alaric's Visigoth Army in 410), were not necessarily all that much worse than the factionalization of the Roman elite both before, and in the decades shortly after, Augustus. Those factions opened the gates, figuratively speaking, to competing Roman generals and their armies.
The events of the 3rd century stand out because of the nearly century-long state of an-and off civil war and the rise of the Gallic Empire for a time as a rival in the West, in addition to the deflation of the buying power of the currency (denarrii), and what appears to be a noticeable decline in the birth rate. What occurred during the civil wars leading up to the accession of Augustus, and the civil wars that occurred only a few decades afterwards in the time leading up to the accession of the Flavians and the "Five Good Emperors", was not greatly less dangerous than what occurred in the late 4th and early 5th centuries until 410.
A major difference between the 1st Centuries BC and AD on the one hand, and the 4th and 5th on the other, as any number of historians tell us (I prefer Palmer and Toynbee, amongst others), tell us, was the apparent drop in birth rate, and the weakening of the economy (leading to Diocletian's system of compelling the son to follow in his father's occupation, and binding most people to the locality in which they lived and no longer permitting most people to move about within the Empire). The late years of the Republic and the early years of the Empire did not appear to face these limitations, and indeed resorted to the use of client-states and kingdoms, such as Commogene, Palestine, and Armenia in the East, and certain "kingdoms" and tribes in what later became the province of Germania. Once these had been disposed of, Rome had to bear the burden alone for both defending them from external threats, and from internal rebellion and disorder.
I was not intending to suggest anything like "imminent civilizational collapse"; that is taking my points much too far. My object was to point out that our strategic options, like those of the Romans, become increasingly limited in time by such factors as economic weakness or unsound fundamentals and low birth-rates. The Israeli Option is vulnerable to those factors.
Last edited by Norfolk; 12-13-2007 at 06:06 PM.
Sorry,
I have to disagree with you on the Better-stated bit.
Information Operations is far from Psyops, sometimes they coincide, sometimes they conflict, but never one in the same. This has been one of the most frustrating things for me throughout my service, in one form or another.
To illustrate as simply as possible ,since I currently have to get back to work;
Information is every single aspect of your reality which may bring influence to one area or another of your operation. History, Psychology, Sociology, Cyber, Physical description ( If I am the bad guy I look at you and your capability and see if I think I can take you).
Anthropology (What each and every entity in the AO thinks and feels from their historical perspective to what they currently percieve)
Empathy ( Understanding what factors or circumstances have brought you, or your enemy, or the populous to where they are at this moment.
Etc, Etc,
What I'm trying to say is that when those who are in the decision making roles rely on precedentiary understanding of "tools" of the trade (PSYOPS)
There is often a over reliance on check the block, unbudging ops which lend not only to possible mis application but many times to mis diagnosis of the effects provided, or not provided.
PSYOPS have a well established programs with immense understanding of what they do but it is not, i repeat not real overarching IO.
If someone could show me how any IO operation worth it's salt could be truly as effective as it should be without going outside of that which PSYOPS encompasses then I might be prompted to reconsider,
OR I would probably just look harder to find facts to support my hypothesis
Ron,Information Operations is far from Psyops, sometimes they coincide, sometimes they conflict, but never one in the same. This has been one of the most frustrating things for me throughout my service, in one form or another.
The Joint Definition of IO and everything I have seen in the past 8 years puts PSYOP as an operational component of IO.
Most folks assume right away that any discussion of IO is speaking to non-lethal operations. Some understand that IO can be kinetic in that it seeks to destroy information technology by various means. Most do not grasp that IO using PSYOP can be lethal, the Rwandan genocide offering a particularly stark example.
Best
Tom
Amusingly, I don't even watch Fox News. Ever.
What's in a word...
I wonder how this thread would have run had Steve not titled it "The Israeli option on Strategy" and had not even mentioned Israel?
I generally agree with his prescription but would instead have called it the TR strategy, walk softly and carry a big stick.
Let's dump the 'Israeli' -- we are admittedly in an entirely different situation and any comparison is bound to be skewed. Our excessive (IMO) support for the Israelis is part of the problem but the strategic issue is far larger and it is also not restricted to the ME. We, like it or not, have a worldwide remit. One that is, at this time, irrevocable. In thirty to fifty years that may change but it'll be with us through the life of many on this board.
We should also discard any major discussion about 'premption.' That has been a facet of US policy for over 200 years, it is a worldwide military option and it will remain one. As for claims it is not nice; war's not nice.
One of the first respondents, Tequila, titled the strategy "Zeus thunderbolt." True in a sense but that does not mean that it is the only approach -- after all, any strategy HAS to be tailored to the situation and to be able to react to events. The stick, if used properly would rarely if ever be actually used. Tequila also said -- correctly IMO -- that:While there is much truth in that statement, there is also the fact that American foreign policy over a couple of centuries has been to strike at potential threats and that for the 45 years of the Cold War, we were pretty consistent. The only true exception being really, the Carter years. Which brings up an interesting point."Also this idea seems to require foreign policy consistency across decades. I submit that this is pretty much impossible in any country and perhaps least of all with American democracy."
Had the strategy Steve espouses been in effect -- more correctly, the strategic policy -- I submit that after the hostages were seized had James Earl Carter gone to the UN, made a speech and said "Iran has invaded soveriegn US territory. When I return to Washington, I will active our Reserve forces and ask the Congress for a declaration of war and unless the hostage are released to US control by the 10th on November 1979 we will, unfortunately, have to invade Iran." I believe the bulk of the UN would have supported that because much as we were (and are) disliked in much of the world, and Embassy is an Embassy. I also believe that Khomeini would have folded in less than a day. Our army then was almost twice the size it is now and Iran was, as a nation, a basket case; they had no means to resist. Khomeini had essentially just taken over and had yet to consolidate his power. Other than moving carriers and some aircraft, little effort would have been required
Instead, he let Khomeini know that we would effectively do nothing, a sign in the Ayatollah's mind that we were weak -- and it is very unwise in the ME to show any weakness for it will certainly be exploited. That effective capitulation by us set the stage for many later attacks emanating from the ME.
Carry that forward using the policy. Lebanon was not a major concern to US interests so there would have been no intervention. Same for Somalia. There would have been no Khobar Towers bombing. Let's say the USS Cole attack may have occurred regardless. Do we take out Yemen? No, we spend scads of money to find out who did it and we get them (and we apparently did that...).
Alternative history is irrelevant, really. What matters is the here and now. Where we are is with a divided polity that is terribly indecisive but that is not likely to be willing to support any interventions in the near term. If we are not going to support interventions and go the COIN route -- which as we all know is fraught with pitfalls -- then we better have Plan B.
Many will recall that when Bush entered office he and Rumsfeld both frequently used the old TR phrase initially. Regrettably, their plans -- with which I agreed -- to draw back to CONUS and avoid nation building were overcome by events that unarguably had started with that Embassy seizure. Any attempt now to return to the Bush / Rumsfeld model is going to generate much heat and little light and a lot of that will be nothing but political theater. Yet, we have to have a policy of some sort; when you're the big guy on the block, you become a target and if the little bullies repeatedly kick you in the shins and you do nothing, eventually, you embolden them and they gang up on you.
The key to the strategic policy Steve recommends is, of course, distinguishing real threats from minor posturing. The latter can be dissuaded by a combination of diplomacy, bribes and minor efforts of force. The former require more drastic action and, if a long and costly intervention is not desirable -- and I submit it will not be to many -- than an alternative must be found.
Any alternative will have to be applied differently in differing situations and should be tailored to the degree of threat or response required. Proportionality, Balance and full spectrum capability. That's all we're talking about.
Penta then posits some good points and a question:The three points are all totally valid; the answer to his question is -- because we have to. Ignore the kids who have tantrums and they'll just keep having them..."1. The world hates us. (Us being America, Americans, so forth) This is unlikely to ever change, because even if we did accede to some demands, what is being demanded is, in a lot of cases, changes to the way the American people think and believe - seemingly to be imposed from Washington. (One sees this in the way Europeans deal with the US, in the way Middle Easterners deal with the US...In the way everybody deals with the US.)
2. The world would like nothing better than for us to pull back. Except that when we do, they freak out.
3. We're damned if we do, damned if we don't. In all cases.
So, maybe it's just me, maybe it's a generational thing, but...Why bother?"
I'd also suggest that his reading of American opinion and hopelessness differs markedly from mine and I just returned from a two week swing through much of the east coast. I talked to a lot of people, I'd estimate the down in the dumps contingent at no more than 10% -- interestinlgy, the further north I went, the more of them there were. Maybe it's the weather and gray skies.
Then Rank Amatuer hits a nail:Totally true -- that's why the strategic policy is important, it will maintain that détente."Actually, I see the world moving to a form of détente. Cheap, effective, easily imitated asymmetric tactics like IEDs make it difficult and expensive for us to invade other countries. Our conventional superiority makes it cheap and easy for us to break stuff they need: bridges, parliament buildings, generating stations, airports, the leader's family, etc."
Then he misses one:Only partly true; there are some of those folks here but not many and those go-getters can generally be and almost always are contained. The more important point is that non-state actors cannot be contained..."The two main problems are that some of the bad guys have no interest in self preservation and a lot of people on our side want destruction instead of being content with containment."
And the attack on Iraq had nothing to do with WMD, Saddam, preemption or containment. It was to establish presence; all that other stuff was just minor synergy. Why presence? Check the latest Unclas NIE...
Is that presence a target? More importantly in terms of this discussion, will it remain a target? I think the answer to both questions is yes, YMMV.
Yet, if they were not there, they would unquestionably not be targets...
The northeast has historically been a "hotbed" (if you will) of rather isolationist and pacifist tendencies from almost the beginning of the US. Much of the opposition to the Mexican-American War centered there, and that section was also one that was closely watched by Lincoln during the Civil War. Interestingly enough it was also the birthplace for many of the more rabid abolitionists. If memory serves they were also reluctant about the Spanish American War and World War I.I'd also suggest that his reading of American opinion and hopelessness differs markedly from mine and I just returned from a two week swing through much of the east coast. I talked to a lot of people, I'd estimate the down in the dumps contingent at no more than 10% -- interestinlgy, the further north I went, the more of them there were. Maybe it's the weather and gray skies.
The world always has to hate someone. Prior to us it was the British, who didn't bother to notice. Our problem is that we do...we want everyone to like us.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
As Tony Soprano would say, it's just business.
Hey JJackson: You want a thought? I'll give you a thought.
Looking back through the pages of the history of empires, I'd say the US is pretty mild, by comparison. America has been the world's leading imperial power for only three or four generations. It took over from the British in WWI. Since then, American military and commercial power have dominated the planet.
But the empire business, like any business, has its good points and its bad points. On the good side, you get to boss people around and feel important. On the bad side, it can be costly - especially if you don't know what you are doing. And on the really bad side, it almost always ends in bankruptcy and military disaster. Empires - like other grand public spectacles - make the news twice, coming and going. Whether U.S. empire is on the coming or going side, you make your own call.
The empire business is fundamentally a protection racket. The imperial power provides political stability and military protection. In return, the tributary or vassal states pay. But that is the fly in America's imperial ointment. No one pays. The United States invaded Iraq. Cynics say it did so to get Iraq's oil. At least, that would have made sense from an imperial finance point of view. But no, this whole thing is deep in red ink up to your neck.
How to pay the expenses? Typically, an imperial power either forces subject nations to render up some form of tribute - gold, slaves, wheat - or, in the more modern variety, it insists on certain favorable trading terms. But America never got the hang of empire; it invades countries but forgets to steal the treasure. It is so impressed with its own claptrap - "making the world safe for democracy"…"fighting terrorists" - that it forgets it has to pay the bills.
We could unilaterally disarm tomorrow, or the whole continent of North America could sink into the ocean like the island of Atlantis. I doubt you would see a universal era of peace and prosperity in the wake of that move, though. I suspect you would see quite a few wars break out in short order.
No signature required, my handshake is good enough.
Tacitus,that's right what happen to the good old days of plunder and pillage and the women don't forget the women ARRRGGGHHH!
Lesson learned
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