Observations (2 of 2)
Here I agree with some, disagree with some. I'll highlight what I don't agree, or where I might differ (or just think we should think about and qualify) with Gray and explain why.
from Gray:
in point #3 - I think its key to say that Gray writes "Be Prepared to", not that it must be so with regard to tearing up existing doctrine. I find most tenets in the cornerstone type doctrine to be enduring, and not at odds with waging COIN warfare - its all METT-TC dependent. I agree we may have to adapt how we consider some of that doctrine, but that goes for almost any new set of conditions. While I agree that we cannot be enemy oriented in every situation, if an insurgency does not have popular support (either it never got off the ground, or it lost its political appeal), then "focusing" on the enemy seems very appropriate to me. Even if the "focus" is on securing the population - in terms of isolating it from the insurgency in both physical, psychological and political ways, you probably still need to devote some effort to the enemy, else he just bides his time. I don't think I'm at odds with Gray, I just need to qualify it for myself.At some risk of overstatement, I will hazard the proposition that almost everything that is regarded near universally as “best practice” in COIN contradicts the American way in warfare.
To excel in COIN an army needs to:
1. Understand that all military action is political theater. Irregular warfare does not, cannot, have a military outcome.
2. Appreciate that the conflict is for the acquiescence or support of the people. Dead insurgents are a bonus; they are not a reliable mark of success.
3. Be prepared to tear up its doctrine manuals for regular warfare. Its first job is to protect the people.
4. Adopt different priorities among its skills. Being highly agile in maneuver and lethal in firepower are not especially helpful. Can it be that our military transformation was, or is, heading in a direction irrelevant, or actually harmful, for effectiveness in COIN?
5. Accept that COIN requires a long-term commitment, typically 10 years. Also, it requires security forces in large numbers. Historical analysis seems to show that one needs roughly 20 members of the security forces for every 1,000 people in the general population.26 Tactical skill and technology are not very relevant. They are nice to have, but the basis of success is numbers in the right ratio.
If your armed forces are shaped by and wedded to a military culture of rapid maneuver for decisive victory, if they seek to exploit firepower as the longest of friendly long suits, and if they draw a sharp distinction between the political and the military realms, COIN will be the source of endless frustration. Not only is an army excellent in the conduct of regular warfare unlikely to shine at COIN, that excellence will also prove a hindrance to understanding and responding to the different challenges posed by a context of irregular hostilities. The picture looks grim, perhaps unduly so. Are there grounds to hope for success in COIN?
in point #4 - I think it depends on which level of war Gray is referring to. At the tactical level some additional skills are needed, and in some cases may take on precedence, but the minute the situation changes from bad to worse, those combat skills become critical - so while I had my FO doing IO 90% of the time, there was a couple of times I wanted him doing his core tasks. I think this is just as true for units, or services. Its why I like the idea of better trained and better led multi-purpose forces.
in Point #5 - again I think it needs qualification - for us, technology and tactical skill are a combination of critical enablers and capabilities required to be able to play those "away games" we find ourselves in. They help us to deal with the unknown faster, and play the cruddy hands we're often dealt a little better then the other guy. If his point is COIN in general - where you could be thinking about a HN dealing with and insurgency, or where there is a long standing relationship between participants, maybe Gray has a better point.
from Gray:
– is this why currently 3-24 needs to be preeminent for those involved in COIN campaigns? I think there is a balance to be had here between specialty doctrine and cornerstone - we just need to recognize them for their qualities and limitations to get the most out of them.While an army must discard most of its doctrine for regular warfare in order to be effective in COIN, it must not try to discard the essential facts of its regularity
from Gray:
– is this why HN (host nation) para-militaries might be more useful – they still have legitimacy, but are able to keep one foot in the LE pool and one foot in the Military pool? This is kind of an enduring question for me. I think there are at least 2 good points here - the first is about maintaining legitimacy through disciplined forces representing the government, an the 2nd is about the requirements of waging counter-insurgency - what role does the HN best play?While a COIN campaign requires a regular army to reorganize, retrain, and reequip, it does not require, it cannot require, the regulars to ape the irregulars.
from Gray
When I read this I thought about SEC Gates' speech in KS - specifically the part where he acknowledged the need for better instruments to execute "soft" power, but he also reinforced the distinction and limitations to "hard" military power. Additionally he said he'd be soon asking for more money for DoD because sooner or later we're going to have to use it again to react or counteract something - it goes with the quote -"you may not have an interest in war, but war has an interest in you". I also thought about some of the things Gray had brought up in the body of this piece as to limitations and the danger of adopting a Jominian view of "victory through the Science of War" - its all to attractive to do so, and risks obfuscating the true nature of war in order to make the use of military power more attractive when wishing for quick fixes.The charge today is not to comprehend the COIN challenge. That is easy. Rather, it is to persuade our institutions to change their preferred behaviors while being alert to the possibility that institutional, strategic, and public cultures may not permit the necessary adjustments.
The audience was not impressed at that time. If the United States believes that it faces a generation and more of irregular challenges, it is going to have to address this potentially fatal weakness in its staying power. Irregular warfare is protracted and apparently indecisive.
“How to Win in Iraq” and similar, if less competent offerings, are quintessentially Jominian. If you recall, Antoine Henri de Jomini, the Swiss theorist, promised victory to those who applied the correct doctrine.33 The idea has taken root that the solution to our irregular warfare nightmares is adoption of the right COIN doctrine. This is a half-truth at best. In historical practice, each case is so unique that although there are some valid principles which should govern irregular warfare, there can be no reliable template for all contexts.
Finally I like the way Gray closes - its a paragraph of wise advice:
Thanks to Prof. Gray for writing it, and for SWC member Gian Gentile for posting it.To summarize the argument just advanced: beware of the great oversimplifications. Look out for the falsely promised silver bullets. Caveat emptor. I have suggested that culture, COIN doctrine, SOF, and the paramountcy of the political have all been adopted as iconic solutions to the hideously complex challenges of COIN. While each is valuable, none is the answer.
Best regards, Rob
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