The Islamic Insurgents (catch all)

[Dayuhan]

and for each of you, Bill, David and Steve, I really mean the term "gentlemen" ...

What is your gut reaction to whacking these guys - IF they "materially supported" Mombai ?

That would depend on the extent and nature of the material support. Were they actively involved in planning and providing specific support for a known operation, or did they send LeT some gear that ended up being used in Mumbai, or something else altogether?

I certainly wouldn't suggest whacking anybody on the basis of information currently available to me.

[Bill Moore]

What think you ?

Not, BTW, as to "legality".

What is your gut reaction to whacking these guys - IF they "materially supported" Mombai ?

On one level it is a tough question, on another it is quite simple. If I lost a friend or family member in that attack and found out that it xyz financed it I wouldn't lose any sleep if xyz was whacked. However, what if xyz provided money in general to the "cause" and not for a specific attack? What if xyz had no knowledge of the attack? The LeT like Hezbollah have a charity arm, and if the financiers raised money (even illegally) to give money to what they thought was the charity/NGO arm I admit that complicates the issue. A lot of things complicate the issue concernning the allegations in this case, for instance if actors in Saudi provide money to hackers in Manila for a service (criminal service) and then that money flows to the ASG in the Southern Philippines or the J,I or one of its off shoots, in Indonesia and is used for a lethal attack (say another hotel bombing) is there a direct or indirect support link? What are the laws in all the concerned countries where the various actors may be in (Saudi, Italy, Pakistan, Philippines, etc. not saying all were involved in this particular case, but just pointing out the complexity of dealing with transnational criminal networks located in numerous countries that at any point can converge with a terrorist organization). Do we act independently and address a criminal country in another sovreign nation because it is tied indirectly to a terrorist group in another that threatens us?

This also addresses the whole issue of surrogates, most nations use them, and so do a lot of non-state actors. We openly supported the Muj fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, did that give the Soviets the right to attack us if they chose to do so? We have Christian groups in the U.S. that provide arms and money to other Christian groups globally that are fighting oppression (Nigeria, Sudan, etc.), so do those oppressing those groups have the right to attack these group? God knows how much we collectively raised for the IRA throughout the U.S. (mostly because we liked Irish beer and music). It isn't the same I know, but it is useful for providing context. Definitely not information available in these articles to even make a subjective value call on this case.

I'm digressing from your question, but I think this case (or it may turn out to be non-case) illustrates the inadequacy of our legal and defense structure for the era we live in. We're spun up about FID and COIN and how to address very localized problems still, which many times are simply done of our business, yet there are real global threats out there that we have no idea how respond to. We recently stood up a cyber command, but I suspect that was largely to deal with state actors, what about non-state actors like this case? This case is small scale (so it appears), what if it was larger? How would we address it?

I don't want to drag Mexico into this forum, but that is another example of where we're struggling to find a solution to projected threats to U.S. security from the transnational criminal organizations there. Guaruntee you that the DEA doesn't have the answer, in fact their operations frequently make things worse, I can't think of one country where they worked that they haven't made the problem worse.

[jmm99]

But, that ain't the question !

Steve (et al; except for Bill's post, which has the nuances I like - I'll have to do that after I sleep. ):

At some point, someone may have enough intelligence (information + analysis) to "decide" ("more likely than not"; but it could be a greater proof test - if you wish to specify it !) that a "Group X" has engaged "in supplying material support" to "Group Y" in an action that kills people.

IF that test is met, then a member of "Group X" can be whacked, anytime, anywhere, etc. ...

That is the "legal premise" - in quotes, because some would argue that is not an acceptable legal premise (please come forth !).

You can address the posited legal premise; but I am far more interested in your "gut reaction" to my "material support" scenario (albeit hypothetical).

How far will you go IF ?

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Throw enough IF in the picture and you can take it anywhere you want to go.

Certainly I can imagine situations in which unilaterally whacking a finance/support cell would be IMO appropriate... there would be a lot of "if" in the picture. I'd want to set the bar pretty high for that sort of thing, for obvious reasons.

For a finance/support group, even more than for an operational group, whacking would be a last resort and something you wouldn't want to do. You'd want tracking and surveillance to the greatest possible extent, to shake out the network, find out where the money is coming from and where it's going. If that's not possible, arrest and interrogation would be way better than whacking: dead guys don't talk.

You have to wonder if arresting a few Filipino hackers at the bottom of the food chain wouldn't just alert the Saudi side to go underground, change the MO, and go to the next plan.

[max161]

Perhaps off topic but since a JI connection was mentioned thought I would through this out.

I still wonder what Patek was doing in Pakistan when he got rolled up. Did he meet with Bin Laden and what does that bode for terrorism in SE Asia?

[Bill Moore]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4f4l742Z2E

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mW4D6...feature=relmfu

Interesting investigative reporting on al Qaeda in SE Asia post UBL. Each video is approximately 15 minutes, if you're short on time I recommend watching the 2d one.

Try to actively listen to and understand the Jihadists, and then assess whether or not our strategy will actually be effective. I suspect this conflict will continue to ebb and flow for years, and we can't lose perspective that it is an idea, a network, etc., that is not restricted to the operational area in the Southern Philippines. We continue to suffer from excessive tunnel vision, which in my opinion is driven by doctrine that uses terms/concepts such as targeted area of interest, named area of interest, high value individual, etc., and as long we keep thinking in terms of refined geographical areas and individuals we'll continue to miss the larger strategic picture and respond accordingly.

[Surferbeetle]

A Social Media Decoder, by David Talbot, December 2011, Technology Review, http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/38910/

New technology deciphers— and empowers—the millions who talk back to their televisions through the Web.

But now he's also dealing with a growing force: the masses talking back through social media. Of the approximately 300 million public comments made online worldwide every day—about two-thirds of them on Twitter—some 10 million, on average, are related to television (though daily numbers vary quite widely). "¿Que sera two and a half men si[n] Charlie?" one viewer recently tweeted, alluding to the replacement of Charlie Sheen by Ashton Kutcher on the CBS sitcom. "The beginning of Person Of Interest is like Jack&Ben all over again," remarked another. (A couple of weeks later, another added: "I assume CBS will keep going with what's been working for them, and replace Andy Rooney with Ashton Kutcher.") TV executives like Poltrack must now grapple with these spontaneous, messy, irreverent remarks.

The complete article in pdf is hosted free at the Bluefin Labs' website

http://static.bluefinlabs.com/websit...ech-review.pdf

[jmm99]

in this post, is where I find myself in considering that part of violent non-state actors who are involved in financing, recruitment, propaganda, psyops, weapons procurement, etc. - the "soft side" of the "business". So, like the father in Fiddler on the Roof, I consider "on one hand, but then on the other hand, etc."

Should the Westphalian rules apply to non-Westphalian situations ? Take the AQ or Taliban IED maker. Should direct action to kill be taken against him ? If so, then should the same direct actions be allowed against Westphalian arms makers (the modern Fords and Krupps) ? Certainly Ford and Krupp were more important to their respective war efforts than were my dad and his Wehrmacht counterpart grunt.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I still wonder what Patek was doing in Pakistan when he got rolled up. Did he meet with Bin Laden and what does that bode for terrorism in SE Asia?

There's been a lot of speculation about that... he was arrested in Abbotabad 3 months before UBL was killed, so of course people will wonder whether they met or intended to meet, and whether Patek's arrest was directly or indirectly linked to the move on UBL.

My personal feeling is that whether Patek did or didn't meet UBL would not make much difference. It's well known that JI has maintained fairly continuous links to the jihadi trunk line in Pakistan; certainly there's regular exchange of information and ideas, and presumably some degree of financing. I'm not sure a meet with UBL would be a real game-changer in that equation

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4f4l742Z2E

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mW4D6...feature=relmfu

Interesting investigative reporting on al Qaeda in SE Asia post UBL. Each video is approximately 15 minutes, if you're short on time I recommend watching the 2d one.

Try to actively listen to and understand the Jihadists, and then assess whether or not our strategy will actually be effective. I suspect this conflict will continue to ebb and flow for years, and we can't lose perspective that it is an idea, a network, etc., that is not restricted to the operational area in the Southern Philippines. We continue to suffer from excessive tunnel vision, which in my opinion is driven by doctrine that uses terms/concepts such as targeted area of interest, named area of interest, high value individual, etc., and as long we keep thinking in terms of refined geographical areas and individuals we'll continue to miss the larger strategic picture and respond accordingly.

Well, you persuaded me to break my rule against watching video reportage. It wasn't really bad, though I confess to getting seriously cranky when somebody shows footage of Mindanao with a voice-over saying things like "this is where Operation Bojinka was conceived...". That's a crock, of course, Bojinka was conceived in a Manila apartment, by a foreign cell with only limited and peripheral connections to the Philippine network, and it was certainly not an ASG cell or an ASG plot... but that's just me ranting.

Overall, I don't think the focus on the inner circle does much justice to the larger strategic picture. For me the single most significant element in the SE Asian terrorism strategic picture is the failure of the jihadi movement to gain acceptance of its narrative beyond the inner circle. There is a committed core, as displayed in these videos, and it's certainly a threat, but the effort to develop a broadly based global jihadi movement in Indonesia and to effectively harness separatist insurgency in the Philippines has not been terribly successful. Of course a small but highly committed movement remains a real terror threat, and a JI attack, probably on a soft target, remains a real possibility, but JI remains firmly in the "terrorism" bracket with little or no success in transitioning to "insurgency". The MILF can be called insurgency but it remains firmly grounded in local issues; there are connections with international movements but the global jihad narrative has gained little broad traction.

In the west (Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, Jolo, surrounding islands), the problem is less the ASG than the mass of armed fragments owing nominal and transitory allegiance to ASG, MILF, various MNLF factions, and any number of other political groups. That's a volatile situation ripe for exploitation. ASG may have been largely degraded, but what Bob Jones would call the underlying causes of insurgency remain firmly in place. Whether the next incarnation takes on a more Islamist, nationalist/separatist, criminal, or other identity remains to be seen, but I don't doubt that a new incarnation will come along.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking...ry_662225.html

'I have witnessed that there has been a radicalisation movement in this nation with religious and ideological motives,' Yudhoyono said in a speech at a national development conference in Jakarta. 'If we continue to let this happen, it will threaten the character of our nation and our people.'

Yudhoyono has allied himself with conservative Muslims in the government and has rarely spoken out against extremist violence, which often goes unpunished.

But on Thursday he said Islamic extremists, who make up a small but very vocal section of Indonesia's 200 million Muslims, were encouraging young Indonesians to 'love violence' and reject the law of the diverse country

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/...469669#Scene_1

Radicalism Losing Ground in Indonesia but Not in Universities: Survey

Support for radicals and radicalism is falling among Indonesians, a survey of 4,840 people has found. The survey by Lazuardi Birru, a Jakarta-based peace group, used a one-to-100 point scoring scale based on answers to a questionnaire, with one being most moderate and 100 being most radical. It measures respondents’ support for radicals as well as their own radical tendencies.

Zuhairi Misrawi, chairman of the Moderate Muslim Society, said support for radicalism may be declining, but the fact is that the number of incidents has been rising, partly because punishments for those who are caught are so weak.

“These non-deterrent punishments have boosted the confidence of the radicals,” Zuhairi told The Straits Times. “It indeed encourages future acts.”

As for the Bojinka Plot, I know it was "compromised" in Manila, but suspect that like the 9/11 plot it was conceived over time in a lot of places to include Malaysia, Saudi, Pakistan, and maybe even during meetings in Mindanao. The good news is it was disrupted.

My biggest concern in the Philippines isn't the ASG, but rather the Balik Islam movement and the potential pool of recruits throughout the Philippines to include Manila that could truly conduct strategic attacks.

You're right that JI and its off shoots have not evolved into an insurgency, but there are still reasons for concern. Det 88 has done a great job at suppressing the threat, but the ideology is alive and well among the true believers (even if they are a minority).