Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[JeffC]

Great article and thanks for the link. Agree wholeheardetly. We've burnt the Army to ash over the last 17 years, we need to take a long pause and realize that military actions has definitive limits for countless reasons.

I think there are two counteracting forces at work in the world right now. Globalization and the rise of non-state actors. The patient who gets to feel the brunt of these two forces is the nation-state - both globalization and the rise of non-state actors pull the nation state apart from two different spectrums. Globalization pulls it apart from the economic angle, and the non-state actors pull it apart from the political, religious and cultural angles. Globalization really means homogenization - you see the same stores, brand names and the like everywhere you go. On a personal level, I hate this but you can't stop progress, even if its not progress.

I think Americans like "either/or" scenarios way too much. We reduce everything to this dichotomy, and the world is much, much more complex and grey. I suppose the media could be blamed, but in reality it's a matter of self education and not trusting what is put out in front of you as gospel.

The Moslems are no better and no worse then most of us in the world. There is a small minority of Qtubists who are deluded into thinking they are the new blend of Leninist/Mohammedanian vanguard of religious revolutionaries. They tend to die a lot, mainly by choice. Isolate them through good propaganda (I mean IO), and increase the standards of living in Islamic countries and they will die off.

I see a connection between black/white thinking and feeling overcome by Globalization. My theory is that if individuals would expand their mental horizons, they'll feel better about the expansion that Globalization is bringing to us.

Regarding Muslim extremists, they're clearly a minority or the world would be engulfed in the flames of religous fanaticism by now (considering how many Muslims there are in the world).

[Steve Blair]

I would suggest that folks on this thread take a deep breath, check any urges to thump on sacred books of any sort at the door, and then resume discussion.

That does not involve checking one's deity at the door but rather refraining from invoking him in every post. The original line of this thread was useful. Let's see if we can get back to that without running down too many rabbit holes.

Thanks.

[Steve Blair]

Now I know these folks all have the PR image of tree-hugging loons with Che t-shirts and an aversion to basic hygiene, but what happens if they become the "next thing?" After all, they developed a great deal of the vaunted "global insurgency" framework (diversified networks and leadership structures, communicating via the internet, and so on). I'm wondering how things might look if more of them buy into the ELF-type mindset.

[Sean Osborne]

With respect to the thread title "After al-Qaeda?", perhaps this current article by Ali Eteraz is germane to the gist of the discussion?

[MikeF]

It's about time. Documentary airs 15 Nov.

New jihad code threatens al Qaeda
Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN

Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- From within Libya's most secure jail a new challenge to al Qaeda is emerging.

Leaders of one of the world's most effective jihadist organizations, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), have written a new "code" for jihad. The LIFG says it now views the armed struggle it waged against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime for two decades as illegal under Islamic law.

The new code, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies" is the result of more than two years of intense and secret talks between the leaders of the LIFG and Libyan security officials.

The code's most direct challenge to al Qaeda is this: "Jihad has ethics and morals because it is for God. That means it is forbidden to kill women, children, elderly people, priests, messengers, traders and the like. Betrayal is prohibited and it is vital to keep promises and treat prisoners of war in a good way. Standing by those ethics is what distinguishes Muslims' jihad from the wars of other nations."

The code has been circulated among some of the most respected religious scholars in the Middle East and has been given widespread backing. It is being debated by politicians in the U.S. and studied by western intelligence agencies.

In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within jihadist ranks to al Qaeda's ideology.

While the code states that jihad is permissible if Muslim lands are invaded -- citing the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine -- the guidelines it sets down for when and how jihad should be fought, and its insistence that civilians should not be targeted are a clear rebuke to the goals and tactics of bin Laden's terrorist network.

[davidbfpo]

Marcus Sageman has written in Perspectives on Terrorism a long piece on
'Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan' and on a read last night it is really a lot more strategic than Afghanistan IMHO. Note an earlier version was given in late 2009 to the US Senate. He supplements his analysis with several charts.

The link is:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/...d=92&Itemid=54

A good read and I expect it has drawn some academic "fire", which can be left alone on SWC, see an old thread on this: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5334

[davidbfpo]

Caught on SWJ news summary, Bruce Hoffman on 'Al-Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one, too': http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...d=opinionsbox1

SWJ summary:In the wake of the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing and the killing a few days later of seven CIA operatives in Afghanistan, Washington is, as it was after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, obsessed with "dots" - and our inability to connect them. "The U.S. government had sufficient information to have uncovered this plot and potentially disrupt the Christmas Day attack, but our intelligence community failed to connect those dots," the president said Tuesday. But for all the talk, two key dots have yet to be connected: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Northwest Airlines Flight 253 attacker, and Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the trusted CIA informant turned assassin. Although a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student and a 36-year-old Jordanian physician would seem to have little in common, they both exemplify a new grand strategy that al-Qaeda has been successfully pursuing for at least a year. Throughout 2008 and 2009, U.S. officials repeatedly trumpeted al-Qaeda's demise. In a May 2008 interview with The Washington Post, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden heralded the group's "near strategic defeat." And the intensified aerial drone attacks that President Obama authorized against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan last year were widely celebrated for having killed over half of its remaining senior leadership. Yet, oddly enough for a terrorist movement supposedly on its last legs, al-Qaeda late last month launched two separate attacks less than a week apart - one failed and one successful - triggering the most extensive review of U.S. national security policies since 2001.

Well worth reading in full IMHO and following my habit this is the last paragraph:

Remarkably, more than eight years after Sept. 11, we still don't fully understand our dynamic and evolutionary enemy. We claim success when it is regrouping and tally killed leaders while more devious plots are being hatched. Al-Qaeda needs to be utterly destroyed. This will be accomplished not just by killing and capturing terrorists -- as we must continue to do -- but by breaking the cycle of radicalization and recruitment that sustains the movement.

[davidbfpo]

Two comments on this burgeoning theme in the media and blogsphere. Hat tip to KOW, which set a balancing view: 'Amid the Hysteria, A Look at What al-Qaeda Can't Do' . Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...#ixzz0cE6UE98G

And on KOW:http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2010...gile-republic/

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll has appeared giving evidence today before the House Armed Services Committee about Al Qaeda and U.S. policy. My complete testimony follows on the link: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...#ixzz0dr2PHFtX

Too long to read fully now.

[davidbfpo]

A new thread resurrected at original author's request that the issues are separate from the general commentary on OBL's demise.

[carl]

I think it reasonable for AQ as it exists in Pakistan and their allies to conclude that the Pak Army/ISI sold OBL to the Americans. If so they might be inclined to focus the bulk of their malign intentions on Pakistan.

[davidbfpo]

Currently we are awash with analysis, so caveat aside here is one written by a Canadian resident in the UK:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/...hats-next.html

It ends with;

Terrorism will not end with the death of bin Laden. There will undoubtedly be retaliatory attacks in his name. However, one of the legacies of 9-11 is that the security regime it unleashed makes future attacks on that scale nearly impossible.

Bin Laden will remain an inspirational figure for his efforts, first against the Soviet Union and then against the US, and those motivated by him now remain the greatest threat.

But bin Laden failed to offer any positive political agenda for the future, which is why Al Qa'eada is so absent from the current events in the Middle East.

[J Wolfsberger]

But bin Laden failed to offer any positive political agenda for the future, which is why Al Qa'eada is so absent from the current events in the Middle East.

I wonder about that. We seem to have assumed from the beginning that AQ was a completely independent entity. Is it possible that they have actually been an instrument of the Muslim Brotherhood?

[SWJ Blog]

Crisis in Yemen, the Rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. National Security

Entry Excerpt:

Crisis in Yemen, the Rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. National Security - Highlights from today's American Enterprise Institute event in Washington, D.C., can be found at the link. Participants included Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Edmund J. Hull, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen; Katheline Zimmerman, AEI; and Frederick W. Kagan, AEI.

Event summary follows: The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy toward Yemen beyond counterterrorism, panelists concluded Tuesday at the American Enterprise Institute. Katherine Zimmerman, an analyst and the Gulf of Aden Team Lead for AEI's Critical Threats Project, outlined the six most likely and dangerous crisis scenarios in Yemen that could result from the current political stalemate, including the collapse of Yemen's economy or a mass-casualty attack on the United States by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.



Frederick W. Kagan, the director of AEI's Critical Threats Project, argued that the United States, in addition to its regional and international partners, has a vested interest in preventing Yemen from complete state collapse. Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that while current American strategy is focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism, the greatest threat facing Yemenis daily is the looming meltdown of their economy--not al Qaeda.



Ambassador Edmund J. Hull described the challenges of on-the-ground implementation of a comprehensive strategy, given the limited ability of US officials to operate beyond the capital, San'a, due to security concerns. The panelists advocated drawing on the lessons from the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to fine-tune an appropriate approach to Yemen that links development gains and security gains.





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[SWJ Blog]

Al Qaeda in its Third Decade

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[SWJ Blog]

One More Thought on Unconventional Approaches to Dealing with al Qaeda

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[Bill Moore]

http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/201...eda-whats-next

Those who assessed that bin Laden’s death would be of no consequence for al-Qaeda have been proven wrong. Bin Laden, along with a select few of his top lieutenants and protégés who’ve been eliminated by drones, provided the last bits of glue that held a declining al-Qaeda network together. As discussed in the 2012 post “What if there is no al-Qaeda?”, al-Qaeda for many years has provided little incentive in money or personnel for its affiliates and little inspiration for its global fan base. Things have gotten so bad that rumors suggest Ayman al-Zawahiri may dissolve al-Qaeda entirely, that’s right, al-Qaeda might QUIT! I’ll address these rumors in a separate post next week. Until then, here is what I see as the good and bad for al-Qaeda and ISIS this year.

A few tables and graphs at the link showing the growth of ISIS influence and the decline of AQ's influence.

Compares good and bad news for both. While we sought to weaken the cohesion of these various groups, it is apparent that these divided loyalties have only contributed to an increase of terrorist activity.

[davidbfpo]

The 2015 Chart



The 2014 Chart

[Bill Moore]

Video of Islamic State capabilities impresses military experts

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/2...abilities.html

But beyond the outcome of the refinery battle, military analysts who’ve viewed the video find it alarming because it shows that the Islamic State retains a surprisingly high level of military skill despite months of daily airstrikes by U.S. aircraft and their coalition allies.

“The overall takeaway from this and several other videos like it, and this opinion is borne out by the facts on the ground, is that Daash remains better trained, more motivated, better led and supported by a logistical infrastructure that the Iraqi government is literally incapable of delivering to their own troops,” said one former British special forces soldier who consults with the Iraqi Kurdish government on military affairs. He spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of his role in Iraq. Daash is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.

Much more in the report, well worth the read. It is an honest assessment from folks on the ground who are not spinning a narrative. It raises important questions on why ISIS is producing more competent foot soldiers than Iraq. I suspect the answers will make us uncomfortable, which normally results in an organizational state of denial.

[SWJ Blog]

A Global Strategy for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State

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