Organization & Distance
There have been several interesting proposals for squad through battalion-level organizations.
I'm interested in the relationships between organization, span of control, and "effective" weapon ranges relative to these proposals. It seems to me that span of control and effective weapon ranges are core organizational drivers but these are usually either assumed in such discussions or left out all together which can result in significant battlefield friction.
For example, if you look at typical WWII organizations there's a clear correlation between effective weapon range and unit frontage and depth at various levels of command from platoon to battalion. In other words a given unit level is expected to control a given amount of frontage and depth based on its size/number of sub-units and equipment. But there were also huge C3limits in WWII that have been addressed today but which are still not completely solved (see Ambush Alley for an excellent description of the limits of current battlefield communications technology.)
This is nothing new but the acceleration curve for battlefield dispersion driven by the firepower available to light infantry has increased rapidly in the 20th century and continues to do as demonstrated in Afghanistan where U.S. special forces used PGMs as WWII troops used 60mm mortars (well, almost): to place indirect fire on enemy troops with great agility. At the same time it's easy to be lulled into believing that strategic "stand-off" weapons directed by small units of light infantry is sufficient to win modern wars. Such technology can be used to smash conventional forces or even massed irregular forces but it faces severe limitations against dispersed unconventional forces determined to resist.
There is also often difference of opinion on how many sub-units a given level of command can control and their appropriate level of dispersion, especially when one considers that a minimal level of situational awareness is required to excercise command effectively. And there is often disagreement on the unit level at which certain weapons should be organic, attached, or left under the control of higher level leaders.
Books such as Not Mentioned in Despatches, Not a Good Day to Die, Ambush Alley, and No True Glory do an excellent job of describing the friction that occurs when higher level leaders (eg battalion+) try to excercise too much control over lower level tactical situations and how lack of equipment at a given level can impede a lower level unit from accomplishing its tactical mission.
So here are a few questions for this group. My involvement in these topics is limited to development of underlying technologies for reconaissance systems (tactical to strategic) so I'm always fascinated by (and greatly respect) the opinions of those with experience at the sharp end.
1. At a given a leader's level (squad, platoon, company, and battalion) how much space (frontage and depth) should he expect to fight as determined by four broad categories of terrain? (eg open desert, rolling countryside, urban, jungle). Assume a typical modern western battalion with respect to technology (eg Blue Tracker, etc.), differentiating between mech and leg infantry as needed. Assume ongoing combat operations against opposing light infantry (regular or irregular) and/or traditional combined arms opfor as opposed to security and stability operations in (relatively) calm urban centers with dense civilian populations going about their daily business. So, collateral damage is still a concern but it's "open warfare" Fallujah-style rather than doing neighborhood patrols while handing out candy to children in Basra. There are of course lots of fields manuals and conventional wisdom on the subject but I still encounter interesting differences of opinion, often driven by the individual's personal experience.
2. At each of the levels, given the amount of space expected to be fought at that level and available transport, what sort of weapons should be organic? Attached? Left under control of higher level leaders? This is covered by some other threads but here it's explicitly tied to terrain and area of operations at each given level of command and seeks comment on specific ranges (do also consider logistics and transport with respect to sub-unit dispersion, ammo supply/use rate, etc.).
For example in one thread I noticed a difference of opinion with respect to ATGMs and ATRLs and their relative value in urban warfare given assumed engagement ranges. One fellow assumed very short ranges and saw ATGM as overkill while another saw urban terrain as allowing 2,000m+ engagements and ATGMs as valuable. Such assumptions are (should be) key drivers to determine TO&E but these assumptions are often left unspoken.
And if one proposes a given weapon system should exist at a given level, what are the assumptions for its operation? Always concentrated and directed at higher levels? If attached, at what level of dispersion before becoming too ineffective? Given typical engagement ranges, weapon effective range, and unit/sub-unit dispersion who's in the best position to control a given weapon system in light of that individual's typical situational awareness and probable reaction times to battlefield developments? (eg if a system is placed too high it can't exploit tactical opportunities, too low and it becomes a burden or isn't aware of opportunities.)
3. Based on the two items above, what should sub-units look like and what level of independece should be expected of them? How should one balance directive command and restricitve control at various levels as determined by tactical situation, C3I, and troop quality considerations? This last item probably deserves its own thread but here is tied directly to how much area a given level of command is expected to fight as determined by various factors such as terrain, etc.
Excellent comment, Timothy. I suppose similar curiosities--but much less well articulated--drove me to want to pull together the various threads that had emerged into a section-to-battalion overview, something that Norfolk and others have now offered.Originally Posted by Timothy OConnor
Did you ever post an introduction here?
Well, the traditional tried-and-true span-of-control is one leader or higher HQ for up to five immediate subordinates or lower HQ. Graicunas (for some reason I called him Granicus in another thread, the name of one of Alexander the Great's battles) if I remember correctly, stated a range of 3-6 subordinates for each leader, with 4-5 being optimal; Clausewitz himself reckoned 4-5. But you also have to bear in mind that good-quality, well-trained and well-led troops can take a good deal of the load off of their commander's shoulders because they are willing and able to handle a lot of the coordination details amongst themselves after being given their task - SoC Theorists call this Fayol's Bridge; the military calls it different things like Teamwork and Auftragstaktik.
For ranges, there's an attachment to this post. Tactical Bounds are tied to those ranges however, "One Tactical Bound" being the Effective Range of a unit's longest-range weapon. Usually units prefer to operate within the range of their Heavy Weapons, for obvious reasons, and may resort to moving distances of one-half of a Tactical Bound when in the presence of or in proximity to, the enemy in order to remain under its protection.
As to distances between men, key weapons, unit frontages and the like, that's a little more involved in some ways. Generally, 10m between Infantrymen is preferred in open country in day, 5m at night, and 5m in close country or 3m at night; some Armies are returning to 5m most of the time - which is closer to WWII than present-day practices, but reduces control problems in the field but increases vulnerability to enemy weapons. The point is to try to stay out of the danger space/beaten zones of enemy weapons, or if caught in them, then to reduce the damage done.
Vehicles try to stay about 100 m apart, but in recent years there have again, been some shifts more towards WWII-style 50m or even 25m spacings between vehicles; sometimes this is unavoidable anyway - in GW1 this sometimes happened. And the Russians still use 25m between tanks much of the time. So you get a Rifle Squad/Section attacking on a 50m (close country) to 100 m (open country) front (USMC Squad may attack on a 125m front), and a tank platoon may attack on a 400-500m front. They usually defend a frontage of twice that.
Of course, as you go up the ladder of echelons, Frontages and Depths increase (see especially pages 5-5 and 6-3 to get an idea of what is involved here at angrif.hp.infoseek.co.jp/corseware/st_100-7.pdf - Google it), depending upon the number of sub-units that units put on the line (ie 2 up, 1 back, vice versa, etc.) and spaces between sub-units of units, and units of formations.
Last edited by Norfolk; 01-05-2008 at 02:09 AM.
Actually got a deadline to deal with so I cannot give this the attention it deserves right now, but the critical aspect here is not really anything to do with weapons. It's sensors and communications equipment. How far you can disperse a given organisation is pretty much a function of the four critical freedoms of Fires, Observation, Communication and Manoeuvre. Your ability to do those things in time and space will define how far you can disperse and how quickly you can concentrate.
EG- A dismounted Coy with Spike ATGMS and a Man packed UAV can in theory cover a 3.5km x 3.5km area in terms of an anti-armour mission. Reality is somewhat different!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Outstanding info! Love the the way the chart correlates weapon to frontage.
An interesting excercise would be to tag the weapons on the chart at the command level and concentration at which various weapon systems are organized.
This goes to the ATGM vs ATRL in urban warfare. Also goes to systems such as 60mm and 81mm mortars (and now 120mm!). Some American TO&Es show only 2 such weapons concentrated in a weapons platoon or weapons company respectively. Others have 3 or 4 and some have proposed as many as 8! This raises the issue of how many such weapons are required to develop a "critical mass" given their tactical roll. Too few 60mm mortars and do you simlpy have an overweight grenade launcher? Too many 81mm mortars and have you created an overweight maneuver element that ties down the battalion? Too few and are you simlpy engaging in small-scale H&I fire without really bending the enemy to your will through agile, rapid response indirect fires? Keep concentrated or disperse? (Some of my friends assert that the Germans dispersed their battalion-level mortars in 1s and 2s to the companies which makes sense due to poor comm technology in WWII.)
This goes to the heart of my interest. Looking forward to your reply!
Small units of dispersed light infantry can accomplish amazing feats of arms against the right enemy (ie those "more" easily found and engaged by supporting stand-off weapons!) But at what point does such dispersion become a liability when trying to clear and control battle space such as an urban environment? Such a force, a sort of rapier, has the attributes needed for quick, precise, and lethal strikes against the right opponent. But against a "hardened", dispersed opponent determined to stand his ground in higher numbers do you need a warhammer instead? Thus two different types of battalions?
My son and I had a discussion today about an "ideal" weapon system. The target acquisition and designation system would be very small and blend in with the environment so as to be innocuous. The muntitions are dispersed and hidden in hard to ID and hard to reach places, silent until called upon by the "hunter" so even when "fired" their release doesn't draw unwanted attention to a platform that matters any longer or a platform that's reachable by enemy weapons. We've nearly achieved that level of capability in some ways and for certain situations and clearly the trend is in that direction. But for now there are severe limits on such technologies when the trigger-pullers must clear and hold certain types of terrain (and without too many broken buildings resulting!) :-)
When you can't defeat the enemy! It's that obvious I'm afraid and there are no clear cut cook book answers. It depends on how well you are trained and lead, and how effective you concept of operations is. If you are too dispersed to effectively perform the tasks and actions you need to achieve your mission the you are dispersed too far.
The biggest factor is usually communications and manoeuvre. Manoeuvre gives you freedom of action, which is why protected mobility is so essential to infantry operations, especially if a competent enemy has it and you don't.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
This obviously is going to depend upon unit types and missions. The frontage for a mechanized brigade in an attack is going to be vastly different of a Cavalry Regiment conducting a cover.
Example is better than precept.
Since we really know nothing about Mr OConnor's interest and background because he has chosen not to introduce himself, excuse me for making some assumptions.
It seems to me that he is seeking a formula for success on the battlefield based on establishing metrics for unit engagement areas. As the posts from both Wilf and RTK point out, it is not quite that simple. Back in the near Dark Ages (I'd have to defer to Ken White for the real Dark Ages), FM 100-5 discussed areas of interest and areas of influence in terms of both time and distance, by level of command. Areas of influence were essential limited by the range of fire support systems. However, these times and distances are best treated as rules of thumb. It ought to be readily apparent that one cannot be expected to defend against a mechanized battalion size force with a dismounted rifle platoon on a frontage of 5 kilometers . However, it is not quite so clear that a dismounted rifle platoon will be more successful in attacking an entrenched infantry force on a 300 meter frontage than on a 500 meter frontage, regardless of terrrain type. There are far too many variables to try to get a simplistic analysis that is as fine-grained as that. Successful tactics are not a matter of applying data into "plug and chug" formulas; there is at least as much art as science to the matter.
Yes, that's precisely the point of my questions (though not to that absurd extreme!).
A lot of bytes have been spilled in related threads about what battalions, companies, platoons, and squads should look like. Many of those posts contained broad (and very, very different) assumptions such as possible engagement ranges in urban combat and the resulting relative value of ATGMs (eg Javelin) and ATRLs (eg SMAW); the value of typical company and battalion-level assets such as mortars; the relative value of various MGs; etc... Yet assertions have been made about what squads and platoons should look like, how many weapons of a given type should be included, etc.
The last 2-3 responses to my question (which range fully from "that's obvious" to "too complicated") demonstrate why the topic is both so difficult and important yet filled with the peril of assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be valid for a given set of circumstances. Such assumptions are of little consequence on an internet forum but they cost lives on the battlefield.
How does one propose a squad, platoon, company, or battalion TO&E without first agreeing upon the unit's operating environment and intended purpose? As the other threads have demonstrated each individual has his own, unique perspective on what that environment looks like which drives his proposals. As Wellington said, "The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball." More coarsely, opinions are like you-know-what and everyone has one!
As for my background, the relevant bit involves asking questions such as these when business people make assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be true and which may or may not be shared by everyone else with a stake in the decision. From what I've observed the typical result is a lot of talking past one another as assertions are made based on often unspoken assumptions.
It's also been my experience that it's for more valuable to hash out those assumptions/assertions first to expose differences of opinion (which are viewed as "facts" too often) which can then lead to identifying that which is truly fact, that which is opinion, and that which is truly unknown (it's also very common for people to assume facts about which little or nothing it really known!).
The Darwinian battlefield is very good at molding troops into rational TO&Es that work for a given situation. Getting to that point from the paper TO&E typically involves the loss of many lives. There's always that danger of designing a TO&E "to fight the previous war" but based on my experience it's always best to back into a solution by clearly, honestly, and brutally laying out the requirements for that solution first and then considering what that solution should look like.
So, let's start again, and maybe this a better, more direct question. Instead of asking questions about TO&Es and redundancy and designated marksmen, let's ask the first question which should drive all of those answers and which should expose a lot of assumptions for further testing.
Describe your view on the full spectrum of the "small war" operating environment. What does it look like? Opposition? Terrain? Climate? Engagement ranges? Mobility limits and enablers? Factors which limit or liberalize applications of firepower? Access and limits to logistical support? Population density and demographics? Media access issues such as native, hostile foreign, and domestic? NGO aid groups? Language and cultural requirements? Force protection requirements? Security of infrastructure? Phase requirements from initial invasion to reconstruction? What is a society willing to pay when it comes to manning and equiping this force?
As an excercise consider these questions in light of the Iraq experience and you can immediately see where assumptions made on each of these issues had a significant effect on operations. Tiny example: a friend who is deploying (again) to Iraq said that the 7th seat on the Bradley is never used due to manpower (too few) and equipment (too much). The 9-man paper squad is a nice theory but just not a reality that makes sense given his world with respect to what he has available and what he needs to do. Another friend trains units such as arty crew in combat MP duties to escort convoys in Iraq.
Bigger examples: the debate between tracked vs wheeled APCs; debate between HMGs vs autocannons on carriers; vehicle armor levels vs intended mission vs actual mission; rules of engagement during initial invasion; force-space ratio relative to taking down conventional forces vs securing the battlefield; suspected WMDs yet not all troops equiped to survive such an environment; phase requirements; etc.
Asking what a platoon should look like without first clearly identifying knowns, opinions, and unknowns about the operating environment is like asking, "how long is a piece of string?" without first asking "what sort of package is that string (platoon) going to deliver?"
So, first, what's inside that small war package?
Then you'll have a better idea (never, ever perfect!) about whether to bring Javelins or SMAWs and how many 60mm mortars should be in a weapons platoon.
The challenge is balancing needs vs wants relative to cost and the full spectrum of objectives and requirements.
I need an organization, mission, and endstate to determine my operational limitations. The topic is too broad to be answered in its present form.
Example is better than precept.
Excellent example of the need to define the operating environment relative to requirements and solution.
Protected mobility is great but protected from what and at what cost?
Another thread proposed an APC with protection nearly as good as an M1 Abrams. The IDF uses obselete MBTs as APCs, But even an Abrams can be disabled by weapons available to the insurgent and the cost would be astronomical.
WWII Shermans were clearly inferior to German tanks but could be transported in sufficient numbers across the Atlantic to win the war (huge debates have been waged there!)
Clearly unarmored humvees are insufficient but what is required and what can is affordable? Resistance to 7.62 rounds? 12.7? 14.5? IED blasts of some significant metric? RPG-7s? (Afghan muj had access to 14.5mm machineguns so it's not unthinkable and protecting against the latest RPGs is nearly impossible at a "reasonable" cost.) It's not only a military issue but also a political one in the US.
In other words, what assumption is one making when speaking of "protected mobility"?
Same trend occured from the early 16th century to the early 18th century as heavily armored cavalry made the evolutionary journey from full plate to breast plate, finally being limited to mounted infantry in the 19th century (inspite of some events during the Franco-Prussian War, WWI, and early WWII!).
One of the things I learned in the Dark Ages
was that there is no perfect TOE, no perfect piece of equipment, no perfectly trained forces and no way to determine what the effects of Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops available and local population and infrastructure will have on ones organization and plans. That's a long way of saying that any attempt to 'study' or rationalize the question(s) at hand is going to fail because the parameters are entirely too many and varied.
So Armies blunder around and sustain some losses and achieve some successes and the key parameter is generally competent leadership and good, smart and intuitive commanders.
As I've grown older, I've watched literally dozens of pseudo scientific approaches to the amelioration of those problems and virtually all have seemed at least somewhat successful in the laboratory, testing ground or conference room while foundering badly when exposed to actual combat.
Penalty of trying to turn an art in to a science, I suspect.
But the military is required to answer that question every day whether or not they want to.
The usual reply is that Darwinian journey from paper TO&E to survivable solution (if not winnable).
Other threads have proposed squad-battalion TO&Es, but TO&Es to address what?
We have redlegs being tasked with convoy escort duty and Braldey companies which have done everything from engaging enemy vehicles to building schools and organizing local elections.
The topic is broad because reality has imposed broad requirements.
Great in theory but the harsh reality is that at some point a congressman puts into place an appropriation for a weapon system, etc. and you end up with APCs that can't carry a squad or VTOLs that approach an LZ with the grace of a commerical airliner. All of that blundering from policy and doctrine determination to training and procurement and finally to action on the battlefield results in guys at Walter Reed missing limbs or losing their lives.
Like I wrote, you can never, ever have perfect solutions because the requirements are so varied relative to cost and available resources. And precisely because it's not a science and rather an art teasing out assumptions and opinions is absolutely critical since unchallenged opinions have killed a lot of people.
Timothy,
First, you've been asked to introduce yourself at least twice. Please pay us the courtesy of complying. Most of us, especially those of us who are regular to the site and have contributed to the Journal, have paid others that respect. Please do the same.
We, the military, have answered those questions over the last four years because we have the answers to the three items I asked for. What I dealt with as a cavalry troop commander conducting reconnaissance, security, and surveillance operations in Northern Iraq was placed in context by understanding what our mission was, my task organization, and my Commander's desired endstate. Reality gave me those items. It was up to me, my Soldiers, and my Troop to conduct our mission in accordance to what we were given and still accomplish my Commander's endstate.
What you are asking the council to do is theorize in a box. Ask me what I did as a Regimental Training officer to get Howitzer Batteries and cavalry Troops prepared to conduct reconnaissance patrols and advisor duties and I'll tell you. Ask me to come up with the 90% solution TO&E and I'll tell you that you can't. The armored divisions of WWII made it through hedgerow country due to inginuity at the lower Soldier level. We'll never get away from relying upon that as the silver bullet, even if the proponents of the FCS try to make it so.
Lastly, we're at war. People die and get hurt. Over half of my troop has received the Purple Heart and I've been to more memorials for friends in the last 5 years than I care to remember. I understand the costs at the user end far more than your post gives credit for. The bottom line is that the enemy has a say and if the perfect solution were to come about, chances are the enemy would find a way around the perfect solution and inflict casualties within 2 weeks anyway. Then we'd be back at square one with this little exercise. Wars precipitate evolution and change and there's no getting around that.
Example is better than precept.
I think it can be said less harshly than RTK did (though I know the harshness was necessary):
Timothy: Combat, war, is not about numbers and math and equations and formulae. I've never experienced it but through games, reading, and history, and I know this.
You are trying to impose math and metrics upon something which is, in its most final analysis, about people. Real, non-integer people.
I've done it myself - it's an easy trap to fall into. It's incredibly seductive to just go "Well, I'll use new whizbang 728 with 23 guys to a squad and..." But it is wrong.
Don't think about the numbers. Throw the technical details out the window.
The people are the key. The people who wear the uniform and man the units, the people who make up the opposing side, the people who decide the context of any particular event.
What RTK is asking for is a question, or set of questions, you really, really need to have answered before you consider anything else:
"Why am I putting 18, 19, 20 year olds on a plane and sending them to a dangerous place? What are they intended to do when they get there? What do we hope to achieve with those people I have sent to a dangerous place, and why do we hope to achieve that?"
If the answer is "I am sending them to Europe to potentially defend against Soviet actions that may be part of a general war that may involve the use of nuclear weapons", you are going to have different parameters than if you're sending them to Afghanistan to fight an insurgency, support a government, and basically make things peaceful and prosperous. If you are sending them to Korea to defend against the KPA as they come across the DMZ, you have yet another set of parameters.
Acutally, I think I'm doing the opposite. A question such as, "what's a good platoon TO&E" leads to comments such as the following from another thread:
Wow! Look at the vast chasm seperating the two perspectives: small raiding force vs. going toe-to-toe in a set piece battle! What very different assumptions in mission objective and yet both participants were proposing solutions to a problem.I think that your proposed 30-man Platoon is a very useful Raiding organization, but I retain doubts about its ability to go toe-to-toe with an entrenched enemy on the battlefield.
The question, as I raise above, what problem? Answering that question first is a prerequisite to a solution (but proposing solutions before figuring out the problem is human nature).
As for my background, I apologize for not introducing myself formally. In fact, when rex made his comment I immediately PM'd him last night that I had not noticed the intro area and would post there as soon as I had time (he can vouch for that if you're still feeling any hostility or doubt towards me as implied in your comments).
I have not yet posted in the intro, not out of deliberate neglect, but merely out of great enthusiasm for the forum's excellent content. I was not aware that such weight was placed on introductions and had been simply enjoying the exchange of ideas.
And that is the peril of assumptions, both mine and yours!
Best Regards,
Tim
PS Quick background: have served in senior leadership positions for various companies supplying defense, civilian agency, and the commercial world with underlying technologies related to reconaissance and information retrieval. These technologies are being used in Iraq, Afghanistan, the broader GWOT, civilian space agencies, and even in commerical entities. Not nearly as exciting as many on this forum thus my interest in your comments. Otherwise I'm just an amateur, armchair historian with a "virtual" doctorate in military history according to my wife who says I buy way too many books (in our last move we had more weight in books than furniture!)
Last edited by Timothy OConnor; 01-03-2008 at 07:20 PM.
My question about the operating environment is not quantitative.
In fact, the questions raised in the other threads are quantitative by neccessity: How many people should be in a squad? Platoon? How many mortars should be at platoon and company level? At some point decisions related to these issues must be made.
Precisely. And thus the disconnects and cross-talk evident in the related threads (raiding force vs set-piece battle?).
I think it's time to go back to discussing how many teeth are in a horse's mouth.
Last edited by Timothy OConnor; 01-03-2008 at 06:32 PM.
Great in theory but the harsh reality is
actually that the Congress Critter in most cases is merely concerned with any tangible benefit to his or her District. Were that not the case, they'd be willing to double the training budget instead of forcing buys of expensive equipment that too many administrations over the years, too many service chiefs have not wanted.
That APC you mentioned and that VTOL are examples of that. They are also examples of systems effectively desired by the services for specific missions -- missions that got changed by those METT-T factors I cited. The Bradley was not great but was fairly good for its initially designed theater and mission (among other things, it needed to be able to be transported on European railways, thus its size constraint). It is not great for other theaters and missions; thus the flaw is not that no one thought about what was needed. They did and they did a good job -- they just assumed that the world situation would remain static and it does not.
Your efforts will be doomed by the same phenomenon; your product will work for the here and now but is unlikely to be able to cope with the dynamics of change. That's a people thing.
All of that blundering is from human fallibility. You got a cure for that?...All of that blundering from policy and doctrine determination to training and procurement and finally to action on the battlefield results in guys at Walter Reed missing limbs or losing their lives.
I've been around the world and back in both directions due to policy and doctrinal blunders, seen poor training and flawed equipment and seen a lot of bodies that didn't need to be dead. The majority of those errors were also due to human fallibility -- and a number of the humans involved tried to institute a more 'scientific' approach to policy, equipment design, procurement, doctrine, training and / or a lot of other things. When you come up with a methodology that will correct for the inability of metrics and other such inappropriate considerations to compensate for human flaws, you may be on to something.
All of the questions you raised in your 1651 post are valid -- they can be scientifically sorted and answered today and today's likely scenarios and locales. Will those answers still be appropriate in 15 year or 20 years in an unforeseen scenario in a locale not even dreamed of being a problem location?
As an aside, you also in that post said that wm's theoretical situation was absurd -- it wasn't, I have seen near replicas of those attack and defend situations on more than one occasion.
Back to my 15-20 years hence question; until then, as you said:
However, you left out the all important "multivaried terms and locales of application," in front of the word 'cost.'Like I wrote, you can never, ever have perfect solutions because the requirements are so varied relative to cost and available resources....
Realize that real cure for your 'problem' is significantly improved training because better trained people will not get tunnel vision, will not fixate on one theater or form of warfare and will design organizations and specify equipment that will better do the job in most places most of the time -- we will never design such that will always do the job everywhere and to waste time and effort attempting to do so is, of course, your prerogative.
No, attempting to convert art in to science sullies and lessens both while unchallenged opinions never killed anyone -- misjudgments, failure or inability to adapt and incompetence have killed millions....And precisely because it's not a science and rather an art teasing out assumptions and opinions is absolutely critical since unchallenged opinions have killed a lot of people.
Last edited by Ken White; 01-03-2008 at 07:53 PM.
You may or may not have noticed that almost no one who is now serving or has much combat experience is participating in those sorts of discussions to any real degree. You might want to ponder the why of that...
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks