The Creation of Mechanized SOC Units

[Rifleman]

I don't know that you really need to take an armored unit and slap it into SOC to do this, but you do need to hark back a bit to the more traditional roles of cavalry in the US: those being as a reaction force and dragoons.

That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

[Steve Blair]

That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

My concept had a Vietnam-era mix, with tanks down at the Troop level along with either wheeled or tracked (I tend to prefer the M-113 family for UW/LIC stuff) vehicles to move a dismount element. For operations you could have a ground Troop with an attached air Troop working route security, quick reactions, and even some population security. One of the forgotten lessons of Vietnam was that cav tended to work better when it had its organic air cav along for the ride and not close-held by Division (or higher). The Vietnam-era air cav troop also had a platoon of infantry (the Blues or ARPs) that could be used as either a ground recon force or dismounts/QRF elements to support movements made by the ground Troop.

[Ratzel]

What are you basing that statement on?

SFC W

When I was in the Army, there was a general disdain for Mechanized forces within light infantry units and especially SOF units. I was stationed at Ft. Benning, and before we deployed to the Middle East-in preparation for the invasion of Iraq-I attended a CQB shooting class/seminar at the Ranger Batt. The class was lead by an ex-Delta guy whose name I totally forgot. Anyway, I was talking to the Ranger Platoon Sgt. about his deployment to Afghanistan and told me that I "can keep that vehicle maintenance crap."

But it goes far beyond that as well. Mechanized Infantry was always looked down upon. Even in Basic Training, I remember the Drill Sgts speaking of the inferior mech units. The general stereotype was that Mech units were lazy, out of shape, and brought grills and coolers out to the field. I also attended several Army schools where I met soldiers and NCO's from light units who held the same attitudes.

Of course, every stereotype holds a little truth and we did have our share of fat bodies and those who used the Bradly as their own personal Winnebago's. Before they merged 11B and 11M, I also noticed some differences in knowledge of tactics between the two. This comes from time in the motor pool. I always served in a rifle squad but still had to spend time in the motor pool. Light Infantry people can spend all their time doing light infantry training, so its a scarcity of time issue.

I look at SF units as being very human capital intensive. What makes Special Forces "Special" is the quality of personal. These men depend on their minds and bodies, with the a little help from technology. Adding in million dollar vehicles, can possibly threaten the emphasis on human capital and divert it to physical capital.

[Schuld]

The Israelis don't understand the idea of light infantry as they don't have any. They have an infantry brigade they can drop by parachute, and an infantry brigade that can do amphibious operations, but they are all just infantry. They use armoured vehicles as and when they need them. When they need to get out and infiltrate on foot, they do just that.

RE IDF infantry, certainly they've shown their flexibility (paratroopers performing amphibious landings in the first war in Lebanon, etc.), but I thought that there was criticism that the mechanized infantry role has been effectively lost in the IDF -- that during the last war in Lebanon on several occasions tanks were sent forward without infantry support?

Also, I'm under the impression that the Airborne aspect of the IDF's Airborne brigades is a genuflection to the doctrine of elan as developed by Orde Wingate and Mickey Marcus among others, and does not reflect any actual current operational offensive capability outside of attached special forces units. It would take a little time for the IDF to regenerate the TTPs and logistical infrastructure to support mass tactical operations. Current actual practice is airmobile when it's air-anything, or so I've heard, and for many paratroopers the only jumps they make are in basic airborne school?

Couple this with the odd nature of the IDF -- the "regular forces" are a quasi-draft army, and so they are capable of quickly learning much, but also quickly forgetting much. Reputedly, much of the strength of the IDF is in the reserve battalions which have soldiers that have been fighting together in the same unit for decades. Those infantry formations are so capable because they comprise men in their 30s and 40s who've been in the game so long. One of the great criticisms of the last war was that the reserves weren't mobilized soon enough and that their equipment stores were empty when they did deploy because the gov't had failed to keep the stockpiles up and what had been there had often been previously "liberated" by black marketeers.

No, I was actually talking about a whole Ranger like Mechanized Unit... ....To make up the loss in numbers, we'd want an extremely well trained and finely selected force. What do you folks think?

If your desire is for generically "elite armor" don't the armored battalions of the USMC Regimental Combat Teams fill that role? Are we talking about the elimination of the Army, the expansion of the Marine Corps, and SOCOM taking the final step to being recognized as a new Uniformed Service? Jeez, chaos in the streets, cats and dogs living together, the end times are here...

I think what the thread was suggesting, was that in the same way that SOCOM has Dedicated Helicopter and Boat units to facilitate air and sea/river support, that the same think is being suggested for protected mobility.

The Rangers were not formed simply to be a better light infantry unit. They perform a series of missions that the regular infantry is not trained or equiped to perform. I cannot think of what specialized mission a SOF armor unit would perform that a regular armor unit could not.

If we're talking about some sort of light armor unit for SOCOM, some work in the US has been done on the classical European "Mechanized Airborne" concept -- see BG Grange on Airmechanization:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...g01/grange.pdf

See also Air-Mech-Strike, 2ed, from Turner Publishing:

http://www.turnerpublishing.com/detail.aspx?ID=724

What you'd be looking at would be some sort of airborne light armor unit of a sort that exists in European armies but does not currently exist in the US Armed Forces. This would be a small unit that would be able to provide airborne and airmobile mechanized forces in support of Delta in the manner that the Rangers provide infantry support, with the emphasis on a mech footprint MUCH smaller than the Strykers:

Wiesel 1
http://www.military-today.com/apc/wiesel_1.htm

Wiesel 2
http://www.rheinmetall-detec.de/inde...ang=3&fid=3825

BV series
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/...updated-02656/

My criticism would be that there hasn't been a second Black Hawk Down, so you must demonstrate that Delta is currently operationally limited by this lack and that current TTPs using airborne firepower (Apaches, A-10s, Specter gunships) are inadequate.

[RJ]

Ratzel,

You might be attempting to reinvent the wheel. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) seems to have all the elements you listed plus air assets too.

Marine Expeditionary Unit
The smallest type of MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) (SOC). The command element is the standing headquarters for the MEU, usually headed by a colonel. The ground combat element is a battalion landing team (BLT), which is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and other ground combat assets. The air combat element is composed of a composite squadron of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and an Air Traffic Control (ATC) and command and control detachment. The combat service support element consists of a Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) which handles the logistics and administration needs of the MEU. The specific makeup of the MEU can be customized based upon the task at hand; additional artillery, armor, or air units can be attached, including squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet and Harrier jets.

There are usually three MEUs assigned to each of the U.S. Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, with another MEU based on Okinawa. While one MEU is on deployment, one MEU is training to deploy and one is standing down, resting its Marines, and refitting. Each MEU is rated as capable of performing special operations.

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

This post comes late to the discussion, but considering the activities of a MEU over the past year in Afganistan and the
results in Helmand Prov. the combined arms force seems to fit the basic description minus airborne and ranger school.

It is half the size of the unit envisioned by you, but covers a lot more options with less troops. The Marines have been fleshing out Battalion Landing Teams with assets needs for specific missions since the mid 1950's.

Todays MEU's grew out of that mix and into what is operational today.

[dogtown]

If I may jump into the SOF Armor debate: what do SOF units have in common? Core airborne rapid deployment capability. SOF units by their very definition are light units so I have a hard time seeing any major armor asset being adopted by SOF units as a core asset beyond GMVs and armored LMTVs. That being said, in a longer term conflict (think OIF vs Just Cause) it's reasonable to see more powerful armor assets being considered as a large conventional pressence would be expected.

Still, there have been numerous occasions where larger scale armor assets have been scooped into action by SOF units, but across the spectrum of their capabilities I think this is very limited.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Great post. Your thinking really shows experience & reason.

This format is the basis of a school of though which has been strong in our Army since WWII; based on mobility horizontally & vertically, force protection in the atomic age & maneuverability over diverse terrains. There's a great book out on it now called Air-Mech Strike.

Luckily we have the equipment on hand to make this happen, such as thousands of M113s and more.

[Bob's World]

Just a couple of quick thoughts:

1. SOCOM does not want to own any armored units. However, this is simply one of many "service-common" capabilities that the services are tasked to man, train, organize and equip. What we do need are much more effective mechanisms for putting such conventional capabilities under the C2 of the SOF Commander. Central to this is the major paradigm shift that sometimes conventional needs to work for SOF.

2. When SOF rides in armor, it belongs to an ally. I rode to war in an Egyptian APC. Limited US CAS, no US Arty, no US medevac, etc.

3. The party line is "Development of SOF enablers." Not to create conventional capabilities in SOF, nor to create SOF capabilities in the conventional force; but to create the capabilities and policies that allows the conventional commander to more readily provide the SOF force with whatever (log, air, armor, infantry, fires, etc) it might need for an operation, without having to provide it in the one size fits all BCT construct.

[ODB]

I played catch up on this one and in the process went through multiple WTFs and just pure madness. Coming from an infantry back ground prior to going SF this was wrong to me on multiple fronts. The number one issue being why would I be doing something as an ODA that would require armor? That is not my mission. One of the biggest problems we face in todays Army culture is everyone wants to be everyone else. SF guys want to do kinetic operations only, conventional forces want to be SF guys conducting FID, gathering intel, working with the local populace. When one cog of the whole mechanism is successful everyone wants to be that cog. All the cogs are in place already, we just need to utilize them properly. Entirely too many capabilities are under utilized or misused today. Everyone is looking for the lastest and greatest capability and what do you know, it already exists. Why Cav Scouts in infantry battalions is a prime example of this......I'll hand it to the Cav branch they sure stole one there. If I sound a bit harsh I apologize.

As far as having our own aviation unit, yes SOF does, but ask any SF guy when the last time they were flown by that unit. Us lowly SF guys are not sexy enough for them, we get much better support from conventional aviation and other services aviation units. When talking an infil platform it is just that a means to move from point A to point B, not a lot of special/elite training needed to do that. So in essence if I was to be moved by bus I would need an elite bus driver to drive me because he/she is so much better at driving.....sorry does not pass the common sense factor.

With the political infighting for budget money the way it is good luck, hence we now have MARSOF, why? Why must we keep creating organizations with capabilities that all ready exist in existing organizations.

Honestly I'm torn on the whole who should work for who. Should conventional forces work under SF or SF under conventional. IMO it depends on the situation. Really what a lot of this comes down to is education/knowledge of each others capabilities and personalities.

[Spud]

[QUOTE=Schuld;35888]SOF have used armor: if I'm not mistaken, the Australian SAS used the Wiesel with 20mm gun for fire support on patrol in Afghanistan -- one answer to the beyond .50 BMG range engagement issue on the DM thread. [QUOTE]

I think you've got the wrong 'Australians' -- no Wiesel in this part of the world.

[reed11b]

IAs far as having our own aviation unit, yes SOF does, but ask any SF guy when the last time they were flown by that unit. Us lowly SF guys are not sexy enough for them, we get much better support from conventional aviation and other services aviation units. When talking an infil platform it is just that a means to move from point A to point B, not a lot of special/elite training needed to do that. So in essence if I was to be moved by bus I would need an elite bus driver to drive me because he/she is so much better at driving.....sorry does not pass the common sense factor.

I agree with most of what you said, but not this. Look into the history of WHY the SOF aviation unit was created aka "Operation Eagle Claw". There are requirments for flying SF missions that differ from GPF missions. I just can not think of armor asset missions that SF would do with eneough frequency to justify the creation of a mechanized SF unit. Perhaps a Ranger asset?
Reed

[ODB]

Just stating the fact that "said" aviation unit rarely supports SF, therefore most of our support comes from conventional and other services. That would also factor into the decision as to why SF is currently fighting for their own aviation assets at the Group level, because SOF aviation in it's current form is not big enough to support all of SOF.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Our DIV CAV Squadrons were very close to the intent here, albeit with a different METL.

Likely light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection....

That being said, should the units be mechanised or motorised ?

I feell mechanised woud be better. What say you ?

[William F. Owen]

Likely light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection....

That being said, should the units be mechanised or motorised ?

I feell mechanised woud be better. What say you ?

The statement that "light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection" is pretty context free. When, where and why might be useful to progress this as a discussion.

[Ratzel]

Ratzel,

You might be attempting to reinvent the wheel. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) seems to have all the elements you listed plus air assets too.

Marine Expeditionary Unit
The smallest type of MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) (SOC). The command element is the standing headquarters for the MEU, usually headed by a colonel. The ground combat element is a battalion landing team (BLT), which is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and other ground combat assets. The air combat element is composed of a composite squadron of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and an Air Traffic Control (ATC) and command and control detachment. The combat service support element consists of a Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) which handles the logistics and administration needs of the MEU. The specific makeup of the MEU can be customized based upon the task at hand; additional artillery, armor, or air units can be attached, including squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet and Harrier jets.

There are usually three MEUs assigned to each of the U.S. Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, with another MEU based on Okinawa. While one MEU is on deployment, one MEU is training to deploy and one is standing down, resting its Marines, and refitting. Each MEU is rated as capable of performing special operations.

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

This post comes late to the discussion, but considering the activities of a MEU over the past year in Afganistan and the
results in Helmand Prov. the combined arms force seems to fit the basic description minus airborne and ranger school.

It is half the size of the unit envisioned by you, but covers a lot more options with less troops. The Marines have been fleshing out Battalion Landing Teams with assets needs for specific missions since the mid 1950's.

Todays MEU's grew out of that mix and into what is operational today.

What makes these units "Special Operations Capable?" Is there a selection process and/or advanced training they go through?

[Ratzel]

IOne of the biggest problems we face in todays Army culture is everyone wants to be everyone else. SF guys want to do kinetic operations only, conventional forces want to be SF guys conducting FID, gathering intel, working with the local populace.

This may be your experience, but in mine, no one wanted to do FID or COIN? Frankly, If the Army ever develops an "Advisor Division" or such, I would not envy the people serving in it in any way. I, in no way wanted EVER to be working with the local population and hated every minute of it when I did. If the Army had units that ONLY did HIC type missions, I probably would have never left?

[jmm99]

You might want to check out this and this and this and this - and also reference the USMC MCDP/WP series here at SWJ for general context.

[Ken White]

...If the Army had units that ONLY did HIC type missions, I probably would have never left?

Doesn't get to pick what type of war it may have to fight. Fortunately, most in the Army adapt and do what needs to done.

[Ratzel]

Fortunately, most in the Army adapt and do what needs to done.

Indeed...

[Bullmoose Bailey]

The statement that "light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection" is pretty context free. When, where and why might be useful to progress this as a discussion.

A context free statement it is.

Thanks you for your question. In response; I've found myself dangerously canalised within the confines of semi- & improved surface roads which comprise our GWOT enemies' primary EA.

In certain of these experiences both pre & post 9-11 I was having great success with wheeled vehicles.....on roadways.

The ability to move off the roadways at a high rate of speed would enable certain bypassing of contacts, envelopments, spoiling attacks, and attacks in depth which would much behoove our efforts in various zones & theatres of operation.

Given the multitudinous terrains over which we should be prepared "engage & destroy the enemies of the United States" (from the latest Soldier's Creed, GEN Schoomaker) to include, but not limited to, urban, agrarian, water, mud, mountain, hill, desert, jungle and the such, I find versatility essential.

So perhaps, having said that, you can understand my frustration that our lightest tank is presently greater than sixty tons & we are a de facto "motorised" army. These are two essential issues which need to be addressed and I expect that good R&D, suggestions from The Forces & innovative leadership will create both useful stop-gaps, such as the MRAP which I think is great in that particular role, & long term solutions.