Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

http://www.eurasiareview.com/2612201...-qaeda-primer/

The Three Versions Of Al Qaeda: A Primer

Al Qaeda today only slightly resembles the al Qaeda of yesteryear. Al Qaeda operatives or “al Qaeda-like” organizations stretch throughout North Africa, across the Middle East and into South Asia. This disparate string of organizations hosts a handful of al Qaeda’s original Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans but mostly consist of newcomers inspired by al Qaeda’s message — disenfranchised young men seeking an adventurous fight in the wake of a tumultuous Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, or more appropriately jihadism pursued under al Qaeda’s banner, has morphed in several waves over the course of more than two decades.

Evaluating al Qaeda through three incarnations may help us fully understand the group’s evolution into the present day and what it may become in the future. Al Qaeda may be examined in three periods: al Qaeda 1.0 (1988 – 2001), al Qaeda 2.0 (2002 – 2011) and al Qaeda 3.0 (2011 – present). Note, these periods are not distinct entities. Al Qaeda has transformed slowly through each phase. Some affiliates carrying al Qaeda’s name have rapidly morphed based on changing local conditions while others have adjusted more pragmatically. However, two significant events, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011 provide natural turning points for tracing al Qaeda’s evolution.

[davidbfpo]

JMM99 asked for a new thread we should discuss "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

His initial comment added:

But, having said that, US "prevention" efforts generally have been less than "shock and awe"-inspiring. Our "state building" operations in Iraq and Astan were certainly intended to prevent AQ expansion. Now, thousands of lives and just south of $ 2 trillion later, we have basically nada - those two "state building" efforts have been the "spectacular failures".

A subsidiary issue for that separate discussion is how far afield does the US go in preventing the expansion of AQ "franchises" (as opposed to hitting AQ Base). In short, the feasibility and the costs of mounting those operations (whatever they might be) may well be prohibitive with respect to local "AQ" groups.

In retrospect from 9/11, the US has been successful in small direct actions and drone strikes against AQ Base and the leadership of closely-tied franchises on an international scale. The US has also been successful within CONUS in prosecuting hundreds of AQ inspired local terrs - with only one shootout (Detroit MI) that I know of.

My initial search, using intervention and prevention failed to identify a relevant thread. A skim through this arena found a thread started by Gian Gentile that does fit! It is a 2008 thread 'The Global Counter Insurgency" Some Thoughts' at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4927

[MoorthyM]

MoorthyM:

If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.

Jmm99 & Carl

Thank you for the kind comments.

I want to posit a new paradigm that I believe will help us safely navigate the threat of radical Islam (and beyond): If a social phenomenon has a wide following (such as the Al Qaeda variety) it has to have a simple and well-known construct.

Indeed, I am confident that we know now how radical Islam functions, and consequently, how to neutralize it. In other words, a “Grand Strategy” policy formulation of addressing the engulfing worldwide threat of radical Islam and the associated Muslim socioeconomic stagnation may be feasible. A research article of mine (about 11,000 words long) that identifies the radical Islamic construct is scheduled to be published in a few months.

I don’t see why it would take more than a few years to break the back of the ideological basis and power centers of radical Islam. We should be able to do that without attacking the religion or antagonize the religious majority. In fact, we can get the religious majority to our side, as they are victimized by Islamists as much as anyone else.

Even then, I do admit that we would still need a few Hellfire missiles, not so much as part of any reactive response, but as part of a strategic one.

[carl]

MoorthyM:

I ask your opinion on this. One of the vulnerabilities of radical Islam is its bloodthirstiness. People in general don't like that, so much so that radical Islam either comes up with a fairy story denying that radical Islam did it, ie the story that we destroyed the world trade center ourselves; or they twist the theology in order to justify psychopathic murder. Even that only goes so far with the people who have live under them, eventually those people rebel, like in Iraq before and in Syria now. The people who provide the recruits and the money never see the blood so they swallow the fairy stories and the twisted theology and continue to provide recruits and money.

So, I think we should attack this vulnerability. We should highlight all the murders continuously, constantly present the obvious evidence that these guys are so many Jeffrey Dahmers organized. Every time an American diplomat meets a Sauidi or Pakistani diplomat bring up the latest atrocity. We should buy time on Al Jazerra and run shows on the bombings and murders. We should beat them over the head so to speak with the severed limbs of the
victims. The idea is to try and make it that people who give the money have to some extent live with and see the blood. I think it would discourage the money giving.

What do you think?

[DrTRFurnish]

I submit that a possible avenue of de-legitimization of AQ and its (Sunni) literalist exegetical paradigm of the Qur'an, Hadith and Islamic history would be Islamic sects, some of which (Ahmadis, Isma'ili Shi`a, a number of Sufi orders) hold different views of, in particular, jihad; they define it as truly non-violent, unlike the majority Sunni view over the last 1434 years. Jihad is thus not "extremist" or even "radical," as journalists and too many analysts parrot; jihad, and yes violent jihad against non-Muslims, is mainstream in Islam and has been since the examples of Muhammad himself. The only way that legitimate narrative--which gives strength to AQ and the other 38 Muslim groups on the current State Dept. FTO list--can be degraded is by holding up to Muslims that there are those within their own faith tradition that dissent. This will take time, but it may work. I wrote an article on this a few years ago: http://hnn.us/article/83742

[jmm99]

As another fan of Jeremiah Johnson (Amazon), I liked your short comment on your webpage:

Friday, January 3, 2014

Jeremiah Johnson, Islam and CT Analysis.

One of my favorites movies of all time is the 1972 atypical Western "Jeremiah Johnson," starring Robert Redford. Johnson is a mountain man somewhere in the Rocky Mountains of the western US in the mid-19th century, fighting the elements, bears, wolves and of course Indians (no they aren't' "Native Americans," because they too came to the Western hemisphere from elsewhere--they just did so some millennia before the Europeans).

At one point Johnson is asked to guide a US Cavalry unit and a Protestant minister through a sacred Crow Indian burial ground, in order to relieve a band of trapped American settlers. Johnson replies that doing so could be dangerous because the area is "big medicine." Reverend Lindquist sneers "you don't believe that!" To which the mountain man retorts "it doesn't matter; THEY do!"

After being reminded of this insightful scene by my good friend Reverend Chuck Treadwell, it occurred to me that most modern American counter-intelligence, intelligence and area studies analysts could learn something from Jeremiah Johnson. I can't even recall how many times I've read, or been told in person--by members of the Intelligence Community, State Department, media, chaplains or even our military--that "jihadists aren't REALLY motivated by Islam" or "no Muslims REALLY believe in the Mahdi" or (perhaps my favorite) "I don't have to read the Qur'an to know that it's a 'peaceful' book."

US CT policy would be better off heeding this guy than the Mark Sagemans of the world.

This was the point I was making in an interview I did with the "Jerusalem Post" (during my trip to Israel in November 2012), regarding analysis of the Islamic world: "We have to look at the culture, economics, politics and psychology in addition to religion—but it cannot be ignored. In intelligence analysis, much like historical analysis, you put yourself in the others' position. It is very important to understand the others—even when we do not agree with them.”

That way, maybe, the Muslim equivalents of Paints-His-Shirt-Red will eventually call off their jihad against us and raise their hands in peace--as that Crow chief did toward Johnson at the end of the movie. But that only occurred after the bearded and heavily armed white Christian had defeated all the braves sent to kill him.

Reverend Lindquist was an idiot, was he not (arrogance bred from ignorance).

Regards

Mike

PS (off-topic): Vine would've argued that the moccasin tracks went in the other direction (link).

I've drunk more than a few beers with Indians (woo-woo kind), but not with a Native American (rara avis ?)

[slapout9]

I submit that a possible avenue of de-legitimization of AQ and its (Sunni) literalist exegetical paradigm of the Qur'an, Hadith and Islamic history would be Islamic sects, some of which (Ahmadis, Isma'ili Shi`a, a number of Sufi orders) hold different views of, in particular, jihad; they define it as truly non-violent, unlike the majority Sunni view over the last 1434 years. Jihad is thus not "extremist" or even "radical," as journalists and too many analysts parrot; jihad, and yes violent jihad against non-Muslims, is mainstream in Islam and has been since the examples of Muhammad himself. The only way that legitimate narrative--which gives strength to AQ and the other 38 Muslim groups on the current State Dept. FTO list--can be degraded is by holding up to Muslims that there are those within their own faith tradition that dissent. This will take time, but it may work. I wrote an article on this a few years ago: http://hnn.us/article/83742

This should be looked at closely. I think it has real merit as a main effort.

[davidbfpo]

Within an article on scaling down the military presence in Kashmir and placing the emphasis on the police are several facts, here are some:

The principal reason to consider scaling back the Army’s counter-insurgency presence in Kashmir is simple: there isn’t an insurgency to be fought. Ever since the 2001-2002 near-war between India and Pakistan, levels of violence in the State have fallen steadily. In 2001, as many as 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces personnel, and 2,850 terrorists were killed in fighting. The numbers fell in 2003 to 658 civilians, 338 security forces and 1,546 terrorists. Last year’s numbers, the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal records, were 20 civilians, 61 security forces and 100 terrorists.

In population-adjusted terms, the insurgency in J&K cost 1.51 lives per 100,000 persons of its population, lower than the homicide rate in Delhi or Haryana. The State’s total firearms fatalities were well below those in Uttar Pradesh (1,575 in 2012) or Bihar (681) or even West Bengal (269).

Link:http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead...le5597916.ece?

[MoorthyM]

The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

[jmm99]

There are a number of threads here at SWC to which you could contribute.

For the benefit of other members/viewers, I don't know Moorthy (his first name, BTW); but I've just looked up his book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War (2009). Here's the Amazon pitch:

Al Qaeda and its sympathizers are often viewed as isolated fanatics outside of the mainstream Muslim population—outlaws not only in the West but also in respectable Muslim nations. This book argues just the opposite: that in fact terrorism is the logical outgrowth of an international Islamic political agenda that is endorsed and funded by Islam’s major players—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. Author Moorthy S. Muthuswamy labels these nations the "Axis of Jihad". For decades, he says, they have been devoted to extending their spheres of influence in the name of religion.

Utilizing a recent groundbreaking statistical analysis of Islamic doctrines and an analysis based upon the outlook of Muslims, he discusses the possibility that Islam is less a religion and more an ideology of conquest.

Muthuswamy urges US policymakers to rethink the War on Terror along the lines of the successfully waged Cold War against communism. The nuclear physicist-author makes the following main point:

Like the Cold War, this war is more a contest of ideas than armed conflict. Rather than placing the emphasis on military might and costly wars abroad, the West should invest the bulk of its effort in a science-based ideological war, one that is directed at discrediting the simplistic, conquest-oriented theological roots of Islamist indoctrination and jihadist politics.

Muthuswamy also emphasizes the importance of a largely non-Muslim India in the War on Terror, in view of its location and size. The India-born author gives a fascinating description of modern Islamic conquest in South Asia. His insights into the Islamist siege and subversion of Indian democracy should be revealing for the citizens of western democracies.

The author asserts that the West needs India in dealing with the conundrum that is Pakistan, as they both share language, culture, and more with each other.

This fresh perspective on the ongoing threat from Islamist terrorism offers much to ponder about the future course of US foreign policy initiatives.

I also found two reviews. One (by Diana West in the WT), BOOK REVIEW: Reversing U.S. policy in AfPak, is favorable. The other (by GB Singh in NER), Dangerous Policy, is unfavorable. The latter attacks Moorthy's message, but also attacks the messenger (IMO). I did take Mr Singh's advice on one point: I will read the book !

Moorthy, the concept here at SWC is to attack the message (ruthlessly), but not to attack the messenger. In short, an officer and a gentlemen standard works best in preventing flaming and in keeping learnable conversations going. In that context and in my opinion, Mr Singh should have left out the last half of his last paragraph.

I encourage you to post here, not only in this thread but elsewhere.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

MoorthyM:

If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.

Moderator adds: new thread created, so please post there and so next two posts have been moved (ends)

[Bill Moore]

The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

We have understood the radicalization for years, even prior to 9/11, but that doesn't mean we understand how to stop it. I think we need to keep a realistic view of our limitations when it comes to both implementing counter-radicalization (prevention) and de-radicalization effective programs. We understand the forces the cause volcanos, but we can't prevent them from happening. Assuming the collective we, to include Muslim allies in this struggle could develop an approach to counter current methods, both state and non-state actors who promote radicalization as a way to obtain their political goals will adjust their radicalization process to overcome our messaging to discredit them. While this will still remain an important effort we're not going to contain Al-Qaeda anytime soon pursuing this.

Fighting will still be required to hold the wave back, but more importantly as Bob's World has pointed out repeatedly governments will have to evolve to limit the appeal of radical Islam. While counter intuitive, if the population desires more fundamentalism then why not encourage it? If they practice Islam in that way, then what is the basis of any argument by Al-Qaeda that they need to change?

[davidbfpo]

The NYT Sunday Review has a succinct article, with many good quotes, for example Will McCants:

Al Qaeda is kind of a ready-made kit now..It is a portable ideology that is entirely fleshed out, with its own symbols and ways of mobilizing people and money to the cause. In many ways, you don’t have to join the actual organization anymore to get those benefits.

The penultimate sentence:

But while counterterrorism can be effective in stopping specific threats, depriving militant groups of the unstable environments where they flourish and organize is much harder.

The last sentence reflects a focus on the Middle East, when IMHO it ignores the sustenance provided by some within stable, governed territory (KSA, Gulf sheikhdoms etc) for militancy elsewhere. The Yemen has been a nearby "sideshow" for years, then there is the 'sore" of Iraq and now Syria. None of them appear to mobilise beyond a small militant minority, which we all too often overlook in our fear.

What you are seeing in the Middle East is a problem of militancy combined with ungoverned territory,....That is the real problem, not which groups belong to Al Qaeda and how can we get rid of them.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/su...aeda.html?_r=0

[JMA]

Good perspective... and probably correct.

When an area 'goes quiet' you need to have a good look at what is going on below the surface (so to speak).

The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

[slapout9]

I have not read Kilcullen's new book so I am asking if anybody knows what Kilcullen means when he says a "Normative" system. In it's normal usage Normative systems are often the primary cause of Insurgencies and Revolts because the Governing system is refusing to Adapt to the needs of the Governed Population.

[JMA]

Moderator adds: Post 2 asks for this thread and Post 9 created this thread (ends).

'Encouraging' somebody is not making him/her anybody's proxy. Only direct support does.

It is how it is done.

Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been to go after Al Qaeda and prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

[jmm99]

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been [1] to go after Al Qaeda and [2] prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

The US has been consistent in going after AQ Base - we have killed a lot of them via direct actions and drones.

We should have a discussion somewhere other than in this thread - a SWC thread may already exist - on "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

Moderator adds: a new thread was started 24th January 2014 at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=19947

But, having said that, US "prevention" efforts generally have been less than "shock and awe"-inspiring. Our "state building" operations in Iraq and Astan were certainly intended to prevent AQ expansion. Now, thousands of lives and just south of $ 2 trillion later, we have basically nada - those two "state building" efforts have been the "spectacular failures".

A subsidiary issue for that separate discussion is how far afield does the US go in preventing the expansion of AQ "franchises" (as opposed to hitting AQ Base). In short, the feasibility and the costs of mounting those operations (whatever they might be) may well be prohibitive with respect to local "AQ" groups.

In retrospect from 9/11, the US has been successful in small direct actions and drone strikes against AQ Base and the leadership of closely-tied franchises on an international scale. The US has also been successful within CONUS in prosecuting hundreds of AQ inspired local terrs - with only one shootout (Detroit MI) that I know of.

Finally, this past situation should not exist today:

Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Exactly!

When, where, HOW and on what scale.

The how requires more than a little bit of 'skill and cunning'

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating review of AQ by J.M. Berger this week on FP, with several hat tips on Twitter and now The New Yorker's recommendations for weekend reading says:

a thorough and clear overview of the group’s evolution since 9/11. Berger argues that Al Qaeda has changed so much in its hierarchy, goals, and tactics that to call it a terrorist organization might actually be a misnomer: its focus has shifted almost entirely to military campaigns and insurgencies. “The new Al Qaeda is still radical, extremist, and incredibly violent, overwhelming evidence suggests that terrorism is now decidedly secondary in Al Qaeda’s portfolio.” Updating our understanding of the organization, Berger argues, can give us insight into the strength of its leadership, the motivations of its recruits, and the next stages of its development, all of which will be difficult to grasp as long as U.S. policies “remain fixated on the brand name and organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks.”

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...n-keillor.html

The FP article is behind a free, registration wall:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...aeda_terrorism

[jmm99]

a Transnational, Violent, Non-State Actor, a nature that existed in 1994, in 2004 and still exists in 2014 - and should be expected to continue in that nature (whether as "AQ", the Base, or under the name of some takfirist affiliate who manages to weather the storms better than its spiritual parent).

One would expect that, since its "conception" ca. 1988, its tactics (and, for that matter, strategies and underlying policies) would have changed to meet changed conditions. And indeed, that has been the case with AQ's embrace of terrorism from 1988 to date - a steadily tightening embrace until ca. 2008 (two decades after its founding as an insurgent group; or probably better, an aider and abettor of insurgent groups).

In other words, what could be seen was The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda (by Carl J. Ciovacco, 2008, SWJ) - a somewhat legalistic way of saying that AQ fell more and more in love with whacking innocent civilians and increasing its reliance on the tactic of terrorism.

Ciovacco sees five stages of AQ's embrace of terrorism in its first two decades:

Phase One

The first phase of al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity begins with respect for noncombatants in war. When al Qaeda first formed in 1988, it was fully engaged in a battle between armed combatants. While the Soviet Army was better trained and equipped, the Afghan militias and Afghan Arabs were armed nonetheless. Al Qaeda only fought the Soviets with guns and tactics directed against its soldiers. Suicide bombings against Soviet civilians in Moscow were scarcely a figment of bin Laden’s imagination. ...

Phase Two

This phase begins in March, 1997, with a CNN interview of bin Laden in Afghanistan. In a dramatic change to bin Laden’s view of noncombatants, he hints that civilians may not be as shielded as they were in the past. While he does not say that al Qaeda will target civilians, he basically intimates that if noncombatants get in the way, “it is their problem.” ...

Phase Three

In this third phase, bin Laden moved from luke warm approval of noncombatant immunity to overtly declaring that noncombatants were legitimate targets. On February 22, 1998, bin Laden released a signed statement on behalf of the World Islamic Front. The World Islamic Front consisted of al Qaeda, the Jihad Group in Egypt, the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiet-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. In this statement, bin Laden, and the rest of the alliance, not only sanctioned the killing of civilians, but also elevated it to level of a holy duty, or fatwa. ...

Phase Four

Phase Four is time-stamped by the 9/11 attacks. In these attacks, nearly 3,000 noncombatants were targeted both on the planes and on the ground. The noncombatants working in the World Trade Towers and those flying on the planes were in no way associated with the American government. Their intentional murder was exacted to draw media attention to al Qaeda’s cause and as retribution for perceived injustices by the American government on the Muslim community. While uniformed combatants were killed in the Pentagon on 9/11, the thrust of the operation was directed against noncombatants. ...

Phase Five

After the 9/11 attacks, it appears that al Qaeda’s move to complete disrespect for noncombatant immunity was complete. This interpretations, however, does not account for the scale-up potential of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Accordingly, the fifth phase demonstrates the final and most disturbing position regarding noncombatants: the use of WMDs to intentionally kill mass numbers of noncombatants. The fact that al Qaeda released a public statement informing the world of this intent, and received religious backing from a prominent Muslim cleric, makes this phase all the more dangerous. This is the current [2008] phase that we find al Qaeda; however, as far as we know, it is only at the rhetorical and preparation stage. ...

But, as AQ was winding up for its pitch at Armageddon, it realized it was as vulnerable to blowback as the USG. Ciovacco saw this in 2008 as a possible Phase Six, where the terrorism pendulum would start to swing back to increased Noncombatant Immunity - a shift which could go on for years (as it took two decades to shift from insurgency to WMD terrorism).

Just as al Qaeda’s targeting of noncombatants progressed in phases, perhaps it is moving into a Phase Six where a limited respect for noncombatant immunity once again exists. In 2005, Zawahiri directed al Qaeda in Iraq to stop killing Shia noncombatants because it was hurting al Qaeda’s greater cause. Furthermore, a top al Qaeda strategist, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has written to al Qaeda in Iraq telling them that its killing of “too many civilians” was undermining al Qaeda’s global strategy. Indeed, one influential ex-jihadist has correctly identified the flawed nature of targeting noncombatants by saying that, “the tactics have taken over the strategy.” While a full prohibition against the targeting of all noncombatants may be years ahead, this development is promising. Although the path to disregard for noncombatant immunity took over a decade to mature, signs are pointing to a reversal as its legitimacy is crumbing under its own weight. ...

So, in the tents of the takfirists, as in the punditry of the infidels, we heard the lament that “the tactics have taken over the strategy.”

The shift from WMD terrorism in 2008 (already then changing) to a more insurgency-focused set of tactics (complete with more formalized base areas - i.e., shadow governments) has been no surprise to those who read Ciovacco's article in 2008, or who arrived at its construct independently.

IMO: J.M.Berger's article is a typical buzz-word piece of rhetoric - the sky is falling; do something quick:

So what happens next?

The most immediate priority for the United States and its allies is to make sense of the rapid changes al Qaeda is undergoing and then make the necessary policy adjustments.

While there are many different dimensions to the course corrections the United States needs to consider, the most important questions are these:

1. Do we believe jihadist warfighting organizations present a national security threat on a similar order to terrorist groups?

[JMM: Jihadist organizations are jihadist organizations - tactics do shift]

2. What policy tools do we need to deal with such organizations?

[JMM: Realistic decisions in each case about our engagement in the "Management of Savagery" would help - see below and above]

3. If such organizations are a national security threat by their nature, does it matter whether a group calls itself al Qaeda or not?

[JMM: No; names can be changed to protect the guilty - The critical question is whether the organization (jihadist or otherwise) is a TVNSA whose violence is directed against the US]

4. How do we address our concerns about these groups without embroiling ourselves in a series of counterproductive wars all over the globe?

[JMM: See "Management of Savagery" below]

5. What can we do to mitigate the risk that future terrorist organizations might emerge as successors to these fighting groups?

[JMM: Probably nothing realistic without attempting to be the World's policeman - Anna Simons footnote below]

As the points raised herein suggest, these are not simple questions -- but the United States must venture answers. The fundamental nature of al Qaeda has shifted, perhaps temporarily, perhaps permanently. But U.S. policies -- most notably the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that empowers the so-called war on terrorism -- remain fixated on the brand name and organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Although these policies allow for broad powers -- perhaps overly broad -- they are geared toward fighting a terrorist mission that has become secondary to our adversaries.

In reality, the 2001 AUMF has turned out to be very flexible in dealing with TVNSAs (e.g., the drone strikes) - the key issue has become violence directed against the US. A decent wordsmith (I don't know if that applies to Mr Berger) could draft a broader AUMF, encompassing all TVNSAs whose violence is directed against the US. But, currently and into the next several years, the 2001 AUMF is not the villain.

That is not to say that the USG has had a coherent policy with respect to AQ and its affiliates since 1996. However, what future policy should be is not going to be helped by premising a qualitative change in AQ's nature which is really only a tactical shift.

Progress toward a coherent policy would be helped if the USG would ask - realistically - whether it should become involved directly in the "Management of Savagery", or become involved by proxy, or not become involved at all. And, "Management of Savagery" is exactly what is involved.

Anna Simons articles 2011-2013:

Sovereignty – The Ultimate States’ Rights Argument

Soft War = Smart War? Think Again

21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them

Regards

Mike