Battle Drill

[Fred III]

What I meant with my comment on DePuy/battle drill was, that it basically provides an answer as how to make a conscript infantry work as fast as possible. DePuy's work at TRADOC was done in an era of conscription, as was his combat service. I freely admit I prefer "Auftragstaktik" - it might offer the better answers for todays's environment. As long - and that is important - as the Army is willing to give more authority to the section level and its leaders. If the Army wants to keep to micromanagment and train troops accordingly, then battle drill is the answer. But I feel that in a professional army that is a waste of ressources and initiative.

Distiller--

That is extremely interesting. I do, however, want to make a small correction to your post. DePuy's combat service was done in the conscription era, but by the time of TRADOC, the army had been-- or was certainly in the process of-- being converted to all-volunteer. Your point is well-taken, however, in that his thinking was probably all for a conscription army.

I am not familiar with the specifics of "Auftragstaktik." Actually, to be perfectly honest, I have no clue what that is, other than a guess that it refers to the German WWII small unit theory of training, possibly extending into today's era. Is it the same, or is it drawn from what Norfolk posted earlier (German WWII doctrine)? And again, I am not at all familiar with how or what it would replace and why it is so different from a clearly defined method of attacking an enemy position.

I could use that education and would be indebted. Also, does anyone have a clue how to download Norfolk's reference?

We are certainly in agreement about the leadership and authority business. It is very interesting, but there seems to have been considerably more small-unit authority allowed back in the latter 19th century army than there is today. Is that because of the improvement in methods of communication? Another interesting point regarding that, is how do we weight the authority issue in small units versus the authority issue vis-a-vis civilian control? The generals complain about civilian meddling from atop, but then proceed to do the same thing below.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Norfolk]

Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.

[Fred III]

Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.

You know, Norfolk, that's really interesting. I often wonder about that kind of thing. It was a different era and a different war. From what I am reading on these pages, even the organization charts are vastly different. I guess, to a very large extent, I am operating in a distant time-warp. I have only recently read about these "BCT's", these brigade combat teams, and how the newest "division" structures are set up. Someone-- on another thread-- said that divisions are now more HQ organizations than actual operating units, sort of like how brigades used to be when they re-introduced the concept in the '60's (there you go!) So a lot of this has passed me by.

I keep reading about "the best army in the world," "the world's best training," and all the rest of the stuff we puff up about. It's like, who's better, Mantle or Bonds?

So I don't really know. I do know that the conscription army I was in was highly disciplined... and that may fly in the face of some of you out there... but it's how I remember it. We weren't worried about guys re-upping, there was always someone else in the pipeline. And, of course, to me that's the issue today. That leads into my buggaboo about too many women and the use of contractors. That's how they make the "professional" army work. The system cannot generate enough volunteers, so the standards-- the physical standards, mind you!!!!!-- are lowered, i.e., women; and the jobs that cannot be filled are farmed out to civilians. We had civilians in my day, but this is a whole new level, and I don't care what anyone says, experience or no, once you're out baby, the womb is gone and it's never the same. You give me a 5-year Special Forces guy in the service any day over a 20-year retiree merc.

I do know your equipment is better today, your training facilities are better... I don't know how to measure it. I will say this: there isn't a unit today I would take over the 1st Infantry Division of DePuy. We were good. That may be an old man bragging, it may be ignorance, it may be pride... I don't know.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[RJ]

Gentlemen,

Thank you for a very interesting thread. This is my first post on the Council.

My infantry training dates back to the Marine Corps of the mid 1950's. The basic weapons for a line company 13 man squad were M-1 Garand rifles and the BAR. Three 4 man fire teams built around a BAR and a squad leader.

My first peek and fondle of a M-14 and M-60 LMG were during a welcome aboard three day mixer with my Battalion and the 503rd Airborne on Okinawa in late 1959 or early 1960.

I was a squad leader at that time.

My Battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. Kenneth Houghton and was transplanted to the Third Marine Division during a new Marine Corps "Transplacement Battalion" concept. 3/5 a 1stMarDiv. unit switch bases with 3/3 a 3rdMarDiv unit.

The Corps theory was to begin each transplacemt battalion
by staffing them with platoon commanders who were 1st Lt. and were experienced in that command slot. In our case the Battalion Commander built his staff, including senior NCO's with Officers and NCO's he had served with in the past.

The Rifle Companies were all commanded by Captians who were combat veterans. Three out of the 5 CO's were mustangs with Combat experience in Korea. Co. 1st Sgts and Gunnery Sgts were all combat veterans. As were most Platoon Sgts. Squad leaders for the most part were young corporals and Sgts. who had re-enlisted aftr learning the "grunt trade" in the infantry Battalions of the three Marine Divisions.

The enlisted ranks were filled with fresh meat directly out of the Infantry Training Regts. from both the 1st and 2nd Marine Division. A volunteer and highly motivated group of brand new Marines.

Each Battalion trained for 5 months in the hills of Camp Pendleton. Live fire exercises were often and competive.
All of them included Fire and Maneuver, including flanking and frontal assualts. Clearing trench lines, preping and assualting bunker systems, squad, platoon and company in defensive postions. The last two months intergrated the LMG and 3.5 rocket launcher sections with the platoons and eveyone was cross trained to function as machine gunners and ammo humpers for both the "guns" and the "rockets!"

Fire team leaders and Squad leaders were cross trained up to work with H&S Co.'s 81mm Mortars and Flamethrower Platoons. Squad Leaders were trained to direct fire missions with the 81mm platoons and expected to pass on that knowledge to the fireteam leaders.

When we boarded the USS J.C. Breckinridge (MATS) we were pretty cocky and had a strong sense of unit. Some of us were going to spend 15 months withthe Battalion and the majority would spend a full 30 months.

It was the best unit I serve in during my 14 years in the Corps. I finished my regular Marine Corps stint as a Recon Squad Leader in the 2nd Recon Bn. in Camp Lejune. And my USMCR years a a Rifle Platoon Sgt. in a NY Reserve Unit that became part of the 4th Marine Division when the Corp consolidated the old Rifle Company concept into a mirror image of the Regular Marine Infantry Divisions.

In our overseas tour 3/5 trained in the Philippeans, Formosa, and functioned as the "float" battalion for the 7th Fleeet. We were one of the initial BNs to utilize the new vertical envelopment concept during a major amphibious exercise in Formosa and trained for the new concept on the USS Princeton and the USS Hornet. We participated in regular amphibious landings in Leyte and Luzon. We interacted in training with the Philippean Army and the Nationalist Chinese Marine Corps and shared some patrol sharing with the Royal Warwicks in FanLing, China along the New Terrorities border at Hong Kong. Liberty in Hong Kong, Manila, Tackloban, Subic Bay and Yokohamma.

Most of our "battle drill" for the lackof a better word, centered around the Platoon and interacting with support weapons to prep and prepare our objectives. We taught fire and maneuver and the units facing a assualt line were primarily trained to batter the objective with heavy fire while the assualt force set up a flanking attack.

Todays, communications between the infantry and the supporting assets has got to be light years ahead of the old, tried and true "Follow Me" rule that was till being followed since the late 19th Century.

When the Marines when across the berm from Kuwait and into Iraq, I noticed a Marine Squad leader directing his squad by voice commands thru a head set mike.

That has to be a huge improvement to the screaming at the top of your lungs in a fire fight or an assualt.

Sorry for my long winded intro I just wanted to let y'all know how long it has been since I did the infantry thing.

I think my question is - haven't communications at the squad level made a great difference in combat for todays troops? and hasn't the ability of the average infantryman to multiply the force levels against the enemy grown enormously?


I'm the new guy on this site and I promise to lurk most of the time so as to get a handle on the new and improved concepts and reality since my time.

[Ken White]

to be welcomed here.

And anyone who's almost as old as I am certainly is...

Welcome aboard.

[RJ]

Thanks Ken!

"Kenny" was an exceptional infantry leader! He was admired, and more than likly "loved" by the troops.

He was the only Marine Officer In my expericence who qualified to wear Jump Wings and Submariners Dolphins.

We were all glad, but not surprised that he made Maj. General before he retired.

3/5 All the Way!

[William F. Owen]

“Moreover, in a day of rapid technical change, when British soldiers were apt to be employed anywhere in the world under conditions that varied widely and could not be anticipated because the tactics, equipment, and transport requirements differed with the circumstances of each campaign, the British Army could not preserve one uniform pattern…About all that could be done to prepare the army to fight was to retain an elasticity in outlook, simplicity in drill, and adopt a common, simplified…training manuals. When the next war came, the British would feel their way amidst the new conditions, but at least their feet would not be chained to a rigid system of tactics long since outmoded”.

Maj Gen Sir John Maurice. The Advantages of Simple Drill 1888

[Distiller]

A quick look at google

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/P...mn/keithly.htm
http://www.ducimus.com/Archive/auftrags-oleary.htm
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...t02/widder.pdf
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita.../6-0/chap1.htm