A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War

[Ken White]

does the bit about informs being common on the streets pertain to WW II when it was hard to see a male on the streets who was not in uniform?

Does it also pertain to the period from 1946 until the mid 1960s when those in the US Armed force routinely wore their uniforms to town and on leaves and passes? I have wandered the streets in most major cities in this country in uniform and never had an ounce of trouble. Also got a lot free drinks while doing so; service was at one time appreciated instead of just being paid lip service by some as is now the case.

The wearing of civilian clothes while off duty started in the mid fifties as the nation got wealthier and Joe could afford civilian clothes. It gathered speed in the 60s because the troops didn't enjoy being hassled by anti-war protestors in and around colleges and college towns. Not because they hated being hassled (many welcomed it ) but because they knew if it escalated and became a matter of record the Services were likely to make them suffer even if they were the aggrieved.

So uniforms were everywhere 60-70 years ago -- and not a military dictatorship yet.

I would offer one caveat, though. I went to Little Rock in 1957, Armed, ammo, steel helmet and all that. Would you rather I had not gone along with 1200 other folks from the 101st to forestall an insurrection and to enforce the law?

The caveat; doing that to put the kids in School and then hitchhiking through Little Rock less than a year later, in uniform and with a 101st patch on ones arm was not smart...

[William F. Owen]

Sorry for the discourse on philosophy of language, but I think it is important to get clear on how hard it is to communicate with each other.

Do not be sorry. This is exactly what we need. Leonhard spends considerable time fleshing out definitions, and explaining why and how he uses language.

I can only view this from my experience. EG: "Recon Pull" was cut from the UK's ADP Land Operations publication, because when everyone sat down to define it, it turned out to be meaningless, in that it failed to describe the activity it aimed to, and was, in fact, misleading. Up until then people were always rattling on about recon-pull - and even worse- STILL DO!

[wm]

I just received the following note.

CAMOS, the Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy, invites proposals for papers or call for panel for the 2008 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. The convention will meet in Boston, Massachusetts from August 28 until August 31, 2008.

As a cooperating organization with APSA, CAMOS is allotted one panel at the 2009 annual meeting.

Papers and panels that address key issues of strategy and military operations will be considered. Specific topics of interest include:

National security and defense policy-making
Strategy in the post-Cold War Era
Role of the military in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building
Operations and strategy of preventive war and regime change
Determinants of military success and failure
Sources of military doctrines
The revolution in military affairs
Civil-military relations

Papers and panels that involve cross-case analysis (over time or across countries) and those that move beyond an exclusive focus on US military operations and strategy will be of special interest.

Paper proposals should include the paper titles, a short abstract (500 words max), and contact information for the author(s). Panel proposals should include the same for each paper, along with a title and abstract for the panel as a whole, and contact information for panel chair and discussant, if included.

Please submit proposals by Friday January 11, 2008 to:

Dr. Sergio Catignani
CAMOS Program Chair
Max Weber Fellow
European University Institute
Phone: +393484295967
Fax: +390554685804
Email: sergio.catignani-at-gmail.com (If you send your proposal as an attached document, please include your name and contact information in the attachment.)

The 5th and 6th topics seem especially germane to the thrust of this thread and a few other threads on the SWC board as well. I might even buy the first beer for anyone who gets a paper selected for presentation.

[Norfolk]

I just received the following note.

The 5th and 6th topics seem especially germane to the thrust of this thread and a few other threads on the SWC board as well. I might even buy the first beer for anyone who gets a paper selected for presentation.

wm, promise me that the beer won't be a Molson's.

The Principles of War: "Mass" should probably still be retained as a Principle of War, whether it is referrring to a massing of forces or a massing of effects or whatever, and however that is achieved, whether by unity of command, agility, suprise, or however that is brought about; as long as it is concentration for the purposes of achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic effect, that should still be termed "Mass".

I am unconvinced that Leonhard's Principles are any better than the "traditional" ones; though I do find them not only worthy of consideration, but indeed worthy of further development. But as they stand right now, I perceive that they so far simply supplement as commentary, rather than replace, the present doctrinally-accepted principles in the English-speaking countries. As Information technology and doctrine matures, and more experience is gained, that may change.

But I discern an immediate useage for Leonhard's principles, as well as those of Russia, China, France, etc., given the following quote that Gian provided us:

Doctrine is how an army thinks out loud about war.

If we are closing officers' and soldiers' minds by having them memorize a single list of principles of war and their formal definitions, then it would appear that much of the point of teaching (some of) them these principles is simply being lost. They are learning less by thinking than they are by rote, or perhaps to be more accurate, some are really learning and thinking about what they're being taught, and some are just learning without thinking all that much about it. There is of course the personal factor here; some people are bold and imaginative thinkers, and some are docile and formulaic "receivers".

As to COIN being extraordinary or somehow exotic, well no. You do not require anything like the sophisticated Unit SOPs and Battle Drills let alone the complex Formation-level aggregation and coordination of all manner of arms and elements in very intense and rapidly-changing operations over significant distances. One of the problems the US Army seems to be having with COIN is that it is indeed viewing it through the comparatively sophisticated lens of HIC Combined-Arms Warfare. A result of this is that, being trained to perceive and handle the difficult and complex tasks of higher-intensity warfare, it is inclined to see difficulties and complexities in COIN that are either aggravated by that perspective, or are illusions created by such a perspective, and they may not in fact exist.

What this also seems to reveal is a neglect of some basic skills or the lack of real proficiency in some basic skills, as the technology that can substitute or at least mitigate the need for such skills in higher-intensity mechanized warfare is not as applicable in lower-intensity human warfare. A 15-week Infantry OSUT does not make for a first-class infantryman; in WWII, US Army infantrymen received 13 weeks' training until late 1943, when battle experience convinced the Army that a 17-week syllabus was needed.

60-some years later, the US Army gives its riflemen 2 less weeks' training now than it did in late-WWII. In the meantime, Commonwealth Armies have gone from a 16-week Infantry syllabus in WWII to a 25-33 week syllabus (depending upon country and whether Army or Marines). The Israelis go for a 5-month syllabus, and the USMC for a 20-week syllabus. A 15-week training syllabus for one of the most important means of fighting and winning a human-based war, the infantryman, is not a good start for COIN. Why the US Army steadfastly refuses to join the rest of the English-speaking world and put their infantrymen on a 6-month infantry syllabus is a source of endless astonishment and wonder to its English-speaking brethren.

[William F. Owen]

60-some years later, the US Army gives its riflemen 2 less weeks' training now than it did in late-WWII. In the meantime, Commonwealth Armies have gone from a 16-week Infantry syllabus in WWII to a 25-33 week syllabus (depending upon country and whether Army or Marines). The Israelis go for a 5-month syllabus, and the USMC for a 20-week syllabus. A 15-week training syllabus for one of the most important means of fighting and winning a human-based war, the infantryman, is not a good start for COIN. Why the US Army steadfastly refuses to join the rest of the English-speaking world and put their infantrymen on a 6-month infantry syllabus is a source of endless astonishment and wonder to its English-speaking brethren.

I am not sure I see a relationship between how long infantry training is and how good a product you turn out. I did 24 weeks in 1980 and looking back is was woeful compared to what was actually needed. Infantry basic training is still stuck in WW2, as I have expounded elsewhere.

IDF infantry is always over subscribed and IDF recruit selection is very thorough, so the raw material they have is of a very high standard compared to some NATO armies. - and basic IDF recruits do no get taught to map read!! according a friend who has just done his stint in Nachal

[Ken White]

a year or so. Another week may be added. Still not enough, I agree. About six months is required to do it right.

Noteworthy that the Germans at the heighth of WW II still kept their Infantry and Tanker training at about that length.

[William F. Owen]

Noteworthy that the Germans at the heighth of WW II still kept their Infantry and Tanker training at about that length.

Actually REFUSED to cut it, despite pressure from Hitler and what adjustments were made, were scrutinised in great detail. In WW1 they dropped drill pretty quickly!

[Ron Humphrey]

a year or so. Another week may be added. Still not enough, I agree. About six months is required to do it right.

Noteworthy that the Germans at the heighth of WW II still kept their Infantry and Tanker training at about that length.

That "grunt" training seemed so disproportionate in its length vs so many of the other component and mos training programs.

Then again it never surprised me when at NG drills or while on active duty we would do our terrain recognition/ find your way back home stuff and less than 20%( possible exaggeration) would make it home in time for dinner.

[Norfolk]

Actually REFUSED to cut it, despite pressure from Hitler and what adjustments were made, were scrutinised in great detail. In WW1 they dropped drill pretty quickly!

Yes, I think the German example of 6 months' training went a long way to convincing the Canadian Army of adopting much the same sort of syllabus. Unfortunately, I think that even at the best of times, the Canadian 6-month syllabus was somewhat less efficient than the German syllabus. The Germans placed an emphasis on live-fire and weapons-handling that is scarcely matched today, maybe not even. WE did somewhat more Drill than we really needed to.

I wonder if Felix Steiner's training program is still in existence in print somewhere?

[Ken White]

I am not sure I see a relationship between how long infantry training is and how good a product you turn out. I did 24 weeks in 1980 and looking back is was woeful compared to what was actually needed. Infantry basic training is still stuck in WW2, as I have expounded elsewhere.

IDF infantry is always over subscribed and IDF recruit selection is very thorough, so the raw material they have is of a very high standard compared to some NATO armies. - and basic IDF recruits do no get taught to map read!! according a friend who has just done his stint in Nachal

training is time; there are only 24 hours to a day and the more time you have to train, the better practiced (as opposed to merely exposed to the concept) the product.

That said, your basic point is valid, we are still essentially using WW II (actually WW I) training methodology. In fairness, here in the US, Initial Entry Training is better than it has ever been but there's still a lot of room for improvement. A part of our problem has been the Drill Sergeant model of training and another is the poor selection process. Both those are slowly -- too slowly -- changing but I think a major improvement might be realized in the next three to six years.

One additional problem is a lot of politically desirable training that Congress adds into training dollars; i.e. we'll give you the money but you have to teach this...

That and the inane and unnecessary details the kids have to pull that takes them away from training. Usually the smart kids on the rationale they'll be able to pass the gate tests anyway -- which of course antagonizes the smart kids who quickly figure out why they pull so many details. Relic of a large draftee Army and just wrong.

[Ron Humphrey]

.

That and the inane and unnecessary details the kids have to pull that takes them away from training. Usually the smart kids on the rationale they'll be able to pass the gate tests anyway -- which of course antagonizes the smart kids who quickly figure out why they pull so many details. Relic of a large draftee Army and just wrong.

Most the one's I knew said it didn't bother them. They'd rather eat more and sweat less anyway

[Gian P Gentile]

As to COIN being extraordinary or somehow exotic, well no. You do not require anything like the sophisticated Unit SOPs and Battle Drills let alone the complex Formation-level aggregation and coordination of all manner of arms and elements in very intense and rapidly-changing operations over significant distances. One of the problems the US Army seems to be having with COIN is that it is indeed viewing it through the comparatively sophisticated lens of HIC Combined-Arms Warfare. A result of this is that, being trained to perceive and handle the difficult and complex tasks of higher-intensity warfare, it is inclined to see difficulties and complexities in COIN that are either aggravated by that perspective, or are illusions created by such a perspective, and they may not in fact exist.

Norfolk:

This is an important point to make and i think it is spot-on. The last couple of sentences are especially relevant to the American Army today. I would add a dimension to your points that there has been sort of a cottage industry made around Coin by some serving officers who had written about it prior to 9/11 but had been banished to the sidelines by the "conventional minded" army. But once Afghanistan and Iraq presented themselves with the need for counterinsurgency operations these invididuals dusted of their wares and said here we are; we are your new experts, embrace us and we shall show you the way. This personalized/professional hyper-interest in Coin has reinforced the point you make above about the American army and its fetish to sometimes overthink things and make things more complicated than they actually are.

[William F. Owen]

Norfolk:

But once Afghanistan and Iraq presented themselves with the need for counterinsurgency operations these invididuals dusted of their wares and said here we are; we are your new experts, embrace us and we shall show you the way. This personalized/professional hyper-interest in Coin has reinforced the point you make above about the American army and its fetish to sometimes overthink things and make things more complicated than they actually are.

As to COIN being extraordinary or somehow exotic, well no. You do not require anything like the sophisticated Unit SOPs and Battle Drills let alone the complex Formation-level aggregation and coordination of all manner of arms and elements in very intense and rapidly-changing operations over significant distances. .

Norfolk and the Gentile. I envy your sights. Yes, yes and a thousand times yes. You have just articulated why I have am deeply mistrustful of the majority of that which I read about so-called "Counter-Insurgency."

[wm]

Norfolk:

This is an important point to make and i think it is spot-on. The last couple of sentences are especially relevant to the American Army today. I would add a dimension to your points that there has been sort of a cottage industry made around Coin by some serving officers who had written about it prior to 9/11 but had been banished to the sidelines by the "conventional minded" army. But once Afghanistan and Iraq presented themselves with the need for counterinsurgency operations these invididuals dusted of their wares and said here we are; we are your new experts, embrace us and we shall show you the way. This personalized/professional hyper-interest in Coin has reinforced the point you make above about the American army and its fetish to sometimes overthink things and make things more complicated than they actually are.

While no names are mentioned, are some of those experts also advocates of 4GW theory? The following is my rather jaded take on some imaginary COIN guru's thought processes. Any resemblance to thinking by any real person, living or dead, is purely coincidental.

"Since our current struggle is an example of 4GW and 4GW is a higher number than what we used to do (3GW), it must be more advanced and, therefore, harder. Besides, if it isn't harder to do than what we've done in the past, we can't justify asking for a a bigger hunk of resources to do it, can we?"

[John T. Fishel]

of 4GW. It always struck me as a false analogy for understanding the history of warfare. At the same time, I wonder about the apparent vehemence that some on this thread have expressed about COIN theory and theorists. The history of American military thought is that Small Wars, including COIN, gets short shrift over the long term and every time we run into a small war we have to reinvent the wheel.

I have no argument with those who say we cannot ignore the various threats that come from states in a more or less conventional form. I won't even argue the point that we are possibly ignoring those threats at present in our current involvement with COIN. But I don't believe that is the long term danger. My sense is that once iraq and Afghanistan are behind us (and they will be, sooner rather than later) the Army will tend to put FM 3-24 on the shelf as a historical reference and will go back to preparing for the "big" war.

I hope I'm wrong and that Small Wars can assume its balanced place within the teaching of military schools as the most likely, if not the most dangerous, of all contingencies for which the military must prepare.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

if not the most dangerous, of all contingencies for which the military must prepare.

Cheers

JohnT

Well said John,this is a part that is often overlooked at our peril.I don't agree that we afford to loose a COIN war but not a conventional one. Loosing a COIN war promotes copy cats who are willing to take on Big nations because it provides a blueprint on how to defeat us.

[Ron Humphrey]

It is quite apparent that there is great concern about large war capability being lost in the small war focus we find our selves in. And considering the history of many who espouse this concern one can only believe theres reality to what they say. Given that is it really as likely that we be caught (offguard) so to speak as it is we be surprised by small wars in various arenas.

Would there really be an ability of an enemy of state proportions who would be able to bring the battle so quickly that there would not be at least a reasonable amount of time within which to prepare and react.

This may be a sign of my youth and inexperience but to me one of the most notable differences between large and small scale wars is that in large scale one tends to react more than be proactive( at least from a western perspective), small wars almost always require the opposite in order to be brought to any reasonable conclusion.

[Norfolk]

It is quite apparent that there is great concern about large war capability being lost in the small war focus we find our selves in. And considering the history of many who espouse this concern one can only believe theres reality to what they say. Given that is it really as likely that we be caught (offguard) so to speak as it is we be surprised by small wars in various arenas.

Would there really be an ability of an enemy of state proportions who would be able to bring the battle so quickly that there would not be at least a reasonable amount of time within which to prepare and react.

This may be a sign of my youth and inexperience but to me one of the most notable differences between large and small scale wars is that in large scale one tends to react more than be proactive( at least from a western perspective), small wars almost always require the opposite in order to be brought to any reasonable conclusion.

Ron, the time it takes just to get sufficient Heavy forces into an area will probably eat up any warning time that you might, or might not have. My Company Commander (and one or two other guys from my Coy as well) was attached to 1st Marine Div in GW1, and the six months that the Coalition forces had to build-up in almost perfect security and relying in part on in-theatre purpose-built bases and pre-positioned stocks of supplies and equipment may mislead poeple as how how long it may really take in practice. The US Army has (or at least had,) a concept in which an entire Army Corps can be sent into a major conventional war within 75 days. Not likely.

And in the meantime you have to bring everyone in your Units and Formations up to a level of training and proficiency that can allow for little in the way or error. You can bring a Unit (but not a Formation) up to scratch for COIN in as little as 90 days prior to deployment - but I would not recommend that - 6 months would be better. At least double those figures for conventional war. Unless you are dealing with a hopelessly incompetent enemy, a 3-month beat-up to a conventional war is a plan for filling a lot of your own body-bags. Even 6 months will be the absolute minimum once you have included Formation-level training - and a year would be best. Time is against you in High-Intensity warfare in a way that it is not in COIN.

Take for example, GW1 again. VII Corps was unable to accomplish its mission of cutting off and detroying the Republican Guard, inpart because it had never practiced a passage-of-lines at night (and this led to the loss of the better part of a day immediately after 1st Infantry Div made the breech in the Iraqi front-lie defences), and because the Corps was inexperienced and unsure of how to manouevre an entire Corps for offensive operations. The entire Corps stopped its advance (on the Second Day if I remember correctly) for the better part of a day, again, in order to get all the Armoured Divisions on-line. Admittedly, VII Corps was given the order to attack few days ahead of schedule, but the better part of two lost days for ther attack allowed not only the majority of the Republic Guard to escape, but also a substantial proportion of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait as well.

There was another problem that occurred while while the Armoured Divs were being formed up on-line; when they did so, a gap straight through to the Corps' logistics trains and LOCs opened up for a day or so, as 3ACR was screening to the north and east of the Corps at the time. A bold and competent enemy commander could have drove an armoured brigade into that gap and temporarily dislocated the VII Corps' attack. Had this been tried against the Soviets in the 1980's, an entire Unified Army Corps/Operational Manoeuvre Group might have found its way into such a gap. Big trouble.

Had something like this occurred in GW1, the theatre reserve, the 1st Cav Div would have had to have been diverted from its strategic deception operation in the Wadi al-Batin to counterattack to the north-west to eliminate the threat and cover the gap. Despite popular opinion, the US Army, much less many other NATO countries, was not as prepared for conventional war as one might think, even after spending years preparing for it.

The problem is this: most of your COIN capability comes from thorough proficiency in basic individual skills and minor-unit operations. And that is the very same basic matter that is required for high-intensity warfare. There is no conflict between the two there. Once your individual and minor-unit level training is completed in your Unit's training cycle, most of its COIN training is already completed, and you're ready to start working on high-intensity combined arms ops. If you do not have thorough proficiency in those areas, simply adopting COIN Doctrine at Unit and Formationa level will not completely make up for those lack of basic competencies.

As far as low-intensity and COIN training at Unit and Formation level, that is necessary to have and to maintain, but it does not take anything like the time that the high-intensity stuff does. Not more than 25% of Unit and Formation-level training should go to Low-Intensity conflict. Do not confuse LIC for HIC; LIC is basic, HIC is advanced, and most of LIC is covered in the same basic training that is required for HIC at the individual and minor-unit level anyway.

That said, you cannot wage COIN the same way you do HIC. That is where COIN Doctrine really comes into its own, at the Operational and Strategic levels. But it is nothing like a hard to manage as HIC; it just requires a thorough grasp of the basics and a different mindset - a slower, somewhat more relaxed mindset. As Gian said, don't over-intellectualize it.

But you cannot afford to lose a major conventional war in most cases, and it takes a long, long time to be ready for one. And even then you may not be ready. Take a look at the Allies in WWII, especially in the Atlantic Theatre: North Africa, Italy, North-West Europe. Not the best showing despite having a couple years to prepare.

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm going to chew on that for a bit.

[Norfolk]

I'm going to chew on that for a bit.

Ron, I've just been informed by a very credible source that at least part of the reason for the VII Corps delay was logistical; the fighting units simply out-ran their supply lines. This is a critical factor, obviously, and must be accorded very great weight in considering the course of the VII Corps attack in GW1.