Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

[Kiwigrunt]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?
If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

[William F. Owen]

@ Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

@ Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

@ Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

@ So is that a heavy Squad or a light Platoon? What this shows to me is the silliness of focussing on the squad level of organisation.

@ Thank you! Actually I think that my best work - and no one ever reads! It was actually incorporated into the Slovenian Army's infantry manual!

@ Suppression is the lack of action caused by fear of harm. If heavier rounds can degrade cover, then they can increase fear. Anything that increases fear, increases suppression. This is why an 8.6mm Long Range Rifle has such an interesting capability.

- now the rub. It was the US fixation with Squads - plus poor infantry tactical doctrine - which lead to the creation 5.56m belt fed weapons for fire teams. Technically, tactically and doctrinally there is very little to support the case for 5.56mm belt fed weapons. The near ideal mix is 5.56mm in 30 round mags and 7.62mm link for your support weapon.

[Norfolk]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

Hello KiwiGrunt,

I have to admit that, yes, the idea of a 20-man Section (with 3x6-man Squads) originally came from Senator and former US SECNAV James Webb, although he envisioned only a single man in the HQ; Tom Odom's (et al's.) article suggested 2 men in the HQ, with the Commander free to fight the Section and his 2i/c handling the comms and admin (great idea). I think that the 2-Section Platoon does that, restoring Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, yet remaining flexible enough to adapt and reorganize as necessary to meet the situation at hand, under conditions of some adversity. I also took one of Wilf's Platoon proposals (the 20-man version) to broadly, if not exactly, reinforce the notion (he would broadly disagree on this point, though).

The purpose of the threads on this board have not been to find some "one-size fits all" ideal Squad/Section/Platoon/Company organization, but the organization best suited to adapting to the tactical situation as it changes - METT-T and all that. In other words, we are looking for the "best" basis for change. The Platoon organization that you propose is perhaps the "best" in this regard that I have seen so far. The Canadian Infantry Pam begins with this quote:

"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."

MGen Sir John Monash, from Chapter 1, B-GL-309-003/FT-001, Infantry, Volume 3, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle, 1996.

Now, I grew up on the old 1982 Infantry Pam, which differed in some ways (some substantially, in some ways better, in some ways worse) than the 1996 Infantry Pam, but as we can see from Wigram's work, never mind more recent work like Wilf's, that much the same old problems persist, and for many of the usual reasons.

What most strikes me about your proposed Platoon composition, KiwiGrunt, is its 2-Section organization. As the Section you propose has its own 2-man HQ and 3x6-man Squads, it is fully capable of independent missions by itself, or semi-independent tasks during a Platoon mission. As it is a mini-Platoon in effect, with its own full HQ and its own Reserve (whether for Fire Support or for Manoeuvre), it can perform F&M by itself if it has to. Operating as part of the Platoon, the Section can bring to bear a substantial portion of the firepower of a Platoon during a Fire-Fight, and either continue to suppress during the Assault, or handle the Assault all by itself while the other Section and the Platoon Mortar continue to suppress. It also makes the Consolidation a little more secure and easier, as the Assaulting Section possesses considerable firepower and fighting power by itself, while the Covering Section moves up to join it.

There is another advantage to it, its ability to operate dispersed over a relatively wide area in small patrols. That was what struck me most about the German Infantry Group, how it operated not so much as an open-order field formation during the approach, but more so as a Patrol, moving from fire position to fire position using all available cover, and only when in the heat of battle would it rely upon suppression by fire in the absence of any available cover ("Effect over Cover"). Even in the Fire-Fight, normally the German Group would fight with only the Group Commander and his Machine Gun Troop of 3 or 4 men, while the Group 2i/c and the bulk of the Group remained under cover, unless circumstances forced it to be otherwise. Wigram and Wilf have each further developed this, and what you propose KiwiGrunt, potentially takes it a little further.

As each of the 6-man Squads can easily form its own self-contained Patrol, or break down into a pair of 3-man Patrols for reducing sign to the utter minimum possible whilst achieving the greatest practical coverage and dispersion. The 2-Section organization of the Platoon makes coordination much easier; 6x6-man Patrols could get complicated for a Platoon HQ to coordinate, and a dozen 3-man Patrols would be positively nightmarish. As is, a 6-man Patrol is really the largest you can use without sign and control likely becoming a significant problem. 3- or 4-man Patrols, as you know, leave the least trace of their presence, and are the easiest to control. As each Section would coordinate half of the Patrols, the Platoon HQ could concentrate on coordinating the two Sections as a whole with the Platoon Mortar Squad. Tighter control of the Patrols by the Sections could make it easier and faster to coordinate the Squads/Patrols, and especially to mass them for attack or quickly disperse afterwards as necessary; the Platoon may find it rather harder to do so with so many Patrols. I do notice a vaguely passing resemblance to the Patrols Company in a Parachute Battalion here.

As is, KiwiGrunt, your proposed Platoon organization may afford the advantages of both Wigram's and Wilf's ideas, not least by disposing of the almost mechanical formations and drills that Infantry presently are indoctrinated in, and moreover to restore Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, where it is best handled (usually). And I am very much in agreement with your ideas on Suppression, the 7.62mm round, and the 6.5 mm Grendel as a possible "best" cartridge at Squad level.

Excellent work.

[Rifleman]

Webb articulated his case for the larger fire teams well, but I have to agree with Wilf on this one: 18 man "squads" seem more like small platoons in action, especially if they have additional attachments.

The three fire team USMC squad made a lot of sense in the BAR days of WWII and Korea. It probably took 3 BARs to equal the suppression capability of one MG 42.

The more I read through everyone's posts again the more I think Paul Melody's ideas make sense: the squad can fire; the squad can maneuver; the squad shouldn't try to fire and maneuver (in the sense of enveloping attacks) as a regular practice. At least that seems sensible to me for the 8-10 man squads that most armys have.

US Army light infantry experience in Vietnam bears this out. The squad was usually reduced (by combat attrition) to 6-8 men with one M60, one M79, and a handfull of riflemen. It didn't have enough people to subdivide and conduct enveloping attacks at squad level. SLA Marshall's bright idea of a two team, 11 man squad suppressing with one team and flanking with another didn't cut it for very long.

Is anyone familiar with SOPs for the Vietnam era special projects? I'd like to know if Mike Forces, Mobile Guerrilla Forces, CIDGs, and SOG SLAM/Hatchet units normally used enveloping attacks at squad level or if that was a platoon function.

[William F. Owen]

"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."

Any chance you have the Canadian PAMs as .pdf's?

Yes, it is all about Platoons. The fixation on the perfect squad is what I call "Error 37" from the UK 1937 Platoon re-organisation.

Once folks lock into Platoon concepts and not section concepts, I get the impression we all seem to come back to same stuff and same approximate numbers.

I am not sure you need a Platoon HQ anymore. I don't think you needed one in 1918 or 1945. Modern radios like PRC-148 make dedicated Signallers/RTO a luxury, and not really relevant. Not having a platoon HQ does streamline a lot of stuff and IMO makes tactical conduct more efficient.

[Norfolk]

E-mail sent.

[Distiller]

Was busy + travelling, no time for the board for some time. Good to see some more discussion going on now


For my taste by putting the 60mm mortar into the platoon you'd create too large a body of men tasked with indirect fire into a fast acting direct-contact formation.

Does the platoon have the oversight for utilizing a 4000+ yards weapon? I think a MGL would be better suited.

And as long as you don't put six men for each barrel into the mortar section you don't have enough ammo for any meaningful fire in case you have to carry everything on your back.
And loading up the regular riflemen with grenades is also not good, as on contact their job is not to first run back to the mortar section and drop their load, but to instantly try to respond to enemy fire, or go for cover and act as fire directors for indirect fire or CAS.

If you put it at company level the mortar section can be more easily converted to a rifle section in case the mortar is not needed, without "braking up the harmony" of the platoon.

And I'm also not sure about a Lapua as marksman rifle. Might be too heavy, and for sure is a repeater. A 7.62 like the M110 is lighter and a semi-auto which can serve as high precision fire to supplement the high volume fire GPMG.
Again, a Lapua might be too long range for the horizon of a platoon.

Regarding coms I would say a dedicated man could come handy, but only if he has the equipment for some basic ELINT. Otherwise technology provides small enough equipment for miniaturized NavCom to be carried by each troop leader. Troop leaders should also be equipped with a precision engagement targeting device (laser or geo-location transceiver) for CAS and precision indirect-fire ammo.

Wilgram's views are sure interesting (and right), only thing is they are basically incompatible with current U.S.-dominated view of command and control. Giving the individual troops more or less tactical autonomy would be more German.

About section size: Don't forget you really should be able to fit into a IMV, IFV or UH-xx without splitting up the squad/section. Gives up a 8 or 9 men section. And not splitting up for mot/mech/air transport might be more important than the question of X men sections in a Y sections platoon.

All in all I think that concentrating on the platoon as smallest unit is more useful than concentrating on the squad/section. And what exactly would be the benefit of a 2 section platton? Why not go for a 6 section company then?

And not wanting to get into caliber discussion here, but a 6.5 Grendel is quite close to a 7.62 NATO. Might well go for a single caliber then. But also the more AK-47 style 6.8SPC for assault carbines and the 7.62mm NATO for MGs plus DMR should be considered.

[William F. Owen]

For my taste by putting the 60mm mortar into the platoon you'd create too large a body of men tasked with indirect fire into a fast acting direct-contact formation.

The 60mm mortars concerned are light hand held devices, operated by one man and in the direct fire role. They have been in UK platoons in one shape or another since 1937. 2-inch, 51mm and now 60mm!

http://www.army-technology.com/contr...enberger2.html

And I'm also not sure about a Lapua as marksman rifle. Might be too heavy, and for sure is a repeater. A 7.62 like the M110 is lighter and a semi-auto which can serve as high precision fire to supplement the high volume fire GPMG.
Again, a Lapua might be too long range for the horizon of a platoon.

The 8.6mm isn't just about range. The terminal effect of the round is amazing as is it's AP performance. It would be great to have both the M110 and the LRR, but how many types of ammo do you want to have across the platoon? If we could 5.56mm link for 7.62mm Ball, we might be in business!!

Troop leaders should also be equipped with a precision engagement targeting device (laser or geo-location transceiver) for CAS and precision indirect-fire ammo.

Concur. You can get all this for < 1kg.

Wilgram's views are sure interesting (and right), only thing is they are basically incompatible with current U.S.-dominated view of command and control. Giving the individual troops more or less tactical autonomy would be more German.

WIGRAM. Not as much as you may think. I may be writing something for Infantry Magazine.

About section size: Don't forget you really should be able to fit into a IMV, IFV or UH-xx without splitting up the squad/section. Gives up a 8 or 9 men section. And not splitting up for mot/mech/air transport might be more important than the question of X men sections in a Y sections platoon.

I disagree. This is a hold over from the Cold War. The APC, IMV or UH, is merely a tool. It is subservient to the dismounted organisation. If it is not, then you have Dragoons, Cavalry, Panzer Grenadiers or Recce Troops. If you are true infantry, then the cabs lift you. You don't jam into the cabs. This is not just "nice theory." It's a sound point of doctrine!

[Kiwigrunt]

And not wanting to get into caliber discussion here, but a 6.5 Grendel is quite close to a 7.62 NATO. Might well go for a single caliber then. But also the more AK-47 style 6.8SPC for assault carbines and the 7.62mm NATO for MGs plus DMR should be considered.

This would only increase overall weight carried. 6.5 would replace both 7.62 and 5.56, or maybe even only 7.62, and therefore save weight for near equal performance (and that would need to be tested and proven of course). 6.8SPC cannot replace 7.62 because it does not have the range.