Airforce may be be going out of business

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

I have sat in meetings where the USAF bemoans insufficient funding to recapitalize its fleet yet has no problem “deploying” 2nd Lts to EUCOM in Stuttgart for four months, paying them TDY, billeting them in hotels, providing them rental cars (at €100 per day) under the guise of “QOL,” and providing them two weeks of leave off the books (to recover from an arduous deployment). All at an estimated cost of around $60,000 per. Now while in the grand scheme of things $60K may be a drop in the bucket, multiply that by the thousands of Airmen who “deploy” under similar circumstances. To me it shows a distinct lack of prioritization and resource allocation skill in a service that often places quality of life issues far ahead of mission capabilities. Yet they are "desperate to figure out how to save money."

"For the 30 years during which I covered the military, the pattern was to defend the advanced weaponry while neglecting the inglorious low-tech equipment needed in war. There is no constituency for the cheap and mundane. The military prepares to fight an enemy, however imaginary, that justifies the high-tech equipment it wants — not the unglamorous ragtag militia that is actually out there."

Fred Reed
Washington Times
December 15, 2007

Of the all the services the USAF has a serious techno-crack habit (although the USN is close behind).

[Penta]

I wouldn't call it techno-crack, I'd call it techno-Ketracel White.

See, if not for the continuing march of technology, there'd be minimal reason for the AF to exist as a separate service.

[carl]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

[selil]

Are you talking about what the Israelis reputedly did to the Syrians only from the ground up rather than from the air down, so to speak?

I can neither confirm nor deny (even though "I" have no security clearance or restriction) the current capability of any state or non-state actor to actively jam and or obtain control of telemetry systems (and or INTERNAL) systems of UAV's.


The answer though is on the Internet. I'm only mildly joking the thrust is quite deadly serious.

[selil]

Not only that, but let us not forget about software bugs.
How many times have each of us cursed Bill Gates when we get some kind of glitch associated with a software programming error?

Just think how many KSLOC (thousands of software lines of code) would have to be written and, at best only partially, debugged to get a fully automated or remotely piloted drone capability that comes close to matching what a human does in an aircraft moving at supersonic speeds. "Oops" just doesn't quite cut it when you get a 404 error and your Predator launched Hellfire flies into Hagia Sophia in Istanbul instead of Balla Hissar in Kabul.

And the UAV was built by the low bidder. In all honesty I think the aircraft has a role, but the implementation may have issues that can't be overcome.

I'd say this... naw I won't.

[Norfolk]

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

I'm a little confused myself: either Air Mobility Command, or Air Material Command - I think it's the former. I still think in terms of SAC, TAC, MAC, etc.

There is no question that the AF needs to replace most of its aircraft fleet: but with what, and at what cost, and for what roles?

Given that the AF really, really needs mondo muella to do so, I think that now would be a good time to extract some concessions from them in the form of serious reforms and reorganization on their part - including turning CAS and perhaps some other Army-related roles (such as certain tactical transport roles)to the Army - along with the legal right (have to work on Congress here for that) for the Army to have its own fixed-wing aircraft for such purposes. A worthy replacement for the A-10, under Army control, would be nice.

But when the AF has to ground major portions of its F-15 fleet because their wiring is literally rotting away, it's clear that there's not much time left before the AF is turned from the Kings of the Sky into the world's largest collection of Hangar Queens. But this has to be done smart, and the AF will have to have its feet really held to the fire here, both because of its past practices and because all the other services need to replace tons of old and worn-out stuff too.

[Rifleman]

See! See! I knew they were going downhill. Bad things happen once you give up C7 Caribous and A1 Skyraiders.

[LawVol]

What is AMC?

AMC is the Air Mobility Command. AFMC is the Air Force Materiel (not material) Command.

AMC has the heavies, the cargo carriers. AFMC (where I am now) does research, testing, development, and evaluation (RTD&E) and acquisitions. It's where we spend all that money that you guys are complaining about us getting!

[SteveMetz]

AMC is the Air Mobility Command.

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Norfolk and carl I apologize for my dependency. AMC is Air Mobility Command the successor to MAC, the lowly trash haulers and tankers who do Herculean service in theater. SAC and TAC have combined into Air Combat Command, silk scarved fighter jocks and bomber guys.

The AF is scrambling to redefine itself to deal with LIC/COIN and yet yearns for a conventional conflict with China or a resurgent Russia. They are a bit on the defensive, witness Dunlap et al, who write op eds decrying those with "boots on the ground." They are having an identity crises and often fail to play to the strength of their current relevancy in the AOR: ISR and airlift. Predator and Global Hawk are force multipliers that pay huge dividends in COIN, as they are passive/aggressive platforms. Strategic and theater airlift are the lifeblood for those boots on the ground.

The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

[Ken White]

I agree with your second paragraph but have some questions on the remainder.

. . .
The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

Even allowing for the Air force manipulating the F15 fleet issues for their F22 procurement benefit, the bulk of the fleet is still approaching an age where upgrading is not an option. The real workhorse in your "GWOT" scenario is the F16. even with all the A/B models retired, the C/D fleet median usage is at 4,600 hours out of 8,000 hour life (and some are approaching 6,000 hours). Extensive upgrades to either fleet are not really cost effective.

Ideally, purpose specific platforms would be procured as attempts to go multi mission always impose compromises. Everyone knows that quantity has a qualitative effect. Also ideally, large production runs offering economies of scale would the norm. Unfortunately, in the era of declining budgets we are likely to face, the Air force is going to have to wrestle with those conflicts and produce a solution -- and I'd submit that cancellation of any of their major programs would be a mistake.

The F35 does not offer the fighter capabilities of the F22 -- but it is likely to exceed most anything else out there to include the F15 and F16. It also provides some great CAS and ISR cape that none of those other three offer. Given the time to develop and field new aircraft, it would, I think, be quite wrong to cancel it though the delivery schedule could be stretched a bit and could ramp up if needed. That doesn't even count the allies that are buying it. It isn't going away for those reasons. And it should not.

Same with the F22; right now we are capable of achieving air superiority in most of the world and fairly quickly. That is a capability we should be quite cautious in lessening.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Can you assure us that the GWOT is the only conflict we will face in the next 20 years or so -- because it is toward the end of that time period that the aircraft you seem to wish to retain will be falling apart...

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

Asymmetrical is a buzz word, it means the other guys strikes where you're weak and / or that he's more flexible than you are. The available equipment -- and money -- have little to do with that. That is mind game pure and simple and we're not doing too well at it.

You say the "GWOT" is war of ideals and idealists. Perhaps. I'd be more comfortable if it were a war between dreamers and pragmatists -- with us being the latter. Even one between plots and common sense. Not at all sure we're there yet...

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

[Ron Humphrey]

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

What ever happened to wind turbine cars

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 13 Dec 07: US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007

The attached chart summarizes the trends in the US use of airpower in the Iraq and Afghan Wars during 2004-2007. While airpower is scarcely a forgotten dimension of both wars, it is clear that it is playing a steadily more important role over time. The data show a steady rise in air activity, with particularly sharp rises in the case of Afghanistan.

The data for total annual close air support/precision strike (CAS) sorties do not show a dramatic increase for Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007, but doubled in the case of Iraq. It is also the number of such strikes that actually used major munitions, however, that measure combat activity, and these data reflect a dramatic increase in both the use of airpower and the intensity of combat in both wars.

Sharp increases took place in the levels of CAS delivery of major munitions between 2004 and 2007, with very sharp rises between 2006 and 2007. In the case of Afghanistan, the total number of close air support/precision strike sorties flown in that dropped a major munition rose from 86 in 2004, and only 176 in 2005, to 1,770 in 2006 (10-fold annual increase), and 2,926 in 2007 (1.7 times higher as of 5 December). The number of CAS sorties that used a major munition in Iraq increased from 285 in 2004, 404 in 2005, and 229 in 2006, to 1,119 in 2007 (Nearly 5 times higher than in 2006 as of 5 December).....

[Steve Blair]

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

All true, but I'm becoming more and more wary of giving the AF a blank check to meet its needs. That's been done before, and left us in many cases with a mess. It's always instructive to remember that the AF didn't want the F-16 at first, and we've already gone over their efforts to get rid of the A-10 on multiple occasions.

The more I look at it, the more I really want to strip CAS away from them in total. Let them build F-22s and the next generation manned bomber (and yes, they are looking at one of those), and then mandate that they upgrade and maintain the heavy fleet (tankers, lift, and AWACs). But since the AF as an overall institution has proven very reluctant to actually devote long-term interest and effort to CAS strip it out and give it to the Army and Marines. The Marine air wing system has proven itself over the years..so why not give the Army something similar?

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Jedburgh's stats are telling and CAS has become a more effective tool with the use of PGMs. "Surgical" air strikes are possible. Do the stats also show the number of missions flown by AMC to support both OEF and OIF?

While the fast movers certainly have an important role in LIC/COIN the heavier burden is upon the airlift folks.

Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted...

While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget.

Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.

But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.

[carl]

I just now read the Navy has had to ground 39 of its 161 P-3Cs for "structural fatigue concerns" and it will take several years to get them all back into the air.

So it is not just the Air Force that is facing a big bill to replace ancient airplanes.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The Stars and Stripes additionally states:

"P-3C aircraft were grounded three times in 2005 and 2006, but those aircraft have since returned to service, Davis said. He also said the Navy is confident the P-3C aircraft not affected by the grounding are safe to fly. The Navy has 161 P-3C Orion aircraft,...The average age...is 28 years...The oldest aircraft is 44 years old, and the youngest is 16 years old. The first squadron of the P-3C’s replacement, the P-8A Poseidon, is expected to stand up in 2013..."

While the article mentions 10 of the 39 are deployed it makes no mention of how many total are deployed. The P3C is a platform in search of a mission since the undersea threat has diminished significantly (but could soon rise as China flexes and Russia rearms)

And while structural fatigue will always be a problem for aircraft, and more so as the airframe ages, it is still should not always the ratioanl for replacing the aircraft with a more expensive version. To wit the B-52.

The KC-135 is still doing service and a telling statement made by a senior USAF officer went something like this: "The father of the last KC-135 pilot hasn't been born yet."

[Ken White]

. . .
Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted...

shop -- ours as in the US Government. However, my history books are still available and we have not been great at predicting our next war. We also, historically since WW II have not had very accurate foreign intelligence....

While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

No big argument from me over any of that; Other than a minor quibble or two, I'd say the odds are about 75:25 that will be correct. However, I do have two questions about the probability -- (1) What occurs if we prepare for such conflicts and a Political decision is made not to engage? I suggest that given the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that is a likely prospect. (2) What do we do if that 25% chance occurs ( in the Balkans, in South America, if a bilateral treaty with any of a dozen nations is invoked)?

Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget.

Agreed -- but that doesn't affect my point on the practicalities of potential conflict. To me, that potential is the issue and parochial 'who shot John' arguments don't address that point.

Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Define decisively? Who could achieve temporary local superiority to achieve some tactical or operational gains at some cost to us a dozen places in the world? What nut could decide to take on the USAF in an air dominance battle no matter how stupid or doomed is the idea? Who would take advantage of our involvement in, say Afghanistan and Iraq, to foment hatred and discontent elsewhere to further occupy us and create a distraction while they really aim for greater turmoil in a third location?

Decisively is not the issue; avoiding any challenge in the air is to our advantage. Recall also that in both Korea and Viet Nam, proxy wars with small air forces for our opponenets, the opposition managed to shoot down a lot US planes. We prevailed in the air because we had a lot more planes. Given the costs of those things today, we don't have that quantity nowadays...

Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

Agree in part. Totally with respect over reliance on technology and to JIEDDO, less so on the ABL, I suspect we'll gain some good spin offs from that, one of which may be DEW for the AC130 replacement program -- and another for the F35.

There are, of course others that meet your criteria, FCS for one (again, some good spin offs but an unnecessary and ill conceived end goal).

We have always tended to reach for technological solutions instead of starting with better and tailored training which would probably be more effective and cheaper. Unfortunately, training dollars don't help numerous Congressional Districts, big ticket hi tech items do.

(quote)I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.(/quote)

Yes, it is and I too realize that. I also know that all the services sometimes do it well, sometimes not -- and it goes in cycles. The Air Force flubbed it for a few years and bought themselves a problem. I'm merely suggesting that, yeah, it IS their problem -- but, like it or not it unfortunately affects us all and it needs to fixed.

(quote)But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.[/QUOTE]

With that, I can totally agree, Perhaps unlike you, my hate list on that topic starts with the Congresses (plural, the last 20 or so...).

[Ken White]

. . .
Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted...

shop -- ours as in the US Government. However, my history books are still available and we have not been great at predicting our next war. We also, historically since WW II have not had very accurate foreign intelligence....

While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

No big argument from me over any of that; Other than a minor quibble or two, I'd say the odds are about 75:25 that will be correct. However, I do have two questions about the probability -- (1) What occurs if we prepare for such conflicts and a Political decision is made not to engage? I suggest that given the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that is a likely prospect. (2) What do we do if that 25% chance occurs ( in the Balkans, in South America, if a bilateral treaty with any of a dozen nations is invoked)?

Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget.

Agreed -- but that doesn't affect my point on the practicalities of potential conflict. To me, that potential is the issue and parochial 'who shot John' arguments don't address that point.

Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Define decisively? Who could achieve temporary local superiority to achieve some tactical or operational gains at some cost to us a dozen places in the world? What nut could decide to take on the USAF in an air dominance battle no matter how stupid or doomed is the idea? Who would take advantage of our involvement in, say Afghanistan and Iraq, to foment hatred and discontent elsewhere to further occupy us and create a distraction while they really aim for greater turmoil in a third location?

Decisively is not the issue; avoiding any challenge in the air is to our advantage. Recall also that in both Korea and Viet Nam, proxy wars with small air forces for our opponenets, the opposition managed to shoot down a lot US planes. We prevailed in the air because we had a lot more planes. Given the costs of those things today, we don't have that quantity nowadays...

Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

Agree in part. Totally with respect over reliance on technology and to JIEDDO, less so on the ABL, I suspect we'll gain some good spin offs from that, one of which may be DEW for the AC130 replacement program -- and another for the F35.

There are, of course others that meet your criteria, FCS for one (again, some good spin offs but an unnecessary and ill conceived end goal).

We have always tended to reach for technological solutions instead of starting with better and tailored training which would probably be more effective and cheaper. Unfortunately, training dollars don't help numerous Congressional Districts, big ticket hi tech items do.

(quote)I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.(/quote)

Yes, it is and I too realize that. I also know that all the services sometimes do it well, sometimes not -- and it goes in cycles. The Air Force flubbed it for a few years and bought themselves a problem. I'm merely suggesting that, yeah, it IS their problem -- but, like it or not it unfortunately affects us all and it needs to fixed.

(quote)But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.[/QUOTE]

With that, I can totally agree, Perhaps unlike you, my hate list on that topic starts with the Congresses (plural, the last 20 or so...).

[J Wolfsberger]

As an aside, and maybe an important one, both the P-3 and the KC-135 started life as commercial airliners.

Over the years, it's always seemed as though the Air Force defines its mission as flying cool planes. Actually fighting a war is incidental. (Unfair, I know. But I'm presenting my perception.)

They've tried to get rid of the A-10, only to retain it when the Army threatens to end the Key West agreement and take them over. AF people claim that the F-16 is better at CAS. It isn't, we know it isn't, they know it isn't, but it is more fun to fly than an A-10.

We've still got a huge number of C-130s that are not only wearing out, they can't carry much, if any, heavy equipment. But I have yet to hear about any effort to expand the fleet of C-17s or C-5s. (Moot by now anyway - I understand the tooling has been destroyed.)

Now the AF has a combat fleet of 1. Fighters that are deteriorating like crazy - but no SEP plan. 2. Bombers way older than their crews, or that can't fly in bad weather. 3. CAS versions of the F-16 that are falling apart because the AF is loading them with 2000 lb bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, then landing again with the unexpended bomb load.

In the meantime, MG Dunlop is complaining that the AF isn't getting its fair share of work in COIN, and we should redefine the doctrine so they can break lots more stuff and kill lots more people.

I agree that the AF is putting itself out of business. They're accomplishing that goal exactly the same way it happens in private industry. They have lost touch with their market and can't provide a relevant product.

If they are going to stay relevant (and in business) they need to redefine the organization around a few major missions:

1. Moving the Army. Transports. Whether anyone likes it or not, we'll be dealing with conflicts of low intensity in areas where there are lots of civilians to be protected. That means moving and supporting infantry.

2. Supporting the infantry. Close Air Support. A-10 type aircraft, not F-16. Long loiter times, lots of low and medium armament. (i.e. 100 lb. bombs, not 2000.)

3. Air superiority/supremacy. The fun planes. F-22, F-35. And extract their heads from the alpha hotels and get effective SEP in place for the F-16s and F-15s before they're grounded permanently.

4. Bombers. Behind the other guys lines. Dumb bombs, smarts bombs, stand off attack missiles, who cares. giver them flexible payloads capability, and make them all weather.

They do that, and they'll find a path forward. They fail, in any of those four areas, and they run the risk of going out of business.