Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

[82redleg]

Yes maybe fire support specialist is better translation. I am talking about person in fire support/forward observer team/squad whose job is to carry laser rangefinders and other similar gear and, to my understanding, help determine exact location on team and/or target for arty and mortars.

A US Army infantry/armor/cavalry company/troop gets a 4-man team for observation/fire support coordination- a LT Fire Support Officer, a SSG (E6) Fire Support NCO, a SPC (E4) Fire Support Specialist and a PFC (E3) RadioTelephone Operator (who is also MOS 13F- Fire Support, not communications).

In addition, rifle platoons (and the cavalry platoons in the Infantry BCT) get a forward observer party consisting of a SGT (E5) Forward Observer and a PFC (E3) RadioTelephone Operator (who is also MOS 13F- Fire Support, not communications).

Other platoons (tank platoons, cavalry platoons except where noted, and anti-armor/weapons platoons).

The US Army used to, and the USMC still does, refer to the artillery officer (LT) in the company as the forward observer. AFAIK, that changed in the mid-70s with the introduction of the Fire Support Team (FiST) concept, and the LT became known first as the FiST Chief and then the Fire Support Officer (FSO). I don't know exactly when the FiST Chief changed to FSO, but it was before I became FA in 1997, although my early BN CDRs were FiST Chiefs in the early-mid 80s.

Also maybe you are right on calling it brigade.

When in doubt, doctrine is always a good place to start. FM 1-02 defines brigade as "(DOD) A unit usually smaller than a division to which are attached groups and/or battalions and smaller units tailored to meet anticipated requirements. (Army) A unit consisting of two or more battalions and a headquarters." Dictionary.com has "a military unit having its own headquarters and consisting of two or more regiments, squadrons, groups, or battalions."

Based on these, and your unit descriptions, I would use the BDE symbol if I were drawing this unit on an overlay, but that's just an opinion, and you can take it for what you paid for it.

[Fuchs]

The latter definition does not draw a line between brigade and regiment, though. Brigades tend to be combined arms, whereas regiments tend to be one-branch formations.


Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time (I certainly would need two months of exercise till I reached that fitness level).
Not the least for this requirement, I dislike the idea that infantry teams always need to have heavy AT munitions.
I'd rather prefer to have multiple TO&E per team; and a Plt base / cache / carrier vehicle with the temporarily unnecessary equipment.

[82redleg]

The latter definition does not draw a line between brigade and regiment, though. Brigades tend to be combined arms, whereas regiments tend to be one-branch formations.

Traditional US Army usage (I don't have the definitions handy) was that a Regiment was a fixed organization of (predominantly) a single arm/branch, while a Brigade was an unfixed organization combining multiple arms/branches, but that wasn't always true, since a square division in WW1 had 2 brigades of 2 regiments. It is also not true in the current organizations, since each of the three BCTs have a fixed organization. The Multifunctional and functional support brigades have an unfixed organization, but at least the functional support brigades are predominantly of one arm.

It also depends on the size of your regiment, since some nations' regiments are only battalion sized.

[BushrangerCZ]

The latter definition does not draw a line between brigade and regiment, though. Brigades tend to be combined arms, whereas regiments tend to be one-branch formations.


Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time (I certainly would need two months of exercise till I reached that fitness level).
Not the least for this requirement, I dislike the idea that infantry teams always need to have heavy AT munitions.
I'd rather prefer to have multiple TO&E per team; and a Plt base / cache / carrier vehicle with the temporarily unnecessary equipment.

I dare to say that right now there is no NATO infantry unit able to do it as a team in equipment they are required to carry on when outside the wire. It´s beating the same dead horse as we do for some years already.

[Fuchs]

Well, I'm not talking about a patrol, but about tactical (area) defence.

[JMA]

Responding to a post from FUCHS containing: "Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time "

I dare to say that right now there is no NATO infantry unit able to do it as a team in equipment they are required to carry on when outside the wire. It´s beating the same dead horse as we do for some years already.

There are assumptions a commander makes when deploying troops and one is the ability to get to where they are required to be with all their fighting kit over various types of terrain and distances.

I wonder if the now weight restricted movement of dismounted infantry is being factored in at Command & Staff Colleges and during other officer training? It seems it is impossible to expect the Michelin Man to conduct even a 10km approach march overnight and be ready to fight from first light.

This would lead to changes in the definition of "full kit" as required for the 2km fitness test FUCHS mentioned.

Would it be naive to assume that as wearing body-armour is now seemingly a non negotiable that it is now worn throughout basic training for recruits and during all field training (including range work) for trained soldiers?

[Fuchs]

Wearing flak vests during all outdoor training was common in Germany in the 90's, but full body armour incl plates? There are training plates that don't break, but it still makes no sense to burden recruits with 'em. Recruits need to build muscle and bone strength first.


I personally don't think that hard plate level IV body armour should be non-negotiable at all. It's a passive protection response to the specific threat spectrum of small wars and occupations.
Inter-state wars include a much much higher fragmentation threat and OPFOR does punish immobile opponents much more as well.
Both points towards a need for a full body fragmentation protection suit.

Likewise, the optimal APC for a large conventional war would probably not exceed the protection levels known from Cold war APCs (when APCs weren't optimised against a specific single threat).

[BushrangerCZ]

Responding to a post from FUCHS containing: "Infantry should be highly agile, a 2 km cross-country run with equipment should be possible at almost any time "



There are assumptions a commander makes when deploying troops and one is the ability to get to where they are required to be with all their fighting kit over various types of terrain and distances.

I wonder if the now weight restricted movement of dismounted infantry is being factored in at Command & Staff Colleges and during other officer training? It seems it is impossible to expect the Michelin Man to conduct even a 10km approach march overnight and be ready to fight from first light.

This would lead to changes in the definition of "full kit" as required for the 2km fitness test FUCHS mentioned.

Would it be naive to assume that as wearing body-armour is now seemingly a non negotiable that it is now worn throughout basic training for recruits and during all field training (including range work) for trained soldiers?

As far as I experienced, body armour is not worn during basic training (not enough plates and carriers), but it is commonly worn during training in regiments.

[Fuchs]

I attempted to draw a kind of genealogy of infantry tactics. It's least impossible for defensive tactics thanks to the relatively greater degree of order.

Too bad my output was utterly Germany-centric. Do you guy have anything to add?


Leading infantry defence concepts

late 19th century till 1914:
single shoulder-to-shoulder line in simple trench

1915:
interlocking machine gun fire with elaborate trenches, rifle fire is secondary

1916-1918:
forward trenches weak, if possible two better-manned rear trenches in up to several kilometres depth (out of range of most hostile field artillery)

1920's:
elastic defence with weak VRV (FLOT), strong HKL (main line of resistance) at up to 10 km depth, some concerns about use of terrain and mines for AT purposes

1939/1940:
Finnish motti tactics and first huge use of ski troops

1941:
hedgehog defence (company strongpoints) on overstretched front-line (due to inability to man it in depth), if possible one continuous patrol trench at VRV (FLOT), dependence on indirect fire support for domination of gaps between strongpoints

early 1950's (1st German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints and squad or fire team resistance nests in between

early 1960's (2nd or 3rd German Heer structure):
network of platoon strongpoints

1960's: U.S. heliborne infantry
extreme mobility in permissive AD environment, but nothing special once on the ground

around 1970: U.S. LRRP
infantry as mobile forward observers / scouts in an environment with huge "blue" excess firepower (offence and defence difficult to separate)

1968 till 1989 Austrian "Raumverteidigung" by infantry militia
defence of key locations to slow down passage of invaders
(Swiss were similar, only that they considered much of their country as key location and emphasised fortifications more)

1970's German (later also Austrian) Jagdkampf
(similar terminology to offensive WW2 counter guerilla patrols, but different concepts) with reinforced platoon-sized Jagdkommandos as forward or even infiltrated skirmishers

~1980: theory: guerilla-like Jäger (Franz Uhle-Wettler's concept)
elusive infantry does not hold terrain, but persist as threat in a designated area of operations. High degree of autonomy, extreme tooth:tail ratio in favour of teeth

~1980's theory: Simpkin's network of Uhle-Wettler's concept
expansion in depth of the concept in order to make entire regions threatened (Uhle-Wettler was more concerned about how easily difficult terrain can be exploited for flanking movements if not guarded, see Ardennes 1940)

sometime 1990's: distributed operations
(this concept of dispersed infantry small units morphed over time into a mere buzzword)

[kaur]

Fuchs, one comment. Iif you mention Finns with skis, then you should mention also first wide scale use of bicycle troops. Germans? Most famous Finns were long range recce troops. Today their mission is called deep operations. During WWII British SAS had same mission, but they used jeeps instead of skis You just have to make compromise between your signature on terrain and mode of transport. Today you should also mention wide use of ATV's where climate favours this. In winter conditions you use snowmobile. Like Finns do.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=51d3s9FevyY

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

A US Army infantry/armor/cavalry company/troop gets a 4-man team for observation/fire support coordination- a LT Fire Support Officer, a SSG (E6) Fire Support NCO, a SPC (E4) Fire Support Specialist and a PFC (E3) RadioTelephone Operator (who is also MOS 13F- Fire Support, not communications)...

Infantry and armoured infatry companies have fire support officer (senior lieutenant or captain) and, depending wether they are armoured infatry company, type 05 jaeger comapany, type 90 jaeger company or type 80 infantry company, either company level fire support platoon with 3-4 fire support squads or each platoon has organic fire support team. Difference between fire support squad and team is that squad has two RTOs and team has one. Reason why squad has two RTOs is that one of RTOs have radio for communicating with firing positions while second carries telephone cable for company network