Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

[William F. Owen]

.

Here is my proposal for light inf. platoon org.

Platoon HQ Capt.
Pl.sgt.
2x sig.
Weapons squad (6 men) 2x 8.6mm Lapua Magnum rifles (2 pers.)
1x 60mm commando mortar (3 pers.)
1x squad leader
2x section (each 20 men) 1x Lt. with IW
1x section sgt. with IW
3x 6man squad: 1x leader with IW
1x 2ic NCO also no.2 on gun
1x 7.62 Minimi (FNH or Mk48)
1x IW with UGL
2x riflemen with IW
(squad leader leads 4 man rifle group and 2ic
leads gun group)

First off, nice effort. My feedback would be,

a.) You may want to look at carried individual loads. Crunch some numbers. I have core data if that helps.

b.) You grouped the 8.6mm LRR with the 60mm! - Excellent idea. I had discussed this with some folks before, as the 60mm really needs a hand held LRF, and that is normally LRR type kit.

c.) IMO, do not split the manoeuvre/function of a 6 man fireteam. Have all of them supporting the Gun, = 3 gun handlers and 3 Ammo carriage and security.

d.) Why have you got dedicated signallers? Does your platoon carry HF sets?

Any ideas of how this set up is actually operated? As per NZ Infantry doctrine?

[Kiwigrunt]

First off, nice effort. My feedback would be,

a.) You may want to look at carried individual loads. Crunch some numbers. I have core data if that helps.

b.) You grouped the 8.6mm LRR with the 60mm! - Excellent idea. I had discussed this with some folks before, as the 60mm really needs a hand held LRF, and that is normally LRR type kit.

c.) IMO, do not split the manoeuvre/function of a 6 man fireteam. Have all of them supporting the Gun, = 3 gun handlers and 3 Ammo carriage and security.

d.) Why have you got dedicated signallers? Does your platoon carry HF sets?

Any ideas of how this set up is actually operated? As per NZ Infantry doctrine?

First of all, thanks all for such immediate and enthusiastic response. I’m honored.

a) I am aware of weight of 7.62 belt and don't like it (as I touched on in my post). I do indeed love the 5.56 LMG with ability for gunner to carry plenty ammo by his little lonesome. Am aware that 2man gimpy group with no2 carrying an IW gives approx. 15 kg of weapons alone. That is the exact equivalent of the same 2 pers carrying 2 5.56 LMGs. Each of these two 5.56 gunners can carry the same number of rounds as the 7.62 gun group, by themselves, for the same weight penalty. My reason for going 7.62 though is the apparent need for 7.62 at section (or near-section) level.
What we are seeing more frequently now in the sand box, is GPMGs being added to LMGs at section level. Do they really compliment each other at that level or is it a case of not being able to make up our minds as to which caliber to go for?
b) Suppose I got that right without trying! Technology is really starting to catch up here though. (In Civvy Street you can now get LRFs up to about 1200m, the size of a packet of cigarettes.) Mortar team should really have their own. You got me thinking though, should I add a no2 to the 8.6 rifles? Are the Brits doing that with their 8.6 rifles at platoon level?
c) If all 6 men are there only to support the gun, then it is hardly a maneuver unit. It becomes a support unit. Even in ‘old’ gungroup/riflegoup scenario’s the riflemen carried extra belt for the gimpy but the gun group was still only 2 or 3 strong. The rifle group was still just that. In fact, didn’t Wigram propose exactly that (separating the guns from the rifles when needed)?
d) I must admit ignorance here. Coms is an area I have never looked into very much. When I left the army 6 years ago, we were still using Vietnam era PRC-77 sets. Even at section level a rifleman was appointed as radio operator. If technology here has advanced to the point that the platoon commander carries his own radio, I’ll happily sack the sigs. (takes a few pers off a relatively large platoon). Would it not be prudent though to have a sig. baby sitting ‘up hill’ radio traffic while pl.com. concentrates on running the platoon?
e)Not NZ doctrine. NZ doctrine has always been fairly close to UK doctrine, with maybe a personal flavor based on experience in Vietnam. Not sure how things have changed since LAV3 replaced M113. When I joined we actually still operated gungroup/riflegroup principals with our 5.56 weapons, with one C9 LSW per 10 man section. It was not until late 90’s that we were given an additional C9 and 203 to apply fire teams.
As for ‘my’ platoon, I can see advantages with my additional officers and sergeants (read also Tom’s article on transformation) but I can also see plenty of potential for over management and over analyzing and debating rather than decision making (at levels as low as section/platoon.)

Oh dear, another long one…that’s what you get though when asking lot’s of questions. But hey, bring it on. That’s what this is all about isn’t it?

P.S. Is Wilgram's battlecraft manual available on line? Love to read it.

[William F. Owen]

P.S. Is Wilgram's battlecraft manual available on line? Love to read it.

Sadly not. I know of one surviving copy and it is held in a UK School of Infantry archive. 4 years ago, I got to sit and read it, and was allowed to copy a couple of sections. Last I heard, it had got some bad water damage from being stored in a damp box. I did try to get it made into a .pdf by the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, but they were "busy."

The nearest document to pure Wigram is the 1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL
http://www.helion.co.uk/product.asp?...379&P_ID=13119 - This is a reprint. I have an original !

This is actually extremely good and well worth studying if you are interested in Infantry Doctrine.

[Cultana]

The closest to this “1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL”, that I have is “The Instructors handbook on FIELDCRAFT and BATTLE DRILL 1943”. But that is a reprint with amendment No 1, dated Sept 1943. This is an Australian print of the manual not the British printing.

Actually I was more impressed with the following “Infantry Minor Tactics-1941” an Australian pam. It appears in some areas more orientated for the AMF than the AIF.

The 43 manual seemed to contradict some of the material in the IMT 41 book. Some of the IMT material was reinforced with brig Wooden’s AAR after Milne Bay, Sep 42 so it is a bit hard to make comparisons.

As I scanned both these at something like 150% actual size and about 200 dpi the files are not exactly emailable; 500- 700 MB in size. If wanted it can only go by snail mail.

[William F. Owen]

The closest to this “1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL”, that I have is “The Instructors handbook on FIELDCRAFT and BATTLE DRILL 1943”. But that is a reprint with amendment No 1, dated Sept 1943. This is an Australian print of the manual not the British printing.

Actually I was more impressed with the following “Infantry Minor Tactics-1941” an Australian pam. It appears in some areas more orientated for the AMF than the AIF.

The 43 manual seemed to contradict some of the material in the IMT 41 book. Some of the IMT material was reinforced with brig Wooden’s AAR after Milne Bay, Sep 42 so it is a bit hard to make comparisons.

As I scanned both these at something like 150% actual size and about 200 dpi the files are not exactly emailable; 500- 700 MB in size. If wanted it can only go by snail mail.

PM sent mate!! Good stuff.

[Kiwigrunt]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?
If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

[William F. Owen]

@ Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

@ Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

@ Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

@ So is that a heavy Squad or a light Platoon? What this shows to me is the silliness of focussing on the squad level of organisation.

@ Thank you! Actually I think that my best work - and no one ever reads! It was actually incorporated into the Slovenian Army's infantry manual!

@ Suppression is the lack of action caused by fear of harm. If heavier rounds can degrade cover, then they can increase fear. Anything that increases fear, increases suppression. This is why an 8.6mm Long Range Rifle has such an interesting capability.

- now the rub. It was the US fixation with Squads - plus poor infantry tactical doctrine - which lead to the creation 5.56m belt fed weapons for fire teams. Technically, tactically and doctrinally there is very little to support the case for 5.56mm belt fed weapons. The near ideal mix is 5.56mm in 30 round mags and 7.62mm link for your support weapon.

[Norfolk]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

Hello KiwiGrunt,

I have to admit that, yes, the idea of a 20-man Section (with 3x6-man Squads) originally came from Senator and former US SECNAV James Webb, although he envisioned only a single man in the HQ; Tom Odom's (et al's.) article suggested 2 men in the HQ, with the Commander free to fight the Section and his 2i/c handling the comms and admin (great idea). I think that the 2-Section Platoon does that, restoring Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, yet remaining flexible enough to adapt and reorganize as necessary to meet the situation at hand, under conditions of some adversity. I also took one of Wilf's Platoon proposals (the 20-man version) to broadly, if not exactly, reinforce the notion (he would broadly disagree on this point, though).

The purpose of the threads on this board have not been to find some "one-size fits all" ideal Squad/Section/Platoon/Company organization, but the organization best suited to adapting to the tactical situation as it changes - METT-T and all that. In other words, we are looking for the "best" basis for change. The Platoon organization that you propose is perhaps the "best" in this regard that I have seen so far. The Canadian Infantry Pam begins with this quote:

"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."

MGen Sir John Monash, from Chapter 1, B-GL-309-003/FT-001, Infantry, Volume 3, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle, 1996.

Now, I grew up on the old 1982 Infantry Pam, which differed in some ways (some substantially, in some ways better, in some ways worse) than the 1996 Infantry Pam, but as we can see from Wigram's work, never mind more recent work like Wilf's, that much the same old problems persist, and for many of the usual reasons.

What most strikes me about your proposed Platoon composition, KiwiGrunt, is its 2-Section organization. As the Section you propose has its own 2-man HQ and 3x6-man Squads, it is fully capable of independent missions by itself, or semi-independent tasks during a Platoon mission. As it is a mini-Platoon in effect, with its own full HQ and its own Reserve (whether for Fire Support or for Manoeuvre), it can perform F&M by itself if it has to. Operating as part of the Platoon, the Section can bring to bear a substantial portion of the firepower of a Platoon during a Fire-Fight, and either continue to suppress during the Assault, or handle the Assault all by itself while the other Section and the Platoon Mortar continue to suppress. It also makes the Consolidation a little more secure and easier, as the Assaulting Section possesses considerable firepower and fighting power by itself, while the Covering Section moves up to join it.

There is another advantage to it, its ability to operate dispersed over a relatively wide area in small patrols. That was what struck me most about the German Infantry Group, how it operated not so much as an open-order field formation during the approach, but more so as a Patrol, moving from fire position to fire position using all available cover, and only when in the heat of battle would it rely upon suppression by fire in the absence of any available cover ("Effect over Cover"). Even in the Fire-Fight, normally the German Group would fight with only the Group Commander and his Machine Gun Troop of 3 or 4 men, while the Group 2i/c and the bulk of the Group remained under cover, unless circumstances forced it to be otherwise. Wigram and Wilf have each further developed this, and what you propose KiwiGrunt, potentially takes it a little further.

As each of the 6-man Squads can easily form its own self-contained Patrol, or break down into a pair of 3-man Patrols for reducing sign to the utter minimum possible whilst achieving the greatest practical coverage and dispersion. The 2-Section organization of the Platoon makes coordination much easier; 6x6-man Patrols could get complicated for a Platoon HQ to coordinate, and a dozen 3-man Patrols would be positively nightmarish. As is, a 6-man Patrol is really the largest you can use without sign and control likely becoming a significant problem. 3- or 4-man Patrols, as you know, leave the least trace of their presence, and are the easiest to control. As each Section would coordinate half of the Patrols, the Platoon HQ could concentrate on coordinating the two Sections as a whole with the Platoon Mortar Squad. Tighter control of the Patrols by the Sections could make it easier and faster to coordinate the Squads/Patrols, and especially to mass them for attack or quickly disperse afterwards as necessary; the Platoon may find it rather harder to do so with so many Patrols. I do notice a vaguely passing resemblance to the Patrols Company in a Parachute Battalion here.

As is, KiwiGrunt, your proposed Platoon organization may afford the advantages of both Wigram's and Wilf's ideas, not least by disposing of the almost mechanical formations and drills that Infantry presently are indoctrinated in, and moreover to restore Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, where it is best handled (usually). And I am very much in agreement with your ideas on Suppression, the 7.62mm round, and the 6.5 mm Grendel as a possible "best" cartridge at Squad level.

Excellent work.