Organization & Distance

[Timothy OConnor]

There have been several interesting proposals for squad through battalion-level organizations.

I'm interested in the relationships between organization, span of control, and "effective" weapon ranges relative to these proposals. It seems to me that span of control and effective weapon ranges are core organizational drivers but these are usually either assumed in such discussions or left out all together which can result in significant battlefield friction.

For example, if you look at typical WWII organizations there's a clear correlation between effective weapon range and unit frontage and depth at various levels of command from platoon to battalion. In other words a given unit level is expected to control a given amount of frontage and depth based on its size/number of sub-units and equipment. But there were also huge C3limits in WWII that have been addressed today but which are still not completely solved (see Ambush Alley for an excellent description of the limits of current battlefield communications technology.)

This is nothing new but the acceleration curve for battlefield dispersion driven by the firepower available to light infantry has increased rapidly in the 20th century and continues to do as demonstrated in Afghanistan where U.S. special forces used PGMs as WWII troops used 60mm mortars (well, almost): to place indirect fire on enemy troops with great agility. At the same time it's easy to be lulled into believing that strategic "stand-off" weapons directed by small units of light infantry is sufficient to win modern wars. Such technology can be used to smash conventional forces or even massed irregular forces but it faces severe limitations against dispersed unconventional forces determined to resist.

There is also often difference of opinion on how many sub-units a given level of command can control and their appropriate level of dispersion, especially when one considers that a minimal level of situational awareness is required to excercise command effectively. And there is often disagreement on the unit level at which certain weapons should be organic, attached, or left under the control of higher level leaders.

Books such as Not Mentioned in Despatches, Not a Good Day to Die, Ambush Alley, and No True Glory do an excellent job of describing the friction that occurs when higher level leaders (eg battalion+) try to excercise too much control over lower level tactical situations and how lack of equipment at a given level can impede a lower level unit from accomplishing its tactical mission.

So here are a few questions for this group. My involvement in these topics is limited to development of underlying technologies for reconaissance systems (tactical to strategic) so I'm always fascinated by (and greatly respect) the opinions of those with experience at the sharp end.

1. At a given a leader's level (squad, platoon, company, and battalion) how much space (frontage and depth) should he expect to fight as determined by four broad categories of terrain? (eg open desert, rolling countryside, urban, jungle). Assume a typical modern western battalion with respect to technology (eg Blue Tracker, etc.), differentiating between mech and leg infantry as needed. Assume ongoing combat operations against opposing light infantry (regular or irregular) and/or traditional combined arms opfor as opposed to security and stability operations in (relatively) calm urban centers with dense civilian populations going about their daily business. So, collateral damage is still a concern but it's "open warfare" Fallujah-style rather than doing neighborhood patrols while handing out candy to children in Basra. There are of course lots of fields manuals and conventional wisdom on the subject but I still encounter interesting differences of opinion, often driven by the individual's personal experience.

2. At each of the levels, given the amount of space expected to be fought at that level and available transport, what sort of weapons should be organic? Attached? Left under control of higher level leaders? This is covered by some other threads but here it's explicitly tied to terrain and area of operations at each given level of command and seeks comment on specific ranges (do also consider logistics and transport with respect to sub-unit dispersion, ammo supply/use rate, etc.).

For example in one thread I noticed a difference of opinion with respect to ATGMs and ATRLs and their relative value in urban warfare given assumed engagement ranges. One fellow assumed very short ranges and saw ATGM as overkill while another saw urban terrain as allowing 2,000m+ engagements and ATGMs as valuable. Such assumptions are (should be) key drivers to determine TO&E but these assumptions are often left unspoken.

And if one proposes a given weapon system should exist at a given level, what are the assumptions for its operation? Always concentrated and directed at higher levels? If attached, at what level of dispersion before becoming too ineffective? Given typical engagement ranges, weapon effective range, and unit/sub-unit dispersion who's in the best position to control a given weapon system in light of that individual's typical situational awareness and probable reaction times to battlefield developments? (eg if a system is placed too high it can't exploit tactical opportunities, too low and it becomes a burden or isn't aware of opportunities.)

3. Based on the two items above, what should sub-units look like and what level of independece should be expected of them? How should one balance directive command and restricitve control at various levels as determined by tactical situation, C3I, and troop quality considerations? This last item probably deserves its own thread but here is tied directly to how much area a given level of command is expected to fight as determined by various factors such as terrain, etc.

[Rex Brynen]

There have been several interesting proposals for squad through battalion-level organizations.

I'm interested in the relationships between organization, span of control, and "effective" weapon ranges relative to these proposals. It seems to me that span of control and effective weapon ranges are core organizational drivers but these are usually either assumed in such discussions or left out all together which can result in significant battlefield friction.

Excellent comment, Timothy. I suppose similar curiosities--but much less well articulated--drove me to want to pull together the various threads that had emerged into a section-to-battalion overview, something that Norfolk and others have now offered.

Did you ever post an introduction here?

[Norfolk]

Well, the traditional tried-and-true span-of-control is one leader or higher HQ for up to five immediate subordinates or lower HQ. Graicunas (for some reason I called him Granicus in another thread, the name of one of Alexander the Great's battles) if I remember correctly, stated a range of 3-6 subordinates for each leader, with 4-5 being optimal; Clausewitz himself reckoned 4-5. But you also have to bear in mind that good-quality, well-trained and well-led troops can take a good deal of the load off of their commander's shoulders because they are willing and able to handle a lot of the coordination details amongst themselves after being given their task - SoC Theorists call this Fayol's Bridge; the military calls it different things like Teamwork and Auftragstaktik.

For ranges, there's an attachment to this post. Tactical Bounds are tied to those ranges however, "One Tactical Bound" being the Effective Range of a unit's longest-range weapon. Usually units prefer to operate within the range of their Heavy Weapons, for obvious reasons, and may resort to moving distances of one-half of a Tactical Bound when in the presence of or in proximity to, the enemy in order to remain under its protection.

As to distances between men, key weapons, unit frontages and the like, that's a little more involved in some ways. Generally, 10m between Infantrymen is preferred in open country in day, 5m at night, and 5m in close country or 3m at night; some Armies are returning to 5m most of the time - which is closer to WWII than present-day practices, but reduces control problems in the field but increases vulnerability to enemy weapons. The point is to try to stay out of the danger space/beaten zones of enemy weapons, or if caught in them, then to reduce the damage done.

Vehicles try to stay about 100 m apart, but in recent years there have again, been some shifts more towards WWII-style 50m or even 25m spacings between vehicles; sometimes this is unavoidable anyway - in GW1 this sometimes happened. And the Russians still use 25m between tanks much of the time. So you get a Rifle Squad/Section attacking on a 50m (close country) to 100 m (open country) front (USMC Squad may attack on a 125m front), and a tank platoon may attack on a 400-500m front. They usually defend a frontage of twice that.

Of course, as you go up the ladder of echelons, Frontages and Depths increase (see especially pages 5-5 and 6-3 to get an idea of what is involved here at angrif.hp.infoseek.co.jp/corseware/st_100-7.pdf - Google it), depending upon the number of sub-units that units put on the line (ie 2 up, 1 back, vice versa, etc.) and spaces between sub-units of units, and units of formations.

[William F. Owen]

Actually got a deadline to deal with so I cannot give this the attention it deserves right now, but the critical aspect here is not really anything to do with weapons. It's sensors and communications equipment. How far you can disperse a given organisation is pretty much a function of the four critical freedoms of Fires, Observation, Communication and Manoeuvre. Your ability to do those things in time and space will define how far you can disperse and how quickly you can concentrate.

EG- A dismounted Coy with Spike ATGMS and a Man packed UAV can in theory cover a 3.5km x 3.5km area in terms of an anti-armour mission. Reality is somewhat different!

[Timothy OConnor]

Of course, as you go up the ladder of echelons, frontages (and depths) increase (see especially pages 5-5 and 6-3 to get an idea of what is involved here), depending upon the number of sub-units that units put on the line (ie 2 up, 1 back, vice versa, etc.) and spaces between sub-units of units, and units of formations.

Outstanding info! Love the the way the chart correlates weapon to frontage.

An interesting excercise would be to tag the weapons on the chart at the command level and concentration at which various weapon systems are organized.

This goes to the ATGM vs ATRL in urban warfare. Also goes to systems such as 60mm and 81mm mortars (and now 120mm!). Some American TO&Es show only 2 such weapons concentrated in a weapons platoon or weapons company respectively. Others have 3 or 4 and some have proposed as many as 8! This raises the issue of how many such weapons are required to develop a "critical mass" given their tactical roll. Too few 60mm mortars and do you simlpy have an overweight grenade launcher? Too many 81mm mortars and have you created an overweight maneuver element that ties down the battalion? Too few and are you simlpy engaging in small-scale H&I fire without really bending the enemy to your will through agile, rapid response indirect fires? Keep concentrated or disperse? (Some of my friends assert that the Germans dispersed their battalion-level mortars in 1s and 2s to the companies which makes sense due to poor comm technology in WWII.)

Actually got a deadline to deal with so I cannot give this the attention it deserves right now, but the critical aspect here is not really anything to do with weapons. It's sensors and communications equipment. How far you can disperse a given organisation is pretty much a function of the four critical freedoms of Fires, Observation, Communication and Manoeuvre. Your ability to do those things in time and space will define how far you can disperse and how quickly you can concentrate.

EG- A dismounted Coy with Spike ATGMS and a Man packed UAV can in theory cover a 3.5km x 3.5km area in terms of an anti-armour mission. Reality is somewhat different!

This goes to the heart of my interest. Looking forward to your reply!

Small units of dispersed light infantry can accomplish amazing feats of arms against the right enemy (ie those "more" easily found and engaged by supporting stand-off weapons!) But at what point does such dispersion become a liability when trying to clear and control battle space such as an urban environment? Such a force, a sort of rapier, has the attributes needed for quick, precise, and lethal strikes against the right opponent. But against a "hardened", dispersed opponent determined to stand his ground in higher numbers do you need a warhammer instead? Thus two different types of battalions?

My son and I had a discussion today about an "ideal" weapon system. The target acquisition and designation system would be very small and blend in with the environment so as to be innocuous. The muntitions are dispersed and hidden in hard to ID and hard to reach places, silent until called upon by the "hunter" so even when "fired" their release doesn't draw unwanted attention to a platform that matters any longer or a platform that's reachable by enemy weapons. We've nearly achieved that level of capability in some ways and for certain situations and clearly the trend is in that direction. But for now there are severe limits on such technologies when the trigger-pullers must clear and hold certain types of terrain (and without too many broken buildings resulting!) :-)

[William F. Owen]

But at what point does such dispersion become a liability when trying to clear and control battle space such as an urban environment?

When you can't defeat the enemy! It's that obvious I'm afraid and there are no clear cut cook book answers. It depends on how well you are trained and lead, and how effective you concept of operations is. If you are too dispersed to effectively perform the tasks and actions you need to achieve your mission the you are dispersed too far.

The biggest factor is usually communications and manoeuvre. Manoeuvre gives you freedom of action, which is why protected mobility is so essential to infantry operations, especially if a competent enemy has it and you don't.

[krsna]

I have read with great interest your thread and feel you need oriental perspective too. Here is what we think in the Asian region:

Area of Operational Influence(AOPIN) = Reach of Ground Forces (REAGROF) x Target engagement range of
Fire Support Systems (TERFSS)

Hence the frontage and depth is governed by AOPIN. The Organization is built upon smallest subunit capable of limited independent operations. It may be squad (4) or section (8-10). The smallest frontage x depth covered is 50 m2 for the squad. The entire hierarchy is built upon it as triad or quad aggregation for command and control. The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics. Hope it solves some of your issues. I would like to be associated with you since I am a researcher too as long as I am cited appropriately.

[William F. Owen]

Area of Operational Influence(AOPIN) = Reach of Ground Forces (REAGROF) x Target engagement range of
Fire Support Systems (TERFSS)

Hence the frontage and depth is governed by AOPIN. The Organization is built upon smallest subunit capable of limited independent operations. It may be squad (4) or section (8-10). The smallest frontage x depth covered is 50 m2 for the squad. The entire hierarchy is built upon it as triad or quad aggregation for command and control. The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.

I'm not sure I understand this well enough to comment, but I would not agree with the idea that:

"The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.".

These are certainly factors, but a squad, as cited in the example, can in theory acquire targets at 3,000m, so I am not sure why a frontage and depth would be specified

As I say, I may not have understood correctly

[Distiller]

Back at my computer again after three weeks of different amusements ...


A couple of thoughts (all based on the fact that this here is small war's council):

# How much space/width and how many threat vectors can a single squad defend? Well, if every man has a PGM targeting device thousands of yards and dozens of targets.
On the other hand, in urban combat a squad might be happy to "control" a single small courtyard of a building and a single vector, reducing their engagement width to single digit meters.

# The equipment:
Assuming that in combat operating (i) a man is fully busy with a weapon with a single characteristic/ballistic one is more than enough, and that (ii) a squad does not have the overview for employing indirect fire, the squad should be limited to direct fire weapons and such as are always needed, and enable the soldier to concentrate on his single weapon, plus without being too heavy and bulky. Thus rifle and machine gun only.
On the platoon level then the weapons specialists with things like RPGs and AGLs, which have about the same max range and do not require a lot more overview than a squad has, plus give the platoon that desired direct/indirect/anti-armor mix. The arithmetics should be chosen in a way to re-enforce the squads, meaning one RPG and AGL per squad (2-men teams each, one operates the weapon, the other carries reloads and observes).
Since a squad/platoon can be expected to be employed in very rough terrain, keep weight down, keep ammo resupply requirements down.
On company level then you ad range and punch - mortars, guided missiles. Still everything man-portable. And with enough people to carry ammo, esp for the mortar.

# On the numbers of the heavier weapons:
Mortars I'd say three, maybe six - but then ammo has to transported in trolleys or barrows (only in not too rough terrain). If you have to operate in very rough terrain you need six men per mortar to have anything more than a few moments of indirect fire. Same goes for the missile teams (anti-armor, anti-air).
All these mortar and missile teams should be sized and trained that they can revert to a fourth platoon in the company, if their special weapons are not needed. I think that is one critical point - it gives the unit flexibility.
For the battalion level there are only the support elements to ad.
What weapon you don't have on company level, you don't get (again, small wars).

# The numbers of heavier weapons depends on your heavy precision fire support (155mm, UAVs, helicopters, fighterbombers), and how much you trust in their availability. Environment, enemy, C3.

# I think keeping fire support together on higher levels is a good idea, but there should be enough of it to support each individual lower formation. Re only two mortars for a company is not a good idea when you have three platoons (and nine squads) that each can potentially face a threat vector and require fire support.

# All in all over-organization on those low levels is a bad idea. You give the squads what they always need, the platoon what is needed in some situations, and the company what is rarely needed. All the rest is for the CO to figure out.
If you are too static in your approach you equip formations with weapons they don't really need, adding weight, logistics needs and costs.
Effector ranges are not as decisive as overview.

# I think one of the questions unchanged is, how can you equip a formation like a platoon or company without loading it up too much, giving too many special weapons to them that they don't need and how to balance the unit for assault and sustained ops.
The U.S. forces, due to their logistics capabilities, might not be the best place to look for such answers I feel.

[krsna]

I'm not sure I understand this well enough to comment, but I would not agree with the idea that:

"The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.".

These are certainly factors, but a squad, as cited in the example, can in theory acquire targets at 3,000m, so I am not sure why a frontage and depth would be specified

As I say, I may not have understood correctly

Dear Owen,
Never mind the niceties. Best debate is frank and forthright. As I said, I shall clarify further. The dispersion as we understand is the geographical area covered by a subunit or unit (let us call it ENTITY for ease of reference) for independent operations whereas frontage and depth is the area covered by the capability (in terms of SATA and Target engagement range) of weapons and equipment organic to it. Dispersion is a product of the the organic capbility as well as the communications (internal permits intra entity dispersion while external permits inter entity dispersion) besides the logistics (mobility and sustenance). Hence the three factors of fire power, mobility and communications play a major role in frontage-depth as well as dispersion. Hope it is a better attempt this time. By the way I am a Colonel from Infantry.

[William F. Owen]

Dear Owen,
Never mind the niceties. Best debate is frank and forthright. As I said, I shall clarify further. The dispersion as we understand is the geographical area covered by a subunit or unit (let us call it ENTITY for ease of reference) for independent operations whereas frontage and depth is the area covered by the capability (in terms of SATA and Target engagement range) of weapons and equipment organic to it. Dispersion is a product of the the organic capbility as well as the communications (internal permits intra entity dispersion while external permits inter entity dispersion) besides the logistics (mobility and sustenance). Hence the three factors of fire power, mobility and communications play a major role in frontage-depth as well as dispersion. Hope it is a better attempt this time. By the way I am a Colonel from Infantry.

Call me Wilf, everyone does. Interesting explanation. So would weapon's time of flight (ATGM and Mortars) be a planning factor associated with Front and depth and not dispersion?

[jcustis]

If we are addressing time of flight for things like ATGMs, then I would offer that we must look at mobility from a specific perspective, and that is how terrain affects the X number of engagement windows available. That, as I'm sure folks here know, will have a significant affect on both frontage and depth (especially depth) if the terrain prevents full LOS for the entire range and time of flight for a system.

Because of rolling terrain, I may only have a few engagement windows, thus forcing me to sight ATGM systems further forward in sector because targets moving at X speed will only expose themselves for X time period, and to engage from max effective range, the target would disappear from view before the missile made impact.

I had the good fortune of having this battlefield geometry lesson instilled during a combt readiness evaluation and not actually on the two-way range. I actually knew the answer, but lack of sleep lead me to eyeball the sector of fire and call it "good" when that was the furthest thing from the truth.

[krsna]

Call me Wilf, everyone does. Interesting explanation. So would weapon's time of flight (ATGM and Mortars) be a planning factor associated with Front and depth and not dispersion?

Wilf and jcustis,
This is for both of you. The effective interlocked arcs of fire, as defined by range of any weapon system, whether static or mobile, determines the frontage covered. In former case it would be frontage of static defence and that of mobile defence in the latter case. Depth is related to certain factors as capability to absorb the breach of frontage and allow repulse of breach by providing counterattack capability. As regards dispersion and the time of flight factors, I maintain that the dispersion is frontage and depth plus the capability to disperse by means of communication, mobility for maneuvre, protection for sustenance and logistics for sustenance. Time of flight is an attribute of speed, hence it influences the effectiveness in terms of time of decision (it may give more time for Commander to decide). Further it shall influence the maneuvre too by allowing speed of engagement and hence allow move to better position of advantage. Dispersion as we see it is not only a factor of larger frontage needs but also of defensive need to avoid being pinned by enemy massed attack by conventional means or by WMDs.