Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with most of their findings and conclusions. I differ from them on many minor and three major points:

1. They advocate a change in strategy to emphasize law enforcement and intelligence operations. IOW, they want to change what we are doing to do what we are doing. Many confuse the war in Iraq as a part if not the major activity of the 'War on Terrorism' (in fairness because of really poor messages to that effect from the Administration). It is in a sense but, even though it is the big story in the media, it is only one small part of the counterterror effort involving US intel and LE assets worldwide that is and has been ongoing for several years. So no cigar there...

2. They advocate minimal use of military force and use of local forces rather than US. Agree with the concept -- but as they point out, AQ et.al. are now concentrating on Afghanistan (vs. their previous concentration on Iraq) -- so we are merely, again, doing what they advocate. We are more heavily involved in Afghanistan than we'd like due to lack of local capability; we were more involved in Iraq for the same reason (and the fact that some idiot disbanded the Iraqi Army and Police instead of paying them to get retrained...). So, again, no cigar.

3. They acknowledge they had little data on religious groups, state that AQ is unlikely to win in the long term and advocate infiltration and police work as the best vehicle to contain or eliminate the AQ problem. I don't really disagree with that but must point out that infiltrating AQ will not be easy and you have to have effective police (or counterterror agencies) to complement the effective intel effort. Note the 'effective;' some nations have those and some do not, some have one and not the other. As an international player, AQ requires international intel and LE cooperation; we do not have that at an adequate level and the US cannot do much about that except strive for improvement. Further, the quasi-religious dedication sparked by AQ will not just go away and their heavy reliance on ideological terror activity to buttress their points is, I believe, misguided. So I guess I give the paper an 'A' for a great academic exercise that only merits a 'D' for practical applicability.

All IMO, of course.

I believe on balance that the paper provided no new insights -- I can recall nothing I read in it that I'd consider groundbreaking; most of their recommendations and findings have been in slightly different form around for some time. I realize that the think tanks and studies such as this have to offer 'new directions' -- if they said keep doing what you're doing, they'd quickly go out of business -- but I truly missed anything new in this one.

[jmm99]

I ain't buying.

COIN strategy, operations and tactics "ain't my department"; but some conclusions raise policy issues - so, IMO.

Rand
First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies.

No argument about co-operation, etc. between CIA, FBI and their external equivalents (subject to standard caveats; e,g., "there are friendly nations, there are no friendly intelligence agencies" - but "we can co-operate, so to speak."). I object to "arrest" as the magic bullet.

With AQ (as with any adversary), there are three basic, non-exclusive paths:

(not a quote - just to set it out)

1. Convert (difficult to do for hard-core AQ)

2. Contain (arrest & prosecution is one aspect of this path - so, within my department as to that)

3. Kill (in other persons' departments).

All three paths should be pursued - based on specific METT-TC, as the military guys say.

Rand
Second, military force, though not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al Qa’ida is involved in an insurgency. Local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate than the United States has, and they have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.

No argument, in general, about the first sentence - economy of force is good - except when you get your neck chopped off because there has been too much economy. The issue is the application of the necessary force at the key application point.

The rest of it - Tora Bora; the ISI and the Pakistan border crossings, etc., come to mind as contra examples.

True, that a light or no US military footprint gives us fewer international law problems; but that cannot be the determining factor.

Rand
Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups .... Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.

Probably some truth there - if the fanatics are not close in beliefs (and practices) to a majority of the target population.

Fanatics are "integral rigidists" (in the sense used in systematic theology) - all their beliefs and practices have to be accepted, or (they believe) their system will fall apart. So, the Taliban became disliked; as also AQ in Anbar (about which others here have written).

Perhaps, that is the basic weakness of the extreme Salafist supremacists. I doubt whether their defeat will occur in my lifetime.