Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[SWJED]

24 Feb. Washington Times commentary - Jihad With All the Medical Benefits by Austin Bay.

Al Qaeda's "bylaws" -- describing the medical and holiday benefits package -- is one of two-dozen recently declassified documents available at West Point's "Combating Terrorism Center".

Most of the documents were translated during 2002, which suggests coalition forces acquired them in Afghanistan. I'm certain the Defense Department would not have released the documents if they had any remaining operational utility. Their instructive value, however, is extraordinary. The documents provide detailed -- if at times jarring -- insight into al Qaeda's goals, its penchant for meticulous planning, its use of propaganda and its intent to use weapons of mass destruction.

Still, the Defense Department needs to declassify more documents like these. If Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thinks al Qaeda has an "information warfare" advantage -- and he said so last week -- one way to erode that advantage is exposing al Qaeda's vicious ambitions, calculated plans and manipulative intents. These documents do that...

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation, 28 Feb: Al-Qaeda's Insurgency Doctrine: Aiming for a "Long War", by Michael Scheuer.

Conventional national militaries train, think, and fight according to their doctrine. To date, however, America and the West have not sufficiently appreciated that al-Qaeda, too, is fighting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan according to a doctrine of its own. That doctrine has been developed from the group's experiences during the Afghan war against the Red Army, and has matured through each of the insurgencies in which bin Laden's fighters have since been involved, from Eritrea to Xinjiang to Mindanao. In presenting their doctrine, al-Qaeda's strategists also have tipped their turbans to the significant lessons they have learned from Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mao, General Giap, and even Ahmed Shah Masood, as well from the training manuals of the U.S. and UK Marines and Special Forces. Ironically, al-Qaeda strategists have discussed all of these matters for years in their Internet journals, but this discussion has garnered little interest in Western essays.

The corpus of al-Qaeda's writings on the development and application of its insurgency doctrine is too diverse and voluminous to discuss in a single article. For present purposes, it will suffice to look at some of the insurgency-related work of five of the group's strategists: the late Abu-Hajer Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Ubyad al-Qurashi, Abu-Ayman al-Hilali, Abd-al-Hadi, and Sayf-al-Din al-Ansari. These writings discuss the need to conduct the political and military facets of an insurgency in tandem. They are especially worth reviewing now because of the success al-Qaeda is having in using its doctrine against U.S.-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, a success that has prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to rename the Global War on Terror as the "Long War" and to publicly lament that al-Qaeda is beating the U.S. in the political war being fought in the media. The essays used herein to analyze al-Qaeda's insurgency doctrine were published between January 2002 and February 2004 in the al-Qaeda Internet journals al-Ansar, al-Neda, and Mu'askar al-Battar...