Battle Drill

[Norfolk]

Section Leading; A Guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned Officers as Commanders and Rifle Sections, 1928:

"Care must be taken that exercises to teach the combination of fire and movement are not carried out as a drill. When a platoon is attacking, advances must not be made by alternate section rushes, without consideration of the ground and the enemy's fire. Every advance should, if possible, be from fire position to fire position. Training on these lines in peace can only result in heavy and unnecessary casualties in war."

CAMT 7-45, Canadian Army Manual of Training: Infantry Section Leading and Platoon Tactics, 1954:

"Battle drill must be our servant and NOT our master."

"It must be wisely used and applied."

"It must be emphasized that all the drills which follow in this book are the basis on which to work. They are simple guides for the simple soldier. As sections and platoons become expert in these drills, they must learn to modify them and adjust them to the situation and ground. No one drill can suit all circumstances, and variations on those set out in this and other chapters must be encouraged and taught as soon as the "basic stroke" is mastered."

Notes From Theatres of War, No. 16, North Africa November 1942-May 1943; The War Office, October, 1943:

Battle Drill.--The teaching of battle drill undoubtedly proved to be of the greatest value in instilling dash and determination into troops and junior leaders. The best results have been obtained from battle drills on a platoon level, but training in the drills up to company level proved useful.
It is important, however, that junior leaders should not regard battle drill as a universal panacea to be applied in toto in every situation. Battle drill training aims at teaching the basic "strokes," and thus represents only the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be intelligently applied in accordance with the nature of the ground and the particular tactical situation. There were many occasions when unnecessary casualties resulted from poor leadership because junior leaders blindly followed a set drill and failed to apply it with common sense.

Col Arjun Ray, quoted in the RUSI Journal, Autumn 1989:

Fetishism for battle drills has been largely responsible for sanitizing imagination, creativity and mental mobility in infantry ranks. Battle drills are … a set of reactions … Conversely, tactics are a thought out plan to overcome the threat, the two are therefore dissimilar.

All quotes found at:

"The Canadian Infantry Section Attack Part One: Attrition Training in a Manoeuvre Army" by Michael M. O'Leary:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk.htm#27

and this is its companion piece, Part Two:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm

[William F. Owen]

Every advance should, if possible, be from fire position to fire position.

Yes, yes and yes. Exactly!! Please send the me the references for this (page number and Pamphlet number etc) . This is excellent!

In a more modern context you can replace or add to fire position with "observation position" or "communication position."

[bismark17]

Yea, I have to agree with that. I know from personal experience going from the Infantry into civilian law enforcement that I had problems going into such a fluid environment without having a Ranger handbook, 7-8, 7-70, the TC on Dismounted Patrolling or the METL manual to help me adjust. In the Army I was able to memorize those TTPs before hand to help create a mental map or model to handle the various situations that may occur. Having specific lane training just reinforced that outlook and I think it does create some issues. I have seen numerous other former military people that seem to have issues with adjusting to the unkown without the benefit of a smart book to assist.

[Norfolk]

Wilf,

Section Leading, 1928, A guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned Officers as Commanders of Rifle and Lewis-Gun Sections, is marked "26 Manuals 355" on the left side of the Title, and the quote is from Chapter VII, Section 22. "Exercises to teach the combination of fire and movement", Item 2; Pages 71-72.

Mike O'Leary Emailed me the Title Page of the Manual, and the whole of Chapter VII in pdf this afternoon. Anyone who wants it can PM me with their Email (the file size is 1.82 mb).

I originally posted this on the Rifle Squad thread some time ago, but it's quite relevant here:

When the British Army introduced Battle Drill early in WWII, the same Field Service Regulations that described them also carried the warning that they were not intended to be a substitute for the tactical judgement of battlefield leaders and soldiers; they were simply intended to be training aids from which soldiers and leaders would have weaned themselves off of towards the end of their basic trade training. Of course, what has in fact occurred in practice is the replacement of tactical judgement by rote drill. The US Army formally adopted Battle Drill in the mid-1950's, and at the same time it formally adopted the Fire Team, with two per Rifle Squad.

Thus all the funny business ever since. The Commonwealth Armies only began to adopt the two-Fire Team Rifle Section starting in the late 1970's, and by the 1980's it was the standard. The German Army has recently adopted the two Fire-Team Rifle Squad as well, with 10 men per squad and 1 MG-4 5.56mm LMG per Fire Team. I haven't heard so far, but I suspect that may adopt Battle Drill now too.

The aforementioned is one of the reasons the offensive tactics of the present-day Rifle Squad are so fixated on the Frontal Attack; it requires a minimum of brainpower and a maximum of firepower to undertake. That said, there are a lot of reasons that the Frontal Attack is more often than not necessary: the ground doesn't provide enough cover and concealment; you're conducting mechanized ops and it's pretty obvious to both you and the enemy that you're coming and they're just waiting for you to pile out of your tracks; there's just not the time to perform a slower but less costly other-than-Frontal attack and you have to attack now, otherwise the enemy will have reinforced his position making it harder to attack a little later; etc.

But in those cases when the Frontal Attack can be foregone, the two-Fire Team Squad and Battle Drill shouldn't be allowed to conspire against alternatives to the Frontal Attack. The German Army in WWII, as I have already mentioned before in this thread, never adopted Battle Drill and never formally adopted Fire Teams; if a Squad at any time split into two balanced teams, it was only because the tactical situation at that place and time made it appropriate to do so. The Squad Leader was free to develop and use his best tactical judgment to fight the Squad as best as he saw fit.

The Fire Team concept and Battle Drill have become crutches with which to prop up weak leaders and weak soldiers who otherwise would be clearly seen to be unable to adapt to the tactical situation at hand; at the same time, by tying capable leader's and soldier's hands with doctrine that has morphed into rigid practice, it serves to obscure those whose tactical judgement is otherwise sound.

[William F. Owen]

Fireteams are nothing to do with Battle Drill. Battle drill was started in 1918 using entire platoons, not sections. If you can find a copy of Maxse's and Liddell-Harts 1919 manual, (SS-148??) it shows this in detail.

What the US adopted in the 1950s is nothing like the UK iteration of Battle Drill.

Battle Drill always talks about attacking from the rear or flank, or even by-passing. The 1942 Instructors hand book is explicit on this. Frontal attacks were used in training because of live ammunition range safety templates. How you train using live fire is still a major consideration on this matter.

[Norfolk]

Fireteams are nothing to do with Battle Drill. Battle drill was started in 1918 using entire platoons, not sections. If you can find a copy of Maxse's and Liddell-Harts 1919 manual, (SS-148??) it shows this in detail.

What the US adopted in the 1950s is nothing like the UK iteration of Battle Drill.

Battle Drill always talks about attacking from the rear or flank, or even by-passing. The 1942 Instructors hand book is explicit on this. Frontal attacks were used in training because of live ammunition range safety templates. How you train using live fire is still a major consideration on this matter.

I had written that post for another thread, where I was discussing the effects of rote application of Battle Drill in lieu of tactical judgement. I was also observing how in the Canadian Army, the adoption of the US Fire Team system coupled to said rote application of Battle Drill made for an almost blind and automatic recourse to the Frontal Attack, even in cases where the traditional Flanking Attack that use to be taught in the CF was possible. At that time, we effectively dispensed with traditional Platoon Battle Drill and settled for an almost US-style approach. Not so good.