Organization & Distance

[Distiller]

If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and airpower enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realisticly allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

[William F. Owen]

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.

[krsna]

You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.

one is prone to be techno-mesmerised but remember the boots on ground dictates the end result. got to get dirty eventually. technology gives one the edge in area of interest and area of influence but area of control is where organic capability comes in. you got to control the area post C4I advantage by quick closing in, defeating the enemy and then retaining the area wrested for whatever duration necessary. a general in washington can see what a sergeant is looking and can direct fires but he still needs boots on ground. conventional wars turn to uncoventional in no time. days of WW 1 are back sooner than you wish despite your asymmetry in surveillance, communications, firepower and mobility.

[krsna]

If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and air power enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realistically allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

further to your comment. i read your earlier submissions today. thumbs up for excellent analysis. some of your argument stems from mobility and balance from the C4I capability of mobile forces. in today's environment, none stays mobile forever. the modern technology disperses an entity away from other entities as well as from its control HQ but it has limits on intra-entity dispersion. Americans and Australians gave up the Soldier Modernization Pro gramme (SMP) induced 24x7 SATA capability of a soldier since ultimately human being wants assurance of physical support at a psychological level. thus the dispersion is limited also by human needs to be together unlike rambos who like to work alone. same is for vehicles where limited FOV restricts inter vehicle dispersion despite technology. the buddy system operates at the lowest to highest level.

[William F. Owen]

Krsna, please go to this (if you haven't already) link and tell us something about yourself.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1441

[Geoff]

I've read through most of this thread and seen a lot of informed comment, but the salient point should be not about organising around weapon systems, they change - we need to think terms of interoperable teams.

If. as was stated earlier the ideal base team is 4-5 then organise around that, build up your structurre from the base. When it comes to weapon systems, design them around your teams and the tasks that you have them perform. You have to be able to operate in a variety of theatres, but your recognition as to what is required for weaponry is driven by the task that people are expected to perform.

It will never be perfect, because the enemy will not do what you want them to do - it is not in their best interests, so we need to focus on well trained people who can react to a changing situation and sieze the initiative and thus dictate the pace and tempo of the battlefield around them.

[krsna]

History of war dates to duel between two unsocialised animals called Homo Sapiens. Has the society imposed the 4-5 limit on base as you suggest? Buddy system is the base of organised combat (Synergy of the twins, as against rivalry of twins-Kane and Abel). You can build anything upwards on this. Think about it.

[William F. Owen]

There are actually two issues at play here.

a.) The optimum team size for a complex and stressful task.
b.) Span of Control - not Command as is commonly expressed.

A lot of discussion assumes they are the same thing. I suggest they are not, thus I view task organisation as being the balance of those two items. Under great stress the span of control shrinks and can shrink down to two! However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller. This is why I argue so much for flexible and/or modular Platoon and Company groupings.

[Timothy OConnor]

However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller.

I think it really depends on the task at hand.

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

But, they've also discovered that if too large their ability to remain undetected truly is compromised such that they become ineffective as the bad guys avoid them. Thus the team is unable to meet its intended purpose if too large.

So, it all depends...

[krsna]

I think it really depends on the task at hand.

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

But, they've also discovered that if too large their ability to remain undetected truly is compromised such that they become ineffective as the bad guys avoid them. Thus the team is unable to meet its intended purpose if too large.

So, it all depends...

I agree with the concept of span of control as much as the need for innovation to suit ground reality. But consider that span of control stems from research in the management field where the supervisor has average span of control over 7-8 subordinates. Our squad span has brought it down to four. This is to to suit the buddy concept upwards than halve the span of control for greater control. The sniper teams signify this concept that the buddies have limit to independence in their sustenance. They must return to base or base must extend support to sustain them. Most of these concepts need to take Urban Warfare than Jungle or Mountain Warfare in our future deliberations.

[Rifleman]

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

Variations of this have always been done.

I've read sniper employment SOPs for 3rd Marine Division and 9th Infantry Division sniper operations in Vietnam. Both called for the two man sniper team to be secured by a fire team to squad size element. I don't think it was usually a case of the security element occupying the same hide site, but they would have been close enough to overwatch and provide supporting fire.

[kaur]

Some time ago, in the beginning of this thread somebody posted one table in pdf format about Candadian small arms shooting distances. Now this attatchement is gone. I do have discussion with my friends in another forum and would like to use this material as good illustration. I'd like to ask this person to post this table one more time. PM is maybe better option.

[Eden]

I've followed this thread off and on as it has wended its way back and forth over various subjects. Just wanted to comment on one recurring theme that I've seen - the idea that there exists an 'optimum' base or span of control that effects dispersion, dictates organization size, and limits the 'flatness' of a particular organization.

I would just ask that people keep in mind that you can find examples of teams or spans of control that far exceed 4 or 5 or a dozen or whatever.

150 years ago one man routinely controlled, with a fair degree of precision, the movement of a regiment. He could do this because the 'team members' had been rigourously trained in fairly simple tasks, they could all be communicated with simultaneously, they all had organic markers to guide their actions (dressing of ranks, presence of the colors, etc), and the leader could monitor their actions with a glance.

60 years ago, one bombardier in a B-17 could control dozens of bombers during their run over a target. He did this without communicating because all the members of that particular team could perform the enabling tasks (fly the plane, drop the bombs, fend off enemy fighters) without supervision, the conduct of the run itself was a well-rehearsed drill, and because of the simplicity of the control mechanism (follow me in your preassigned relative positions, drop your bombs when I do).

Finally, a quarterback controls ten other men in extremely complex tasks every play, with only a few seconds notice as to what task is required. He can do this because of a well-developed communications system (huddles, audibles, hand signals), a pre-determined way of reacting to opposing countermeasures (pass routes, blocking schemes, option handoffs, etc.), and, of course, practice, practice, practice.

My point is that optimal span of control and organizational size is a function of many factors - training, complexity of the task, weapon systems, willingness to accept risk, and many others. To state that there is an inherently optimal number - probably drawn from 20th Century management theory - and design your weapons, tactics, or organizations from that seems to me bassackwards.

And apologies to my Commonwealth friends for the American football example.

[William F. Owen]

My point is that optimal span of control and organizational size is a function of many factors - training, complexity of the task, weapon systems, willingness to accept risk, and many others. To state that there is an inherently optimal number - probably drawn from 20th Century management theory - and design your weapons, tactics, or organizations from that seems to me bassackwards.

It's actually military research, done by the DERA in the 1980s that proved the span of control was 4-5 and shrinks under pressure. This assumes that all of the 4-5 elements are doing different tasks.

The Napoleonic Army, B17 formation, football teams tasks are all "self synchronised" actions, that do not require explicit and direct control.

[marct]

Actually, Eden is right - it comes out of management research, originally with the Bank Wiring Room in the early 1930's, and then formalized again by the Brits with socio-technical systems (STS) theory in the 1940's and 50's. One of the findings of STS was that span of control was directly related to the degree of independence / professional expertise of a subordinant in order to fulfill their work role; the greater the required skills / knowledge, the lower the span of control. Napoleonic and 19th century armies required much less exercise of judgement and skills than 21st century armies do.

[Ken White]

Eden's examples are all those of mechanistic responses. If one wants to instill the fear of flogging or death that prevailed in most Armies of the Napoleonic era, then one man can still control a Regiment -- on a linear battlefield. Don't think I'd want to try it in the mountains of the 'Stan against the wily Pathan...

On the other hand, if one wants troops with drive and who will use their initiative and do innovative things, then 'iron discipline' is contraindicated. I submit in this day, more rather than less autonomy is needed in combat.

Any Tank Platoon leader that insists on fighting all four of his tracks as a unit instead of in pairs is likely to get in big trouble. A Company commander running squads is a menace. Can't do either of those things in most high intensity combat so why do it in training -- then your Squads or tracks are waiting for divine guidance when they should be acting.

I have controlled over 30 people in a gaggle in combat. I use the term control in its figurative sense because I was nominally in charge but I sure had no idea what the majority of those folks were doing. I have controlled three people, each of whom controlled three others -- and in a bad fight, I had no clue what one or two of the three I was supposed to be 'controlling' were doing.

I've in training and combat worked with varying numbers, have read a lot of the studies produced by The US Army Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), the Marines (and Wilf's UK DERA) which all came up with a combat effective span of 3-5. So a long time ago I came up with White's Control Theorem:

"If you try to control more than three to five subordinates and / or try to do any part of their jobs for them, you are a dangerous micromanager and I do not want to go to war with you."

And yes, circumstances have forced me to go to war with some of those against my 'want.' Proving that my theorem was and is totally correct...

[Eden]

The Napoleonic Army, B17 formation, football teams tasks are all "self synchronised" actions, that do not require explicit and direct control.

That was sort of my point. Span of control was increased because the team members exercised a greater degree of self-synchronization than is possible in combat today, due to doctrine, tactics, weapons system, etc.

I wholeheartedly agree that currently 3-5 subordinates is the optimal number, given today's circumstances. For all I know that may continue to be the case well into the future. However, I also believe that improvements in communications, situational awareness, individual and vehicular armor could change that. In other words, both Ken and Wilf are right...given today's conditions. But change those conditions and optimum solutions change.

After all, initiative, for instance, is not in and of itself a good thing. It is a good thing today because of the current state of communications and the complexity of the tasks we face. We want NCOs with initiative who can act within the spirit of issued orders to accomplish a stated goal. But NCOs two hundred years ago were most valued who displayed a brutal willingness to follow orders, set a good example, and enforce discipline. Initiative - at least in the tactical sense - was neither valued nor particularly desired. This was not because leaders back then were stupid, its because the conditions were different.

So, if you are looking for a theoretical approach to optimizing span of control and/or organizational size, you have to free yourself from the prejudices of the moment. Especially if, as most futurists predict, our ability to self-synchronize operations will improve in the near future.

[Ken White]

...
"... However, I also believe that improvements in communications, situational awareness, individual and vehicular armor could change that. In other words, both Ken and Wilf are right...given today's conditions. But change those conditions and optimum solutions change.

No question that conditional changes can adjust the size of the span and are likely to do so. Whether that adjustment is downward or upward remains to be seen. I think the human mind and not any degree of situational awareness is going to be the ultimate arbiter.

After all, initiative, for instance, is not in and of itself a good thing...

We can disagree on that

... It is a good thing today because of the current state of communications and the complexity of the tasks we face. We want NCOs with initiative who can act within the spirit of issued orders to accomplish a stated goal. But NCOs two hundred years ago were most valued who displayed a brutal willingness to follow orders, set a good example, and enforce discipline. Initiative - at least in the tactical sense - was neither valued nor particularly desired. This was not because leaders back then were stupid, its because the conditions were different.

I suggest that innovative leaders of 200 years ago did prize initiative on the part of their subordinates. From Gustavus Adolphus through De Saxe to Sir Henry Clinton and Sir John Moore they not only fostered initiative, they changed warfare.

So, if you are looking for a theoretical approach to optimizing span of control and/or organizational size, you have to free yourself from the prejudices of the moment...

Good advice, though I suggest that the theory is not nearly as important as the practice and one should exercise care to avoid introducing replacement prejudices.

... Especially if, as most futurists predict, our ability to self-synchronize operations will improve in the near future.

If the Futurists are correct in this instance, that will be a pleasant change from their past performance but I believe that such self synchronization if it (a) appears and (b) is allowed will call for more, not less initiative while significantly reducing any 'benefit' from over control.

[krsna]

No question that conditional changes can adjust the size of the span and are likely to do so. Whether that adjustment is downward or upward remains to be seen. I think the human mind and not any degree of situational awareness is going to be the ultimate arbiter.We can disagree on that I suggest that innovative leaders of 200 years ago did prize initiative on the part of their subordinates. From Gustavus Adolphus through De Saxe to Sir Henry Clinton and Sir John Moore they not only fostered initiative, they changed warfare.Good advice, though I suggest that the theory is not nearly as important as the practice and one should exercise care to avoid introducing replacement prejudices.If the Futurists are correct in this instance, that will be a pleasant change from their past performance but I believe that such self synchronization if it (a) appears and (b) is allowed will call for more, not less initiative while significantly reducing any 'benefit' from over control.

Great to see the thread active again. Just a small incident for you guys. I was in the combat zone engaged with a group of terrorists some years ago. Although at the helm of 1000 or so men, I was left alone with just my own team in the thick of ops and with just my buddy in the face of two of the enemy. I remember my buddy admonishing me for single shot than a burst of fire, which he did of course and we won that round. In combat not just the span but the leadership shifts too, down the chain. All communication fails at the crucial moment except the basic animal instinct ingrained since ages. Hence training to control is less important than training to survive and let the enemy die. Technology may reduce the physical distance but it often fails at the wrong moment. I for one can vouch for it. My advice is to look beyond the span argument and let the sleeping dogs lie.