Section Leading; A Guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned Officers as Commanders and Rifle Sections, 1928:

"Care must be taken that exercises to teach the combination of fire and movement are not carried out as a drill. When a platoon is attacking, advances must not be made by alternate section rushes, without consideration of the ground and the enemy's fire. Every advance should, if possible, be from fire position to fire position. Training on these lines in peace can only result in heavy and unnecessary casualties in war."
CAMT 7-45, Canadian Army Manual of Training: Infantry Section Leading and Platoon Tactics, 1954:

"Battle drill must be our servant and NOT our master."

"It must be wisely used and applied."

"It must be emphasized that all the drills which follow in this book are the basis on which to work. They are simple guides for the simple soldier. As sections and platoons become expert in these drills, they must learn to modify them and adjust them to the situation and ground. No one drill can suit all circumstances, and variations on those set out in this and other chapters must be encouraged and taught as soon as the "basic stroke" is mastered."
Notes From Theatres of War, No. 16, North Africa November 1942-May 1943; The War Office, October, 1943:

Battle Drill.--The teaching of battle drill undoubtedly proved to be of the greatest value in instilling dash and determination into troops and junior leaders. The best results have been obtained from battle drills on a platoon level, but training in the drills up to company level proved useful.
It is important, however, that junior leaders should not regard battle drill as a universal panacea to be applied in toto in every situation. Battle drill training aims at teaching the basic "strokes," and thus represents only the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be intelligently applied in accordance with the nature of the ground and the particular tactical situation. There were many occasions when unnecessary casualties resulted from poor leadership because junior leaders blindly followed a set drill and failed to apply it with common sense.
Col Arjun Ray, quoted in the RUSI Journal, Autumn 1989:

Fetishism for battle drills has been largely responsible for sanitizing imagination, creativity and mental mobility in infantry ranks. Battle drills are … a set of reactions … Conversely, tactics are a thought out plan to overcome the threat, the two are therefore dissimilar.
All quotes found at:

"The Canadian Infantry Section Attack Part One: Attrition Training in a Manoeuvre Army" by Michael M. O'Leary:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk.htm#27

and this is its companion piece, Part Two:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm