Redundancy in small unit organization

[novelist]

I have and they are linked in other threads. - or some that others may point you at.

A.) A lot of the criticism of my ideas as outline in the "Fire team Group" is valid in the context that some state. So I am not dismissive of the critiques, nor are any of my insights necessarily greater than those who think I'm full of sh*t. but what sh*t I am full of, I know very well!

B.) My ideas have moved on a bit in the last 5 years. I think a Platoon has to be able to adjust its organisation based on Mission, Threat, Terrain etc. The article that is often cited was written to provoke debate.

C.) I believe that the Core Functions - Find, Fix, Strike, and Exploit are a very strong basis on which to train and organise. A Platoon that adheres to that is in, IMO, pretty good shape.

D.) Doctrine, training, education and leadership, matter far more important than precise Squad or Platoon Size.

E.) and I currently think a platoon should be about 30 men, organised into 3 x 10 man sections. Each Section contains a Recce Group and Weapons Group (6 & 4?).
1 Section is lead by the Platoon commander, and a L/Cpl.
2 Section is lead by the Platoon Segreant and a Corporal.
3 Section is lead by a Corporal and a L/Cpl.
If necessary,
The Platoon can form as two "Multiples". The Recce Multiple is the 4 x 5 man teams under the Platoon commander, two L/Cpls and a Corporal.
The Weapons Multiple is 2 x 5 Man teams under The Platoon sergeant and a Corporal.

It sounds like you are a Marine. Don't know alot about Marines, except what I learned from my cousin, who was an E-6 at Pendleton. It sounds like you are talking about a recon platoon, because you have x 20 men dedicated to reconnaissance. You have another x 10 men dedicated to weapons, and I assume those weapons have to be along the lines of machine guns and anti-armor systems. This is x 30 men. O.K., so you have two 10-man recon elements and a 10-man weapons element. If you are using weapons during a recon mission, you're not going to last. That means the "eyes and ears" of the battalion commander are going to be put out of commission; that combat information off of which the S-2 can deduce "actionable intelligence" is going to be cut off; and that toes are going to be tagged. On the other hand, if you're talking about a x 30-man rifle platoon, there's no need for x 20 recon men. The Corps has a number of x 32-man platoons already, and for their force structure this is not bad because you need small units to fit everybody on amphib ships, AAV's, etc. Small, sufficiently mobile units with a very high degree of lethality are what I think the Army & Marines are looking for in the future. Marine squads have three fire teams totaling x 13-men, x 14 with a Navy Hosp Corpsman. Each team has a machine gun, SAW or newer M-27, TL, grenadier, and a rifleman. If you are thinking " x 30-man rifle platoon" you should take this into consideration to reorganize a x 41-man platoon into a x 30-man platoon. If you're thinking recon, they aren't fighters unless they get caught by the enemy. I'm not trying to be critical, just throwing a few thoughts your way. Maybe an x 8-man weapons section, (x 4 Bravo 240's) with three x 6-man teams having a TL, x 2 SAW/M-27 gunners, a grenadier, and x 2 riflemen for a total of x 26. Add a four man platoon HQ Group of the PL, PSG, Corpsman, and RTO and you have a x 30-man platoon with a very high degree of lethality. Hope you consider it, especially as far as part C) of your writing above goes.

[JMA]

Wilf, is a Brit - an ex NCO I believe - who no longer posts here.

With respect to him and a number of others who have indulged in speculative theory around here their lack of wartime experience undermines their contributions to such debates.

It sounds like you are a Marine.

[novelist]

Well, I just came to this sight yesterday and lance corporal is a Marine rank. Please excuse my failure to recognize my mistake.

[Compost]

Wilf, is a Brit - an ex NCO I believe - who no longer posts here.

With respect to him and a number of others who have indulged in speculative theory around here their lack of wartime experience undermines their contributions to such debates.

JMA
Your first comment may be accurate but it was also mindless kidney punching. Your second comment was mostly valid and is a cautionary to me as a self-appointed commentator and incidentally an ex-reserve infantry NCO.

Overall and usefully demonstrating one hazard of self inflation the phrasing of your post revealed a Blimp with bile line showing. Don’t bother to respond because my future reading will exclude anything attributed to you.

[JMA]

Much of these discussions - about the organisation and structure of fire teams/sections/platoons etc - is a waste of time.

What trumps most arguments or motivations for change is the constraints of military budgets.

Thereafter all your planning and training can be undone minutes into the first battle.

Let me explain.

Take the 4th Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry - as part of the 43rd Wessex Division - experience in the taking of Hill 112 for example.

Out of its original strength of 36 officers and nearly 700 other ranks, The 4th Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry, received reinforcements of 15 officers and 541 other ranks, between the 5th and 18th July 1944 leaving it below its full strength. This is admittedly a radical case.
(source 18 Platoon by Sidney Jary)

So how long will all these theoretical organisations and structures survive after battle is joined?

The answer is how do the units taking casulaties adapt. The key lies in the abilities of the officers and NCOs - who survive - to show initiative and get on with what they have got. History provides those interested with many examples of how soldiers have risen to the challenge in the most dire situations.