The Creation of Mechanized SOC Units

[Ratzel]

All,

I think all that is being proposed is the creation of an armoured unit for SOCOM, in the same way as they have dedicated Helicopter support, or small boat support, why not give them dedicated protected mobility. This does not change SF or SOCOM in any way. It augments it.

Thank you for stating this. I didn't intend to start discussing unit finance or budgets. Lets just assume that no ones budget will be touched. The idea isn't to re-flag the Ranger units or to force a Special Forces A-Team "behind walls." The idea is to form a new unit, that is Mechanized, which has the same standard of fitness, leadership, discipline, and training as a Ranger Battalion. No one who is currently in a Ranger or SF unit would be forced into it. All were doing here is having a brainstorming session.

I meant no offense towards the regular Army, As I was in the regular Army myself. And like I said, I happened to be in a Mech unit. Sticking Rangers into some APC's is not the same as a unit who specializes in it. We want Airborne Rangers to do what they do. We want this unit to do what it does. Think specialization, think comparative advantage. When I said Panzer Grenadier, what I should of said was SS Panzer Grenadier. The SS was a highly trained unit, at the same time, they weren't airborne. We have an image of SOC units as always being Airborne, this unit wouldn't need that. So there would be no changes for anyone else, this unit would be created from the regular Army and from new recruits.

I've been thinking about this since I was in the Army. I often thought about what a mech unit would look like made from the guys who always had high PT scores, got the school slots, never got in trouble, were always motivated for the field, never dropped out of ruck-marches, and who were highly disciplined? This unit would be just another tool for the military to use. A mech unit that could go further, and fight harder than a regular mech unit.

I think we can all agree that the military is going to be very busy for next 20-30 years? I foresee situations that will call for variety of mixed units. If Rangers are the best of the best for light infantry, then why not have the same for a mechanized unit? There may be times when fast-roping into a town and bringing in the little birds will be too dangerous. Instead, what may be needed is a unit to drive into the town that has tanks, 120MM mortars, and maybe even some light artillery?

Don't think about this affecting you. Just let your creative minds operate. Think outside the box.

[SWJED]

... let your creative minds operate. Think outside the box.

... you are in the right place for that!

[dogtown]

If I may jump into the SOF Armor debate: what do SOF units have in common? Core airborne rapid deployment capability. SOF units by their very definition are light units so I have a hard time seeing any major armor asset being adopted by SOF units as a core asset beyond GMVs and armored LMTVs. That being said, in a longer term conflict (think OIF vs Just Cause) it's reasonable to see more powerful armor assets being considered as a large conventional pressence would be expected.

Still, there have been numerous occasions where larger scale armor assets have been scooped into action by SOF units, but across the spectrum of their capabilities I think this is very limited.

[Uboat509]

I think we can all agree that the military is going to be very busy for next 20-30 years? I foresee situations that will call for variety of mixed units. If Rangers are the best of the best for light infantry, then why not have the same for a mechanized unit? There may be times when fast-roping into a town and bringing in the little birds will be too dangerous. Instead, what may be needed is a unit to drive into the town that has tanks, 120MM mortars, and maybe even some light artillery?

As I stated before, there is no need to create a SOF armor unit. On those occasions when something heavier than upamored HMMWVs or MRAPs is needed then we can get those assets from big Army. The Rangers were not formed simply to be a better light infantry unit. They perform a series of missions that the regular infantry is not trained or equiped to perform. I cannot think of what specialized mission a SOF armor unit would perform that a regular armor unit could not.


SFC W

[jonSlack]

Thank you for stating this. I didn't intend to start discussing unit finance or budgets. Lets just assume that no ones budget will be touched. The idea isn't to re-flag the Ranger units or to force a Special Forces A-Team "behind walls." The idea is to form a new unit, that is Mechanized, which has the same standard of fitness, leadership, discipline, and training as a Ranger Battalion. No one who is currently in a Ranger or SF unit would be forced into it. All were doing here is having a brainstorming session.

...

I've been thinking about this since I was in the Army. I often thought about what a mech unit would look like made from the guys who always had high PT scores, got the school slots, never got in trouble, were always motivated for the field, never dropped out of ruck-marches, and who were highly disciplined? This unit would be just another tool for the military to use. A mech unit that could go further, and fight harder than a regular mech unit.

Based on the quote from Ratzel, I think SOF/SOC is the wrong term to be using to describe this hypothetical unit. A better term is "elite."

All SOF (the Ranger Regiment, Army Special Forces, and their equivalents from other branches of service) are normally considered to be "elite." On the flipside, all "elite" units need not be SOF and "elite" forces can, and do, exist in "big Army."

SOF means that the units are designed, capable, and expected to undertake missions defined as "Special Operations." This hypothetical mechanized element would not be conducting any "Special Operations." Rather, it would merely be a rapidly deployable conventional heavy element with a high quality personnel at all levels, a high state of readiness, and no constraints when it comes to equipment and training resources.

The high PT scores, rucking ability, good behavior, and other positive traits being sought can be, and are, acheived by having good leaders at all levels willing to devote the time and energy to train and mentor every Soldier under their leadership to exceed the standard in physical fitness, professionalism, maturity, and all other areas.

[Uboat509]

Big Army does not like the elite concept for the simple reason that if you take all the high quality personnel and put them into one elite unit, what does that leave for the rest of the units? As it is big Army only tolerates "elite units" because they perform different mission sets from big Army. Even still, big Army has taken is toll on elite forces where it could. The Rangers in particular have had to contend with this. Ten years ago, if you did not start in Batt as a private then you simply did not go to Batt. Some time in the recent past someone decided that there was too much talent and experience concentrated in the Batts and so began rotating the NCOs out out of the Batts and rotating NCOs in who had not come up in the Batts. The idea was to "share the wealth" so to speak but the concept is flawed. There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

SFC W

[Rifleman]

There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

I don't doubt there's truth in that but I have to wonder if at least part of it is sour grapes; since, there will always be some "bemoaning" if anyone perceives that someone else hasn't paid their dues. But for people "born and raised" in the 75th dues paying often simply means that you experienced the "Spec. 4 Mafia" hazing culture as a private.

When the battalions were formed in 1974 nobody had grown up in them. I know some people who served in SF or Ranger/LRRP companies were active in the formation of the battalions but I don't think that was excusively the case. Am I wrong about that?

I've never spent "day one" in a Ranger Battalion nor have I been to RIP, but two of the most impressive NCOs I encountred in the Army "grew up" in the battalions. One was a 2nd Battalion Ranger from the mid '70s and the other was a 1st Battalion Ranger from the early '80s. Then again, two of the biggest screw ups that it was my displeasure to serve with had been 1st Battalion Rangers "born and raised" in the battalion.

[Jones_RE]

I think the resistance to this idea comes from the fact that Special Operations units are different in kind from regular units and not just in quality.

A regular army sergeant who is the strongest man in the world, a crackshot and can run laps around marathon winners might not make it as a Ranger because he lacks the mindset and discipline to operate behind enemy lines. Whereas a Ranger isn't necessarily any better of a fighter than the regular army guys in a stand up fight just because he can parachute and so forth.

An elite mechanized unit, one better only in quality, is a non-starter due to army (probably American military) culture.

A mechanized unit designed to support the unique missions of SOC is viable (because it's been done before).

Raids and surprise attacks well behind enemy lines have been done with armor in the past. Such a capability would probably be useful for current Ranger formations. Might also be useful for certain other units as well. This unit would have to be different in kind from a regular army unit because it would operate by stealth and far from logistical support.

[Jones_RE]

Does anyone here think that providing an armored capability to current units would result in their being used as elite infantry?

This happened to US Ranger forces during WWII as I recall. The battalions acquired heavier weapons that made it harder to raid behind the lines and more likely that they'd be used in conventional combat. The high casualties of conventional combat thinned the ranks of skilled Rangers making it less likely that they could succeed in their original mission. This vicious cycle was compounded by the fact that the Ranger battalions had no regular source of trained replacements.

I could see a decision to send an armor augmented Ranger unit to storm Fallujah, for example. Whereas with their current equipment using Rangers in that environment was simply not an option.

[Surferbeetle]

Big Army does not like the elite concept for the simple reason that if you take all the high quality personnel and put them into one elite unit, what does that leave for the rest of the units?

There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

SFC W

Big Army often doesn't like things that are different and that do not fit the mold. Unfortunately it takes some time for things to change.

With regard to quality NCO's I can't speak for the Ranger Battalions but I do know that in general Ranger and SF NCO's are a good thing. I spent a few years in Vicenza, some Guard time, some USAR time, and some time with the 101st. In each of these organizations a group of solid NCO's are largely responsible for the successes of the organization. More times than not they are tabbed, have 'grown up' in a more rigorous culture, and have alot of real world experience. As a result they are able to influence and train up some 'mini-me's' which are vital to improving things. Weak NCO's lead to weak organizations.

To paraphrase a 'SOF truth' quality is better than quantity and it cannot be mass produced in response to an emergency. Our current efforts at recruiting and retention fail to account for this truth, instead we are rapidly moving towards future personnel problems:

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/fea....tilghman.html

http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money_bonuses.jsp

Steve

[Granite_State]

Based on the quote from Ratzel, I think SOF/SOC is the wrong term to be using to describe this hypothetical unit. A better term is "elite."

Was thinking the exact same thing, and the Army's hostility to elite units makes basic sense to me. Aren't the Marines much the same way, viewing Force Recon with suspicion? Cultivating esprit de corps, along the lines of the British regimental system (which has its faults) seems like a better solution to me.

As for the SS, I'm not an expert on WWII German forces, but weren't their roles basically the same as those of the Wehrmacht? You can get divisions of elite, indoctrinated troops when you have conscription and a decade of fascist rule...

[ROKMAN]

I read a book called Breaking the Phalanx and its update Transformation Under Fire, both by a retired colonel named Douglas Macgregor.

In his book we should concentrate on Combat Groups instead of the division as the all arms formation. The Combat Group according to him is smaller than a division but larger than a brigade. The current modularity going on in the Army right now is kinda based on it but rather a bastardization of the original concept. His approach to TANK/MECH is this.

1 Recon Battalion (Ground and Air (UAV) recon)
3 Combined Arms Heavy Battalions each with
--- 2 Tank Companies
--- 2 Mech Companies
--- 1 Engineer Company
--- 1 HHC
1 Strike Battalion (Artillery and UAVs with missiles)
1 Support Battalion (with improved support capability)
1 C4I Battalion (HQ, Staff, and other support like MP, ADA, etc.)

Total troops is about 5,000 to 5,500 and under the command of a Brigadier General.

As I mentioned before these are not part of a division but rather semi-independent. This semi-independent nature can be used to build a Task Force enabling a wider span of control.

This systems has it all, in my opinion. What do you think?

[Uboat509]

The SS were not necessarily more elite than the regular Wehrmact troops but they were more fanatical and loyal to the party and therefore got the best equipment first. This has, in fact, been an accusation that has been leveled against the SOF community by some in big Army.

SFC W

[selil]

There was a genearl back in the 1980's I can't remember exactly what or when or any of that, but I internalized the message. It was something like, "Double the pay, triple the requirements, and I'll give you an army four times more capable", later it was added "and recruits will bust down the door", but I don't believe that was in the original article.

The theme of course was that elitism in the military is counterproductive, and that an elite military is highly productive. What could you do with 350K soldiers trained like every special operator?

[jcustis]

Was thinking the exact same thing, and the Army's hostility to elite units makes basic sense to me. Aren't the Marines much the same way, viewing Force Recon with suspicion? Cultivating esprit de corps, along the lines of the British regimental system (which has its faults) seems like a better solution to me.

I would say it is less a matter of suspicion and more one of, "Yeah, there go those primadonnas again." Still, I believe there is a fair amount of awe within the junior ranks of the infantry when the term Recon comes up. It all starts with the paperbacks in the Vietnam section of the Military History shelves.

[Steve Blair]

Actually I kicked around a concept somewhat similar to this in a paper I did for a class (slapout's seen it...and I may expand it as a more serious article). It was more of an updated version of the division cavalry squadron circa Vietnam (except with two ground combat troops, two air troops, and a boosted H&S troop), but I'd actually call the concept more medium cavalry than I would any sort of Spec Ops unit. It's optimized to serve as a reaction force for COIN efforts, but would also function pretty well in a medium to high level conflict as recon and/or security (as well as a reaction force for the Somalia-type situations...it's intended to have a reasonable deployment footprint).

I don't know that you really need to take an armored unit and slap it into SOC to do this, but you do need to hark back a bit to the more traditional roles of cavalry in the US: those being as a reaction force and dragoons.

[MattC86]

Essentially this concept sounds like a TF Baum/Hammelburg Raid type unit. Entirely self-contained armored task force.

I agree essentially with what SFC W has said; if the mission requires such a unit, it's not a mission for SOF. DA or recon missions seem to me to require an element of speed and stealth that are incompatible with a couple of M1 tanks clanking around. If armor or heavy air/arty support is needed for potential extraction, SOF should be able to call upon those regular forces if needed; that doesn't warrant a brand-new unit.

As far as the self-contained armored TF, for raids or other "special" missions; I think the armored cav concept, and the ability to pare down an ACR into smaller packages depending on the mission, is sufficient; though I don't know enough to say for sure.

To expand upon JonSlack, this unit would be a redundant raid-type capability (covered by ACRs) and much too heavy for SOF-type missions. It would indeed be a unit without a true niche mission.

Perhaps you could expand upon the type of role such a TF would fulfill?

Matt

[Rifleman]

I don't know that you really need to take an armored unit and slap it into SOC to do this, but you do need to hark back a bit to the more traditional roles of cavalry in the US: those being as a reaction force and dragoons.

That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

[Steve Blair]

That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

My concept had a Vietnam-era mix, with tanks down at the Troop level along with either wheeled or tracked (I tend to prefer the M-113 family for UW/LIC stuff) vehicles to move a dismount element. For operations you could have a ground Troop with an attached air Troop working route security, quick reactions, and even some population security. One of the forgotten lessons of Vietnam was that cav tended to work better when it had its organic air cav along for the ride and not close-held by Division (or higher). The Vietnam-era air cav troop also had a platoon of infantry (the Blues or ARPs) that could be used as either a ground recon force or dismounts/QRF elements to support movements made by the ground Troop.