Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

The 2015 Chart



The 2014 Chart

[Bill Moore]

Video of Islamic State capabilities impresses military experts

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/2...abilities.html

But beyond the outcome of the refinery battle, military analysts who’ve viewed the video find it alarming because it shows that the Islamic State retains a surprisingly high level of military skill despite months of daily airstrikes by U.S. aircraft and their coalition allies.

“The overall takeaway from this and several other videos like it, and this opinion is borne out by the facts on the ground, is that Daash remains better trained, more motivated, better led and supported by a logistical infrastructure that the Iraqi government is literally incapable of delivering to their own troops,” said one former British special forces soldier who consults with the Iraqi Kurdish government on military affairs. He spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of his role in Iraq. Daash is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.

Much more in the report, well worth the read. It is an honest assessment from folks on the ground who are not spinning a narrative. It raises important questions on why ISIS is producing more competent foot soldiers than Iraq. I suspect the answers will make us uncomfortable, which normally results in an organizational state of denial.

[Bob's World]

One strategic lesson for the US should be this:

"Military capacity built in support of a fundamentally illegitimate government by a foreign power cannot stand up to a legitimate foreign challenger, or an illegal domestic challenger perceived as legitimate by it's followers."

Consider the track record of the United States in this regard. Since emerging on the global stage in 1900 the United States implemented a strategy of creating governance we perceived as good for US interests and the development of military capacity to secure those de facto illegitimate governments in the following places:

Philippine Islands, 1900-1941: Defeated by the Japanese in short order (though the subsequent Filipino resistance for far more legitimate rationale proved quite strong)
Vietnam 1955-1975
Iraq 2003 - present
Afghanistan 2001 - present

All with the same result. Helping a sovereign partner with governance perceived by it's population as legitimate is a good investment in regional security. We have a solid track record of this with many nations around the globe. But investing in the security of governance lacking in popular legitimacy as in the four examples above is a proven failure.


As to ISIL vs AQ: AQ conducted a non-state approach to UW, and their great strength was their non-state status. It gave them sanctuary from state action, having no territory or population to defend; and it relieved them of the duties of governance having no territory or population to govern. But to win they had to become tangible, and that would destroy both these strengths, so they remained the champion of a virtual Caliphate.

ISIL, on the other hand, sought purposely to create and emerge as a de facto state, and a tangible nucleus for a physical "Caliphate" (the names scares us, but in effect little more than a state dedicated to the laws and values of Sunni Muslims that is free from excessive external influence). This resonated with the same revolutionary movements and populations engaged by AQ, and many, grown weary of the promise of virtual Caliphate, are embracing the opportunity for something real that ISIL offers. This is the strength of the ISIL state-based approach to UW; but it also saddles them with the burden of governance, and gives them all the liabilities common to small, weak states.

I don't think the West has accurately characterized either organization, and have therefore not handled either particularly well. We exaggerate the dangers, we confuse the rationale for their existence and appeal, and we seek to make them be what we want them to be, rather than to deal with them for what they actually are.

How well ISIL fights is actually a clear metric of the inherent legitimacy they possess. We would do well to ponder on that thought.

[Bill Moore]

How well ISIL fights is actually a clear metric of the inherent legitimacy they possess. We would do well to ponder on that thought.

That uncomfortable thought is certainly part of the reason. I would add that a unifying ideology is critical to bring together civilians (in this case from around the world) and turn them into a disciplined fighting force. And of course, a statement of the obvious, they must have excellent trainers. It also appears they're a learning organization.

A lot of folks we train around the world don't believe in their cause (probably most, thus the value of the legitimacy argument), they have weak and dishonest leaders they don't trust, and they're not learning organizations capable of adapting (based on poor leadership). There are a lot of intangibles involved in unit effectiveness that will undermine our tangible capacity to train and equip.

[tequila]

Video of Islamic State capabilities impresses military experts

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/2...abilities.html



Much more in the report, well worth the read. It is an honest assessment from folks on the ground who are not spinning a narrative. It raises important questions on why ISIS is producing more competent foot soldiers than Iraq. I suspect the answers will make us uncomfortable, which normally results in an organizational state of denial.

After watching the propaganda video in question, I'm not sure what the experts are seeing that I'm not (the video is accessible through a link in the story itself).

All you really see is a couple of ranger files of guys walking towards Bayji carrying bottled water. Proper spacing is hard to figure out, but it's not like these guys are doing a squad assault. Then there's about 2:30 of closeups of jihadis firing full auto. Some are firing from the shoulder, a few are doing controlled bursts. But the vast majority are just doing Rambo-style jihadi-cool full auto at something vague in the distance - a few are firing from the hip and aiming at the clouds. Most of these are likely posed.

I agree that ISIS has shown it can outfight the ISF - but I think that's because the ISF has degenerated from an already parlous state, not because ISIS is any good in a stand-up fight.

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for sharing the link to the video, this is the fourth video I have seen of ISIS in combat, and it only adds to the assessment of the analysts quoted in the article. Again we're assessing relative combat effectiveness, so I disagree with you that they couldn't stand up to a real Arab Army anywhere in the Middle East. The Syrian Army is quite good relatively for the region, and ISIS does moderately well in stand-up battles against them.

0:55 the automated command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence (supported by a drone) is relatively impressive. Probably something we'll see more of around the world due to the availability of this technology.

starting around 1:35 the use of mostly conventional crew served weapons is impressive. Acquiring them in battle is one thing, employing them effectively is another. They have done both. Results starting around 6:40, with numerous IA vehicles destroyed including at least one tank.

I tried to find it, but I suspect it was removed from the internet , there is one video that is impressive showing ISIL storming an occupying building. They took some hits in the way in, but in a disciplined manner persisted with the attack until they were successful.

People much less well trained and equipped made life difficult for our guys in Fallujah, so I wouldn't underestimate the challenge. No doubt we can defeat them, but at times it would be become a slug fest.

[tequila]

Bill - agreed with all your main points. They've showed they can defeat their adversaries, and that's what counts. Short of the fall of Baghdad, a MEU or a US armored division is not coming over the horizon.

I think that one of the main things that requires research is ISIL's ability to maintain C4IR and logistics across a very large battlespace in the face of US airpower. Right now I don't think anyone outside of ISIL's command structure itself and maybe the US Gov really knows just how autonomous the different emirs or regions are, or how ISIL's internal supply network works. That they managed to sustain combat in Kobane as long as they did in the face of crippling strikes was pretty impressive to me, even if they did retreat in the end.

That ISIL shows the sort of internal cohesion and leadership to outmatch the Iraqi government, as feeble as that task may be, shows just how important those two qualities are in the face of billions of dollars in aid and equipment.

I think Iraq is in the process of forming a genuine national identity that can command real loyalty to a nation irrespective of governmental identity. Unfortunately this appears to have an exclusively Shia Arab phenomenon at the moment. Not sure where this goes in the end - probably not towards the sort of Iraq we wanted in 2003.

[Bob's World]

Key phrase being "...what we wanted."

Some day we will learn that we are far better served by what we need (a partner with a government possessed of local popular legitimacy - regardless of the form that government might take), than we are by a government we want that is inherently lacking in popular legitimacy by all but those who have sold out to the US to gain power under our protection.

Every time we have adopted a strategy of building a military to defend such a government it has been an abysmal failure. In order, Philippines pre-WWII, South Vietnam, Iraq and (collapsing as soon as we leave) Afghanistan.

I used to think our approach of not controlling such forces was far superior to the British model of recruiting units from such places to serve Britain, rather than their born homelands. But the British model has a legitimacy all of it's own. Those men join to serve Great Britain. We train units to serve government who are created by us. My apologies to Brits who I have chided in the past on this matter.

Better still are units serving a national government possessed of broad popular legitimacy, but that is not something we can create. We often support such partners and allies, but to attempt to create is to render them fatally flawed from inception.

[Bill Moore]

Key phrase being "...what we wanted."

Some day we will learn that we are far better served by what we need (a partner with a government possessed of local popular legitimacy - regardless of the form that government might take), than we are by a government we want that is inherently lacking in popular legitimacy by all but those who have sold out to the US to gain power under our protection.

Every time we have adopted a strategy of building a military to defend such a government it has been an abysmal failure. In order, Philippines pre-WWII, South Vietnam, Iraq and (collapsing as soon as we leave) Afghanistan.

I used to think our approach of not controlling such forces was far superior to the British model of recruiting units from such places to serve Britain, rather than their born homelands. But the British model has a legitimacy all of it's own. Those men join to serve Great Britain. We train units to serve government who are created by us. My apologies to Brits who I have chided in the past on this matter.

Better still are units serving a national government possessed of broad popular legitimacy, but that is not something we can create. We often support such partners and allies, but to attempt to create is to render them fatally flawed from inception.

A lot of factors need to be aligned for capacity building to work, both tangible and intangible. We focus too much on the tangible things we can count and convince ourselves we're making progress. Heck, we have stats to prove it