The Creation of Mechanized SOC Units

[Uboat509]

Yes, Ranger and SF units do have Armoured Hummers and MRAPs - today. How many did they have on establishment in 2003? If SF can afford dedicated Helicopter support, as they have in both the US and UK, why not dedicated protected mobility?

We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq. in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.

No threat currently seen in Iraq is new. Even EFPs have been around for years. They are all threats that folks chose to ignore. Why? I can never work it out.

The types of threats may not be new but the scale of these threats is new. No one has ignored these threats but there is more to consider than simple armor protection. That type of thinking is why I keep getting issued more and more body armor to the point where, if I were to wear it all, I would be fairly well protected and nearly immobile.

SFC W

[William F. Owen]

@ We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq.

@ in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.

@ The types of threats may not be new but the scale of these threats is new. No one has ignored these threats but there is more to consider than simple armor protection.
S

@ Well the threat down here in Southern Thailand means the RTA want's more armoured vehicles. We deployed a lot of armoured vehicles to Northern Ireland, and used them in large numbers for all but the last 10 years. IRA IEDs meant there was no significant Army road movement in South Armagh for nearly 8 years.

@ Agreed, that is why the Royal Marines - and soon Para - are going for BvS-10, not Warrior or Bradley.

@ Well I think the PKM and RPG-7 were very likely to be encountered in great numbers anywhere on the planet, but yes, sensible TTPs are vital, and logistic and operational judgements and compromises have to be made - that is no excuse to base line a units equipment around something that has all the protection of a family car.

My point being, none of this is new. The sensible application of Armour saves lives. A key lesson of the Falklands war was the need to equip light infantry formations with more armoured fire support and mobility - something we, the UK chose to ignore until 1999/2000.

[Ratzel]

We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq. in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.
SFC W

Try not to think about this in terms of what you understand Mechanized forces to be today. I'm talking about a new concept here. Your unit, or for that matter, any Special Operations unit would not be transformed into one of these units. Instead, this unit would be formed from, or reflagged from the regular Army.

The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?

Is there a need for an highly trained mechanized unit that can get on the ground fully in 24 hours and operate for a for a week or so in an intense environment? Mechanized units can sustain themselves longer than a regular Ranger unit. If re-supply by air is imposable due to weather or something unforeseen, this type of unit would be especially useful.

Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there. You bring up the point about a target not being SF if tanks and APC's are needed. But in this situation, this is far from the truth. So now the question is, if we did use armour in that situation, would you rather it be from the regular Army or from the new Panzer-Grenadier-Mech-SO capable Unit? Please answer this question?

[William F. Owen]

Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there.

As an side, I went back to my light armour presentation notes and found a figure of 6 dead and over 40 wounded from travelling in un-armoured vehicles during the Blackhawk down thing. Can't remember where I got those figures, but they are telling in themselves.

[Ski]

SF and the Rangers also have Stryker (Rangers) and Pandurs (SF - I think that's what they ended up procuring). I think the capability exists to an extent already.

[Uboat509]

The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?

Is there a need for an highly trained mechanized unit that can get on the ground fully in 24 hours and operate for a for a week or so in an intense environment? Mechanized units can sustain themselves longer than a regular Ranger unit. If re-supply by air is imposable due to weather or something unforeseen, this type of unit would be especially useful.

That is the genesis of the light cav concept. I was with 2 ACR when it was first formed as a light cav regiment. Back then our prime mission was "expand the lodgement." The Rangers or 82nd or whoever would seize an airfield and then we would land on that airfield, push out and hold the terrain around the airfield until heavier forces could be landed and pushed into the fight. The original intent of the Stryker battalions was similar. They were designed to be carried on a C130 and then roll off into the fight and as far as I know that is still the intent. Everyone is focused on Iraq right now and not really thinking about forced entry into another country but that is what Stryker is supposed to be for.

Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there. You bring up the point about a target not being SF if tanks and APC's are needed. But in this situation, this is far from the truth.

No one ever denied that armor would have been nice to have for that raid in Somalia but it was not was up to SOF. The armor had been removed as a result of a decision by the NCA not SOF. Had the armor been available in sector then SOF would have used it. That does not mean that they need organic armor capability. In any case, even if SOF did have its own armor it would likely have been pulled out with the rest of the armor.

So now the question is, if we did use armour in that situation, would you rather it be from the regular Army or from the new Panzer-Grenadier-Mech-SO capable Unit? Please answer this question?

I have no problem at all with getting armor support from big Army on those rare occasions when it is needed. What I do have a problem with is a mech unit eating up SOF resources and budget.

SFC W

[Norfolk]

Uboat509 has an important point about funding being an issue for SOF; simply creating more Units is just spreading existing resources even more thinly.

But Wilf is on to something when he raises the example of the Royal Marines. One of the major differences between the US Army Rangers and the British Commandos is that the latter are trained, organized, and equipped for sustained as well as brief operations. The 75th Ranger Regiment is almost entirely composed of Infantry Battalions, and also a dedicated SF-Support Company or Group; no Armour, no Artillery, no Engineers, no ADA, etc, and as such, can normally only perform operations of very short duration. 3 Commando Brigade has organic Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., and Armour attached or on-call. Moreover, within the Infantry Commandos, there are Heavy Support Weapons and Troops; in the Ranger Battalions, the Rifle Companies are mainly left to their own devices, although that appears to be possibly changing or about to change.

When 2 Para fought at Goose Green, the presence of a few Light Tanks may have made quite a difference; I do not mean to say that Light Armour will always or even often be required in many operations by Airborne or Commando Forces, but it should be organic to Airborne and Commando Forces Formations, and therefore available if needed. Even a situation not unlike Mogadishu in '93 may have turned out rather better if a Unit akin to the Rangers found themselves in a similar situation (political factors eliminating that option for the Rangers themselves in '93).

In sum, adding a Light Tank Squadron (Company) or even a Regiment (Battalion) to a Formation such as 3 Commando Brigade would give it tactical and even operational capabilities and options that may prove very useful under certain circumstances. Even a Commando Tank Regiment (Battalion) with a few Squadrons (Companies) plus a Rifle Company or two, and with the usual attached Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., might make for a very potent striking force for certain roles and in certain environments.

As for the 75th Ranger Regiment, personally I would rather see it augmented into something at least comparable to 3 Commando Brigade, with sustained operations being added to its roles. That said, I am speaking from a Commonwealth perspective where having fewer troops means having to train them in a greater range of skills and for a greater range of roles. Large Armies may have the luxury of not doing this, though I do not agree with it at all.

Light tracked vehicles are the way to go where possible; the LAV-III Stryker has not turned out well in cross-country operations in Afghanistan; it works best when there is a reasonable road network to use most of the time, and it does not fare well under attack by volleys of RPGs and the like.

[Schuld]

SOF have used armor: if I'm not mistaken, the Australian SAS used the Wiesel with 20mm gun for fire support on patrol in Afghanistan -- one answer to the beyond .50 BMG range engagement issue on the DM thread. If a small vehicle like the Wiesel 2 could be fitted with something like the Warrior 40mm CTW gun in the remote turret configuration, and powered by hybrid electric drive such as that demo'd in the RA 93-23 program, would it be useful to the Rangers? It would essentially be reprising the role of the M24 Chaffee but in a much smaller, airmobile and LAPSE-able package. This would fill the niche between the GMV-R and the Stryker 105mm MGS, if such a niche needed to be filled. There is also a Wiesel 2 with 120mm self-loading mortar whose 14-rds/minute burst-mode ROF and fire-control might be superior to the current towed 120mm mortar used by the Rangers. If only money were no object.

I think the light infantry fear, which I recollect a NZ Army infantryman expressing as he transitioned to Stryker-type wheeled armor, is that equipment changes mindset and mission focus (in this case, the fears expressed were that suddenly the concept was patrol-from-the-vehicle and COIN skills like tracking were dying out).

[Surferbeetle]

All,

It's been my observation that SF has moved to a more kinetic focus over the past few years. No doubt this is in part a necessary response to our current operational requirements in Afghanistan & Iraq, however despite this change a standing SOC Armor unit seems to violate some of the basic tenets of SOF.

It has been my observation as a CA-Bubba (OIF 1 & New Horizons) that 'lighter is righter'. Psychologically I am not looking for walls/armor to separate me from the locals. Instead I am looking to develop a network of relationships with key power brokers, SME's on various subjects, and your average local. Often-times my SF brothers have helped me out by fleshing out local networks before I arrive. With this network I can, if I speak the language and understand the culture, identify friction points and leverage points where I can help the commander to influence his AO. I am also situationally aware of how to keep me and mine alive (always a good thing). Over time I can figure out who might need a kinetic visit and make a recommendation. More importantly I can also make short and long term recommendations on how to get to a point in time where kinetic relationships are minimized. To produce this I need to spend alot of time with the locals.

From my vantage point Armor is geared more for highly kinetic operations where one needs a barrier between oneself and something very unpleasant than for working closely with the populace to influence the battle.

Steve

[William F. Owen]

All,

I think all that is being proposed is the creation of an armoured unit for SOCOM, in the same way as they have dedicated Helicopter support, or small boat support, why not give them dedicated protected mobility. This does not change SF or SOCOM in any way. It augments it.

In the Royal Marines, they have a separate Armoured Support Group. This provides Commando Battle Groups with protected mobility as and when required. Marines still have to learn to Ski, climb and do all the Commando stuff. Nothing changes except you have more capability.

[Spud]

[QUOTE=Schuld;35888]SOF have used armor: if I'm not mistaken, the Australian SAS used the Wiesel with 20mm gun for fire support on patrol in Afghanistan -- one answer to the beyond .50 BMG range engagement issue on the DM thread. [QUOTE]

I think you've got the wrong 'Australians' -- no Wiesel in this part of the world.

[JOgershok]

The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?

My read was that this would be a Mech/RANGER unit. The RANGER mission is direct action. If you specialize too much, you have no one to do the regular infantry work.

[RJ]

Ratzel posted - "A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on. "

Not to pick your scenario apart, but 12 hours is a very long time to put all your assets on the ground. What part of the security would the very small and light armor provide.

I would suspect that the target of your scenario could be secured in under 6 hours by an Airborne, Ranger or Marine Battalion. Holding it would be the test. And injection would probably be by Helos or Osprey's. More focus LZ's and no form up wasted time.

When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Grenada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.

One in Korea if I remember correctly. 187th RCT?

None in Vietnam that I can remember?

The secure an air field in Grenada?

And to secure an airfield in Panama?

None in Iraq. Perhaps one in Afganistan in 2002??

The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisons are fully capable of investing and holding the target you described. And to be reinforced by airborne light armor and artillery units almost immediately. That is what they train to do.

A Mech-Ranger unit is unsupportable for a host of reasons.

Too exotic and too limited in its ability. It would be an Orphan! And a waste of talent.

[82redleg]

Ratzel posted - "
When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Granada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.

By the US?

187th twice in Korea (20&21 OCT 50, 23 MAR 51).

TF 2-503(+) in OPN Junction City (Vietnam)

1st & 2d RGR Bns in OPN Urgent Fury (Grenada)

75th RGR RGT & 1st BDE/82d ABN in OPN Just Cause (Panama)- 5 BNs jumped, IIRC.

173d ABN BDE in OPN Iraqi Freedom.

[Uboat509]

173d ABN BDE in OPN Iraqi Freedom.

That one really doesn't count. 10th Group had already secured the DZ for them. Not exaxtly forced entry.

SFC W

[RJ]

I stand Corrected on the Bn. size airborne operations.

I was surprized to see the 503rd Airborne (The Rock) on the list. They were kind enough to let me hitch rides with them to maintain my jump status in Okniawa in 1959-60.

It was the first time I handled an M-14 and the M-60 MG.

[82redleg]

That one really doesn't count. 10th Group had already secured the DZ for them. Not exaxtly forced entry.

SFC W

You can argue that if you want. I'll argue that we couldn't drive there (Turkey wasn't letting us), and if 10th Group had the capability to execute the 173d's follow on tasks, they would have- WITHOUT the airborne operation.

173d jumped into enemy held territory (ok, 10th Group and some Pesh had the DZ secured), expanded the lodgement, brought in follow-on airlands (2-63 AR, and some 10th MTN, IIRC?) and executed a tactical mission.

To be a valid airborne operation doesn't mean you have to jump onto an enemy armored formation- in fact, we actively try to avoid that.