Originally Posted by Norfolk
Just curious, what was the success rate for operations conducted under this system?
On a seperate note, what ever happen to the principles of MOOTW (I always loved the way that word sounded ... MOOOO-TWAAAH!)
Some of them, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy made it into the new Joint Principles.
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 12-16-2007 at 10:35 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
Hated the name...
... OOTW and LIC too. While not principles, I wrote / listed / extrated about General Zinni's considerations for MOOTW in 2003. I posted this on the Urban Operations Journal as we were on the eve of OIF.
... They are presented here as helpful guidelines on winning the peace before, during, and after the dust settles in Baghdad and other Iraqi urban areas.
- Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single experience.
- Each operation has two key aspects - the degree of complexity of the operation and the degree of consent of the involved parties and the international community for the operation.
- The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.
- Start planning as early as possible, include everyone in the planning process.
- Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.
- Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determine the centers of gravity, end state, commander's intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the operation.
- Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid mission creep and allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by political leadership in consultation with the military commander, responding to a changing situation.
- Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows subordinate commanders to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual situation or rapidly changing conditions.
- Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms that include political, military, nongovernmental organizations, and the interested parties.
- Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decision-makers are. We must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture.
- Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.
- Don't lose the initiative and momentum.
- Don't make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don't treat them gently. Avoid mindsets or words that might come back to haunt you.
- Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams between organizations and involved parties.
- Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.
- Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.
- Personalities are often more important than processes. You need the right people in the right places.
- Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate, use as a go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence in the process.
- Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the image; humanitarian or firm, but well-intentioned agent of change; ensure your troops are aware of it so they can conduct themselves accordingly.
- Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and psychological operations are coordinated, accurate and consistent.
- Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and military interoperability are crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all parties may not be uniform; but they cannot be allowed to work against one another.
- Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff need to develop and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately, and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.
General Zinni offers basic, common-sense guidelines here. Unfortunately, many of these guidelines are left behind at our military think-tanks and schoolhouses once the first round goes downrange. We are reaching critical mass and can ill-afford to relearn lessons from such places as Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere. It is time to start winning wars instead of battles - winning hearts and minds instead of temporary respite. With that we will win the peace.
Last edited by SWJED; 12-16-2007 at 10:36 PM.
I remember reading articles about this subject 30 years ago when I was in college. They made me think the whole thing was complex beyond human understanding until I read the following:
'Many years ago, as a cadet hoping someday to be an officer, I was poring over "The principles of war" listed in the Old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came upon me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement "Don't bother your head about all them things me lad." he said "There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow as quick as you can and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't looking." -Field-Marshall Sir William Slim'
That is the most sensible thing about the subject I ever read.
When he was still persona grata
Larry Cable used to delight CGSC students with his comment on MOO TWAAA, "Sounds like a cow going out of both ends."
Cheers
JohnT
Larry was also the first person that I ever heard refer to peacekeeping as "armed social work." Don't know if he invented it but I guess it's possible since he apparently invented his whole life story.
Having been involved in a few COINs I respectfully disagree; however, I agree that the many in the American military are far from the ideal individuals to execute COIN. Too many of our Soldiers and officers are arrogant and assuming, and unwilling to "really" listen to the locals, thus too quick to burn bridges with the indigenous personnel in whatever country they manage to put boots on the ground in. Special Forces is one of the only units that is actually trained to establish and maintain rapport with the locals, and trust is absolutely essential (it takes time to develop and constant work to maintain it). Unfortunately we too have started to lose that trait since 9/11, since everyone, including SF wants to play whack-a-mole and engage in bankrupt concepts like network targeting.If you are a foreigner, particularly if there is a large cultural and /or racial gap, they are not ever going to give you their hearts and minds and are not going to trust their own folks who are on your side.
Some people, I believe Kilcullen is one, say there are two strategies in COIN. One is enemy focused, and it only works when the insurgency is in the incipient phase. The other one is population focused and it has historically had the highest success rate. I would argue that neither of these strategies work unilaterally, but rather is using a combination of carrots and sticks to influence the population to act a certain way. The key is getting the population to support you (not like you), so you need to find ways to organize them, not simply build schools and assorted other eye wash. The center of gravity is not the population, because regardless of what Mao stated (we have another Clausewitz problem, as many think all insurgents have to follow Mao's tentants) about a fish swiming in a sea of people (support). I can support an insurgency without popular support from the locals, especially if I'm content to conduct strictly terrorist type activities. On the other hand, I will have a hard time forming large maneuver forces from the local population without some degree of moral/popular support. To weed the insurgents out you have to some degree of support from the population to get the required intelligence, and you have to convince them that your objectives are in their best interests (hearts) and that you are going to win, not the insurgents (minds), which will stem the flow of support to the insurgents from inside the country. This doesn't happen overnight, you have to have operational patience, because X doesn't equal Y, rather X equals a wide range of potential responses, so you have to be flexible, but remain focused on the population to get to the enemy. I think the new COIN doctrine allows this, but that doesn't mean it being practiced that way. Instead some simply want to build schools and naively assume they're having the desired effect.Get too wrapped around the people bit and you'll expect things you'll never see. Yes, the focus is on the people rather than on the enemy forces but it's entirely too easy to determine that a specific pattern of operation is the holy grail. I doubt that any one size fits all is going to adapt totally to all situations and the tendency to adopt a mantra and make it a dogma exists.
I for one don't think that COIN is sole fight of the future, but rather we still face grave threats (in the future) of state versus state conflicts for access to vital resources. The persistant threat of state versus state conflict is why many Army leaders didn't want to see the Army involved in COIN again after Vietnam, because it would distract the Army at many levels from maintaining its warfighting capability. While that argument is true (look at where we're at today), it was also illogical to assume that we could avoid COIN altogether. I think we are once again at the Fulda Gap crux, but instead of the gap its COIN. During many of the Cold War years the focus of the Army was defeating Soviet Maneuver forces in Europe, everything else was a distant second priority. Reasoned analysis told us that was the gravest threat to our security at the time. Now we think the gravest threat to our security is transnational terrorism (I would argue this isn't reasoned analysis at all, but regardless it is where we are at now), and COIN is the response, everything else is a distant second priority.
As always we need to maintain the capability to do both. I still generally agree with GEN Shinseki when he said something along the lines of we can lose a COIN and still survive, but we cannot survive losing a conventional war. I think that argument is still valid, and we have to accept that some insurgencies can't be won without an unreasonable amount of dollars and blood, because the HN government is simply inept. In those cases we have the option of saying enough, we tried to help you.
Hi Global Scout, Speaking of Special Forces there was an outline I was given (1973) that I don't have anymore from the JFK school of Special Warefare called the "Seven Steps From Hell" or something like that. It outlined the 7 steps or principles to be used in COIN warfare has anybody ever heard of it? It was a pretty easy read and easy to follow. If anyone has or knows where to get it, it might be interesting to post it. The title is the best I remember it and it could be slightly differant but seven steps was in the title somewhere.
Well said, Global Scout.
You packed a lot of wisdom in that post.
Steve, you have to admit that, at the very least, Larry was an original (or should I say inventive) thinker.
You packed a lot of wisdom in that post.
Steve, you have to admit that, at the very least, Larry was an original (or should I say inventive) thinker.
He and Ralph were two people I NEVER want to follow as a speaker. Last time I saw Larry the two of us were speakers at the SF Branch Conference. I met a two star named Schoomaker who was running it.
7 steps for COIN?
I'll look around, we had the 7 phases of U.S. sponsored unconventional warfare forever (a somewhat limited perspective of UW, focuses on using guerrillas/insurgents to support our conventional forces), but I don't ever recall seeing the 7 steps for COIN? I'll look though and see what I can come up with.
The UW steps are:
1. Psychological preparation of the target audiences
2. Initial contact between guerrillas and U.S. contacts
3. Infiltrating USSF
4. Organizing the guerrillas
5. Build up the guerrilla forces
6. Employ the guerrillas (guerrilla warfare)
7. Demobilize the guerrillas (turn the weapons into plows again, yea right).
There is a lot that goes into each step, but this is the general idea. I guess you could draw some parallels to COIN, but I wouldn't.
Global Scout, due to the time frame that I read it I would you have found what I was thinking of. Associating this with COIN was just my sometimes bad memory and my interpretation if it. Thanks for finding it. Slap
Good post. I don't think we disagree significantly.
That's fine, your nations involved and mine probably differ and people and experiences differ. Other than with Latin Americans (with no great culture or religion gap), It still tracks in my experience.
I haven't been involved in Iraq or the 'Stan but I did live in the ME for a couple of years and got to travel about. Certainly no expert but I did learn four things in the ME:
1. They are exceedingly polite.
2. That politeness leads them to tell you what they think you want to hear.
3. They will hew to you as long as they perceive any advantage to them, their family, their Tribe or their country in that order.
4. Nothing in the ME is as it seems.
My son who's been to both theaters says the Afghans are different in many respects and are far easier to work with and that they can be won over to a far greater extent. Different strokes.
Agree on all counts. I'd also say that some Americans will never be able to be trained to lose some of those negative aspects you cite -- which complicates the COIN problem for the non-SF Army....however, I agree that the many in the American military are far from the ideal individuals to execute COIN. Too many of our Soldiers and officers are arrogant and assuming, and unwilling to "really" listen to the locals, thus too quick to burn bridges with the indigenous personnel in whatever country they manage to put boots on the ground in. Special Forces is one of the only units that is actually trained to establish and maintain rapport with the locals, and trust is absolutely essential (it takes time to develop and constant work to maintain it). Unfortunately we too have started to lose that trait since 9/11, since everyone, including SF wants to play whack-a-mole and engage in bankrupt concepts like network targeting.
Problem is that there aren't enough really qualified people who can pass honest Selection and fill the Groups, therefor the rest of the Army in all likelihood going to have to get involved and better cooperation between Green and big Army is necessary...
Agree. No caveats.Some people, I believe Kilcullen is one, say there are two strategies in COIN. One is enemy focused, and it only works when the insurgency is in the incipient phase . . . Instead some simply want to build schools and naively assume they're having the desired effect.
Agree.I for one don't think that COIN is sole fight of the future . . . Now we think the gravest threat to our security is transnational terrorism (I would argue this isn't reasoned analysis at all, but regardless it is where we are at now), and COIN is the response, everything else is a distant second priority.
And I agree with that as well. It all goes back to a frank assessment before commitment. Given that the 'national leadership' (scary phrase, that...) over the next decade or so is not likely to have any military experience at the helm; it is up to the Army to produce a full spectrum capability, to better operate with SOCOM and to let said leadership know what's in the too-hard box. As one of Shinseki's predecessors said, "We 'can-do' ourselves to death." That needs to stop. However, excessive caution and disinclination to commit also merit thought...As always we need to maintain the capability to do both. I still generally agree with GEN Shinseki when he said something along the lines of we can lose a COIN and still survive, but we cannot survive losing a conventional war. I think that argument is still valid, and we have to accept that some insurgencies can't be won without an unreasonable amount of dollars and blood, because the HN government is simply inept. In those cases we have the option of saying enough, we tried to help you.
Good post. I just want to see some balance and have watched for a great many years the swings to opposite poles in doctrine. Those are not good.
And I still never got to Europe...
Last edited by Ken White; 12-17-2007 at 02:52 AM. Reason: Typos
Read Leonhard
Gentelman,
As previously stated I strongly suggest reading Leonhard. Despite the title, it is real "old school" stuff, and does a away with a lot of the rubbish that Fuller, Liddell Hart, and FM-100/5 comes up with.
SEMANTICS
Words are important. If we were all doctors, all words used would have a universal and precise meaning. Same is true if we were physicists or engineers.
We can't talk about surprise, initiave or economy of force unless there is a precise, accurate and useable definition. Look at the way Ken White and I have utterly different understandings of Agility and Initiative.
It would seem to me, that the calibre of men on this board (and it is exceptional - most boards like this are populated by morons) should be able to focus on developing a common understanding to ensure greater use.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Works more often than not. British and Anzac operations in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo, Oman, and Northern Ireland were more-or-less successful, although some of them were rather more "Militarized" than others. Palestine, India, and Aden are the more spectacular failures - although the Brits themselves left in order. Canada had to use thousands of troops in 1970 during the FLQ Crisis (a debatable case admittedly), and again in 1990 to deal with Mohawk disquiet (not as debatable as the FLQ) - tense times, but nothing like the aforementioned examples.The Curmudgeon: Just curious, what was the success rate for operations conducted under this system?
As to Leonhard's Three Laws of War, I discern recourse to the Just War Doctrine in the First, and Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in the latter two, and especially hard/ordinary/conventional and soft/extraordinary/unconventional elements (zhi and qi) in the Third Law. Good, solid, traditional stuff.Table 5. Leonhard’s Laws of War and Principles of Information Age Warfare.34
LAWS OF WAR:
The Law of Humanity
The Law of Economy
The Law of Duality
PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION AGE WARFARE
Principle of Knowledge and Ignorance (Independent Principle):
Two Principles of Two Principles of Two Principles of
“Aggression”: “Interaction”: “Control”:
Dislocation and Opportunity and Option Acceleration
Confrontation Reaction and Objective
Distribution and Activity and Security Command and
Concentration Anarchy
In late 1998, Robert R. Leonhard, an active duty U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, released a provocative, yet insightful book titled The Principles of War for the Information Age.30In his book, Leonhard rejects the entire set of principles of war based on what he considers both their obsolescence and intellectual bankruptcy in dealing with conflict.31 Leonhard does not reject the notion of identifying and espousing principles of war. He asserts, though, that a “principle” must not be treated as an “aphorism” (which he defined as “a truth of some sort”32) or a prescription; but rather, as a basis for dialogue and argument. 33He proposes three, immutable “laws of war” underpinning his seven “principles of information age warfare.” These are summarized in Table 5. Though his proposed principles may at first appear to carry a format roughly similar to the traditional nine, that is where any similarity abruptly ends. [] Leonard’s calls for a radical shift in how the military uses and thinks about principles of war, and his ideas deserve careful consideration.9
The "Seven Principles of War for the Information Age" offhand make sense, but since this is very new to me I have not grasped it beyond the superficial, although I see elements of the Three Laws reflected in the Seven Principles, especially the last two Laws. I am in full agreement with Leonhards' view of the role and purpose of "Principles of War" as bases for "dialogue and argument" - thinkin' n' learnin'. More good stuff.
There does seem to be an un- or under-stated element or principle of time/speed here, and I'm not certain that Leonhard merely implies it, or that its covered by his "Two Principles of Interaction" and "Option Acceleration and Objective" from the "Two Principles of Control". This is well worth thinking about, but it's going to take me some more time to really assimilate.
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