I attempted to draw a kind of genealogy of infantry tactics. It's least impossible for defensive tactics thanks to the relatively greater degree of order.
Too bad my output was utterly Germany-centric. Do you guy have anything to add?
Leading infantry defence concepts
late 19th century till 1914:
single shoulder-to-shoulder line in simple trench
1915:
interlocking machine gun fire with elaborate trenches, rifle fire is secondary
1916-1918:
forward trenches weak, if possible two better-manned rear trenches in up to several kilometres depth (out of range of most hostile field artillery)
1920's:
elastic defence with weak VRV (FLOT), strong HKL (main line of resistance) at up to 10 km depth, some concerns about use of terrain and mines for AT purposes
1939/1940:
Finnish motti tactics and first huge use of ski troops
1941:
hedgehog defence (company strongpoints) on overstretched front-line (due to inability to man it in depth), if possible one continuous patrol trench at VRV (FLOT), dependence on indirect fire support for domination of gaps between strongpoints
early 1950's (1st German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints and squad or fire team resistance nests in between
early 1960's (2nd or 3rd German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints
1960's: U.S. heliborne infantry
extreme mobility in permissive AD environment, but nothing special once on the ground
around 1970: U.S. LRRP
infantry as mobile forward observers / scouts in an environment with huge "blue" excess firepower (offence and defence difficult to separate)
1968 till 1989 Austrian "Raumverteidigung" by infantry militia
defence of key locations to slow down passage of invaders
(Swiss were similar, only that they considered much of their country as key location and emphasised fortifications more)
1970's German (later also Austrian) Jagdkampf
(similar terminology to offensive WW2 counter guerilla patrols, but different concepts) with reinforced platoon-sized Jagdkommandos as forward or even infiltrated skirmishers
~1980: theory: guerilla-like Jäger (Franz Uhle-Wettler's concept)
elusive infantry does not hold terrain, but persist as threat in a designated area of operations. High degree of autonomy, extreme tooth:tail ratio in favour of teeth
~1980's theory: Simpkin's network of Uhle-Wettler's concept
expansion in depth of the concept in order to make entire regions threatened (Uhle-Wettler was more concerned about how easily difficult terrain can be exploited for flanking movements if not guarded, see Ardennes 1940)
sometime 1990's: distributed operations
(this concept of dispersed infantry small units morphed over time into a mere buzzword)
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