Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Leah Farrell has written a short article on AQ command; key points:

Key Points

1. Al-Qaeda’s decentralised operating structure has cushioned it from the impact of droneattacks and arrests. A clear hierarchy remains intact, supported by robust and adaptable command and control processes, despite the losses it has suffered since 2001.

2. This modus operandi for external operations plots has remained remarkably constant in recent years, with plot members assigned several points of contact who provide technical and logistical support.

3. Nearly all recent disruptions to Al-Qaeda’s operational activity have occurred outside of its Pakistan-based command structure via the arrest of couriers tasked with facilitating franchise communication or co-ordinating the
activities of operatives in the West planning for attacks.

Full article:http://allthingsct.files.wordpress.c...20-command.pdf

One caveat… I wrote this in September/October last year so it is a little dated in terms of drone attacks etc. However, I still stand by the arguments I made in this piece.

[davidbfpo]

This article was clearly written before the Times Square attack and appears within a Kings of War comment:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/05/com...(Kings+of+War)which in itself is of value.

Cracks is by Tomas Rid, he opens with:

Yet it is only growing more difficult to defeat the global jihad.

and near the end:

The global jihad is losing what David Galula called a strong cause, and with it its political character. This change is making it increasingly difficult to distinguish jihad from organized crime on the one side and rudderless fanaticism on the other.

Link:http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?AID=1523

[davidbfpo]

A BBC commentary by Gordon Corera, which opens with:

As uprisings challenge the old order in the Middle East and North Africa, one organisation which for many years claimed it was at the vanguard of toppling authoritarian regimes has so far played almost no part. So is al-Qaeda still relevant? Do the uprisings represent a threat or an opportunity to its role?

Citing Nigel Inkster, a former deputy head of Britain's intelligence service, now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies:

Ayman Al-Zawahiri (al-Qaeda's number two) has been trying to overthrow Egyptian regimes for the last 30 years by violence, and a group of middle-class activists armed with cell phones managed to achieve it in under one month...This is hardly a resounding endorsement for the jihadist business model.

Gordon concludes:

...if al-Qaeda currently appears on the backfoot it may still be able to find new ideological and physical spaces in which to renew itself and continue its struggle.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13003693

[Bob's World]

Arab Spring is the moment that the west has been waiting for, but most do not recognize that yet.

The tremendous potential energy of these many populaces in varying stages of suppressed insurgency is what AQ has been leveraging for years with they networked UW campaign. Now that many of these are starting to break from from that suppressed state the time is ripe to make aggressive moves to Out-compete AQ for influence with these movements and to provide the much broader populaces behind such movements a far better advocate to help them negotiate new or better governance with their leaders.

They know AQ offers a bad choice, but when a bad choice is your only choice for confronting a worse situation, what do you do?

The other realization the West needs to come to is that while we cannot "contain" AQ in the FATA, neither should we try to defeat them there either. Better to know where their base of ops is than to send them completely into the shadows. Ideology cannot be contained, and these guys do not need some big patch of real estate to run effective operations.

The final move for greater success is to narrow the aperture tremendously in regard to what we consider to be "AQ." We have allowed a legal process and threat-seeking intel mentality lump all manner of movements under broad categories of "terrorist" or "AQ" that may facilitate capture kill operations, but tremendously hinders other forms of engagement to bring these organizations in from the cold and convert to part of the legal solution. Sure, some deserve the title and the relentless hunting, but most do not and it is a problem.

[jmm99]

I'm not disagreeing with your analysis of AQ and its waging unconventional warfare against the US; nor your BL that "Sure, some deserve the title and the relentless hunting, but most do not and it is a problem."

That said, what does the "West" have to offer the Arab World, or for that matter, the Muslim World ? Those Worlds have already picked at "Western Technology" (they like it and want more of it; but not its ideology as perceived by them). They also have picked at some forms (repeat, forms) of governance.

If you'd asked Maududi, he (IMO) would have said: "Yes, I believe in "justice", "democracy" and "self-determination".

Tell you what, I'll play Maududi and you convert me.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Mike,

It is not what we have to offer so much as what it is we have persistently denied through our presence and influence over the governments of the region.

What we have to offer now is as simple as "De Oppresso Liber." These are populaces who have had little option other than to turn to organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and AQ for support and leadership in challenging outside influences and governments at home that have come to act with a growing impunity to the concerns of the common people.

Currently AQ is the UW force in the region, AQ is the De Oppresso Liber force in the region. When we send US forces to help these governments build "security force capacity" far too often that is capacity to suppress their own populace rather than capacity to protect their populace against external threats or terrorism from non-state actors that we lump as "VEOs."

So what we offer is simple:

1. Stop being an obstacle to good governance (no more enabling of poor governance or capacity building that we can reasonably assume will be used far more to suppress than protect)

2. Start competing AQ IAW our own professed principles as a nation. Not to overly intervene or demand that other act, think, govern or pray as we do, but rather to help establish clear limits for internal disputes to be resolved within; and to focus on repairing the dysfunctional nature of the relationships we have with so many of these governments (and with so many of the non-state actors as well).

For the US we slid with increasing speed down the slippery slope of involvement in this region following WWII. Much of Cold War Containment was waged here. Little of Cold War Containment was rolled back here as it was elsewhere. The local autocrats liked the lives they had developed and the protection to maintain them. We liked the certainty of these relationships as well, with the access to resources and key sea lanes that are critical to our economy. We just need to find a new, less abusive of the people of the region, approach.

[jmm99]

Robert, if I may address you so,

First, a general question that pervades all: why should I or any other resident of the Islamic World accept principles of governance from the United States ? What do you have to offer that cannot be found within the four walls of the Islamic House ?

Second, yes - "Stop being an obstacle to good governance". And, withdraw your support from governments in the Islamic World - their fates have been ordained. As you know, I wrote of good governance many years ago.

Third, I may not understand this - "Start competing AQ IAW our own professed principles as a nation." However, this seems inconsistent with your other statements. Are you speaking only of diplomatic discussions; or are you speaking of interventions to change our professed principles (albeit, "kinder and more gentle" as one of your presidents said) ?

Fourth - what does ""De Oppresso Liber" translate to (to you) in the modern-day realities of the Islamic World ?

Fifth - if the US "We just need to find a new, less abusive of the people of the region, approach", why not just depart and allow the People of the Islamic World to seek out what we want and do not want from the US ?

Sincerely,

Abul
(last address, Buffalo, NY, 1979)