Future COIN in Afghanistan

[Gian P Gentile]

Future Coin in Afghanistan

Some of you won’t like this but I will say it anyway. Is this where we are headed with the next Coin/Surge narrative for Afghanistan? This entry by the SWJ editors certainly suggests such undertones. Will we start to see opeds by AEI neo-cons arguing that in 2007 American troops had basically quit the country and hunkered down on Fobs like they did according to the Iraq narrative in 2006? You sit back and say nobody is saying that but I heard from the mouth of a senior officer who was on a senior commander’s staff in Iraq this past year characterize American troops in Iraq in 2006 as “Fob Rats.” And this officer said this so matter-of-factly that it seemed clear to me that that was the garden variety view of things in the halls of the palaces in the GZ and VBC. I thought to myself well if I and my men were “Fob Rats” in 2006 then how in the hell did some soldiers under my command “just get dead?” So why not, let’s just build the same story for Afghanistan. But perhaps this time instead of saying the Americans screwed up we can go easy on ourselves and blame NATO for not “getting it right.” And again the lean toward hagiography in this entry is striking but still without the temporal insights of history to inform.

Why do we have such a positivist view of American military power and its ability to control and shape ANY environment? Clearly, at least to me, that is what underpins the Iraq narrative and is the start of a new narrative for Afghanistan.

[SWJED]

Future Coin in Afghanistan

Some of you won’t like this but I will say it anyway. Is this where we are headed with the next Coin/Surge narrative for Afghanistan? This entry by the SWJ editors certainly suggests such undertones. Will we start to see opeds by AEI neo-cons arguing that in 2007 American troops had basically quit the country and hunkered down on Fobs like they did according to the Iraq narrative in 2006? You sit back and say nobody is saying that but I heard from the mouth of a senior officer who was on a senior commander’s staff in Iraq this past year characterize American troops in Iraq in 2006 as “Fob Rats.” And this officer said this so matter-of-factly that it seemed clear to me that that was the garden variety view of things in the halls of the palaces in the GZ and VBC. I thought to myself well if I and my men were “Fob Rats” in 2006 then how in the hell did some soldiers under my command “just get dead?” So why not, let’s just build the same story for Afghanistan. But perhaps this time instead of saying the Americans screwed up we can go easy on ourselves and blame NATO for not “getting it right.” And again the lean toward hagiography in this entry is striking but still without the temporal insights of history to inform.

Why do we have such a positivist view of American military power and its ability to control and shape ANY environment? Clearly, at least to me, that is what underpins the Iraq narrative and is the start of a new narrative for Afghanistan.

Gian,

Undertones are in the eye of the beholder and I take exception to you taking quite a bit of liberty in interpreting what I “suggested” in the Afghanistan COIN posting. To be quite honest, and I am, the idea of AEI-like use of arguments and false analogies about Iraq FOB-rats had nothing to with my posting.

That said, my bottom line is this – we are facing an increasing insurgent threat in Afghanistan and we have a sound COIN doctrine – you have said the later yourself on several occasions – shouldn’t we constantly re-evaluate our OEF COIN efforts to ensure we are optimizing our strategy based on that doctrine?

If not, what alternatives do you suggest?

Dave

[Penta]

A small RFI.

I've heard again and again about national caveats on the use of forces contributed to ISAF. SWJ brings it up again by saying there are as many as 50 separate caveats.

Has -anybody- ever sat down in public and said which countries are placing what caveats?

I think it'd be really, really good to know.

[Rex Brynen]

I think it'd be really, really good to know.

However, I think it would be really bad for the bad guys to know...

[Ron Humphrey]

However, I think it would be really bad for the bad guys to know...

in that part of the world it's probably pretty safe to assume they already have a good idea and utilize that information to their advantage.

Otherwise why would it be necessary to make a big fuss about it publicly in order to bring pressure on those nations to wise up.

In relation to COIN, Afghanistan, and FOBs If we take the region for what it is and remember what they have been through over the last many years, it would seem to be a wiser choice to follow a path that has shown itself to be effective (with local adjustments of course). And in direct relation to FOB's and their utility I sincerely doubt they are truly seen on high as being a place of cowardice as would seem to be the impression by some but merely need to be seen for what they are in the larger picture (as a Forward Base of Operations) Operations which overwhelming take place outside of said FOB's.

I would hope noone would be percieved to be discounting the lives lost by soldiers no matter where or how they were working as in the end they were doing their job.

[Eden]

Having been a planner/liaison in ISAF recently, I can attest to how dysfunctional the entire NATO set up is in Afghanistan. NATO planners - some of the sharpest officers I met in my career, by the way - kept a chart that listed by nation what their caveats were. It had to be cross-indexed, color coded, and linked in a constantly updated website so that the order writers knew that Country A could not deploy outside of their allotted region without their MOD's approval, or that Country B would only accept TACON to Country C, or that Country D's helicopters could not be used for reconnaissance. The US was just as guilty as other members of NATO; though we denied having any caveats, we in fact had several that hampered planning and cooperation.

What is worse was the fact that each major NATO player runs its own war. The US played whack-a-mole, the British tried to apply the tactics of 1919, the Canadians manfully fought pitched battles requiring artillery, CAS, engineer support, and tanks, while the Dutch plied the open-hand, soft cap approach. All of this in neighboring provinces! ISAF, at least while I was there, tried to bring coherence at the operational level, but it had no levers to force compliance. Again, the US was just as guilty as any other party in refusing to support a common NATO approach to counterinsurgency, even after we came under ISAF 'command'.

Finally, the force levels are just too low. ISAF's minimum military requirement - the forces needed to successfully conduct operations even under the present limited mandate - has never been met. At one point during my last tour, the US had as many generals as they had infantry companies in Afghanistan. Anybody who has gone through the NATO Force Generation process comes away disillusioned that neither the US nor our fellow NATO partners are willing to ante up the troops needed. On the other hand, there are more than enough troops to engender resentment and resistance.

So, frustration in Afghanistan will continue for three classic reasons:

1. The counterinsurgents do not have sufficient combat power to hold what they clear. Nor can they concentrate what combat power they do have due to NATO's system of national fiefdoms, national caveats, and the scattering of PRTs helter-skelter across the countryside.
2. The insurgents have a reliable source of funding and manpower to allow them to take the field pretty much when and where they choose.
3. The insurgents have a secure sanctuary across the border.

This is COIN 101, and no strategy is going to work that doesn't address all three questions.

[JeffC]

"Defeating Cross Border Insurgencies": A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the equirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies by THORSTEN LYHNE JØRGENSEN, MAJ, DENMARK, Graduate Diploma Royal Danish Military Academy Copenhagen 2002, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2007

Abstract:

"History has witnessed numerous examples of cross border insurgencies where the insurgents have operated across international borders: in the 1950s in Algeria, the 1960s and 1970s in Oman, the 1980s in Afghanistan and Kosovo in the 1990s. Presently, the international community has returned yet again to Afghanistan. Using a comparative case study design, the analysis examines the insurgencies in Oman (1960s and 70s), Kashmir (1989 -) and Afghanistan (2001 - ).This thesis assesses whether COIN efforts can be successful when the insurgents are operating from safe havens in neighboring states. The Oman case study was chosen because the counterinsurgents were successful even though the insurgents had access to safe havens in neighboring Yemen. The ongoing Kashmir insurgency (since 1989 in its current incarnation) depends on heavily cross border support from Pakistan. Afghanistan is the focus of the analysis. Currently, NATO forces and non-NATO allies are engaged in fighting an insurgency which is operating out of safe havens in Pakistan’s western provinces (North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchistan).

The methodology applied in this thesis is a combination of the structurally focused Collier-Hoeffler model and Bard O’Neil’s process oriented model on insurgencies. A variety of factors ranging from the status of the economy to cross border ethnicity are discussed in order to determine if, and how, a COIN effort can achieve success.

This thesis concludes that in order to be successful against a cross border insurgency, the international community must assume a strategic approach encompassing all the instruments of national power. Prior to the application of the elements of the DIME, the counterinsurgent should conduct a thorough historical and cultural analysis in order to fully comprehend the region in which operations are going to be executed. Once counterinsurgency operations have commenced, progress must appear immediately, especially with regards to issues such as: security, poverty, medical care and unemployment. Finally, cohesion and persistence on the COIN part are crucial. Once engaged in the COIN fight, the international community must stay the course. Incessant political debates regarding extraction, limitation of forces and national caveats only serve the purpose of the insurgency."

Hat tip to Sources and Methods for finding this.