Results 1 to 20 of 307

Thread: Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    A company attack with two platoons up with each platoon in turn attacking with two sections up is in effect then four simultaneous section attacks involving section level fire & movement. Each platoon commander is observing their individual two section attacks and have the third section in reserve in case the attacks stall. This while the company commander observes the progress of his two platoons and hold his third platoon in reserve in case either of the platoon actions stall.

    So I see it that the sections are not attacking isolation and have an objective and boundaries for each action (with the reserve section passing through to take on the next objective) the command and control is always with the next higher HQ.

    Are we on the same page?
    Well that's exactly how I was trained. IMO, it's grossly simplistic, and a poor starting point. It never worked well in WW2 and markedly failed in the Falklands.

    IMO, the section level of command is superfluous as concerns co-ordination of the attack.
    Section commanders should do fire control and conduct moves.
    Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants should be the lowest level of co-ordination, so F&M occurs a the Platoon level, not the section.
    Company commanders organise and control supporting fires.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  2. #2
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Well that's exactly how I was trained. IMO, it's grossly simplistic, and a poor starting point. It never worked well in WW2 and markedly failed in the Falklands.

    IMO, the section level of command is superfluous as concerns co-ordination of the attack.
    Section commanders should do fire control and conduct moves.
    Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants should be the lowest level of co-ordination, so F&M occurs a the Platoon level, not the section.
    Company commanders organise and control supporting fires.
    I suggest you are moving the command to far forward. We did the reverse by spliting the section in two (basically) and then expected to stick commander (Cpl or L/Cpl) to get on with it. Put in some 4 man attacks where used the gunner to fire us in then he followed at the double. Talking 50-75m here but can't do that with inexperienced troops especially the gunner. I believe once the fire fight has been won you got get to them quickly and put an end to it.

    However... I do accept that due to the supporting fire requirement both before and during an attack on a prepared position there will have to be a MFC, FOO, FAC or whatever forward and the need to coordinate and control the position and movement of own forces the platoon cmd/coy cmd may have to move forward to take local control.

    Again we are talking different wars, different terrain, different enemies etc. I suggest not to try to make it a hard and fast rule either way.
    Last edited by JMA; 04-30-2010 at 03:38 AM.

  3. #3
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Again we are talking different wars, different terrain, different enemies etc. I suggest not to try to make it a hard and fast rule either way.
    Concur. This is why I see the ability to group the platoon to the operation and not alter the operation to fit the platoon organisation.

    ...but, you do have to have a base line of reference, or "default setting" that is as simple and coherent as possible.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #4
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Concur. This is why I see the ability to group the platoon to the operation and not alter the operation to fit the platoon organisation.

    ...but, you do have to have a base line of reference, or "default setting" that is as simple and coherent as possible.
    Has someone produced anything better than the current section and platoon battle drills as a basic foundation?

  5. #5
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Has someone produced anything better than the current section and platoon battle drills as a basic foundation?
    As of 2009 There are 6 section battle drills:
    a. Preparation.
    b. Reaction to effective enemy fire.
    c. Locating the enemy.
    d. Suppressing the enemy.
    e. The attack.
    f. Regroup.

    The 4 Platoon Drills are
    a. Preparation.
    b. Reaction to effective enemy fire.
    c. The attack.
    d. Regroup.

    Personally I think we can do better.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #6
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    589

    Default My behind schedule contribution to a dead thread...pt.1

    Although Rex Brynen set his challenge some time ago I have spent the time since thinking through my proposal and am submitting it here for the consideration of the SWC (be gentle with me I'm a ToE virgin!). None of what is proposed here is original (I owe a great deal to two articles in the Marine Corps Gazette written by a Cap. Spricin, Sen. James Webb, the French Type 107 infantry battalion, WILF, Col. Odom, the Regimental Rogue and kiwigrunt among others) but I have spent some considerable time examining the pros and cons of each proposal and formulating a syncretic combination to achieve the best organisation (IMO only).

    Conceptual basis of force design: Find, Fix and Finish
    I have proceeded from the assumption that platoons and companies are the smallest subunits to which tactical tasks can be assigned. As such they must be combined arms formations which contain sufficient organic firepower to accomplish those tasks. Furthermore, they must be organised in a fashion that enables them to do so effectively/efficiently. Hence, and in accordance with the core functions (F³) my company contains a reconnaissance (recce) platoon, two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Recce plt finds and fixes with indirect fires whilst the two rifle platoons manoeuvre to finish (preferably from a flank).

    The recce platoon has a HQ team with a 60mm commando mortar (2 men), 2 radio men, a PL armed with an M32 & a P2iC, five recce teams and an RPV team with 4 Puma AE (for instance) UAVs and a GCS. Operates according to infiltration and patrol based techniques. For FIBUA/MOUT recce teams would have UGVs too. Once TiC I envisage one or two teams peeling off to provide flank security/observation. Not too sure about the RPV team attached to Recce plt HQ...got an inkling it should be attached to coy HQ.

    The rifle platoons comprise a HQ team and two 20-man sections and operate along Wigram lines. The HQ team comprises a 3 man HQ element, a 2-man 60mm mortar team and a LRR (1 man). Each section has a two man HQ element. One section is a “pure” rifle-grenadier section with three 6 man teams each with an M32 and 5 IW. The other section is the direct fire section with two six man rocket teams and a LMG team. The rocket teams each comprise three two man teams (MPMS gunner and ammo man) with a minimum of five rounds carried between both (15 for each team). The gunners carry pistols as secondary weapons whilst the ammo men all carry IW (or rifle calibre PDWs). The LMG team is similarly organised with light machine gunners carrying pistols as secondaries. In practice the section compositions can be chopped and changed. For constabulary type operations (peace-keeping rather than peace-enforcement) not requiring such overwhelming firepower both rifle platoon’s direct fire sections can be re-rolled as rifle sections to provide more BOG (they’d keep their CLUs for obs purposes). Depending on mission both DF sections can be consolidated into one platoon with the other a pure “rifle-grenadier” platoon (for especially stubborn stains, sorry, I mean targets/strongpoints/bunker complexes/urban block houses). The Rifle-Grenadiers can be liberally sprinkled with LAWS/RPG-27s according to METT-T (don’t fancy the NLAW myself; much too large a weapon- weight and volume wise- for what it offers which may be technologically out of date anyway given current and projected active protection systems such as LEDS).

    The weapons platoon has a SF section with a two man HQ and two 6-man SF teams (each with two GPMG or M307 should they ever come on line in which case three four man M307 teams). ATGM section with three Javelin (3 men each) and a two man HQ and finally a mortar section with two mortar teams each of four men. The mortar section HQ element doubles as an FDC.

    Attachments such a FOOs, Medics, ADA personnel have not been included because I haven’t figured that out yet. It’s not because I’m lazy (being thorough can sometimes be perceived as such) it’s just that I’m still figuring manpower requirements in relation to emerging and near term technologies especially with regards to FISTs/ COLTs/ FOOS. In this latter respect I am assuming that the Recce platoon teams have personnel trained as FOOs (either the sniper No. 2 or team 2IC) in order to help them accomplish the Find/Fix function. Also, I am assuming that the recce plt HQ can form the core of a specialist CLIC.

    Weapons/Equipment:
    All troops have combined TI/NVG. The M32s are all equipped with the IMI MPRS or STK LV ABMS sight and can thus fire air-burst munitions as well as MV rounds (out to 800m). Recce plt teams and rifle platoon section commanders carry HUNTIR rounds as standard and can be issued with smaller UGVs (i.e., for FIBUA, trench-clearing, etc.). The MPMS (Multi-Purpose Missile System aka Mini-Spike) CLU also has a useful observation capability ideal for use in FOBs or OPs (as do the Javelin CLUs) whilst I am assuming that FAE and anti-bunker rounds are available/can be developed for it. I would prefer SPIKE MR (at both coy and Bn level) simply because of their NLOS capability (gives one more employment options) but as we (UK) have chosen Javelin that’ll have to do (at Bde level I’d have a 9 launcher Spike LR -25km+- battery in the Artillery battalion but that’s a different thread/site). Gimpys/Jimpys have lightweight tripods and are employed as a section not broken up and attached to plts (though not wholly out of the question). 60mm mortars (as well as the 120mm battalion mortars) all fire PGMMs (of the GPS variety) hopefully easing log demands (but HE is still ubiquitous). I’d like to see 60mm FAE rounds given that they are more lethal than straight HE-Frag but I could (more than likely am) wrong about that (I suspect blast overpressure would tie with molten metal fragments at a game of papers, scissors, rock on a summer’s day...on a rainy/humid day however....). For Afpak type operations from FOBs I had envisaged some kind of MULE-T section accompanying the company but at 2 tonnes (2.5 tons) each for a payload of half that something along the lines of laws of diminishing returns start taking over (for the weight and volume of each MULE-T that would have to be transported intra-theatre wouldn’t you rather have more ammo/food/medical supplies). I’d rather issue each coy with a few Supacat ATMP from lighter composite materials and power them with solar batteries/small diesel engines converted for vegetable oil or some such (they can be stacked for LAPES or C-130 transport too).

    Means of conveyance:

    Mechanised Infantry (UK)-
    The entire company (+ say a 10 man attachment) of 195 men can be lifted by a “carrier company” of 14/15 APCs of the GPV Captain or iKlwa variety (2+13/14) armed with nothing heavier than a 40mm GMG with airburst capability) and either a Javelin pod (1-2 rounds) or a 5 round 70mm guided rocket pod in a RWS. C2 would be as per the (old) UK and Aussie principles (i.e., APC crew are separate from the mounted infantry although organic to the formation). Vehicles’ baseline armour protects from 155mm fragments, mines and 14.5mm HMG rounds. Additional armour can be mounted. Vehicle protection suite would include active protection systems and (in future) electric armour.

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    589

    Default ...and pt. 2

    Armoured Infantry (UK)-
    Entire company (as above with 185 + 10 men attached) carried in a “carrier company” with 17 converted Chally 1 hulls (or similar) to create a Heavy APC (Namer/Temsah/BMPV-64-style) alternatively a stretched CV-90. Each vehicle would be powered by a Europack engine (which frees up a great deal of room within the hull, though it may need extending slightly), have identical armament to the APCs above and carry 2-3 crew plus 12 men. Baseline armour would provide better protection than the APC but with similar provision for up-armouring.

    Air-Assault (UK)-
    An eight or sixteen bird squadron of EH-101/Mi38s should be able to lift an entire company (8) or two (16). With a Battalion being lifted by two/four such squadrons or fewer numbers of CH-47s escorted by AH. For rapid reaction missions follow on echelons would be airlanded by An-70s once the Paras had taken Pristina airport...or some such suitable LZ. (An-70s are the missed opportunity of European aviation, could have helped Ukrainian industry whilst providing EU troops with an affordable and capable transport...bloody politicos)

    Royal Marines- However they want, not going to argue with them (...or the Paras).

    Battalion
    A battalion would have four companies, a weapons coy (mortar plt of 8 120mm, SP in mechanised and armoured formations, towed in air-assault and light roles; GMG plt with 9 GMG (or M307); ATGM plt w/ 9 ATGM & a 30 man sniper plt), artillery battery (6 155mm LWH/SPG and a FDC/FOO platoon), combat engineer/pioneer company, a recce platoon and the usual CSS attachments (I say usual, but they are the unheralded decisive enablers). Tank and AH support according to mission/threat/taste.
    Attached Images Attached Images

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •