The Islamic Insurgents (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

I still wonder what Patek was doing in Pakistan when he got rolled up. Did he meet with Bin Laden and what does that bode for terrorism in SE Asia?

There's been a lot of speculation about that... he was arrested in Abbotabad 3 months before UBL was killed, so of course people will wonder whether they met or intended to meet, and whether Patek's arrest was directly or indirectly linked to the move on UBL.

My personal feeling is that whether Patek did or didn't meet UBL would not make much difference. It's well known that JI has maintained fairly continuous links to the jihadi trunk line in Pakistan; certainly there's regular exchange of information and ideas, and presumably some degree of financing. I'm not sure a meet with UBL would be a real game-changer in that equation

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4f4l742Z2E

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mW4D6...feature=relmfu

Interesting investigative reporting on al Qaeda in SE Asia post UBL. Each video is approximately 15 minutes, if you're short on time I recommend watching the 2d one.

Try to actively listen to and understand the Jihadists, and then assess whether or not our strategy will actually be effective. I suspect this conflict will continue to ebb and flow for years, and we can't lose perspective that it is an idea, a network, etc., that is not restricted to the operational area in the Southern Philippines. We continue to suffer from excessive tunnel vision, which in my opinion is driven by doctrine that uses terms/concepts such as targeted area of interest, named area of interest, high value individual, etc., and as long we keep thinking in terms of refined geographical areas and individuals we'll continue to miss the larger strategic picture and respond accordingly.

Well, you persuaded me to break my rule against watching video reportage. It wasn't really bad, though I confess to getting seriously cranky when somebody shows footage of Mindanao with a voice-over saying things like "this is where Operation Bojinka was conceived...". That's a crock, of course, Bojinka was conceived in a Manila apartment, by a foreign cell with only limited and peripheral connections to the Philippine network, and it was certainly not an ASG cell or an ASG plot... but that's just me ranting.

Overall, I don't think the focus on the inner circle does much justice to the larger strategic picture. For me the single most significant element in the SE Asian terrorism strategic picture is the failure of the jihadi movement to gain acceptance of its narrative beyond the inner circle. There is a committed core, as displayed in these videos, and it's certainly a threat, but the effort to develop a broadly based global jihadi movement in Indonesia and to effectively harness separatist insurgency in the Philippines has not been terribly successful. Of course a small but highly committed movement remains a real terror threat, and a JI attack, probably on a soft target, remains a real possibility, but JI remains firmly in the "terrorism" bracket with little or no success in transitioning to "insurgency". The MILF can be called insurgency but it remains firmly grounded in local issues; there are connections with international movements but the global jihad narrative has gained little broad traction.

In the west (Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, Jolo, surrounding islands), the problem is less the ASG than the mass of armed fragments owing nominal and transitory allegiance to ASG, MILF, various MNLF factions, and any number of other political groups. That's a volatile situation ripe for exploitation. ASG may have been largely degraded, but what Bob Jones would call the underlying causes of insurgency remain firmly in place. Whether the next incarnation takes on a more Islamist, nationalist/separatist, criminal, or other identity remains to be seen, but I don't doubt that a new incarnation will come along.