You know, with all this "channeling" goin' on here lately at the SWC, it sounds to me like I'm surrounded by psychics or somethin'...I think it's high time for me to invest some coin in a high-quality Tin-Foil Hat, or somein'.
You know, with all this "channeling" goin' on here lately at the SWC, it sounds to me like I'm surrounded by psychics or somethin'...I think it's high time for me to invest some coin in a high-quality Tin-Foil Hat, or somein'.
Last edited by Norfolk; 01-24-2008 at 01:04 AM.
Nomad posted - "But I’m sure that the same was said to Earl “Pete” Ellis in 1920 when he first envisioned amphibious means in the Pacific against Japan that would come to fruition some twenty-one years later. But then again, I am no Pete Ellis."
"Thoughts?"
The Corps has that "Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance Parameters" as a genitic pattern in its long view planners.
Vertical Envleopment for instance was not an Air Force or Army vision in the 60's, but a Marine one that was developing in the 50's. As a Ronnie Recon type in 1960 my unit was tasked to develop ambush tactics to lure and trap choppers into landing kill zones.
Captured me a Battalion Lt. Col. one time! Brute Krulak was the ADC of the 2nd MarDiv at the time. He thought it was very funny!
The "Anabar Awakening" seems a product of the Marine Forces in Anabar developing a friendly assist attitude and going along with Sheiks who thought that some of the sunni insurgents who were hand and glove with al Qaeda could be brought in and turned against the enemy.
In the Pacific War the Corps had 6 Divisions and 4 Air Wings and did the bulk of the Island hopping conquests.
The bulk of the Army was focused on North Africa, the Med and Europe.
The Pacific was by its nature an amphibous war stretched out over vast distances and fell to the naval service to take the lead.
Given the money and logistical support the Corps could bulk up for the multi small wars that will more than likely be the near future mode of modern warfare.
I guess the question still is , Does it wan't to belarger than 3 Divisions and Air Wings again?
Last edited by RJ; 02-06-2008 at 04:12 PM.
RJ you make an excellent point.
However if we optimise forces for a specific function, rather than train them for the wide spectrum of operations which the modern day soldier has to undertake? What happens when the COIN war is sucking up all the trained personnel? What about spreading the love (& knowledge)
Would it not be better to have specialists embedded within units, by actually incorporating different operations as part of the education and development process. Not saying that every unit must have a mountain warfare specialist, an OBUA specialist etc, but a ready pool of people who can be used in preparation for these operations and deploy to cement those lessons learnt. These individuals could then form a conduit for passing lessons learnt on the ground back to the widerarmed forces, rather than waiting for an armchair general like me to pontificate, CNN to advise and the inertial mass of bureaucracy to get in gear?
I must confess I do have a bias against too much specialisation, yes we need experts, but we should use them to spread knowledge, not hold them close and subject them to internal political wrangles - which would happen.
I feel that we need to ensure greater clarity from the political masters, not likely in my lifetime, but also the military hierarchy needs to be more forthright in its capabilities and endurance. It has been known for ages that warfighting has an increased wear and tear on men and materiel - why don't we seem to factor that in our plans? Off point but still pertinent.
Cheers
Geoff
Check out the article in the Marine Corps Times entitled
Marine Corps to get back to its expeditionary roots
[I've included the lead in paragraphs but this is a long article and y'all should down load it. It addresses some of the items and concerns discussed in this thread.] RJ
By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Feb 8, 2008 18:12:13 EST
The Corps is creating a new pre-emptive strike force unit that will put more Marines back aboard ships.
The plan, which includes creating new Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, is a road map for how the service plans to fight future irregular wars and was reportedly signed off on by Commandant Gen. James Conway the week of Jan. 28.
For Marines, it means new advisory missions on top of existing requirements. And for sailors, it will mean a steady reliance on the amphibious fleet.
In recent years, with Marines committed to a long-term presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy’s gator force has, at times, deployed without Marines on unique missions, such as chasing pirates off Africa or using a big-deck amphib as a floating health clinic in Asia.
But that may soon be adjusted under the new operational concept, known informally as “The Long War” brief.
The emerging “long war” will put new demands on the Corps, Conway said in the report.
“Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries,” he said.
Based on threat assessments projected through 2015, Marines face a spectrum of operations, the report said: stability and support; small wars and counterinsurgency; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nation-building; peacekeeping operations; combating terrorism; counterproliferation and nonproliferation; combating drug trafficking and crime; and non-combatant evacuation operations.
“There will be fewer high-spectrum combat operations that require our Marines to bring the full force of our combined arms capabilities to bear,” according to the report.
Under the “Long War” plan, Marine expeditionary units will continue to be the “vanguard” first responders of the Corps. The Corps also will forward-deploy more Marines in the Western Pacific through a combination of permanently forward-based forces and forces sourced through the re-establishment of the Unit Deployment Program.
Central to Conway’s plan is the creation of the new units — the SC MAGTFs — to handle the building of partner-nation capacity, including requirements for civil-military operations and training less-developed military forces, the plan said. The unit will be “‘eyes forward’ in areas not previously accessible to U.S. military forces,” and will be used as an operational reconnaissance asset capable of taking on some special-operations missions.
Why would that be a Marine mission? It doesn't have anything to do with what Marines do. OK, they may have done it in the past, but isn't the army far better resourced to handle this?
So if this was a threat assessment, why are they talking about "types" or "styles" of operation and not talking about the threats? I understand the article is written for folks with no military understanding, but this must be dumbing the idea down to it's bare bones.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I suspect someone who has read the 52 page document will share it with us and either answer your questions or someone else will.
I suspect the Ambhib Navy will support the shift and all those admirals digging up gator navy missions to keep the boats afloat and tuned up.
I am not speaking on the basis of any ‘insider’ knowledge, for I have no such info. So these are just some thoughts:Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ View Post
“Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries,” he said.
Wilf posted:
Why would that be a Marine mission? It doesn't have anything to do with what Marines do. OK, they may have done it in the past, but isn't the army far better resourced to handle this?
This mission does fit from what I heard articulated at conference a couple of weeks back about the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy -- which was that the USMC was very keen in developing the Strategy that conflict prevention be elevated to be of equal importance with warfighting. It ‘may’ also be that this mission is attached to, or related to, the USNs move to work with other naval forces to develop better partnerships with them as part of its increasing focus on Phase 0 operations (conflict prevention).
Beyond that, the article suggests that the USMC does not see being involved, or would prefer not to be involved, in any long term, ground wars in the future (if it can avoid this). Another thought is that if the era of big footprint operations will pass once the US draws down in Iraq, then this mission provides a persistent role in the Long War, which seemingly is the working title of the briefing.
I the take point that this list is a list of ‘capabilities’. But has not the US shifted, or tried to shift, to capabilities based planning on the premise that this is the best means to be as prepared as possible for futurer risks, dangers and threats that are uncertain? ‘Bout the only thing missing in the list is conventional force-on-force, and that was mentioned elsewhere as not being a likely prospect in the short to mid term.Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ
Based on threat assessments projected through 2015, Marines face a spectrum of operations, the report said: stability and support; small wars and counterinsurgency; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nation-building; peacekeeping operations; combating terrorism; counterproliferation and nonproliferation; combating drug trafficking and crime; and non-combatant evacuation operations.
Wilf posted: So if this was a threat assessment, why are they talking about "types" or "styles" of operation and not talking about the threats? I understand the article is written for folks with no military understanding, but this must be dumbing the idea down to it's bare bones.
The Marine Corps has conducted theater engagement for a long time. There is even a Security Cooperation Center aboard Quantico that serves as the hub of sorts.
In its capacity as an amphibious-capable force, the Corps has provided a lot of bilateral training and support with many other nations facing littoral threats, like the Philippines. And since the PI has its own Marine Corps, I don't think utilizing the Army to be the lead makes sense.
Even though it may simply be a hallmark of the past, I think the Corps is just as effectively resourced to provide security training/assistance to other nations. True, we would serve as better enablers of SFers working the FID mission in the backwaters of the world, but if the Groups are going to continue to be hard-pressed as part of the Long War rotations, the gaps have to be filled somehow.
I think that there is a definite and clear distinction between a team catching a helo in to train the indigenous security forces of a state that cannot muster armor formations or air forces, and tasking a MAGTF to focus (instead of conduct as a sideline event) on bilateral exercises and security cooperation engagement that aims at maintaining professional standards within the HN military and making the country as a whole more effective a defeating forces opposed to our national interests. Back as far as 2005, the Corps has been looking at ways to leverage off its unique abilities and skill sets to help the overall fight, not to be the new game in town and break rice bowls that have belonged (and rightly so) to snake eaters with the USA.
jcustis is correct in the role of the Marine Corps is assisting training other nations forces is correct.
In March of 1960 my Battalion along with most of the 3rdMarDiv. conducted a large amphibious landing at Formosa. We, 3/5 went ashore via the "Peter" and "Mike" Boat route by climbing down nets in to the assualt craft. Made a classic amphib landing near Kao-Hsiung, Formosa. Once ashore we linked up with a Nat. Chinese Infantry Co. and boarded helicopters and did a vertical envelopment shift inland about 20 miles.
When the whole Bn. finished the airlift we moved out ot that air head and maneuvered back towards the City of Kao-Hsiung. The name of the training exercise was "Operation Blue Star" .
M-3/5 spent two days at the Chinese Marine Corps home base and worked with them on tactics.
They were primarily a Raider Style Unit and I rembeber their 9 man squads had two Thomson Sub-machine guns for every M-1 Garand rifle.
Lt. Col. Houghton was forever finding us new faces to work with. Chinese Marines, PI Army, Royal Warwicks near Hong Kong, etc.
We were not uncomfortable in mixing with those units and comparing our tactics to theirs.
I just finished Hog Pilots and Blue Water Grunts and there were a couple of small Marine training units in out of the way places, in that interesting read.
It could be a culture deal that dates back to the Banana Wars where Marines traind "Native Constablary Units" to fight "bandits".
Last edited by RJ; 02-12-2008 at 09:46 PM.
Army, Marines give waivers to more felons, CNN, 21 April 2008.
Well, that's one way of optimizing for the GWoT...WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Army and Marine Corps are allowing convicted felons to serve in increasing numbers, newly released Department of Defense statistics show.
...
It also allowed two people convicted of making terrorist or bomb threats to enlist in 2007, up from one the year before.
The Marines did not immediately respond to request for comment.
weren't crimes are today 'felonies.' The bomb threats were probably made when they were High School students. Few years ago there was a lot of that down here, got 'em out of classes for half a day sometimes while the Bomb Squad and the dogs swept the building. Got too expensive, so all the states started prosecuting for it. The kids generally get costs, restitution and probation.
You left out the fact that they aren't waiving drug sale offenses; they'll waive burglary and even manslaughter as they should, IMO but not pushing.
Be great to not need waivers, we could do that in an ideal world. It's not an ideal world; never has been and is unlikely to ever be one...
That's another article that's much ado about nothing. The NCOs and Officers will gripe because it makes their jobs slightly harder but by and large it'll make little difference. We've been there before and it doesn't break anything.
Last edited by Ken White; 04-22-2008 at 12:17 AM. Reason: Typo
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