Airforce may be be going out of business

[Ken White]

in all services are married at the 18-22 year mark while among their civilian peers, the age for marriage continues to rise...

The services financially reward marriage and thats dumb, IMO. Recall when Mundy tried to suggest that enlisted Marines were better off not being married -- a true statement -- that the Sociologists and Churches of America found common cause for once and thus that Congress had one of their well known knee jerks. Probably as much because piddling with DoD Pay and Allowances is as complex as would be messing with the Tax Code...

Regardless, no marriage is a good idea, I think. I'd even go with a bonus for staying single, all ranks...

My wife does NOT agree with the foregoing and has refused to endorse the statement. She does agree with marriage being pay and allowance neutral, thus, that is the Official Position of the REAL White house.

[Distiller]

Well, maybe supporting families that way helps with the demographic issues that we experience in Europe!


Re that air force business and some daydreaming:

Besides equipment issues (see down below) the Pentagon really should re-do the whole forces structure.
There was a debate (one of them, actually) in the late 1950's about a U.S. General Staff. I think that is overdue. The structure with SecNavy, SecArmy, SecAF, Forces, multi-tier technical, global and regional Commands is way too unruly. And the Joint Commands are basically a GenStaff, but w/o abolishing the old structures. Maybe a structure like General Staff (with couple of directorates) -- Strat ISR Cmd, Strat Weapons Cmd, Strat Logistics Cmd, Spec Ops Cmd -- Theatre Commands -- Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, Maritime Forces (as forces pools, nothing more). Actual operations (like basically already now, but with way too many other "commands" playing into) managed by the Theatre Commands via permanent or ad-hoc Task Forces, Groups and Units.

Applied to the aerial forces I more and more like the idea of something like a "Tactical Aviation Corps" plus a re-established "Army Aviation Corps". The TacAvCorps as a unified structure, and I think all tactical aircraft should be carrier capables, since I'm not sure that the tactical aviation community will have the ressources in the future to maintain three aerial forces. Close Air Support goes to Army Aviation, Tactical Aviation is tasked only with theatre level ISR, air supremacy and interdiction. I mean, the reason for the Air Force to exist was SAC and LeMay, nothing else. If the strategic nuclear mission go to a strategic command (together with ICBMs, SSB/GNs, BMD) and close air support back to the Army, the reason to maintain the Air Force is not so clear any more. And looking at the NavAir mess and ever less ressources there I'd say a unified tactical aviation would prove more flexible than what there is now.


On to equipment:
I think everything that is spent now on "old" equipment is basically lost money.
The only shooters worth spending money on in the Air Force are F-15E. Those should be kept as up-to-date as possible until some UCAV takes over that role.
In if the USAF is getting short on fighterbombers - the EFA-18EFG is in production. And those are carrier capable, too.
F-15ABCD should be replaced as fast as possible, whereby a evolutionary and navalized F-22B version (F-22 was developed in the 1980s!) could follow the F-22A as standard fighter (these 180 could be sold).
F-35A should be cancelled, only F-35C and B built.
And then a UCAV to fill the gap the A-6, F-111 left and as F-15E replacement.
Plus a Combat Support Platform for ASW, Sensors/Relays, for COD, and as aux tanker, optionally manned/unmanned.
The A-10s should go to the Army.
And any more dicking around with the tanker competition should end and the KC-767 built.

On the strategic aviation side probably the B-52 should be retired. Or the B-1B. But whatever is left should be thoroughly upgraded (incl engines). And I also question the decision to basically retire the heavy manned bomber from the nuclear ALCM carrier role (see AGM-129). Nothing like a bomber gives you such a multitude of attack vectors, vehicles and warheads. The Russians know that.
Strategic air mobility should be supported be at least 350 C-17, an evolutionary B model might be an idea. The C-5 fleet upgrade should be expanded, but kept to the absolute minimum of airframes (40 to 50), the rest retired.

One of the most important aspect would be to maintain a steady (and evolutionary) production, even if it comes somewhat more expensive, after the current elderly equipment is replaced by rather steep production rates. Otherwise the same mess as today shows up again in 15 to 20 years.

As I said - daydreaming.

[carl]

Jill:

I think it inappropriate to compare weapons acquisition and development in WWII and now. Then, everybody it was a breakneck race to acquire a small advantage that would last for a few years or months even; with the knowledge that something better was just behind. But still a lot of effort and expense was put into gaining even that small advantage because it made a big difference in the outcome of the individual fights. Also, the level of technology was much lower so it was just easier, a lot easier, to bring a weapon from from conception to battle (for airplanes at least).

Now thought has to be given to what must be fought 20 years down the road knowing that a replacement isn't just behind. "Good enough" now may be disaster in 15 years if you don't get it right. That plus the higher level of technology means it is going to take longer and cost more. Running it through the modern defense bureaucracy doesn't speed things up either.

The Japanese were a strategic disaster. Their very few and slight equipment advantages didn't get avail them much once we got our torpedo depth settings right and they ran into well trained, determined pilots. Then when we fielded vast numbers of superior equipment they were done for.

I entirely disagree the American Navy was behind the Japanese in realizing the importance of carriers. Most of the big carrier battles occurred in the first 10 months of the war and we wouldn't have done as well as we did if we had only just figured it out.

Horse drawn transport can be an advantage at times I suppose. But the advantage can't be much since every single army that could, has traded in their horses for trucks. The Germans I think would have liked to have had truck borne infantry divisions in 1941. The Russians were probably glad they had so many trucks in the summer of 1944.

The Allies entered the war without advantage in the air because they were attacked. They had to fight with what they had. That they won had as much to do with German and Japanese strategic stupidity as with anything else. One of the lessons many people drew from WWII is if you have superiority and the enemy is convinced of that, there may not be a war. I agree our past 65 years of advantage in the air is a historical anomaly. But we can keep that anomaly going for another 20 or thirty years by making the right decisions today. That 20 or 30 years is worth the investment. Us fighting without control of the air isn't something we've had any practice with lately. If we had doubts about our ability to control the air, it might be more prudent not to fight at all.

Air defenses may or may not be cheaper to build. The Soviets spent an awful lot on them. And I don't know that it is so easy to counter advances in
aircraft tech. and the other things related to defeating air defenses, the Syrians didn't do well at all against the Israeli attack in Sept.

[Norfolk]

Today's edition of Air Force Magazine is reporting some interesting news:

Presents in January?: The Air Force yesterday released its weapon system “roadmap” describing all the bases at which the service’s new hardware could be based over the next 30 years. The roadmap, crafted with input from all Adjutants General, details the bases at which the F-22, F-35, KC-X, C-27, and other systems might “potentially” bed down, according to the USAF release. Nothing’s certain, though, because: a) environmental impact studies would have to be passed, and b) the Air Force actually has to get the equipment. The EIS process is not a given, because the F-35 and F-22 are noisier than the F-16s and F-15s they replace, for example. Moreover, the roadmap lists bases where USAF would put F-22s if it were to get all 381 it wants, as opposed to the 183 that have been approved. The F-35 would go largely to bases that now have an F-16 or A-10 mission. With few exceptions, bases that already have transitioned from the F-16 to another system—like the MQ-1 Predator—would not go back to flying fighters, senior USAF officials said. That’s because the Predators offer Air National Guard pilots an opportunity to participate in deployed operations without actually deploying, as the crews “fight” by remote control at their home base.

It seems that even the Air Force Association thinks something is a little dubious about the Air Force "Roadmap" (scroll down to the bottom of the same page):

One Last Word: Although senior Air Force leaders won’t say so in so many words, the service’s new beddown roadmap (see above) is a map of constituencies and effectively puts members of Congress on notice that if they want an Air Force mission in their district, they better support the buying of the new systems. If they don’t, and inventories continue to shrink, the missions—and the bases, and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command units associated with them—will surely go away.

[Sargent]

Ahhh, shades of "if the Corps wanted you to have a family, it would've issued you one!"

From my experience as a resource draining dependent (insert wry smiling emoticon here), and from what I understand about the Corps, the truth of that quote would be, "If the Corps didn't want you to have a spouse and family, there'd be a rule against it."

There are costs and benefits associated with military dependents. Me, I'm a force multiplier, so I'm not worried about the paltry amount the Marine Corps coughs up to support us.

Cheers,
Jill

[LawVol]

The Air Force also has a unique definition of the term “deploy.” To the Army, Marines, and Navy this is time away from home often under austere conditions. The AF will “deploy” personnel from the Pentagon to Crystal City (if you didn’t know they’re walking distance apart). After this arduous deployment the Airmen gets the same two weeks of off the books leave as folks returning from the AOR do. That’s fair.

I've wondered about this as well. I asked about this and the unconfirmed consensus I get on this is that it is termed a deployment because it is in support of operations downrange. This allows GWOT money to pay for it rather than unit O&M funds.

I know you guys probably won't like that either, but don't kill the messenger. I don't know about the timoff thing, but I was told that the time off was for the member to take care of family issues that resulted from being gone. I owuld assume that whether the member is across the pond or across the country, they're still gone. I don't know.

[LawVol]

From my experience as a resource draining dependent (insert wry smiling emoticon here), and from what I understand about the Corps, the truth of that quote would be, "If the Corps didn't want you to have a spouse and family, there'd be a rule against it."

There are costs and benefits associated with military dependents. Me, I'm a force multiplier, so I'm not worried about the paltry amount the Marine Corps coughs up to support us.

Cheers,
Jill

My wife is a force multiplier too! I've always said that the family doesn't get enough credit.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

LawVol you might be right about it being a which pot-o-money issue.

But there are always rules! The two weeks of free time off is very restrictive, it is not leave, the service member must remain in the local area of their assigned unit. It is time to "decompress" from the stress of a combat zone.

As to "time with the family" I don't see how someone "deploying" from the Pentagon to Crystal City (3/4s of a mile) involves missing the family and needing two weeks to make it up.

Somehow I do not see the stresses imposed by deploying four months in Stuttgart to be quite the same as those found in Fallujah.

Not that there are not considerable stresses to be found in southwest Germany during Oktoberfest. Like which drinking tent to go to next and stepping around all the "Bierleichen".

[LawVol]

LawVol you might be right about it being a which pot-o-money issue.

But there are always rules! The two weeks of free time off is very restrictive, it is not leave, the service member must remain in the local area of their assigned unit. It is time to "decompress" from the stress of a combat zone.

As to "time with the family" I don't see how someone "deploying" from the Pentagon to Crystal City (3/4s of a mile) involves missing the family and needing two weeks to make it up.

Somehow I do not see the stresses imposed by deploying four months in Stuttgart to be quite the same as those found in Fallujah.

Not that there are not considerable stresses to be found in southwest Germany during Oktoberfest. Like which drinking tent to go to next and stepping around all the "Bierleichen".

Concur with your thoughts on the differences in a "deployment" vs. a deployment. If I'm ever "deployed" to Germany during Oktoberfest, can I just get a beer coupon instead of a GWOT ribbon?

[Sargent]

I think it inappropriate to compare weapons acquisition and development in WWII and now.

The second favorite quote of anybody is the old saw about not learning the mistakes of history. The obvious corollary is that the failure to learn how things were done or happened in the past is that one is doomed not to be able to take advantage of the successes.

I don't know many people who would point to the contemporary American weapons' development system as a model that ought to be followed. There are obviously flaws that have crept into it. Thus, it seems eminently useful to me to look at a time when the system worked differently and to good effect. None of the problems you cite are objectively so -- for example, a platform that wears out in 15 years is only a liability if it take 30 years to develop, manufacture, test, and procure the next one. However, if you have a 2-5 year cycle, then the 15 year life cycle becomes not so much a problem.

I've already stated that the Japanese were at a loss from word go. They couldn't compete, and I know that.

While the US had certainly gotten into the carrier business prior to WWII, the USN was not nearly as far along in carrier-centric aviation operations as the IJN. This was their bread and butter.

I don't think extant superiority suits the US. The American culture of warfare is Rocky -- take a beating and then struggle back to fight and win. It suits us. We like to be (or at least seem to be) the underdog. It makes us more likable. Why do folks love the Marine Corps and have qualms with the Air Force? Because the Marine Corps image is about making due with less, of relying upon hard work and perseverance, whereas the Air Force's is about buying the best. These stereotypes might not be fair, but the American preference for the former rather than the latter is what matters. There is a place for technology, but I don't think it needs to be the leader of the parade. Oh, and to be the leader costs an (expletive deleted) load, and that could become a real problem -- it was a lot of the reason that Vietnam was ended, the dollar outflows could no longer be supported.

Cheers,
Jill

[Distiller]

Difference is that these days enabling technology with kind of binary character progresses so fast, that you simply have no other choice as to apply and integrate it. Otherwise your equipment becomes irrelevant. Digitalisation, computers, networking, automatisation, &c. Every time it's almost like starting from zero again with RD&T, integration, and real-world application. Just that there is the advantage of the industrial base. In old times it was not so fast; maybe the best comparison is the Dreadnought race, when within a few years brand new ships became an obsolete money-hole.

And for the aerial forces the next revolution is already in the making with the unmanned/autonomous vehicles. Besides the propulsion aspect this seems on of the times where a new power can catch up with the old powers.

Also the chance for old airframers and system integrators (like e.g. NGCO, Vought) to get back into business again, and for new companies with innovative ideas to get into business.

I think a lot of troubles that we see now with accquisitions, except from ever intrusive politics, stem from the rapid technological progress. You can already can see where it will go, but what you should order now to replace your tatty legacy equipment does not even bring you halfway there. So you try to wait just a little longer, try to stretch the programme just a little more.

Rumsfeld was not so wrong. He had the right ideas. His time preference was askew and his concept of realization were a disaster, but he had the right instincts.

[carl]

While the US had certainly gotten into the carrier business prior to WWII, the USN was not nearly as far along in carrier-centric aviation operations as the IJN. This was their bread and butter.

The Akagi was commissioned in 1927, the Kaga in 1926. The Lexington and the Saratoga were both commissioned in 1927. At the end of 1942 the American and Japanese carrier forces had fought each other to a standstill and didn't fight again until 1944. That seems pretty even-steven to me.

A 2-5 year development cycle for a fighter or fighter equivalent would be a nice thing, but I think it is impossible. There hasn't been a high performance fighter anywhere in the world in the last 20 or so years that has come even close to that. None that I can think of anyway.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

despite their "innovative" use of carriers to execute a long range attack against Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy's primary strategic focus throughout the war was to fight a Mahan influenced decisive main battle fleet action (a la Tsushima), which didn't occur until Surigao Strait in Oct '44. Which by then was too late.

Some naval historians posit that Pearl Harbor was actually a good thing, since our main Pacific battle fleet was put out of action it forced us at the Coral Sea and Midway to use carriers as a weapons system unto themselves, vice as an adjunct to the main battle fleet.

While Japan did launch the first purpose built aircraft carrier in 1921 she concentrated a much larger share of her naval program to developing the main battle fleet (Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, and two others laid down but never completed). Once the war started many Japanese Naval aviation units operated from land bases, with the carriers used more as shuttles. So to say that carrier-centric operations were the "bread and butter" of Japanese fleet operations is overly simplistic. If one looks at the composition of the Japanese Navy's Hawaiian attack force it includes a large number of submarines and two battleships (the Hiei and Kirishima). They were almost as surprised by their stunning success as we were of the attack.

[Norfolk]

Here's some news on the proposed new bomber for the Air Force:

Boeing and Lockheed Martin team for next USAF bomber
By Stephen Trimble

Boeing and Lockheed Martin have teamed to compete against Northrop Grumman for development and production of the US Air Force’s Next Generation Bomber, planned to enter service in 2018.

In May 2007, the US Air Force revealed it preferred a manned, subsonic next-generation bomber. Requirements include an unrefuelled combat radius of 3,700km (2,000nm) and a payload ranging from 6,400-12,700kg (14,000-28,000lb). These makes the bomber more comparable to the General Dynamics F-111 than either the Boeing B-52 or Northrop B-2.

Pratt & Whitney has disclosed plans to offer an engine derived from the F119 that powers the F-22. General Electric may consider offering a version of the F135 under development to power the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, or the variable-cycle F120 that power Northrop’s rival to the F-22, the YF-23.

An all-new engine design is not likely to be available to meet the air force’s 2018 in-service date. The US Air Force Research Laboratory has launched the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology programme to demonstrate a variable bypass turbofan in 2012, but it is not scheduled to enter production until after the new bomber is fielded.

No word on how much the program will cost, nor even on how many bombers are required. If this bomber is to be something in the class of the F-111 as the article suggests, then it seems that this will likely be a tactical bomber rather than a strategic one. If so, what's going to replace the B-52 and the B-1? Keeping the B-52 in service until 2043 or whatever strains belief beyond any reasonable bounds.

[Distiller]

The weight (and thus size) limitations have to do with the desired stealth characteristics. It will be a strategic bomber in the sense can it act as platform for nuclear armed cruise missiles classified as strategic.

That it will not be a giant like the B-52 or Tu-160 is also clear I think.
If your mission does not require to drop large quantities of free-falling bombs you can build a cruise missile carrier quite small (depending of course on the size/weight of a yet-to-be-developed cruise missile). 10 to 12 metric tons give you four to six ALCMs. A hundred bomber (and fewer are not probable) make it 100 platforms with 400 to 600 vectors with 400 to 600 warheads. More than strategic arms reduction allows/needs, taking the triade as basis.

Also the question will it be supersonic. Given that all technology used has to be available now, it will probably have supercruise capability like the F-22. But also loitering capability will be important for long-range CAS, perhaps resulting in some kind of variable aerodynamic geometry (and variable cycle engine).

Should I guess I'd say a supercruising stealth bomber between 80 and 100 tons, manned but optionally or in a later version also autonomous ops capable, 4 engines w/o afterburner, armed with four to six ALCMs, or whatever fits for the conventional mission. And the airframe might also used as stealth buddy-buddy tanker and intelligence platform. -- Basically a modern day Avro Vulcan.

[SWJED]

Via Tom Ricks's Inbox (Washington Post)

Here, the Air Force uses the jargon of modern warfare to discuss its competition with the Army and Navy. Usually, it is China that U.S. officers describe as a "peer competitor" -- that is, a real or potential adversary...

[Norfolk]

The Budget Battle is Zero-Sum Gain?!

Unreal. The Air Force comes right out and declares "war" on the other services. Even if the AF wins, the Armed Services as a whole will still lose. Just unbelievable that some of them would actually come right out and publish it - maybe the AF should be disbanded after all?

[LawVol]

Someone please explain to me how the budget battle is not a zero sum gain. The amount of money Congress will assign to the defense budget is finite and all branches cannot get everything they want. In the scramble for dollars, every service presents its arguments and woes supporters on the hill. If you see this as a declaration of war, you're reading too much into it.

Although Tom Ricks indicates that the AF refered to the Army and Navy as "peer competitors," a term usually reserved for China, I didn't see that in the posted material. I did see the term "peer," which according to dictionary.com is defined as "a person of the same legal status" or "something of equal worth or quality." Again, please explain to me how this is not true.

Step away from the Kool-aid.

[Rob Thornton]

Old Eagle and I were talking about the lead up to the next QDR and the politics that are going with it. The whole thing is more then a little sad - much more debate and focus by the services on getting what they want vs. tackling the tough, common problems that face us all.

Maybe that is the nature of the beast, but its telling of a lot more then just how the pie gets cut. It speaks to fear, paranoia, mistrust, influence of people not worried about the same things we are (the folks who stand to really profit in terms of $$$, and a host of other things that drive us to ignoring our common sense about what we should be doing, and instead figuring out the best ways to short sheet the other guy without really considering how it might effect our over-all capability to defend the constitution form our enemies foreign and domestic.

I hate the way this makes us dance to a tune barely related to what we profess to be; argueing over money makes us less then we are capable of being. Maybe its the just the best we can do, and maybe its a requirement, but I don't have to like it.

Best, Rob

[Ski]

This is no surprise.

The services care about two things - resources and force structure.

I always thought it was crap, and then I read the initial draft of the first Army campaign plan, and it stated "The resourcing process is the center of gravity for the Army."

Not winning wars, not defending the country, but the resource process. It's all about protecting the institution gents, and that means resources and force structure. If anyone has ever done time on the HQDA staff and gone through a POM build, they will understand exactly what I mean.

Totally repugnant.

The fact the Air Force has codified the message and send it out to their beancounters is no surprise.

What this should tell every officer is that it is indeed a zero-sum game, and that money does not grow on trees.