Airforce may be be going out of business

[Entropy]

That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

Well, the rumor among some of my AF friends is that part of the reason the AF leadership wants more than 183 F-22's is because with so few aircraft there won't be many pure fighter pilots in the future and so the fighter mafia won't take almost all the leadership positions. There is probably a grain of truth to that, but there are also legitimate reasons, IMO, to increase the F-22 buy. One thing to keep in mind is that capping production at 183 aircraft and closing the line, the AF will probably want an F-22 follow-on sooner than might otherwise be the case

And I agree with you on the problem with a mentality that demands the best at the expense of the good enough - something that seems to afflict military procurement in general. Part of the thinking however, at least with the F-22, is that it will be the principle air superiority weapon for four decades and that it must be state-of-the-art now to ensure it remains competitive against potential threats 30 years from now (particularly the surface-to-air threat, which I see as much more of a problem over the next decade or two than enemy fighters). There is some legitimacy to that argument, but I think the AF has oversold it. As I said in another thread, if I could set the wayback machine to the mid-1990's and made myself procurement Czar, I would have halted F-22 development for 10-15 years and bought updgraded F15's instead and worked on an alternative for the important SEAD mission. We could have safely waited another decade before fielding a fifth-gen fighter IMO, while continuing basic R&D to mature some of the technologies before full development which would (hopefully) save some on development cost.

One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises.

Everything = compromises. Specialized aircraft have compromises too, just different ones. It's much harder, for example, to min/max capabilities on the fly with specialized aircraft and adjust to changing needs. And specialized aircraft will require a bigger Air Force with more airplanes and people - something that doesn't seem likely given financial realities. I would agree, however, that for some things you really do need a specialized aircraft, though we might disagree on what those needs might be.

Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft...

Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's. The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition. The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.

Maybe what the AF needs to do is allow different units of multi-role aircraft to specialize their training in certain areas while maintaining minimum qualifications in everything else instead of pursuing a standard qualification routine. For example, out of all of the F-16 squadrons we have, some percentage would specialize in CAS, some air strikes, some air-to-air, etc. Such a scheme could prevent CAS from atrophying after OIF/OEF are over and provide other benefits as well.

All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?

Yes, and for similar reasons: readiness and sortie generation rates. Airlines cannot afford unreliable aircraft because that means canceled or delayed flights, disruption of the sensitive hub system most airlines use, etc. The military cannot afford much of it either because lower readiness rates negatively impact the ability to meet mission requirements and severely impact the ability to surge forces for any length of time. This is because of two factors: Older aircraft breakdown more often and older aircraft require more maintenance time per flying hour. These factors compound on each other to significantly reduce the number of aircraft you can have in the air at any one time and the ability to turn those aircraft around in a timely manner for the next sortie. Such issues can be planned for and worked around in the relatively static air environment that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan today, but can really spoil your dinner in air operations with greater uncertainty and higher optempo.

Take my F-14 experience from earlier where out of a squadron of 14 aircraft only about 8 were considered "up" at any one time on average. That means only 2 or maybe 3 aircraft can be kept in the air constantly (say for a CAP). But, since those airplanes break more often and since turn-around time is longer (because more maintenance is required per flying hour), the ability to keep those 2-3 aircraft in the air diminishes more rapidly over time than for a newer aircraft like the F-18. So by contrast, a 12-plane F-18 squadron typically had ten aircraft "up" at any one time and so could keep more aircraft in the air and sustain that for a much longer period of time.

The flip side of this is exploiting those factors on our enemies, which is something you usually don't hear much about. Most world air forces have low readiness rates compared to western air forces. This is great for us because it reduces the number of aircraft we'll have to deal with and, in the case of a long conflict, those air forces will run out of steam quickly through maintenance attrition even if all other factors are equal (which they never are). When talking about air threats a lot of people seem to like to list the OOB - look, country X has a gazillion Mig-29's!, but as I'm sure you know, inventory =/= capability.


So in short, newer aircraft with better readiness rates allow you to do more and do it for a longer period of time and usually at less cost economically.

True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable...

Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

Cliff,

When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.

I don't really agree with you here. The main driver toward multipurpose aircraft was to provide greater operational flexibility and to realize cost savings by reducing maintenance, logisitics and support costs through having to support fewer airframe types. That's a big reason driving the F-35, for example, an aircraft attempting to maximize commonality while still satisfying a diverse set of requirements from a diverse set of customers.

Overall, I think we have realized savings in O&M costs but at a price, part of which is increased development cost. It remains to be seen whether the F-35, for example, will prove cheaper over the entire lifecycle than three separate aircraft.

Wilf,

You can drop JDAMs off a P-3, or AC-130 as long as they fly above 16,000ft and out of the MANPAD threat umbrella.

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

[120mm]

Entropy,

I agree with your entire post, including the need for F-22, up until I get here:

Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft -

<big ole snip>

Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

The original post, if I recall correctly, had to do with the Air Force wearing out combat aircraft during a prolonged COIN campaign. I don't think you can rule out "cost" as an advantage. In fact, due to the lack of counter-air threat, and the prolonged nature of successful COIN efforts, "cost" which is a component of maintainability, is possibly the most important advantage an airframe can have.

Cliff,

I don't really agree with you here. The main driver toward multipurpose aircraft was to provide greater operational flexibility and to realize cost savings by reducing maintenance, logisitics and support costs through having to support fewer airframe types. That's a big reason driving the F-35, for example, an aircraft attempting to maximize commonality while still satisfying a diverse set of requirements from a diverse set of customers.

The F-35 is too capable to waste on COIN. I know it sounds counter-intuitive, but a successful COIN effort needs to look hard at the bottom line, and satisfy the customer as cheaply as possible.

The kinds of aircraft that could do this, could, provided the institutions would let them, be funded completely, from the "pencil dust" that falls to the floor when signing the check from just one F-22 or F-35.

Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

They're cheap, and more than capable enough. And they prevent Air Force officials from embarrassingly create asses of themselves in taudry theatrics, when maintenance and aging high-performance airframes start eating their budgets alive.

[Ken White]

First off, I agree with more F-22s; i just don't think the AF has gone about it very well.

And I agree with you on the problem with a mentality that demands the best at the expense of the good enough - something that seems to afflict military procurement in general.

True, it's the American way.

Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's.

Who writes those???

The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition.

Heh, not a great example. The Marines would prefer more Harriers or even better, an all JSF fleet because the F-18 while adequate is not a great CAS aircraft (not to mention that it would also blunt the AF demand for total theater control...). I'd also point out that the F-16 won the competition mostly because the USAF trusted Consolidated (GD) and didn't trust Northrop while the F-18 got the Navy nod mostly because it wasn't the F-16. Even then the Navy insisted it had to be built by a "Navy familiar house" thus the production contract went to McDonnell vice Northrop (before there was Northrop-Grumman).

The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.

I'd say almost equally but we are both entitled to our opinions.

So in short, newer aircraft with better readiness rates allow you to do more and do it for a longer period of time and usually at less cost economically.

True but best is the enemy of...

As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time.

and as I pointed out and all three of us know, that's very much situation dependent.

It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

If you disregard ability to be based close to the action in a rough austere environment (anathema to the USAF, I know...), loiter and scan capability, repairability, training ease (and thus the ability to take less than premium grade Jocks) and a few other things, you're probably correct *.

Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

See * above

[120mm]

Not to be too much of an Everready rabbit on this, but I don't think you can overstate the value of ground and air guys being able to go face-to-face on post-mission analysis or pre-mission planning.

The OV-10 was created primarily to accommodate this very thing.

[Entropy]

The original post, if I recall correctly, had to do with the Air Force wearing out combat aircraft during a prolonged COIN campaign. I don't think you can rule out "cost" as an advantage. In fact, due to the lack of counter-air threat, and the prolonged nature of successful COIN efforts, "cost" which is a component of maintainability, is possibly the most important advantage an airframe can have.

Here's where you may be onto something, which adds to Ken's point:

If you disregard ability to be based close to the action in a rough austere environment (anathema to the USAF, I know...), loiter and scan capability, repairability, training ease (and thus the ability to take less than premium grade Jocks) and a few other things, you're probably correct

Ok, I can see there are specific situations where that kind of aircraft would be more valuable and as Ken says, everything is situation dependent. Now, is it worth it to create a capability to fill that niche (and how much to create), as Ken might say, would doing so be a case of the best being an enemy of the good? I guess it comes down to how likely one thinks we'll be operating for long periods in austere, low threat environments in the future. Definitely something to think about.

[Entropy]

Not to be too much of an Everready rabbit on this, but I don't think you can overstate the value of ground and air guys being able to go face-to-face on post-mission analysis or pre-mission planning.

That's definitely true, though obviously not always possible. The joint procedures developed a few years ago have helped immensely, but IMO there is still too little communication between lower levels and air and ground units are too often not on distro for each others basics like mission summaries, etc. My unit in OEF (CSAR, HH-60's) supported the Army quite a bit and it was like pulling teeth sometimes to get information on what the Army was doing (CSAR was a CFACC asset ostensibly there in case a pilot went down but we were used almost exclusively for medevacs, especially high-risk ones the Army couldn't do). At the same time, I'm not sure if the Army ever got our products (since they went up to the CFACC first), but I did forward them to people I thought might be interested if I had a POC. Anyway, I could launch into a long tirade but that is probably best for another thread. At least that was the case back in 2005 - hopefully things have changed.

[120mm]

Here's where you may be onto something, which adds to Ken's point:



Ok, I can see there are specific situations where that kind of aircraft would be more valuable and as Ken says, everything is situation dependent. Now, is it worth it to create a capability to fill that niche (and how much to create), as Ken might say, would doing so be a case of the best being an enemy of the good? I guess it comes down to how likely one thinks we'll be operating for long periods in austere, low threat environments in the future. Definitely something to think about.

Agreed. It would take a revolutionary approach to acquisition, though, as once you add on requirements and specs, your cheap, effective COIN aircraft becomes an expensive, duplicated effort incredibly quickly, because the current acquisition system is built to do exactly that.

I smell a research project, there....

[120mm]

That's definitely true, though obviously not always possible. The joint procedures developed a few years ago have helped immensely, but IMO there is still too little communication between lower levels and air and ground units are too often not on distro for each others basics like mission summaries, etc. My unit in OEF (CSAR, HH-60's) supported the Army quite a bit and it was like pulling teeth sometimes to get information on what the Army was doing (CSAR was a CFACC asset ostensibly there in case a pilot went down but we were used almost exclusively for medevacs, especially high-risk ones the Army couldn't do). At the same time, I'm not sure if the Army ever got our products (since they went up to the CFACC first), but I did forward them to people I thought might be interested if I had a POC. Anyway, I could launch into a long tirade but that is probably best for another thread. At least that was the case back in 2005 - hopefully things have changed.

I was force branched from Armor to Transportation because my unit needed a Terminal Transportation Officer during the latter part of OIF I.

I swear, if another Army officer demands that they be given control of an Air Force asset, my head will physically explode. There is definitely a culture clash and language separation between the services.

And to a certain respect I feel your pain.

[Ken White]

Agreed. It would take a revolutionary approach to acquisition, though, as once you add on requirements and specs, your cheap, effective COIN aircraft becomes an expensive, duplicated effort incredibly quickly, because the current acquisition system is built to do exactly that.

I smell a research project, there....

because not only the acquisition process (Heh -- little humor there...) but the big manufacturers (as I originally said ) are attuned to obsolescence creation.

We ended WW II with three sizes of tracks and roadwheels and five power packs that had over 50% parts commonality throughout the range for all tracked vehicles. Rationalization to cut costs and increase efficiency and effectiveness. More to the point, the Navy ended up designing small classes of aircraft and ships to explore various approaches wherein rationalization and commonality were emphasized in an effort to get ideal and easily mass produced, durable and effective fighting equipment with no gold plating (think F8F) built in the future. Try that today and the Lobbyists would have a field day buying Congroids. BAE systems does not want to pay a license fee to GD for a track nor does Bath like paying one to Northrop Grumman...

Same thing applies with aircraft; gotta be proprietary in all things to minimize the competitors (and suppliers) profit.

I'm afraid we're stuck where we are...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The way a plane is used has a huge effect on it's service life. Aircraft's lives are indeed defined by age and hours... but a bigger factor is how the airplane is used. Spectrum Life is a common way of measuring the age of the aircraft. It is a mix of hours, g-loadings, loads carried, etc.

The above is true and I agree.

The jets in question fly at 9gs every day, and to contend with the newer fighters that you say they are as good as, F-15s and F-16s have to carry new avionics and weapons. These only add to stress on the airframes.

This IMHO is not so true. No fighter is flown to pull 9Gs every day. In fact, most fighters don't even fly every single day. Plus repeatadly pulling 9Gs is not too good for the pilots either.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

Exactly, so what advantage does an OV-10 provide over an existing aircraft that justifies buying, operating and maintaining a fleet of them?

The OV-10 can be based at FOBs, so close to AO, and can do a bunch of other tactical missions, such as transport, casevac, and some of things we currently get AH-64s to do. In 1995, an OV-10 operated by the Philippines AF cost only about $350 per/hour to run, exclusive of weapons.

[Entropy]

Ran across this article this morning which linked to this Air Force Association analysis (pdf file). Pretty interesting stuff (at least to a geek like me). AFA isn't exactly unbiased in their analysis, but I think the numbers support what I said earlier about aircraft age and readiness rates.

[Ken White]

of the living dead...

In previous discussions on the topic, Cliff has implied or said that there's very little or no difference in CAS efficiency between platforms and Entropy has said this:

Yes, true to a point, but as I discussed above, the dedicated CAS aircraft we have (A-10) doesn't appear to be clearly superior to other types of aircraft - at least based on what I've read in AAR's and LL's. The Marine's seem to get by just fine with an airframe not designed for CAS - the one that lost to the F-16 in the Air Forces lightweight fighter competition. The point being that training and coordination are more important than a dedicated airframe.

Adding this a little later:

Well, I agree with F-4's getting embarrassed by Skyhawks, etc., but that was 40 years ago. As Cliff pointed out, CAS is a whole different ballgame today - flying low and slow to properly ID targets is not necessary anymore, nor desirable most of the time. It's why I don't understand the continuing interest in fielding a CAS-specific or COIN-specific aircraft such as the OV-10 or T-6. Those aircraft don't offer any advantage over current aircraft except for operating cost that I can see.

The implication of all that being that the USAF is getting better at CAS -- no question form me on that. The further implication was that platforms were seen by the CAS recipients as immaterial and thus there was no reason not to go for multipurpose birds.

Based on experience, that latter was counter intuitive -- but I'm old and not current so I couldn't weigh in on that other than broadly philosophically. Until I did some unscientific research and talked to soldats and Marines recently returned from both theaters and asked specific questions. Anecdotal results for your edification follow:

● The perception of CAS being platform immaterial is dependent on who is asked. Joe could care less as long as satisfying booms are heard; Staff Officers are even less concerned with anything other than the end result. Thus the people most likely to be asked and to answer will say, ala the M4 which is the only rifle most have used; "It's good..." OTOH, ask the Officers and NCOs who ask for, use and see up close CAS and they'll almost universally tell you that the platform they select, given a choice by the JFAC / TACP or whomever, will be in order: The A-10, or then an Apache; then a Cobra and then any other -- with the Afghan guys putting in B1 /52 after the Hoptiflopter gunships and before fast birds.

● They do this because the Hog and Gunship pilots fly slower, fly lower, are far more accurate and, very importantly, are used to doing the mission and can and will talk to guys on the ground in depth and in knowledgable terms about what they see from the air. They're willing and able to talk in terms the ground guys identify with and this is not true with respect to any of the fast movers.

● An interjection we did not discuss on the thread was the AC-130; they were ranked, both theaters, directly behind or even in front of the Whirlyguns and their great sensors, willingness and ability to talk to and respond to guys on the ground were considered very important -- still, the A-10 came out way ahead, hands down.

● The Marines are still perceived as doing CAS a little better than the USAF (by both Army and Marines and as is only to be expected, it is after all a doctrinal tenet for the Corps as opposed to a must do but unloved mission) and a part of this is their total willingness and ability to use their pods to provide eyes in the sky, they routinely volunteer to do it. They see it as part of the job while the perception is that most USAF fast movers don't like to bother with it. The British and Dutch also got good comments (and their Apaches particularly so).

● This also confirms what both Cliff and Entropy said, that training and coordination are important. I'd merely add that while that's certainly true, the type of training is most important.

● I think it does however, certainly raise a significant question on platforms; not least that the type and planned use of the platform affects the mindset of its operator...

I raise the unwanted dead not to debate the need for the Air Force or for air superiority -- those are givens -- nor to pick further squabbles or argue about or for platforms (reminder; I'm an F-22 and an F-35 supporter ) but merely to add some more information to the discussion. It is, as I said, totally anecdotal information and from a small (but I think knowledgeable and reliable) sample, however, it tracks to me and is probably worth at least some consideration by you guys in Blue...

[Cavguy]

With a 10 digit grid and JDAMs the bombs can be put where needed as long as the guy on the ground is accurate.

I think the main argument for a prop or simpler plane is that the USAF is flying the wings off of expensive fighters to do a job a cheaper airframe (both cost/maint) could do the same, given the capability of precision munitions.

[Ken White]

With a 10 digit grid and JDAMs the bombs can be put where needed as long as the guy on the ground is accurate.

I can see several problems with that. First, your statement is correct as long as GPS is up insofar as own location is concerned. Distant locations are not ALWAYS that precisely located. Then, if your GPS (or the JDAMs...) is out...

Second, your statement is correct for the most part for Iraq where there are more JTACs per capita and the possiblity of using the laser terminal guidance in bad weather is not too significant. It is more problematic in Afghanistan. Who knows what conditions will be in the next one...

The Marines -- sensibly IMO -- want to train Rifle Squad Leaders to call in air. There will be many who object to that (the USAF already has...) on safety grounds. Lack of trust and faith in training, I say, I know too many NCOs who called in Air in too many places -- including both current theaters of operations -- to think other than that is a good idea. However, good idea or not, the likelihood of all those guys being able to comsistently provide accurate ten digit target grids is not good. I also submit that it doesn't usually have to be that good in most combat situation and it certainly will be unnecessary in MCO or more intense operations than in Iraq -- which aren't going away.

One thing that almost all the A-10 and AC 130 plus the gunships praise I heard cited was the gun. Everyone liked the gun but particularly the guys from the 'Stan where there isn't an urban constraint and firefights with large groups in the open are more common. As a couple of people said, "the others have one but it's only a 20mm for the fast kids and they aren't nearly as accurate as due to speed and altitude." The A-10, the AC-130 and the AH-64 can lay down 25 or 30mm shells tens of meters from you, the others cannot do that. Given the vagaries of weather, electronic glitches and such, the gun is a reassuring capability and it gets a lot of use.

ADDED: Consider also that a JDAM or other precision munition can take out a room or a building and, by definition, most everyone in said structure or part thereof. OTOH, given a ragged line of 50 bad guys with minimal cover in a field environment (much less in mountains) and that weapon might get five to ten of them. Conversely, the gun can do a far better job in that environment -- and bigger, lower and slower is better...

I think the main argument for a prop or simpler plane is that the USAF is flying the wings off of expensive fighters to do a job a cheaper airframe (both cost/maint) could do the same, given the capability of precision munitions.

True provided the limitations of the precision munitions aren't factors.

[Cavguy]

Don't get me wrong Ken - I LOVE the AC-130, and haven't ever used an A-10. Great airframe. For COIN/Small wars I guess I wonder about the economic advantage of flying F-15E's and F-16's to do what a cheaper airframe could do instead.

[Ken White]

Don't get me wrong Ken - I LOVE the AC-130, and haven't ever used an A-10. Great airframe. For COIN/Small wars I guess I wonder about the economic advantage of flying F-15E's and F-16's to do what a cheaper airframe could do instead.

One could probably buy three or four "Son of Hog" for the price of one F-16 Block 50/60 or one F-35. Hmm. 'zat mean six or so for an F-22? (Kidding, AF guys; we need 22s and 35s as well as Tankers. It's just future bombers I'm less sure about ).

Maybe some day they'll get the UAVs flexible and reliable enough to do an unmanned dedicated CAS type mit Maschinenkanone...

[Entropy]

Ken,

Thanks for the helpful comments and insight. I don't think your anecdotal information is far off the mark. I also think this is very important:

Everyone liked the gun but particularly the guys from the 'Stan where there isn't an urban constraint and firefights with large groups in the open are more common.

Astan is a lot different and gun employment can be used far more often. And when it comes to that, the A-10 and AC-130 (and helos) are king. I would add there is a capabilities gap (for lack of a better term) between a JDAM and gun for fixed-wing assets, though this has been partially addressed with the SDB.

And, like you have said many times before, everything is situational. Unfortunately, the guys on the ground may not have the ideal platform on station for a particular situation. I think once the A-10C is out there then it will again become the premier CAS platform since it will have all the capabilities of the fast-movers (integrated EO/IR/targeting pod, datalink, etc.) plus the gun and ability to employ at low or high altitude, etc. I really do hope the aircraft gets a new lease-on-life or a dedicated replacement before its scheduled 2028 retirement.

The AC-130 is a wonderful aircraft (105 with prox fuse especially), but it is quite vulnerable and so is really a night-only platform. And that's one danger I see with adding a prop plane (like a T-6) for the CAS mission. I'm concerned it wouldn't be survivable which would restrict its use, even in the relatively low air threat environments we're now in.

So that's good info - even anecdotal info is very valuable. Thanks for taking the time and interest to put that together!

[Entropy]

Maybe some day they'll get the UAVs flexible and reliable enough to do an unmanned dedicated CAS type mit Maschinenkanone...

I think that is where we are headed personally. Who knows, maybe one day the JTAC will BE the CAS pilot. Wouldn't that be cool?

[Ken White]

with your last -- that would be the height of kewel...

On the thanks they're really due to several folks who put up with my inane questions; H/T and thanks are really due them, I are merely a retarded conduit. I'm still trying to track down a local acquaintance nephew who's a S/Sgt AFSOC JTAC; we keep missing each other. That boy doesn't stay at Hurlburt very long at a clip..