Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[Jedburgh]

More on Al-Suri from the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 18 Jan 07:

Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training - Part 1

The evolution toward smaller, more autonomous and decentralized organizational structures has been identified as a key trend in jihadi terrorism during the past few years. Confronting amorphous structures and networks, which lack clearly identifiable organizational linkages and command structures and in which self-radicalization and self-recruitment are key elements, is a formidable challenge for security services. The jihadi decentralization trend is clearly a result of counter-terrorism successes. These "defeats" have been scrutinized and digested in the writings of key jihadi theoreticians during the past few years. New roadmaps and operational concepts are being explored as the jihadis search for effective ways to operate in the much less permissive security environment of the post-9/11 era....

Edit to add: Part 2, in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 1 Feb 07:

Training jihadi recruits in the post-9/11 world is increasingly about finding a safe place where training is possible rather than discussing curricula, facilities, selection of recruits, instructors and related tasks. In his voluminous treatise The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, published on the internet in January 2005, the Syrian-born al-Qaeda veteran Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim, examines five different methods for jihadi training based on past jihadi practices:

1. Secret training in safe houses.
2. Training in small secret camps in the area of operations.
3. Overt training under the auspices of states providing safe havens.
4. Overt training in the camps of the Open Fronts.
5. Semi-overt training in areas of chaos and no [governmental] control....

[slapout9]

Jed,this is fantastic stuff. Should be read by all. I know everyone is tired of me saying this but this article explains why the Strategic Framework of Ends,Ways and Means is not going to work. It is Motive,Methods,and Opportunity. The article explains it far better then I can but we had better wake up to this because these guys are not just tough, but smart!


The counter so to speak, at least for the US is in SWJ magazine#7. I can not remember the name of the article but it is about the training philosophy used by Carlson's raiders. Again read the article, it is quite good.

As usual for your listening plasure and cultural enhancement and dedicated to all the AQ assholes in the world. Keep looking behind you!! that is (US) you here coming to take you away.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmfgrcpRpoo

[SWJED]

23 June London Daily Telegraph - Cameraman Reveals Secrets of al-Qa'eda Propaganda War by Isambard Wilkinson.

An al-Qa'eda propagandist has revealed the inner workings of the terrorist network's media machine, describing how he was summoned to a hideout in Afghanistan to shoot a video of Osama bin Laden's deputy.

Qari Mohammed Yusuf, a cameraman, described in an interview with the Associated Press news agency how a courier brought a summons to him. It read: "The emir wants to send a message."

The emir, meaning prince or commander, was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who wanted to broadcast a message of defiance proclaiming that he had survived an American air strike.

Yusuf, 30, claimed that he followed the courier's directions to one of Zawahiri's hideouts in January. "Everything was ready," said the bearded cameraman. "There was just myself and the emir. I used a small Sony camera. It lasted just half an hour.

"They chose the place. They fix it and then they just say to me to come, and my job is only to record it. These are their rules, and no one asks any questions."...

The speed with which the Taliban and al-Qa'eda manage to respond to events in Afghanistan and churn out propaganda has frustrated commanders. "The Taliban are winning the propaganda war," said one senior British officer in Afghanistan...

[SWJED]

6 September Voice of America - Experts Say Al-Qaida Has Transformed Itself Since 9/11 by Andre de Nesnera. Reposted in whole per VOA guidelines - bolded text by SWC.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 launched President Bush's global "war on terror" - a struggle that is still going on five years later.

The first target was Afghanistan, where the Taleban government was harboring al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. A U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taleban, but Osama bin Laden remains at large, believed to be hiding in the rugged terrain between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

American Enterprise Institute terrorism expert Danielle Pletka says al-Qaida has been significantly weakened since the beginning of the Bush administration's "war on terror."

"They are constantly under assault. Their financial lifelines have dried up. Their weaponry has dried up. Anytime your leader is hiding in a cave, it is hard to say that you are in the same strong position you were in when you were living in a mansion," noted Pletka.

Many experts agree that the "war on terror" has been successful in degrading al-Qaida's operational capabilities.

One of those is Brian Jenkins, a leading authority on terrorism working for the RAND Corporation. But he says the U.S. and its allies have not been successful in denting al-Qaida's determination to continue its "jihad," or holy war, against the West.

"We have not blocked their communications. We have not blunted their message. We have not impeded their recruiting, nor have we prevented them from planning and preparing new terrorist attacks. There have been close to 30 communications from Osama bin Laden himself since 9/11 - a greater number from his lieutenant [Ayman] Al-Zawahiri," said Jenkins. "The fact that they can, despite the security risks involved, still deliver videotapes and audiotapes to television stations, indicates an ability to deliver other things. If they can get a tape to al-Jazeera, they can get a secret message to someone else, and it suggests that it would be premature to write off the center."

Jenkins says since 9/11, al-Qaida has transformed itself into something other than a radical Islamist group.

Al-Qaida has transcended its historic organizational skin to become an ideology, and I think it is probably more correct today to speak of the 'jihadist enterprise' which is inspired by al-Qaida's ideology," he continued. "Now that may include the veterans of the original terrorist organization. It includes a new cohort of fighters who are gaining their experience and skills in Afghanistan and Iraq today. It includes affiliated groups in Indonesia, in Egypt, in Algeria, in Saudi Arabia. And it includes those self-radicalizing entities who may not have any organizational connections with the historic al-Qaida, or any center at all, but who self-radicalize and who, on the appeal of al-Qaida's message, turn themselves into weapons."

Jenkins says since al-Qaida is now an ideology, the removal of Osama bin Laden would have less effect on the whole terrorist enterprise now than it would have had four or five years ago.

"The fact that he has been able to survive, the fact that he has formulated this narrative over the past five years, the fact that this ideology has spread via the internet and other means of communications throughout the globe, does suggest that his departure now, while it would have some impact, psychological impact, would not necessarily lead to the demise of the enterprise itself," explained Jenkins.

Given the international scope of the terrorist threat, Jenkins and others believe the "war on terror" will go on for a long time. Experts say a successful outcome will involve a combination of vigilance at home and increased international cooperation.

[Steve Blair]

Of course they've transformed. All successful terrorist groups do. What has really helped Al-Qaida in this effort is their linkage to Islam (radical or otherwise), which has a much wider appeal than the Marxist-Lenninist calls of most of the terror groups in the 1980s.

It's worth remembering that most of the terrorist groups that survived for the long haul (over ten years) had links to nationalist/ethnic minority causes (the ETA or PLO) or quasi-religious overtones or links (the IRA and UDA both come to mind). Any terrorist group that can link itself to something with pre-existing social value within a society or community has a much greater chance of surviving and thriving.

[CPT Holzbach]

How Al-Qaida may evolve, or end:

The war on terrorism might be perpetual, but the war on al-Qaida will end. Although the al-Qaida network is in many ways distinct from its terrorist predecessors, especially in its protean ability to transform itself from a physical to a virtual organization, it is not completely without precedent. And the challenges of devising an effective response over the long term to a well-established international group are by no means unique. Al-Qaida shares elements of continuity and discontinuity with other terrorist groups, and lessons to be learned from the successes and failures of past and present counterterrorist responses may be applicable to this case. Current research focuses on al-Qaida and its associates, with few serious attempts to analyze them within a broader historical and political context. Yet this context sheds light on crucial assumptions and unanswered questions in the campaign against al-Qaida. What do scholars know about how terrorist movements end? What has worked in previous campaigns? Which of those lessons are relevant to understanding how, and under what circumstances, al-Qaida will end?

[Jedburgh]

Beyond Al-Qa'ida Part 1 - The Global Jihadist Movement

Defeating the global jihadist movement—which we define as al-Qaeda and the universe of jihadist groups that are associated with or inspired by al-Qaeda—is the most pressing security challenge facing the United States today. The global jihadist movement can be distinguished from traditional or local jihads, which are armed campaigns conducted by Islamist groups against local adversaries with usually limited aims as well as geographic scope, in that it targets the United States and its allies across the globe and pursues broad geopolitical aims...

Beyond al-Qaeda Part 2 - The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe

The “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the terrorist or extremist threat facing the United States. Clearly, Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders hope that their efforts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. But what about the terrorist or extremist groups that are not part of the al-Qaeda network and do not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers is to set aside groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as less dangerous. Yet these Islamist groups, non-Islamist terrorists, and criminal organizations still pose a threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies....

Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Hezbollah and Hamas

Chapter Three: Other Islamist Groups Outside the al-Qaeda Network

Chapter Four: The Iraqi Insurgency

Chapter Five: Non-Islamist Groups

Chapter Six: Antiglobalization Movements

Chapter Seven: The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 15 Feb 07:

The Threat of Grassroots Jihadi Networks: A Case Study from Ceuta, Spain

...The jihadi group in Ceuta was composed of at least 11 individuals and constitutes another good example of the emergence of grassroots jihadi networks in European countries. "Grassroots jihadis" refers to groups that sympathize with and relate to the global jihadi movement, sharing common strategic objectives, but have little or no formal connections to al-Qaeda or any other associated organizations. They could, however, eventually secure relationships with some established operatives....

[Jedburgh]

RFE/RL, 4 Feb 08: The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message

Key Findings
- The ”original” Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden accounts for a mere fraction of jihadist media production.

- Virtual media production and distribution entities (MPDEs) link varied groups under the general ideological rubric of the global jihadist movement. The same media entities that “brand” jihadist media also create virtual links between the various armed groups that fall into the general category of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements.

- Three key entities connect Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements to the outside world through the internet. These three media entities — Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and Sahab — receive materials from more than one armed group and post those materials to the internet.

- Information operations intended to disrupt or undermine the effectiveness of jihadist media can and should target the media entities that brand these media and act as the virtual connective tissue of the global movement.

- While video is an important component of jihadist media, text products comprise the bulk of the daily media flow. Within text products, periodicals focused on specific “fronts” of the jihad are an important genre that deserves more attention from researchers.

- The vast majority of jihadist media products focus on conflict zones: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

- The priorities of the global jihadist movement, as represented by its media arm, are operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Africa.

- Jihadist media are attempting to mimic a “traditional” structure in order to boost credibility and facilitate message control. While conventional wisdom holds that jihadist media have been quick to exploit technological innovations to advance their cause, they are moving toward a more structured approach based on consistent branding and quasi-official media entities. Their reasons for doing so appear to be a desire to boost the credibility of their products and ensure message control.

- In line with this strategy, the daily flow of jihadist media that appears on the internet is consistently and systematically branded.

Complete 28 page paper at the link.

[Spud]

Thanks Jedburgh

paper is virtually winging its way through my IO mates as I speak

very useful

[SWJ Blog]

U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Warns that Full Withdrawal will Allow al-Qaeda to Regroup

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[SWJ Blog]

Bin Laden’s Son Steps Into Father’s Shoes as al-Qaeda Attempts Comeback

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[davidbfpo]

An article by Ali Soufan that poses this question, although it can be applied to other Islamist groups. A passage that summs up his views (lightly edited):

Today’s al-Qaeda can boast tens of thousands of fighters under its command, and that is not even counting the thousands more who still swear allegiance to al-Qaeda’s wayward progeny, the Islamic State.Why have jihadi groups survived and grown? In short, because their ideology remains strong. That evolution, Fazul predicted, would make al-Qaeda much harder to defeat. Unfortunately, he was right. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadi groups have become adept at luring disaffected young men with false claims of an epochal war between Islam and the West and fraudulent promises of history-shaping adventure.

He has some thoughts, none startling, on as he concludes:

we must dedicate ourselves to undermining the resource that underpins each of its branches: its store of ideas.

Link:https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article...qaeda-thriving

Very little seems to be done on the 'store of ideas', even after a succession of events that have undermined the optimism in the 'West' that terrorism is a rare, painful event. Then we look around parts of the world and as the author writes there is little room for optimism where most deaths form Islamist activity happens.