The Israeli Option in Strategy

[Stu-6]

I think the communication problem is internal. We have a set of beliefs about ourselves (we are the good guys supporting freedom and democracy etc etc), we view our actions though the prism of these beliefs, which causes us to have an excessively positive opinion of them. Others not subscribing to these beliefs see out actions in a much harsher light. This problem becomes most obvious with what you called strengthen local partners. Seeing these partners though our prism we tend to think of them as the best choice among bad options. Often the locals will view these partners though their own beliefs, often a more honest view, and many times end up seeing them as just a bad choice. Which leads them to think the US talks all of this wonderful stuff about freedom and human rights but is allies with terrible men, therefore the US is not to be trusted. Examples of this can be seen in the Shaw in Iran, Musharraf in Pakistan, etc.


Back to the root of this thread the problem with the Israeli option is that it can never end, making it a strategy of perpetual war. While the Israelis are dominate for now, they can never enjoy it and almost certainly they can not keep it up forever. While the Arab states are so dysfunctional that they can do little more the bluster; the Palestinians are with in Israeli’s borders, mad as hell, have nothing to lose, and perhaps most importantly have an expanding population. As the Doors said “they got the guns but we got the number Gonna win, yeah, we're takin' over”.

The Israelis are strong but they can’t fight forever. Out of necessity their strategy works for now but it won’t last. If we model ourselves on them we doom ourselves to a similar fate.

[SteveMetz]

Back to the root of this thread the problem with the Israeli option is that it can never end, making it a strategy of perpetual war.

True, but that raises another question: is the traditional American conceptualization of war that sees it as a discrete event with a clear beginning and end applicable in today's world? Or have we entered an age of perpetual war whether we like it or not?

Phrased differently, are we trying to operate in an age of perpetual war with a strategy based on episodic war?

[Stu-6]

True, but that raises another question: is the traditional American conceptualization of war that sees it as a discrete event with a clear beginning and end applicable in today's world? Or have we entered an age of perpetual war whether we like it or not?

Phrased differently, are we trying to operate in an age of perpetual war with a strategy based on episodic war?

War is a constant of human society however this is not the same a perpetual war. Even wars that appear perpetual can, often with the hindsight of history, be seen more correctly as epochal (such as best articulated in of Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles). Therefore while just accepting war is perpetual may seem like a realist solution, it actuality represents a failure in grad strategy.

[tequila]

The "basic structure" of the world is, I would submit, malleable to change, but not to control. Policymakers by their very nature are inclined to forget this. The Iraq War, for instance, has irrevocably altered the social structure and culture of Iraq and the broader Middle East in ways that would never have occurred without it --- but certainly not in ways that the United States, Iran, Muqtada al-Sadr, al-Qaeda, or the Sunni tribes could really imagine or control.

Perpetual war conjures an image of armies clashing and existential crisis - was the Cold War, by definition then, "perpetual warfare" as well? The world was certainly far bloodier and in far greater danger of destruction back then. We in the U.S. seem to have weathered it fairly well, being the ultimate victors if not necessarily in the usual Roman triumph sense of the word.

[JJackson]

I am British and not a fan of US foreign policy. I would fall into the group that believes the some within the administration are labouring under the impression that much of the anti-American feeling globally is just because ‘they’ don’t get what we are trying to do for them. I think we get it, we just don’t want it.

Tony Blair’s willingness to bend over backwards (or was that forwards?) to align the UK with US policy on a number of issues killed him with the electorate.

What is it that is so unpopular? The US is just trying to make the world safe for democracy and freedom, who could object to that. May be, but that is not what it looks like to the rest of us. A military that is so far in excess of anything any other country would view as necessary to protect itself would be a matter of concern in any age. Changes – mainly post 9/11 – have led more people in countries that would traditionally be neutral or friendly to question the basis for this closeness. The British particularly have had a traditional view that ‘Americans are just like us but with a few bad habits, they ice their beer and put it in whisky’ while the continentals have been the badies in our history books for generations and ‘don’t even speak English’. On closer examination the US is a radically different society; neither its flavour of democracy nor the platforms of either of its main political parties would be acceptable anywhere in Europe. The US’s position on a wide range of issues like the pre-emptive use of force, extraordinary renditions, Gitmo and torture have stunned the rest of us and left us with the view it is not safe to be anything other than a US passport holder, even if you never go anywhere near the USA.

Woe betide any state that is not on the US’s Christmas card list. A state like Iraq or Iran can be portrayed as so wicked they must be militarily rescued for democracy while Saudi Arabia can be a close ally and buy all kinds of high tech weaponry. The CIA has been instrumental in implementing – or trying to implement – regime change all over the world for decades but until recently this has not been openly declared policy and seems domestically to be viewed as perfectly acceptable behaviour, but I suspect it would be less acceptable if Iranian agents were trying to facilitate it in the US, certainly Bin Laden’s efforts were not well received.

I like Rawl’s application of the veil of ignorance as test of prima facia fairness and often apply when considering these kinds of questions. Put the boot on the other foot. Fast-forward 50 years China has used its GDP to out strip the US military, as the US did to the USSR. Your American grandchild is walking down the road in Paris, is bundled into a car, whisked off to a little jungle base in Laos for a bit of water-boarding, then to a converted bulk carrier detention centre anchored in international water off China. Several years later, after a lot of enhance interrogation, your grandchild is released. Never charged, tried or convicted. But hey, they were Chinese, what can you do.

Fair or was I a little harsh?

[slapout9]

I am British and not a fan of US foreign policy. I would fall into the group that believes the some within the administration are labouring under the impression that much of the anti-American feeling globally is just because ‘they’ don’t get what we are trying to do for them. I think we get it, we just don’t want it.

Tony Blair’s willingness to bend over backwards (or was that forwards?) to align the UK with US policy on a number of issues killed him with the electorate.

What is it that is so unpopular? The US is just trying to make the world safe for democracy and freedom, who could object to that. May be, but that is not what it looks like to the rest of us. A military that is so far in excess of anything any other country would view as necessary to protect itself would be a matter of concern in any age. Changes – mainly post 9/11 – have led more people in countries that would traditionally be neutral or friendly to question the basis for this closeness. The British particularly have had a traditional view that ‘Americans are just like us but with a few bad habits, they ice their beer and put it in whisky’ while the continentals have been the badies in our history books for generations and ‘don’t even speak English’. On closer examination the US is a radically different society; neither its flavour of democracy nor the platforms of either of its main political parties would be acceptable anywhere in Europe. The US’s position on a wide range of issues like the pre-emptive use of force, extraordinary renditions, Gitmo and torture have stunned the rest of us and left us with the view it is not safe to be anything other than a US passport holder, even if you never go anywhere near the USA.

Woe betide any state that is not on the US’s Christmas card list. A state like Iraq or Iran can be portrayed as so wicked they must be militarily rescued for democracy while Saudi Arabia can be a close ally and buy all kinds of high tech weaponry. The CIA has been instrumental in implementing – or trying to implement – regime change all over the world for decades but until recently this has not been openly declared policy and seems domestically to be viewed as perfectly acceptable behaviour, but I suspect it would be less acceptable if Iranian agents were trying to facilitate it in the US, certainly Bin Laden’s efforts were not well received.

I like Rawl’s application of the veil of ignorance as test of prima facia fairness and often apply when considering these kinds of questions. Put the boot on the other foot. Fast-forward 50 years China has used its GDP to out strip the US military, as the US did to the USSR. Your American grandchild is walking down the road in Paris, is bundled into a car, whisked off to a little jungle base in Laos for a bit of water-boarding, then to a converted bulk carrier detention centre anchored in international water off China. Several years later, after a lot of enhance interrogation, your grandchild is released. Never charged, tried or convicted. But hey, they were Chinese, what can you do.

Fair or was I a little harsh?

I think there is something to this . When I read that we are the world's only super power so we get to tell everybody what to do that is just a little bit provovative. I guess I missed the World Election that put is in charge.

[Tom Odom]

Steve,

The problem I have with this theory is its primary underlying assumption: That the "Israeli" option works in stand alone fashion. That is not the case and has not been the case since the October 1973 War. Israeli strategy, military, and economics are very much tied to the assumption that the US will back up their use of a thunderbolt strategy.

I see your strategy here as a twist on preemption theory, something else that has been borrowed in large degree from the Israelis.

Bad theory and worse results.

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

The problem I have with this theory is its primary underlying assumption: That the "Israeli" option works in stand alone fashion. That is not the case and has not been the case since the October 1973 War. Israeli strategy, military, and economics are very much tied to the assumption that the US will back up their use of a thunderbolt strategy.

I see your strategy here as a twist on preemption theory, something else that has been borrowed in large degree from the Israelis.

Bad theory and worse results.

Tom

I take your first point but on the second there still seems to be an underlying assumption that Israeli strategy has failed. Given the challenges and threats they face, I think you can make a case that it has made them remarkably secure at an acceptable price.

[Tom Odom]

I take your first point but on the second there still seems to be an underlying assumption that Israeli strategy has failed. Given the challenges and threats they face, I think you can make a case that it has made them remarkably secure at an acceptable price.

As long as they have someone--US--to back them up--a strategy of continued existence has succeeded. At heart, that is a colonial strategy and requires continuous backing.

Defining who pays the price is an interesting question as well, one I will leave for now. But in trying to apply this to the US, whom do you see as our backers?

Tom

[Rank amateur]

Steve,

The problem I have with this theory is its primary underlying assumption: That the "Israeli" option works in stand alone fashion. That is not the case and has not been the case since the October 1973 War. Israeli strategy, military, and economics are very much tied to the assumption that the US will back up their use of a thunderbolt strategy.

I see your strategy here as a twist on preemption theory, something else that has been borrowed in large degree from the Israelis.

Bad theory and worse results.

Tom

Yet we are completely and unabashedly supportive of Israeli strategy. To me that's the issue. How do we minimize the costs of wedding ourselves to an unsuccessful strategy that produces perpetual conflict?. (Now that resolving the conflict by spreading democracy on the Arab side has proven to be an unrealistic pipe dream.)

[Stu-6]

Steve,

The problem I have with this theory is its primary underlying assumption: That the "Israeli" option works in stand alone fashion. That is not the case and has not been the case since the October 1973 War. Israeli strategy, military, and economics are very much tied to the assumption that the US will back up their use of a thunderbolt strategy.

This is part of what I was thinking about when saying that Israel couldn’t keep it up forever. Their overall strategy has become progressively more dependant on factors they can not control.

[Norfolk]

This is part of what I was thinking about when saying that Israel couldn’t keep it up forever. Their overall strategy has become progressively more dependant on factors they can not control.

Indeed. The Romans resorted to a more or less similar series of strategies to deal with external threats. But for the Western part of the Empire (and with serious but not fatal consequences for the Eastern part), that all failed in the end as the Roman economy started a long decline beginning in the 3rd Centruy (although Constantine did stabilize the situation for a time). Coupled to the collapse of the Roman birthrate, also occurring by the 3rd Century, and the large influx of immigration in general and barbarians in particular, and reliance upon units of Foederati became necessary from the late 4th century in order to make up for the lack of Roman manpower for the Legions.

Subsequently, the Roman preference for striking the enemy first in his own territory and then withdrawing, increasingly had to give way because of growing military weakness to allowing the enemy to actually penetrate and occupy portions of the Empire itself (not unlike much of Chinese practice over the millenia vis a vis the barbarians) before attempting the destruction of the invading forces. This of course resulted in progressive destruction of population, tax-base, and above all, the loyalty of the population to the Roman state. The Roman state proved increasingly incapable of protecting their lives and property, so local loyalties increasingly passed into acquiescence to the barbarians.

In sum, the Israeli Option is a short-term fix at best, and if the birthrate is low and the economy is unsound, it is unsustainable and has served only to aggravate the animosity of the enemy.

An alternative, that has already been suggested on another thread, is the resort to a strategy of engaging client-states. Preserve your own treasure and your own freedom to use military force by engaging local powers on your behalf. Subsidy (within reason) is a great deal cheaper and more efficient than bearing the burden entirely oneself. It also tends to enlist local expertise as a matter of course - though it may also engage local animosities as well. The client-state system has its dangers also - Iran being one example of this.

A key to successful resort to client states is being in a position of strength to begin with, vis-a-vis the actual or prospective client states. It is also important to be careful about whom you support, and how. If you are intent on engaging a prospective ally to be a client state, you have to be choosy. Much easier said than done in reality. There must also be a reasonable prospect for engaging the Government of a prospective client-state in internal self-reform to the extent that it is possible. This may requires decades of patience and stable policy on the part of the "Great Power" concerned. It may not work, but even attempting such is preferable to standing by more or less helplessly and watching a client-state sliding into implosion.

For the US to establish a worthwhile system of client-states, and within a strategy with emphasis on the resort to said, would take many years, and would require the US to recoup the military strength and the freedom to use its forces that it has lost through war in Iraq. Use of force results in loss of force; conservation of force results in ability to use force. Otherwise, operating from a relative position of weakness, the US may find any client-states that it may engage able to exploit that weakness, and the political concessions and cost of subsidies may become self-defeating.

The Israeli Option, while it is tempting and appears to offer benefits and efficiencies in the short term, is unsustainable and self-defeating in the long-term. Especially if you have a low birthrate and an unsound economic basis.

[SteveMetz]

Indeed. The Romans resorted to a more or less similar series of strategies to deal with external threats. But for the Western part of the Empire (and with serious but not fatal consequences for the Eastern part), that all failed in the end as the Roman economy started a long decline beginning in the 3rd Centruy (although Constantine did stabilize the situation for a time). Coupled to the collapse of the Roman birthrate, also occurring by the 3rd Century, and the large influx of immigration in general and barbarians in particular, and reliance upon units of Foederati became necessary from the late 4th century in order to make up for the lack of Roman manpower for the Legions.

Subsequently, the Roman preference for striking the enemy first in his own territory and then withdrawing, increasingly had to give way because of growing military weakness to allowing the enemy to actually penetrate and occupy portions of the Empire itself (not unlike much of Chinese practice over the millenia vis a vis the barbarians) before attempting the destruction of the invading forces. This of course resulted in progressive destruction of population, tax-base, and above all, the loyalty of the population to the Roman state. The Roman state proved increasingly incapable of protecting their lives and property, so local loyalties increasingly passed into acquiescence to the barbarians.

In sum, the Israeli Option is a short-term fix at best, and if the birthrate is low and the economy is unsound, it is unsustainable and has served only to aggravate the animosity of the enemy.

An alternative, that has already been suggested on another thread, is the resort to a strategy of engaging client-states. Preserve your own treasure and your own freedom to use military force by engaging local powers on your behalf. Subsidy (within reason) is a great deal cheaper and more efficient than bearing the burden entirely oneself. It also tends to enlist local expertise as a matter of course - though it may also engage local animosities as well. The client-state system has its dangers also - Iran being one example of this.

A key to successful resort to client states is being in a position of strength to begin with, vis-a-vis the actual or prospective client states. It is also important to be careful about whom you support, and how. If you are intent on engaging a prospective ally to be a client state, you have to be choosy. Much easier said than done in reality. There must also be a reasonable prospect for engaging the Government of a prospective client-state in internal self-reform to the extent that it is possible. This may requires decades of patience and stable policy on the part of the "Great Power" concerned. It may not work, but even attempting such is preferable to standing by more or less helplessly and watching a client-state sliding into implosion.

For the US to establish a worthwhile system of client-states, and within a strategy with emphasis on the resort to said, would take many years, and would require the US to recoup the military strength and the freedom to use its forces that it has lost through war in Iraq. Use of force results in loss of force; conservation of force results in ability to use force. Otherwise, operating from a relative position of weakness, the US may find any client-states that it may engage able to exploit that weakness, and the political concessions and cost of subsidies may become self-defeating.

The Israeli Option, while it is tempting and appears to offer benefits and efficiencies in the short term, is unsustainable and self-defeating in the long-term. Especially if you have a low birthrate and an unsound economic basis.

Geez, the Romans got a 300 year run out of it. I'd take that.

[John T. Fishel]

Steve--

You are right that any survey is a snapshot in time. But string them together over time and it is more like a moving picture. That said, I do not disagree with the philosophical point but I think that the application of available survey research data would provide a more nuanced starting point. As I said before, I don't think that the 2 approaches are necessarily mutually exclusive although they probably are so in any particular country at any given point in time. Which leads me to my second point:

Gian--

You are correct to point out that IO - or better stated, PSYOP - depends on performance on the ground. Unlike commercial advertising where the problem is to convince people that your aspirin works better than the other guy's, the PSYOP problem is to convince people that "aspirin" works at all. If that can be demonstrated then sophisticated and simple techniques for getting the message out will work. If not, then no technique will work over the long haul to sell the "snake oil."

Cheers

JohnT

[Tacitus]

Fair or was I a little harsh?

Hey JJackson: You want a thought? I'll give you a thought.

Looking back through the pages of the history of empires, I'd say the US is pretty mild, by comparison. America has been the world's leading imperial power for only three or four generations. It took over from the British in WWI. Since then, American military and commercial power have dominated the planet.

But the empire business, like any business, has its good points and its bad points. On the good side, you get to boss people around and feel important. On the bad side, it can be costly - especially if you don't know what you are doing. And on the really bad side, it almost always ends in bankruptcy and military disaster. Empires - like other grand public spectacles - make the news twice, coming and going. Whether U.S. empire is on the coming or going side, you make your own call.

The empire business is fundamentally a protection racket. The imperial power provides political stability and military protection. In return, the tributary or vassal states pay. But that is the fly in America's imperial ointment. No one pays. The United States invaded Iraq. Cynics say it did so to get Iraq's oil. At least, that would have made sense from an imperial finance point of view. But no, this whole thing is deep in red ink up to your neck.

How to pay the expenses? Typically, an imperial power either forces subject nations to render up some form of tribute - gold, slaves, wheat - or, in the more modern variety, it insists on certain favorable trading terms. But America never got the hang of empire; it invades countries but forgets to steal the treasure. It is so impressed with its own claptrap - "making the world safe for democracy"…"fighting terrorists" - that it forgets it has to pay the bills.

We could unilaterally disarm tomorrow, or the whole continent of North America could sink into the ocean like the island of Atlantis. I doubt you would see a universal era of peace and prosperity in the wake of that move, though. I suspect you would see quite a few wars break out in short order.

[slapout9]

Tacitus,that's right what happen to the good old days of plunder and pillage and the women don't forget the women ARRRGGGHHH!

[John T. Fishel]

Steve, Tequila, and Stu--

This is an interesting discussion, however, the premises on which it is based are empirical questions. How do people see the US? The Pew Global Attitudes project (reported with data as of 2005) in America Against the World by Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes is a good place to start. But State Department commissions plenty of current surveys the results of which can be accessed. Another source is Zogby.

The Pew data are mixed. They give a nuanced picture of attitudes in a sample of countries toward US policy and the American people. the problem is that the survey data reported does not cover a lot of the places we are interested in. But there are regional survey research firms that do, such as Latinobarometro in Latin America.

Based on the data I've seen (which is only up to 2005), I would argue that a case can be made for either assumption but not one that would be fully convincing. Nor do I really think that the choice is a dichotomous one.

Cheers

JohnT

[SteveMetz]

Steve, Tequila, and Stu--

This is an interesting discussion, however, the premises on which it is based are empirical questions. How do people see the US? The Pew Global Attitudes project (reported with data as of 2005) in America Against the World by Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes is a good place to start. But State Department commissions plenty of current surveys the results of which can be accessed. Another source is Zogby.

The Pew data are mixed. They give a nuanced picture of attitudes in a sample of countries toward US policy and the American people. the problem is that the survey data reported does not cover a lot of the places we are interested in. But there are regional survey research firms that do, such as Latinobarometro in Latin America.

Based on the data I've seen (which is only up to 2005), I would argue that a case can be made for either assumption but not one that would be fully convincing. Nor do I really think that the choice is a dichotomous one.

Cheers

JohnT

I think what I'm struggling with it deeper than that. Polling data is a snapshot at a moment in time. It can vascillate dramatically. The bigger issue is almost philosophical: Americans assume that conflict occurs because of the confluence of two things: 1) evil people; and 2) misperception (which evil people encourage and exploit). Thus the solution is to get rid of the evil people and ameliorate the misperceptions.

I'm not just sure this is accurate. If conflict is structural, then it is likely to be persistent. I think the Bush strategy kind of attempted to get at this, but it grossly overestimated the ability of the United States to adjust the basic structure of the world.

[Rank amateur]

I think what I'm struggling with it deeper than that.
I'm not just sure this is accurate. If conflict is structural, then it is likely to be persistent. I think the Bush strategy kind of attempted to get at this, but it grossly overestimated the ability of the United States to adjust the basic structure of the world.

How about this? Conflict in the Middle East is structural. Bush wasn't trying to change the world, just the Middle East. We see ourselves as "the good guys" and we are in most of the world, but in the Middle East we are not "fair brokers." We are completely and unabashedly on one side of the conflict. The opposite side of the people with all the oil. (Like Gian says, our actions prove this and we can't convince the people with the oil that we're not with IO.)

We need a different way of dealing with structural Middle Eastern conflict than let's say Somalia or Kosovo, which are discrete events.

[John T. Fishel]

would would have been predictable from a close look at the data in the Kohut book but there are many in the UK who would take a different tack.