Hey Fred!
When you head south on US41 down past Pelican Bay on the right is little hamburger spot called CheBurger CheBurger...... Have one and really enjoy it.... Dang I miss that place.
Norfolk—
Thank you, as well. I wasn’t aware you were in one of the Commonwealth armies, so your points about this whole discussion are particularly interesting to me. Unfortunately, I am not well versed in either the tactics of “British-born” armies (and I use that term only in the way of Genesis) or current-day American thinking. Obviously, much of what I have to say comes from experience of a long time ago, plus the good fortune of having served under some extremely fine examples of American leadership. I guess I can drop some names with the best of them!
I am in complete agreement with you and Ken White regarding “battle drill” vis-ŕ-vis leadership and I think this is where some people may get tripped up. Nothing works without good leadership to ensure the theories are properly instituted and carried out and I wonder if that is more the problem than the specifics of the drill. As you can imagine, I am particularly sensitive to the areas of military convoys, patrolling, and platoon drill, and whenever I see or hear about these situations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan my ire is drawn to our leadership. I am not fond of contracting out what I consider military operations and I am even less happy about seeing the greatly expanded role of women in the military. To me, contractors should spend their time building facilities the military is not traditionally equipped to handle and that fall more in line with civilian expertise, i.e., port facilities, permanent structures, etc., not convoy driving, not running mess halls, not dishing out supplies; and women should be doing the clerical, the nursing, the doctoring, and more of the administrative duties than humping tires on 5-ton vehicles or trying to out-run a bunch of Iraqis dying of laughter. That doesn’t work, I’ll tell you. My cynicism tells me precisely why these two situations exist, but the horror—to me—is that the individual soldier—and that includes the women who serve—are the ones who pay the price. That ain’t “battle drill,” but it is a matter of leadership and it extends to well beyond the military. What makes it particularly galling is that by now the military leadership is complicit. It’s like the old arguments for and against the volunteer army: you had to drag the generals, kicking and screaming, into it, and now you would have to drag them kicking and screaming out of it. Today, they’d probably get a medal from the politicians just for a public “thumbs-up.” Re-sew the lettuce, boys! And that pink-and-purple one on the far left is for….
The problem with DePuy’s battle drill is that I am not sure it was ever fully accepted or implemented into doctrine. That’s more an I-don’t-know, however, than a statement of fact. One might think as head of TRADOC, he would pretty much get his way, especially with something as menial as platoon-sized drill, but I don’t know. I am very surprised, however, that there is not more discussion of his ideas and methods, especially when I see the quality of person on these boards. That almost leads me to believe he has been superseded by… not the skirmish line, I hope!
His drill worked—at least in theory—and I know his “traveling” formations worked in practice—and in combat. But again, it must always be remembered, there was more than just the “A Team moves; B Team fires,” etc. Cover and concealment were integral parts of the drill, as was reliance on higher assets. The deal was to sow confusion and uncertainty and I’m not sure there is anyone unwilling to accept those principles when it comes to warfare, however small the engagement or units involved.
Another thing about William DePuy that I believe a lot of people are unaware of. The American army has this penchant for attrition warfare. It started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command and it hasn’t changed a whole hell of lot since. What’s so intriguing about DePuy’s strategy, however, is his reversal of the theory. Grant employed his “attritive” tactics sort of like a battering ram. He just kept throwing assets at Lee until he wore the Southern forces out. That has been our way ever since and we’ve been blessed with the ability to do just that (of course, there’s the human element that might not agree too readily about flinging fathers and sons into the cauldron!). In Vietnam, DePuy turned the tables and I don’t really know if he’s been given credit for what he attempted to do. The press grabs a hold of this stuff and screams attrition didn’t work in Vietnam, but with DePuy’s theories—and practices—it was the other guy doing the attrition. Think about that for a moment. Knowing they will keep coming, pound them and pound them and pound them. Make them use their assets. Without the bottomless pit spelled “A-M-E-R-I-C-A,” the NVA would eventually have to fold. Clever, don’t you think?
The problem, however, was that we couldn’t go into their sanctuaries; into Cambodia, into Laos (except for Special Forces); we couldn’t physically control or take out the Ho Chi Minh Trail, so we could never hit them hard enough to force the necessary replacements, thereby draining the swamp. Their “swamp” was always regenerating and so we failed. Military strategy succumbed to civilian vicissitudes. I find distinct parallels with our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tora Bora is a partial example, exacerbated by what I see as Tommy Franks’ incompetence. If we had a foray or two into Pakistan, what do you think Musharraf might say besides, “Thanks, boys!” As for the militants… what? Piss them off? Seems like we’ve already done that! This ruse of turning over security and military operations to the Iraqis is another. We did that with the ARVN, remember? That’s the old blame-game again. Who, Moi? You lost the war! This sudden enlightenment with the new counter-insurgency manual also fits the shoe. Did anyone read the Special Forces Warfare School’s manuals and study publications of some 42 years ago? They say smell is the most powerful of the senses. Seems like I’ve smelled that rose before.
Anyway, I am delighted to know there are DePuy adherents here and I really do think this so-called “battle drill”—if properly taught—works. Again, as an officer, I wouldn’t know what to do without it, and I would be interested in seeing what those who think it is all worthless would substitute for training and doctrine.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Last edited by Fred III; 01-17-2008 at 01:13 AM.
Hey Fred!
When you head south on US41 down past Pelican Bay on the right is little hamburger spot called CheBurger CheBurger...... Have one and really enjoy it.... Dang I miss that place.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
@ Fred
I feel that a good deal of what you talk about in your second paragraph comes from the lack of understanding of military affairs by the political leadership. Did it start with McNamara? Now there is a situation where civilian leaders fiddle with operational matters - which is not their business, and on the other hand military leaders fiddling with political and strategic matters - which should be attanded to, but isn't enough, by the political leadership. Or in short, the civil leadership is out of touch and not up to the job.
And regarding DePuy: Isn't that more the answer to the questions of a (rapidly built) conscript army, not so much for professional soldiers?
Sam--Originally Posted by selil
I know it well. My cardiologist, however, keeps telling me to avoid the beef, so rather than the burger, on my next foray to someplace good, I'll hoist a beer and wish you well.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Distiller--
I completely agree with you regarding the "lack of understanding" business. It seems to me we handled this a lot better in WWII than we have done since and I do not know if the breakdown began with McNamara; however, you may be correct with that, as well. What I do know is that it has reached epic proportions with the likes of Rumsfeld, Feith, et al. The Pentagon "intelligence-gathering" operation was the first "hint," but it ran into monstrous proportions-- I feel-- when Rumsfeld caved in to the Turks regarding sending the Ivy Division into Iraq, via that route. The decision to withhold the additional force was a major reason we are in the pickle we're in now. (At least, that is how I see it.) I am a huge believer in the employment of overwhelming force at critical junctures and the elimination of such a major element in one's planning is the utter height of arrogance. And stupidity! We howl about how the Turk's are such great allies, yet we allow something like this to happen. I think if we exercised a lot more diplomacy, we would have been a lot better off.
I do not understand what you mean about your DePuy comment. Are you speaking of the use of "battle drill"? If you are, then please allow me to say this: we all seem to get caught in the web of agree/disagree. Someone puts forth an idea or a policy, implements it, and the criticism follows. Much of that criticism is what I call "destructive." In other words, it tears down the policy, but never puts something else in its place. If "battle drill" is worthless, fine, I can fully accept that; but put something else in there to fill the void. You don't want to teach "fire and maneuver," you don't want to teach "skirmish lines," fine. What do you want to teach? What is the alternative? Don't just criticize and walk away.
That was always one of the big buggaboos I had about Vietnam. We did have a treaty called SEATO; we did have a perceived threat, especially in reference to the times and the so-called "monolithic" debate about communism. (George Kennan's theories were not yet fully accepted in 1964.) So what do we do? Send in troops or not? If not, then what? That is what I seemed to have missed. What do we do if we do not address the problem directly? Or... is there even a problem? This-- to me-- is a similar issue with Iraq and strangely enough, it feeds right back into your original point about civilians not understanding the military. Iraq was jammed down our throats and as far as I am concerned, the decision to go into the country-- some how, some way, in some manner, at some time-- had been made long before the WTC came down. Iraq was a seething blister for any number of years. My only question is, Why?
Best wishes,
Fred.
Last edited by Fred III; 01-17-2008 at 12:35 PM.
What I meant with my comment on DePuy/battle drill was, that it basically provides an answer as how to make a conscript infantry work as fast as possible. DePuy's work at TRADOC was done in an era of conscription, as was his combat service. I freely admit I prefer "Auftragstaktik" - it might offer the better answers for todays's environment. As long - and that is important - as the Army is willing to give more authority to the section level and its leaders. If the Army wants to keep to micromanagment and train troops accordingly, then battle drill is the answer. But I feel that in a professional army that is a waste of ressources and initiative.
Distiller--
That is extremely interesting. I do, however, want to make a small correction to your post. DePuy's combat service was done in the conscription era, but by the time of TRADOC, the army had been-- or was certainly in the process of-- being converted to all-volunteer. Your point is well-taken, however, in that his thinking was probably all for a conscription army.
I am not familiar with the specifics of "Auftragstaktik." Actually, to be perfectly honest, I have no clue what that is, other than a guess that it refers to the German WWII small unit theory of training, possibly extending into today's era. Is it the same, or is it drawn from what Norfolk posted earlier (German WWII doctrine)? And again, I am not at all familiar with how or what it would replace and why it is so different from a clearly defined method of attacking an enemy position.
I could use that education and would be indebted. Also, does anyone have a clue how to download Norfolk's reference?
We are certainly in agreement about the leadership and authority business. It is very interesting, but there seems to have been considerably more small-unit authority allowed back in the latter 19th century army than there is today. Is that because of the improvement in methods of communication? Another interesting point regarding that, is how do we weight the authority issue in small units versus the authority issue vis-a-vis civilian control? The generals complain about civilian meddling from atop, but then proceed to do the same thing below.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.
You know, Norfolk, that's really interesting. I often wonder about that kind of thing. It was a different era and a different war. From what I am reading on these pages, even the organization charts are vastly different. I guess, to a very large extent, I am operating in a distant time-warp. I have only recently read about these "BCT's", these brigade combat teams, and how the newest "division" structures are set up. Someone-- on another thread-- said that divisions are now more HQ organizations than actual operating units, sort of like how brigades used to be when they re-introduced the concept in the '60's (there you go!) So a lot of this has passed me by.Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.
I keep reading about "the best army in the world," "the world's best training," and all the rest of the stuff we puff up about. It's like, who's better, Mantle or Bonds?
So I don't really know. I do know that the conscription army I was in was highly disciplined... and that may fly in the face of some of you out there... but it's how I remember it. We weren't worried about guys re-upping, there was always someone else in the pipeline. And, of course, to me that's the issue today. That leads into my buggaboo about too many women and the use of contractors. That's how they make the "professional" army work. The system cannot generate enough volunteers, so the standards-- the physical standards, mind you!!!!!-- are lowered, i.e., women; and the jobs that cannot be filled are farmed out to civilians. We had civilians in my day, but this is a whole new level, and I don't care what anyone says, experience or no, once you're out baby, the womb is gone and it's never the same. You give me a 5-year Special Forces guy in the service any day over a 20-year retiree merc.
I do know your equipment is better today, your training facilities are better... I don't know how to measure it. I will say this: there isn't a unit today I would take over the 1st Infantry Division of DePuy. We were good. That may be an old man bragging, it may be ignorance, it may be pride... I don't know.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Gentlemen,
Thank you for a very interesting thread. This is my first post on the Council.
My infantry training dates back to the Marine Corps of the mid 1950's. The basic weapons for a line company 13 man squad were M-1 Garand rifles and the BAR. Three 4 man fire teams built around a BAR and a squad leader.
My first peek and fondle of a M-14 and M-60 LMG were during a welcome aboard three day mixer with my Battalion and the 503rd Airborne on Okinawa in late 1959 or early 1960.
I was a squad leader at that time.
My Battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. Kenneth Houghton and was transplanted to the Third Marine Division during a new Marine Corps "Transplacement Battalion" concept. 3/5 a 1stMarDiv. unit switch bases with 3/3 a 3rdMarDiv unit.
The Corps theory was to begin each transplacemt battalion
by staffing them with platoon commanders who were 1st Lt. and were experienced in that command slot. In our case the Battalion Commander built his staff, including senior NCO's with Officers and NCO's he had served with in the past.
The Rifle Companies were all commanded by Captians who were combat veterans. Three out of the 5 CO's were mustangs with Combat experience in Korea. Co. 1st Sgts and Gunnery Sgts were all combat veterans. As were most Platoon Sgts. Squad leaders for the most part were young corporals and Sgts. who had re-enlisted aftr learning the "grunt trade" in the infantry Battalions of the three Marine Divisions.
The enlisted ranks were filled with fresh meat directly out of the Infantry Training Regts. from both the 1st and 2nd Marine Division. A volunteer and highly motivated group of brand new Marines.
Each Battalion trained for 5 months in the hills of Camp Pendleton. Live fire exercises were often and competive.
All of them included Fire and Maneuver, including flanking and frontal assualts. Clearing trench lines, preping and assualting bunker systems, squad, platoon and company in defensive postions. The last two months intergrated the LMG and 3.5 rocket launcher sections with the platoons and eveyone was cross trained to function as machine gunners and ammo humpers for both the "guns" and the "rockets!"
Fire team leaders and Squad leaders were cross trained up to work with H&S Co.'s 81mm Mortars and Flamethrower Platoons. Squad Leaders were trained to direct fire missions with the 81mm platoons and expected to pass on that knowledge to the fireteam leaders.
When we boarded the USS J.C. Breckinridge (MATS) we were pretty cocky and had a strong sense of unit. Some of us were going to spend 15 months withthe Battalion and the majority would spend a full 30 months.
It was the best unit I serve in during my 14 years in the Corps. I finished my regular Marine Corps stint as a Recon Squad Leader in the 2nd Recon Bn. in Camp Lejune. And my USMCR years a a Rifle Platoon Sgt. in a NY Reserve Unit that became part of the 4th Marine Division when the Corp consolidated the old Rifle Company concept into a mirror image of the Regular Marine Infantry Divisions.
In our overseas tour 3/5 trained in the Philippeans, Formosa, and functioned as the "float" battalion for the 7th Fleeet. We were one of the initial BNs to utilize the new vertical envelopment concept during a major amphibious exercise in Formosa and trained for the new concept on the USS Princeton and the USS Hornet. We participated in regular amphibious landings in Leyte and Luzon. We interacted in training with the Philippean Army and the Nationalist Chinese Marine Corps and shared some patrol sharing with the Royal Warwicks in FanLing, China along the New Terrorities border at Hong Kong. Liberty in Hong Kong, Manila, Tackloban, Subic Bay and Yokohamma.
Most of our "battle drill" for the lackof a better word, centered around the Platoon and interacting with support weapons to prep and prepare our objectives. We taught fire and maneuver and the units facing a assualt line were primarily trained to batter the objective with heavy fire while the assualt force set up a flanking attack.
Todays, communications between the infantry and the supporting assets has got to be light years ahead of the old, tried and true "Follow Me" rule that was till being followed since the late 19th Century.
When the Marines when across the berm from Kuwait and into Iraq, I noticed a Marine Squad leader directing his squad by voice commands thru a head set mike.
That has to be a huge improvement to the screaming at the top of your lungs in a fire fight or an assualt.
Sorry for my long winded intro I just wanted to let y'all know how long it has been since I did the infantry thing.
I think my question is - haven't communications at the squad level made a great difference in combat for todays troops? and hasn't the ability of the average infantryman to multiply the force levels against the enemy grown enormously?
I'm the new guy on this site and I promise to lurk most of the time so as to get a handle on the new and improved concepts and reality since my time.
Anyone who worked for Ken Houghton ought
to be welcomed here.
And anyone who's almost as old as I am certainly is...
Welcome aboard.
Thanks Ken!
"Kenny" was an exceptional infantry leader! He was admired, and more than likly "loved" by the troops.
He was the only Marine Officer In my expericence who qualified to wear Jump Wings and Submariners Dolphins.
We were all glad, but not surprised that he made Maj. General before he retired.
3/5 All the Way!
I thought I would add this here
“Moreover, in a day of rapid technical change, when British soldiers were apt to be employed anywhere in the world under conditions that varied widely and could not be anticipated because the tactics, equipment, and transport requirements differed with the circumstances of each campaign, the British Army could not preserve one uniform pattern…About all that could be done to prepare the army to fight was to retain an elasticity in outlook, simplicity in drill, and adopt a common, simplified…training manuals. When the next war came, the British would feel their way amidst the new conditions, but at least their feet would not be chained to a rigid system of tactics long since outmoded”.
Maj Gen Sir John Maurice. The Advantages of Simple Drill 1888
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Regarding the notion of Auftragstaktik and Battle drills:
IMHO the essence of Auftrakstaktik is constituted of the idea that an order is a description of what to achieve but not how to achieve it - leaving it to the subordinate who has better judgement of the situation he encounters to understand the superior's intentions and how to implement it in a given situation.
This implies that for instance am enlisted man had to be able to take over as a squad leader, a squad leader was also educated as a platoon leader, etc...
Historically, the necessity to introduce such concepts in Germany lies in the unique and unfavorable strategic location of Germany which was "encircled" by other powers. Therefore, German armies throughout the history were often outnumbered and short of supply. So creativity was a necessary ingredient to compensate for the odds. I believe it was first mentioned in the liberation wars against the French occupants under the rule of Napoleon.
However, I also believe that the Wehrmacht did exercise something like battle drills (e.g. ballistic machine gun fire together with advances requires frequent rehearsals) - but they were not to be followed blindly - and flexible tactics were encouraged (although on a strategic level the high command always had to struggle with often insane orders given by Hitler).
Notice, that German armies have been draft based for hundreds of years.
Interestingly, as media becomes omnipresent on the battle field, the army becomes more professionalized, due to the technological improvements in communication technologies, and politicians play General and Generals have to cover their asses, Auftragstaktik slowly starts to erode in the modern German
forces...
I was never exposed to drill training, but drills seem to make sense whenever there's not enough time for thinking and/or communication in a situation.
The Origins of Attrition Warfare in U.S. Doctrine
Fred's comments about the origins of attrition warfare are a bit at odds with the facts. When he writes that "(I)t started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command", he does Grant a considerable injustice. Grant's strategy was to prevent the Army of Northern Virginia from being allowed to disengage. If Lee was unable to reinforce the other Southern armies, then Sherman and Thomas would be free to maneuver, outflank and defeat their opponents in the field. (Grant's frustration with Thomas before the Battle of Franklin was based on his fear that Thomas would have the same "slows" that McClellan and too many others had shown.) Whenever Grant had the option, he chose maneuver warfare (Donelson, the entire Vicksburg campaign, the relief of Chattanooga). When, as it did against Lee, the situation required steady pressure, he made that choice but only as a necessary sacrifice, not as the preferred way of doing things. Even as he was dying, Grant felt it necessary to express public regret in his Memoirs over the third and final attack at Cold Harbor. He hated attrition warfare and thought it was complete folly.
Battle Drill and how it is taught
From the U.S. Army perspective, at least pre-OEF/OIF, battle drill was something to do again and again, until it was ground into the membrane. Very little variation was accepted or allowed.
COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.
The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading. The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train. Stealing this from someone else, but we need to be more focused on results or outcomes. I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.
Perhaps we still have a conscript-focused training system for a supposedly-professional Army. We do tend to focus on bulk number of iterations vice quality training. We still tend to be obsessed with keeping our numbers looking good. It is also a mixing of Armor mentality (gunnery being easy to grade/quantify) into infanty training.
Tankersteve
Battle Drill, never was and never is the rote execution of a formatted response,. This was the same criticism the UK War Office levelled in 1942, and did great damage in doing so. Me thinks I need to write something to explain it!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The fatal flaw of Task, Condition and Standard based training is
That it encourages -- almost demands -- exactly that.All totally valid observations based on the way 'Battle Drill' changed after 1975 and the introduction of the very flawed TCS training process. The process effectively decrees that no one should think, just play automaton -- it has totally screwed up Army training at all levels.COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.
Their recon is good because they're patient --patience can be taught (I spent many an hour under watchful eyes without moving...) and we used to do that but the TCS process eliminated that. Know why? It couldn't be defined as a 'task'...
Think about that.
Our Recon is generally poor because we lack patience and our training tries to break the complex process of stealthy reconnaissance into discrete little blocks that don't seem to make sense. Plus, to 'enable' training, a lot of tasks are not taught but are tabbed to the gaining unit to train -- where many of those tasks are usually not trained. The tasks that are taught are all taught pretty much the same way to 'standardize' the performance of the tasks -- that is a guarantee of uniformity.
It also guarantees predictability -- and tactical defeat.
If COL MacFarland said that, and I have no doubt he did and also suggest that many others believe that as well, my question is why have they tolerated such a flawed process??????????Did you mean to say objective grading? I hope so because one of the reasons for the introduction of the TCS process was to remove subjectivity from grading and replace it with objective grading. Since the assessment of training for war without being at war HAS to be subjective; it was a terribly flawed premise. The only way they could make it look like it worked and introduce an appearance of 'objective grading' was to move to a 'Go - No Go' standard and define the 'tasks' down to bare essentials. That does not allow for combining tasks which is a combat essential.The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading.No they don't -- love it, I mean. they accept it but most people instinctively know there is something wrong with it. It's accepted because it treats Soldiers like stupid and ignorant beings. It's a pathetic way to 'train.' The fact that the US Army is as well trained as it is (which is far from great...) is due to the fact that a lot of good Officers and NCOs go beyond the training process and the Troops are about five times as smart as that process assumes.The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train.Great for the first, true for the second sentence.I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.
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