The Islamic Insurgents (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

I’m not surprised to find this article here, and I really have to say something about it. Aside from the melodramatic tone, it is a really striking piece, not for what it says, but for what it does not say. Right at the heart of the story Bowden is telling is one of the most bizarre and controversial incidents in the bizarre and controversial history of the Abu Sayyaf – and Bowden doesn’t even mention it. He had to have known about the incident, which features prominently in every other account, and it’s something that one would expect to put a journalist’s salivary glands into overdrive, but in Bowden’s account it simply didn’t happen.

The omission starts with a factual error. Bowden writes (of ASG leader Aldam Tilao):

His target that spring morning was Amanpulo, the most expensive diving resort on the southern coast of Palawan, where he and the others hoped to harvest a crop of wealthy foreign hostages. They would extort large ransom payments from the victims’ families and employers, and shatter the friendly calm vital to the Philippine tourism industry. Palawan was considered completely safe. The trouble in recent years had been confined for the most part to the southern islands. This thrust across the Sulu Sea was a bold move by Abu Sayyaf, and something of a stretch. Indeed, when Tilao and his men arrived in the unfamiliar waters off Palawan, in the predawn darkness, they got lost. The plan called for them to strike before sunrise and set off on the long return trip while it was still dark. But with dawn rapidly approaching, they grabbed several local night fishermen off their boats and pressed them into service as guides. Abandoning their primary goal, the raiders settled for a resort called Dos Palmas.

This sounds all well and good, except that Amanpulo isn’t on “the southern coast of Palawan”. It’s not even close to the southern coast of Palawan. It is in fact in the Cuyo Islands, northeast of Palawan, over 300km from where Bowden places it. That’s not a minor error, for reasons that become clear as we review the rest of the omissions.

Now we get to the truly bizarre bit:

On the fifth night, the kidnappers and their captives slipped off the boat into the warm, chest-high water off Basilan and walked ashore through the lazy lapping of the tide. Behind them, the spotlights of fishing vessels dotted the horizon. Islanders lived along the shoreline, but like these guerrillas, they knew how to move inland along narrow trails that pushed uphill into the black jungle. By straying just ten feet, a person could vanish into the dense vegetation.

The first time I read this I was so astonished that I went back and clicked around, thinking somehow I’d missed a page. I hadn’t.

Here’s what was left out:

The ASG and the hostages did not “move inland along narrow trails that pushed uphill into the black jungle”. On June 1st, shortly after landing, they were engaged by AFP units in the town of Tuburan. The ASG commandeered a vehicle, abandoned 3 hostages that wouldn’t fit into it, and withdrew, with the AFP in pursuit. At about 11pm, they entered the town of Lamitan, where they took over the Jose Ma Torres Hospital, taking more hostages in the process. The hospital was surrounded by an AFP force of 2000-3000 men (accounts vary) supported by armor and helicopters.

Late the next morning, three hostages left the hospital in what was officially described as an escape, a “dramatic dash to freedom” one writer called it. One was Reghis Romero, a businessman who had amassed a fortune estimated in the billions of pesos, primarily through government contracts. The others were his mistress Rizza Santos and an 8 year old boy named RJ Recio. Their exit was made from the hospital’s front door.

Later that day, the troops at the rear of the hospital left the area. Military officials do not deny the troop movement, but describe it as tactical redeployment.

At about 5pm, a vehicle with arms and ASG members arrived through the front entrance of the hospital compound. Hostages claim that they heard the ASG arrivals state that they gained access by claiming to be bodyguards of Basilan Governor (and later Congressman) Wahab Akbar, a man with the dubious distinction of having at various times held leadership positions in the MNLF, MILF, ASG, and the Philippine Government. (After several interviews I personally concluded that through this chain of affiliations Akbar had served, with fanatical loyalty, a single cause: the ascension and prosperity of Wahab Akbar.) There are also several eyewitness accounts claiming that Akbar visited the hospital during the siege, which Akbar denied.

At about 5:30pm, the ASG and the hostages left by the back gate, unmolested. Hostages later claimed that the ASG appeared unprepared for combat during the exit and unconcerned with the possibility that they might have to fight their way out. Well outside the compound, there was a brief firefight with a small group of police and civilian volunteers, in which two hostages were wounded and left behind.

At about 1am the AFP launched an all-out assault on the hospital compound, which by that time had been empty for over 6 hours.

There are some obvious questions here. Reghis Romero was the big ticket item among the hostages, it seems odd that he would have been given an opportunity to escape, especially through the front door, where according to accounts by other hostages the bulk of the ASG contingent was placed. The arrival of arms and additional ASG forces during the siege is inexplicable. The “tactical redeployment” that left the rear of the hospital unguarded is beyond inexplicable.

Here’s the unofficial version:

The ASG were never headed for Amanpulo, they were going to Dos Palmas from the start. This is why Bowden’s geographical error is significant. If Amanpulo were in fact on the southern coast of Palawan, the diversion story would be credible. Given the actual location, the account becomes absurd.

The ASG went to Dos Palmas for a reason: Reghis Romero. Romero had been using the resort as a love nest for some time, the ASG had a tip from an inside contact. They knew he was there and they went and got him. Ransom negotiations began by satellite phone immediately after the kidnapping, and the ransom was prepared and a private aircraft made available before the group even landed. The ransom (varied reports say 17 or 25 million pesos) was delivered, negotiations were held, the money was divided. Romero, Santos, and Recio were released, and as part of the deal the ASG and the hostages were permitted to depart unmolested.

That’s a nasty story, but if you ask just about anyone in the Philippines and it’s what you’ll hear. It also seems more consistent with events than the official story. Questions, of course, were asked. An inquiry by the Philippine Senate concluded that there was strong circumstantial evidence to support allegations of collusion, and recommended court martial for 3 officers. No court martial was ever held.

It should perhaps be noted that there is a long history of allegations that Philippine civilian, police, and military officials are routinely involved in collusion and profit sharing with kidnappers, bank robbers, drug dealers, illegal loggers, etc, ad infinitum, and that there is strong circumstantial evidence suggesting that this does occur on a regular basis.

I have other questions about the article, most notably about the allegations of Aldam Tilao’s AQ connections and training abroad, but this post is way too long already.

Getting back to Bowden and his article… given the attention the Lamitan incident has already achieved, I cannot begin to imagine how Bowden and the Atlantic, both with fairly credible reputations, could completely exclude it from their account. The only explanation I can think of is that it is not quite compatible with the rather heroic tone taken by the rest of the story… but is that reputable journalism? What ever happened to “warts and all”? If Bowden had reviewed events and concluded, citing some deep dark source in the intel community, that all was above board, that I could understand… but to omit the events entirely?

It strikes me that Bowden clearly depended heavily on military and intel sources for his inside information, and that these sources may have insisted as a precondition for participation that the incident not be discussed. That idea does not paint a very pretty picture of Bowden or the Atlantic – in fact it would make the article something approaching disinformation. It’s the only explanation I can think of, though.

If anybody here has a better one, I’d love to hear it.