So there's no selection, but the unit trains for missions usually thought of as being SO? Can any Marine be sent to one of these units, or is there some sort of selection process?Originally Posted by RJ
Ratzel,
It is advanced training and qualification that makes MEU units special operations Capable.
Special Operations Training Group trains two Marine Expeditionary Units and the security element from the 31st MEU every year to certify the MEUs as Special Operations Capable. Their courses range from specialized demolitions and close-quarters battle to vehicle assault and assault climbing.
In a recent SOC training schedule:
Objectives the Marines were evaluated on included, but were not limited to, a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), a mechanized raid, a boat raid, and an airfield seizure. In addition, SOTG presented on-call challenges, including, but not limited to, Tactical Recoveries of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), mass casualty drills, recovery of displaced American citizens, floating mines, and hostile water and aircraft. The Marines performed these missions in only a five-day period.
Though the Marine Corps' other six MEUs re-qualify as SOC every 18 months.
So there's no selection, but the unit trains for missions usually thought of as being SO? Can any Marine be sent to one of these units, or is there some sort of selection process?
"Politics are too important to leave to the politicians"
Ratzel,
Any qualified MOS 0300 Infantry Marine can be assigned duty with these units.
Remember there are 12 MEU's operating in the world. Three Deployed (SOC) MEU's, Three Refitting and Resting after Deployment MEU's, and Three In Training for Deployment MEU's.
The rotation allows for recent graduate recruits who have passed the advanced infantry course run by Infantry Training Regiments (ITR) to be mixed in to the Rest and Refit Infantry Battalions. Marine ITR includes what the US Army defines as Air Assualt training. ITR training puts them in the pipeline and mixes them with SOC qualified Marines with one or more deployments under their belt.
Those combat veterans are the heart of the MEU's Combat Infantry units. SOC is a unit designation not a badge qualification course like Ariborne, Ranger or Air Assualt.
When the R&R battalion's rotation moves into the Deployment Training cycle the newbies have been settled into Company, Platoon, Squads and Fireteams with experienced Marines who have been part of one or more SOC units.
The MEU system has been operating as SOC deployed units well before Gulf War One. Remember it was a Marine SOC unit that extracted that Air Force pilot who was shot down in Bosnia.
Looking back on you initial propsal, why do you need to to create a SPECIAL FORCES Armored Unit?
Who would staff this SOF unit?
What training would the have to have to be assigned to your armoured SOF Battalion?
What are the advantages of a SF unit that is Armor designated vs. a regular US Army Mechanized Infantry unit.
Special Forces "A" and "B" team missions are different and their special training does not allow for them to be thrown into a straight infantry or mechanized infantry environment.
Delta Squadrons, are even more highly refined and their individual skill levels would be wasted in a straight infantry or mechanized infantry environment.
Army Airborne units have light armor and artillery units in their T/O. And Army Divisions have transport, armor and artillery units in their unit mix.
After 7 years of Combat deployments there are very few if any Army or Marine infantry, Mech Infantry, Stryker Brigades that do not have a lot of skill working with the other combat arms units. And skill working with Marine, Navy and Air Force assets.
I doubt any US Army Unit is deployed without a high percentage of combat experienced officers and NCO's who have been deployed at least once.
With that in mind, what is the advantage of a SF Armor unit?
Last edited by RJ; 02-02-2009 at 06:58 PM.
This entire thread is interesting conversation, but entirely moot.
While SOF may certainly require armor support at times, or even work with coalition armored forces ( I personally worked with the Egyptian 3rd MECH Divsion during the first Gulf War, and rode into Kuwait in an Egyptian APC with Egyptian crew during the ground offensive), but none of this translates to a requirement to create Armored or Mechanized SOF; certainly not at the Company level or higher.
Could you see an ODA in a theater near you roll by in a couple of Brads and an M1? Sure. But you might want to check your motorpool to see if you just went short that same number of vehicles...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I guess I just can't see the reason for Armored SOF - it's not like TT VIII changes or something.
Having an "elite" ranger-like unit with high funding, rigorous selection, and that did little else except practice gunnery and maneuver would be a fun tank/cav unit.
However, I just don't see a need or that the mission can't be done with a reasonably competent tank company when needed.
The unit would be a Ranger unit but mechanized. And the purpose would the same as why we have airborne Ranger units. The 82nd can seize airfields and pretty much do anything a Ranger unit can do, but we have Ranger units for missions which require a more highly trained unit. The advantage of this unit would be the same advantages of why we have airborne Ranger units.
It would have a mix of light tanks, APC's, Weasels, and other assault vehicles. All of the vehicles would be small enough to be transported by aircraft. The troops would have better training and better equipment than the regular army. Troops would go to this unit after RIP just like ABR units and E-4 and above would be required to have a Ranger tab.
A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on.
I guess the bottom line is:
Is there a need for a highly trained Ranger type unit that trained with, thought about, and fought with vehicles? We could be creative with how this unit used its assets as well? Why not a company with 4 weasels, four light tanks, four APCs (w/2 squads) , 2 mortar vehicles, 1 medic and 1 mechanic track?
"Politics are too important to leave to the politicians"
While I believe that the authors drew the absolute wrong conclusion due to their predisposition to prove their thesis; the recent article on the failure of mechanized forces in COIN operations fits well here:
Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson
International Organization , Volume 63, Issue 01,
http://journals.cambridge.org/action...01&iid=3291884
Some great research, and I really like the "Alternative Explanations" that were raised, briefly discussed, then by-passed to get on to the armor objective (Fond memories of roaring across West Germany as Team Mech attached over to one of the two armor battalions in our brigade during the Cold War...but I digress). I need to take some time with it, but a combination of 3-4 of these alternatives is closer to the truth.
They set out to prove that as armies became more mechanized, they became less effective at COIN, and that that is the cause of a corresponding decline in effectiveness. I buy the part of the argument completely that mounted forces are less capapble that dismounted forces in this type of populace-based engagement. I just think that it is far more due to advances in communications among the populace/insurgent than mechanization among the government/counterinsurgent that truly drives the trends described.
Worthwhile read for those who have not seen.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Poor arguement
I have to agree that while light forces are better suited for dismounted patrolling, that is because that is what they were initially designed to do. The study is a bit of a blinding flash of the obvious in that a light unit, especially at a time when we didn't have a great deal of docrine on how to handle an insurgency, will revert to what it knows - patrolling, primarily on foot. A heavy unit, built to survive on a high-intensity battlefield, will revert to what it knows - using its mobility and firepower to patrol. While it is obvious that one method will be drastically more effective than the other in counterinsurgency, the authors never delve into the greatest viariable in any military operation, from the squad patrol to the division campaign plan: Leadership. This is hard to quantify in a statistical analysis.
The methods and effectiveness of the 2 divisions is well known. Yet, while heavy units do not inherently have the same numbers to conduct dismounted patrolling, the idea that they can't be effective is untrue. One has to look at what 3ACR (with 2 heavy squadrons and 1 light battalion) or 1/1AD (3 tank battalions, 1 marine battalion, 1 light infantry battalion) accomplished on their second tours in Iraq.
Using a heavy formation in COIN is ususally not optimal - however, with an effort to focus on good task organization and some equipment changes (more wheeled vehicles), along with Leadership that understands the fight, any heavy unit can be effective in a COIN environment.
Tankersteve
My read was that this would be a Mech/RANGER unit. The RANGER mission is direct action. If you specialize too much, you have no one to do the regular infantry work.
Ratzel posted - "A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on. "
Not to pick your scenario apart, but 12 hours is a very long time to put all your assets on the ground. What part of the security would the very small and light armor provide.
I would suspect that the target of your scenario could be secured in under 6 hours by an Airborne, Ranger or Marine Battalion. Holding it would be the test. And injection would probably be by Helos or Osprey's. More focus LZ's and no form up wasted time.
When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Grenada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.
One in Korea if I remember correctly. 187th RCT?
None in Vietnam that I can remember?
The secure an air field in Grenada?
And to secure an airfield in Panama?
None in Iraq. Perhaps one in Afganistan in 2002??
The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisons are fully capable of investing and holding the target you described. And to be reinforced by airborne light armor and artillery units almost immediately. That is what they train to do.
A Mech-Ranger unit is unsupportable for a host of reasons.
Too exotic and too limited in its ability. It would be an Orphan! And a waste of talent.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2009 at 10:52 PM. Reason: Amend Granada to Grenada.
By the US?
187th twice in Korea (20&21 OCT 50, 23 MAR 51).
TF 2-503(+) in OPN Junction City (Vietnam)
1st & 2d RGR Bns in OPN Urgent Fury (Grenada)
75th RGR RGT & 1st BDE/82d ABN in OPN Just Cause (Panama)- 5 BNs jumped, IIRC.
173d ABN BDE in OPN Iraqi Freedom.
That one really doesn't count. 10th Group had already secured the DZ for them. Not exaxtly forced entry.
SFC W
I stand Corrected on the Bn. size airborne operations.
I was surprized to see the 503rd Airborne (The Rock) on the list. They were kind enough to let me hitch rides with them to maintain my jump status in Okniawa in 1959-60.
It was the first time I handled an M-14 and the M-60 MG.
You can argue that if you want. I'll argue that we couldn't drive there (Turkey wasn't letting us), and if 10th Group had the capability to execute the 173d's follow on tasks, they would have- WITHOUT the airborne operation.
173d jumped into enemy held territory (ok, 10th Group and some Pesh had the DZ secured), expanded the lodgement, brought in follow-on airlands (2-63 AR, and some 10th MTN, IIRC?) and executed a tactical mission.
To be a valid airborne operation doesn't mean you have to jump onto an enemy armored formation- in fact, we actively try to avoid that.
Sad example of Conv-SOF "cooperation" all around
Not only did the 173rd knowingly jump onto an airfield already secured and held by SF and Kurdish Iraqis; but they then essentially fortified themselves into it denying it for use to support the guys who'd actually taken it.
The real sad part of this whole sordid chapter is that in a novel approach that placed the 173rd subordinate to the 1oth SFG, the CDR of the 173rd from all accounts that I have heard essentially refused to follow that order as he would not submit to being under an SF command.
Some silly #### really, but the guy should have been fired; because he could have gotten a lot of good men killed with his attitude and actions.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
173d mustard stain
Is it a combat jump when the aircraft could have landed as easily as the troopers could have jumped? Or with a similar amount of risk? I am not an expert, or even airborne-qualified, but I am curious about this.
No one is doubting that the forces were needed or that they brought capability that the SF in the area didn't have. However, I don't actually know the precise definition of a combat jump. If there hadn't been an airfield at the location, meaning planes couldn't land, but the closest enemy is, say over 100 miles away, is it a combat jump? Is it any jump over enemy territory, as defined by a map? Even if there isn't any enemy where you landed?
I don't think jumping into a locally secured location fits that definition. If you already have friendlies on the ground, beyond a very covert pathfinder element and in this case, more than one ODA and a LOT of friendly Peshmerga, it doesn't sound like combat yet.
I suspect the troopers had to jump because there wasn't a good lounge for the pilots to relax in while the plane was offloading, if they had landed.
Tankersteve
Define secured.
Lot of myths about that drop. Broadly irrelevant. One can criticize several aspects of it including the necessity and the C and C issues -- which none of us can really comment on with any accuracy because even if we have access to SOME of the AARs, they only tell what the writer wanted told. If one was not there, one cannot know what transpired.
It was also apparently a bad drop, the AF inadvertently extended a one click DZ to 10KM and it took almost 15 hours for the Bn TF to assemble and get functional. If that's correct, it's a situation that is likely to have played in the alleged decision of the Bde Cdr to reject 10th Gps efforts to direct him and the unit (as he had no effective unit at the time); that and the rank of the 10th Gp person on the ground AND what that person directed. None of which we know...
As for the necessity of a jump -- may or may not have been such a need at Drop time on 26 Mar 03. That's not really germane. The issue is what was the perceived requirement and situation on the ground at the time the planning commenced almost certainly five or quite likely more days prior to the drop...
In any event they get credit for a combat drop -- and it was about as much combat as all the others after WW II saw...
The Ranger drop in Grenada, incidentally was not 1st and 2d Bn but a 'select' bunch (I use the word 'bunch' advisedly -- it was not a unit) of senior SPC, NCOs and Officers from both Bns. Bad way to do business. In the 1/504 Jump into Panama, a somewhat similar shuffle took place; a few troops from the Bn were left behind so some senior folks from other Bns could make the jump. Unit integrity and Integrity at their finest...
Last edited by Ken White; 02-16-2009 at 11:01 PM.
Avoiding armour
Correct point and I know the UK Airborne Division did drop at Arnhem (1944) onto an armoured formation, which soured the operation somewhat. It is not implausible given the "fog of war" for airborne troops to land in the wrong place, even amidst armour.
davidbfpo
Alway's look for the bright side
At least if you land in the middle of tanks theres less likelihood that someone somewhere is about to open the flood gates and make ability to swim a life or death matter
Just a side note/question.
Exactly how likely is it in todays world that you drop without requiring at least a requisite number of Heavier items quite quickly otherwise your gonna be in trouble. This in reference to large group drops,
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Too true about AARs
Interesting info about the drop zone and the 10th Group relationship.
And Ken, you are right, in the greater scheme of things, this whole 'combat jump' issue is irrelevant.
I am curious about experiences with SOF and heavy versus light relationships. While it may be solely based on the attitudes and previous experiences of the senior leadership involved, I wonder if there are common, underlying themes to when a SOF/GPF relationship, either direction, works well.
I would have liked to argue that an armor officer is less likely to have a problem being subordinate to a senior SOF commander because they are more likely to be impressed with the people in SOF. An infantry commander (especially a light infantryman) likely had this guy as a peer or knows his reputation and is less enamored with his 'special-ness'. However, I think it really comes down to competence and a willingness to work together.
CAVGUY mentioned it in another thread that the SF we had in Tal Afar were about as helpful as a missing HEMMT fueler - its not good and a bit of a worry, but in the long run, you have other systems that can do the job and bigger problems to worry about. Meanwhile, in Ramadi, the SEALS and OGA were incredibly involved in being integrated and coordinating actions. If we had turned the relationship around to SOF being the supported HQ, I think it would have worked just as well in Ramadi, and likely would have been pretty ugly in TA.
So I guess the real answer is do your part and be a team player and hope the other guy does his.
So back to the point of this thread - RANGER MECH. While it would be great to be in a heavy unit with incredible training levels and super motivation, Ranger school probably won't make it a SOF-type unit. Most Army light infantry battalions have tons of Ranger school grads within their leadership but the bulk of the troops are just young, bright, fit Soldiers. They get to train a lot on fieldcraft and weapons, compared to most heavy units, but they are far from being a SOF. And I still can't think of missions that require an established special heavy unit.
Once you introduce the dynamic of having to maintain lots of vehicles, and remove the notion of absolute self-reliance as the number one priority in combat, I think you take away much of the special motivation that drives a Soldier to feel 'special'. However, the Rangers are playing with some of their vehicle mixes, using everything from Land Rovers to Strykers to increase their capability. The focus is still on the individual Ranger though.
Tankersteve
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