Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[Jedburgh]

Testimony presented to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on February 16, 2006:

Bruce Hoffman, RAND: Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat

Four and a half years into the war on terrorism, the United States stands at a crossroads. The sustained successes of the war’s early phases appear to have been stymied by the protracted insurgency in Iraq and our inability either to kill or capture Usama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri. More consequential, but less apparent perhaps, has been our failure to effectively counter our enemies’ effective use of propaganda and related information operations. Their portrayal of America and the West as an aggressive and predatory force waging war on Islam not only continues to resonate among large segments of the Muslim world but also continues to undermine our own efforts to break the cycle of recruitment and regeneration that sustains al Qaeda and the militant, global jihadi movement it champions. Although many reasons are often cited for the current stasis in America’s war on terrorism—from the diversion of attention from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri caused by Iraq to inchoate U.S. public diplomacy efforts——the real cause is at once as basic as it is prosaic: we still don’t know, much less, understand our enemy...

James Philips, Heritage Foundation: The Evolving Al Qaeda Threat

Al-Qaeda is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist network operating in over 60 countries around the world. At the center of the web is the core group, which I will refer to as al-Qaeda Central (AQC), a disciplined, highly-professional cadre of committed revolutionaries, which now probably consists of less than 1,000 dedicated members, and perhaps less than 500. Although it has become the most hunted terrorist group in world history since its September 11, 2001 attacks and has been severely degraded by substantial losses, it remains a resilient and potent threat to the United States...

Zeyno Baran, Nixon Center: Combating al-Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you to share with you my views on combating al-Qaeda and the militant Islamic threat. I will focus my remarks on two key issues and then suggest some policy options.

I. The threat posed by militant Islam is neither new nor solely military in nature; instead, the challenge is primarily an ideological one. Unless we understand this ideology that gives rise to extremist violence, we will not succeed in defeating either the terrorists or the “non-violent” Islamists who seek to trigger a clash with the West.

II. Western Europe has become a central battlefield in the war of ideas within Islam between moderates and radicals. For decades, radicals have taken advantage of the legal and societal openness of Western Europe to strengthen their organizations and spread their ideas—and furthermore to export radical ideas and radical activities to Muslim lands. The continuing inability of the West to differentiate between moderates and radicals is resulting in the legitimization of radicals and the isolation of moderates. The failure to effectively integrate its Muslim citizens, coupled with the eventual return from Iraq of European Muslims with experience in armed jihad, will lead to even more serious problems in the future—both for Europe and the U.S....

[davidbfpo]

THis is the title for an Adelphi Paper (No.394), published by the London based IISS, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating AQ by Audrey Kurth Cronin, now a few weeks ago, but only reached me a week ago. A fascinating read and recommended.

From their website: Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al‑Qaeda world.

To order: http://www.iiss.org/publications/ade.../how-to-order/

Being a highly respectable, nay prestigious international think tank you may find a copy in a good university / military library. The author is currently at the US National War College and previously Oxford University. She has written widely on the nature of war and when we last met was working on the Pakistani Army.

davidbfpo

[marct]

THis is the title for an Adelphi Paper (No.394), published by the London based IISS, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating AQ by Audrey Kurth Cronin, now a few weeks ago, but only reached me a week ago. A fascinating read and recommended.

Very interesting, David; thanks for posting it. It will take me a while to go through it.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 28 Jul 08: How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida

By analyzing 648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, this monograph examines how terrorist groups end. Its purpose is to inform U.S. counterterrorist efforts by understanding how groups have ended in the past and to assess implications for countering al Qa’ida.....

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: How Terrorist Groups End

Chapter Three: Policing and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo

Chapter Four: Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador

Chapter Five: Military Force and al Qa'ida in Iraq

Chapter Six: The Limits of America's al Qa'ida Strategy

Chapter Seven: Ending the “War” on Terrorism

Appendix A: End-of-Terror Data Set

Appendix B: Al Qa'ida Attacks, 1994–2007

Appendix C: Regression Analysis

[davidbfpo]

I have skimmed this RAND paper, it has many good points - notably Bruce Hoffman's comments and using the statistics gathered advocates a massive change in the US strategy - more police and intelligence, less military.

Audrey Cronin's paper is far shorter. They do compliment each other, but if economy of effort is critical - read her paper.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

I have skimmed this RAND paper, it has many good points - notably Bruce Hoffman's comments and using the statistics gathered advocates a massive change in the US strategy - more police and intelligence, less military.

Audrey Cronin's paper is far shorter. They do compliment each other, but if economy of effort is critical - read her paper.

....but if economy of pocketbook is critical - the RAND piece is a free download and Cronin's paper is $28.95

However, for all of us cheap bastards, her '06 piece from International Security, which is essentially an earlier version of the same theme, How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, is available for free download....

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with most of their findings and conclusions. I differ from them on many minor and three major points:

1. They advocate a change in strategy to emphasize law enforcement and intelligence operations. IOW, they want to change what we are doing to do what we are doing. Many confuse the war in Iraq as a part if not the major activity of the 'War on Terrorism' (in fairness because of really poor messages to that effect from the Administration). It is in a sense but, even though it is the big story in the media, it is only one small part of the counterterror effort involving US intel and LE assets worldwide that is and has been ongoing for several years. So no cigar there...

2. They advocate minimal use of military force and use of local forces rather than US. Agree with the concept -- but as they point out, AQ et.al. are now concentrating on Afghanistan (vs. their previous concentration on Iraq) -- so we are merely, again, doing what they advocate. We are more heavily involved in Afghanistan than we'd like due to lack of local capability; we were more involved in Iraq for the same reason (and the fact that some idiot disbanded the Iraqi Army and Police instead of paying them to get retrained...). So, again, no cigar.

3. They acknowledge they had little data on religious groups, state that AQ is unlikely to win in the long term and advocate infiltration and police work as the best vehicle to contain or eliminate the AQ problem. I don't really disagree with that but must point out that infiltrating AQ will not be easy and you have to have effective police (or counterterror agencies) to complement the effective intel effort. Note the 'effective;' some nations have those and some do not, some have one and not the other. As an international player, AQ requires international intel and LE cooperation; we do not have that at an adequate level and the US cannot do much about that except strive for improvement. Further, the quasi-religious dedication sparked by AQ will not just go away and their heavy reliance on ideological terror activity to buttress their points is, I believe, misguided. So I guess I give the paper an 'A' for a great academic exercise that only merits a 'D' for practical applicability.

All IMO, of course.

I believe on balance that the paper provided no new insights -- I can recall nothing I read in it that I'd consider groundbreaking; most of their recommendations and findings have been in slightly different form around for some time. I realize that the think tanks and studies such as this have to offer 'new directions' -- if they said keep doing what you're doing, they'd quickly go out of business -- but I truly missed anything new in this one.

[Jedburgh]

18 Sep 08 testimony before the HASC Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida and the Way Ahead:

Seth Jones, RAND

.....The good news about countering al Qa’ida is that its probability of success in actually overthrowing any governments is close to zero. While bin Laden enjoys some popular support in much of the Muslim world, this support does not translate into the mass support that organizations such as Hezbollah enjoy in Lebanon. But the bad news is that U.S. efforts against al Qa’ida have not been successful. They have now lasted longer than America’s involvement in World War II. Despite some successes against al Qa’ida, the U.S. has not significantly undermined its capabilities. Al Qa’ida has been involved in more attacks in a wider geographical area since September 11, 2001, including in such European capitals as London and Madrid. Its organizational structure has also evolved, making it a dangerous enemy. This means that the U.S. strategy in dealing with al Qa’ida must change. A strategy based on military force has not been effective. Based on al Qa’ida’s organizational structure and modus operandi, only a strategy based on careful police and intelligence work is likely to be effective.

Michael Scheuer, The Jamestown Foundation

.....Finally, it is worth considering whether it might be smarter, cheaper, and less bloody to change the failed foreign policies that brought war with al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies, rather than maintaining those war-motivating policies as divine writ and building an ever-larger military to fight the ever-expanding wars that writ produces. Energy self-sufficiency, a fixed and even obdurate determination to stay out of other peoples’ religious wars, and a much more narrowly defined set of genuine U.S. national interests would require far less frequent resort to war and would be much more consonant with timelessly wise foreign-policy goals of our country’s Founding Fathers.

John Arquilla, NPS

....Indeed, it might serve us best if we completely reconsidered the very problematic notion of waging a war of ideas against an enemy whose core constituency of zealots – numbering in the several tens of millions, if opinion polls across the Muslim world are to be believed – will never be talked down by even the slickest rhetoric. So instead, with the goal in mind of improving our ability to detect, disrupt and destroy terror networks, we should recast our intellectual efforts in favor of conducting “a war of ideas about the idea of war.” If such a debate were fostered and undertaken, there would be a good chance that our military might be able to make the shift, in a more supple manner, from industrial-age interstate warfare – characterized by mass-on-mass maneuvers – to the new age of conflict in which the fundamental dynamic is that of “hider/finder,” and whose key tactical formation is a “swarm” capable of simultaneous, omni-directional attack.....

[davidbfpo]

In a rather interesting contrast BBC Radio 4 'Start the Week' programme had Professor Audrey Cronin and Sir Hugh Orde (former RUC/PSNI Chief Constable) discuss their perspectives: http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/stw/

Hopefully available to listen tobeyond the UK (unlike some TV items I have posted).

[omarali50]

It is important to keep in mind that civilian police work and intelligence work are going to work when you have a regime you can work with. Nobody is advocating going to war against Britain in spite of a number of terrorists who were radicalised in Britain or come from Britain. Clearly, Britain is a friendly government and we can take it from there.

The problem is the existence of states that do NOT wish to cooperate (or pretend to cooperate and don't). Military operations are sometimes the only way to change such a govt (Afghanistan) or to force it to change its behavior. Of course, it doesnt have to be a frontal attack. Pakistan may be said to have changed course because of the fear of military action rather than actual action (though there is some confusion about the issue and the army's insane obsession with India makes it resistant to some forms of anti-terror cooperation even now)....

On another note: It may be a mistake to focus too much on the Islamic roots of Salafist terrorism. The idea of Islamic solidarity and the way military supremacy and religion were intertwined in early Islamic history means that classical Islamism (there must be a better term, but i am in a hurry) provides a ready made tool for anyone wishing to organize military resistance (or terrorism, same thing on a different scale), but in the end, populations seem to respond to straightforward "secular" pressures even though the supposed ideology does not change.

EVEN in supposedly fanatical Pathan lands, with decisive military superiority (and ruthlessness), Maharaja Ranjit Singh ruled over several Pakhtun districts with no more trouble than he was getting within Punjab from fellow sikhs and "less fanatical" muslims.

My point is, it may be a distraction to be too hung up on trying to change the supposed ideology of "fundamentalist Muslims". History, not argument, undermined the gods. Ideological change will come from within when it's need is felt strongly enough (and its need IS being felt). Foreign powers may be better off dealing in standard carrots and sticks and not making too much of a fuss about why Achmed insists on believing that infidels should pay Jizya. Unless his army can beat the infidel army, that dream is going nowhere.....

Of course, I am all in favor of USAID supporting arts and literature and CIA front companies employing religious scholars and arranging "courses" in Honolulu for sympathetic intellectuals (because a number of my friends are likely to be beneficiaries of such largesse and because its a worthier cause than paying off rapacious warlords)....I am just saying, that is not the crucial front.