I have some serious doubts about some of the propositions being advanced here.
First, the extent to which nationalist insurgents turn to AQ for support is debatable, and largely unsupported. What support has AQ actually provided to these groups? In many cases AQ is the one receiving recruits and financial support from nations where we assume nationalist insurgency. This relationship is a lot more complex than "AQ rides to the rescue as champion of the populace". While AQ has very successfully exploited regional resentment to western intervention, its efforts to muster revolution against local regimes have fallen pretty flat. There's little to suggest that anyone, anywhere has adopted AQ as their champion against their own government.
Similarly, resentment to despotic governance is not the only or the most effective narrative exploited by AQ. There's a deep-seated generic resentment to the west throughout the region, and not just because the west is perceived as supporting local despots. We should not assume that if Saudi Arabia or Egypt ceases to be governed by despots AQ will lose support in these countries. It's very likely that even if these countries were democracies AQ would still find them ready suppliers of funds and recruits, as long as western powers are engaged in the region.
We should not overestimate our role as "enablers" or "supporters" of despotic governments. Certainly we have to deal with the perception, but if we assume that the perception is the reality we will assume influence that we do not actually have. Saudi Arabia or Kuwait will not become a constitutional monarchy because we press them to. More likely they will tell us to bug off and mind our own business, and there's not much we can do about it if they do. At the moment we need them more than they need us, and they know it.
We cannot assume that pressure on these governments will win us points with the people. Often it won't. Even people who loathe their governments often react very badly to US criticism of those same governments: it's not seen as standing up for the populace, it's seen as intrusive meddling and as disrespect for the nation and the culture. Our motives will always be suspect, no matter what we say. We may intervene chanting "de opreso liber", but that doesn't mean the populace won't be hearing "we want the oil".
I've no objection at all to reducing or eliminating support for and enabling of despotic regimes... though we should not assume that will change much. When we start talking about actively trying to change those regimes, we step into very muddy waters with abundant potential for misinterpretation and unintended consequence. It's tempting to think that the ill effects of past bad meddling can be corrected by compensatory good meddling. We should remember that the meddling that now seems bad seemed quite good at the time, and we're no more omniscient now then we were then. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.
Sallying forth to liberate the Middle East is likely to leave us in an even bigger mess. That doesn't mean we have to stick with the status quo, but it means that we have to proceed with a great deal of subtlety and restraint - not traditionally our strong points - when it comes to challenging that status quo.
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Originally Posted by Dayuhan
, as we await 
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