I'm curious Ken, how tall are you? I'm a short guy, and my limited experience with bullpups has been mostly positive, and most short guys I have served with prefer them when they get the chance to shoot them. I don't think they are the next step in battle rifle design, but I wouldn't rule it out either.
Reed
Originally Posted by sapperfitz82
I'm old and have shrunk
from 6'2" to 6' -- good catch. As I said, it's a personal preference thing. Both my 5"5" and 5'9" sons like Bullpups (both are AUG fans), the 6'3" guy does not. Rifles are like everything else, METT-TC rules...
Agree they have a place. Most Infantrymen in a bigger war will do little CQB but some folks do a lot -- Bullpups are good for that.
How you been?
I think the primary considerations should be reliability, accuracy, range and stopping power. That is of course in reference to small arms, not to guys who have shrunk.
Does anyone know how the XM-25 is working out?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Apparently the grenade launcher system has deployed to Afghanistan in very limited numbers, with limited results.
The XM-25 has fired 55 rounds in nine firefights between Dec. 3 and January 12, when the formal Forward Operational Assessment ended. Officials say the weapon “disrupted” two insurgent attacks against an observation post, destroying one PKM machine gun position in one of those attacks. That is where the ”usually our engagements last for 15-20 minutes. With the XM-25 they’re over in a few minutes” line came from.
The XM-25 also “destroyed” four ambush sites during engagements on foot patrols or movements to contact. In one instance, the 25mm HE round exploded on a PKM gunner and he was either wounded and fled or scared and fled, but dropped his machine gun, which Soldiers later recovered.
Read more: http://kitup.military.com/2011/02/in...#ixzz1KLNJSaXO
Kit Up!
The XM25 is a dubious project
Was the US Army expected to report that initial use of the pre-production XM25 was disappointing, inconclusive or going well ? Did anyone expect something more than a folksy anecdotal press release ?
Re-reading the PR blurb it may even include some double counting. One predictable outcome of the XM25 project is that those who devised and promoted it for issue to each “infantry squad and special forces team” will be seeking cover from verbal fire. [Quote from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM25_CDTE]
Currently the US Army infantry squad has a squad leader plus two 4-man teams each equipped with a 5.56mm LMG and three 5.56mm carbines/rifles, or an LMG plus 2 carbines/rifles and a 5.56 or 7.62mm DMR. To provide baton, buckshot, HE, smoke, AP and other chemical support each team has at least one carbine/rifle fitted with a 1.5kg single-shot UBL attachment that can fire a 40x46mm LV projectile weighing 160 to 180gm to about 150m against point targets, or 350m against area targets. The squad leader may also have a UBL attachment.
The 6-shot semi-automatic XM25 was ostensibly developed as a partial successor for the M203 UBL. Weighing about 6.5kg unloaded the XM25 includes an electronic ranging and fuzing system and can fire a projectile of about 100gm (estimated on basis of acceptable recoil into the shoulder) at more than 200m/sec. Its reported range with a low elevation trajectory is up to 500m against point targets and 700m against area targets.
However, the infantry squad is intimately concerned with close range firepower extending outward to rifle range. So is a squad or team likely to relinquish one or more of its simple, rugged and ubiquitous 40x46mm UBLs in exchange for the substantial capability and system weight of an XM25 ? That’s as likely to happen as requiring one of its infantrymen to give up hand grenades because the Claymore is available.
Also - unlike the Claymore - the XM25 is an attempt to validate the attractive ballistic paradigm in which a sophisticated sight overcomes dispersion with range and hence improves the feasibility of a small payload. For the infantry squad and even were it to be carried in place of one of the LMGs, it is apparent that adding an XM25 together with its need for yet another variety of ammunition would be burdensome.
Due to its system weight, complexity and range capability the XM25 should have been developed as a platoon support weapon rather than as a component of squad level fire and movement. The question that keeps surfacing is ‘ Was it necessary to develop a flyweight range of 25mm ammunition ’ ?
Currently there are three basic types of 40mm grenade ammunition (approx data from Wiki etc):
40x46 LV: 160 to 180g at 75m/sec, max effective range 350m from M4/M203 (5.5kg unloaded);
40x51mm MV: 160 to 180g at 110m/sec, max eff rge 700m from M32 MGL (5.5kg unloaded);
40x53mm HV: 240gm at 230m/sec, max eff rge 1600m from Mk47 AGL (inc tripod 30kg unloaded).
A strong selling point for the XM25 has been that its air-burst proximity to target derives from a precise correlation of range and spin count. Presumably - but not certainly - that fuze performance and also weight have been evaluated against those of the air-burst fuzes that are already available for 40mm grenades.
Regardless of the brilliance of its ranging/fuzing system, there are at least two alternatives to the XM25. One, development of a magazine-fed semi-automatic weapon to fire 40x53mm HV ammunition from a recoilling over-the shoulder barrel. Such a weapon might have an unloaded weight with bipod up to the 12kg of the M240 MG and yet be acceptable at platoon level provided it could deliver radio and impact fuzed 240gm projectiles accurately to say at least 300m, and 900m against area targets. To reduce system weight it might be practicable to also fire LV and/or MV rounds.
Two, there is the less ambitious but rapid LV/MV path adopted by the USMC with the 6-round M32 semi-automatic MGL as a platoon or squad weapon. It has a capable sight that can be used to fire 40x46mm LV rounds with better accuracy than the M203. It can also fire 40x51mm MV rounds to about 275m against point targets, and 700m on a high trajectory against area targets. The 13-man USMC squad with three 4-man teams seems well structured to add one M32 and drop one LMG or other auto weapon.
It's in practice likely less a grenade launcher than a thermal sight that uncovers even some camouflaged opfor and can see through smoke and night.
People get too fixated on firepower at times.
This seems to fit your description fairly well except it is not over-shoulder.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Good, moved to sunnyWA and I am now in a sniper section (WANG).
Been hanging out mostly on SOCNET these days.
Reed
Kind of an indicator of the Talibans' counter-move(s).
A former Royal Marine helped smuggle scopes for sniper rifles to Iran which ended up in the hands of the Taliban, an investigation has revealed.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ling-ring.html
A scrimmage in a Border Station
A canter down some dark defile
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail
http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg
Smuggling? Decent hunting scopes are good enough for the job, and easily available even in countries with gun control laws. It should be extremely simple to get some - even without some form of smuggling (save for smuggling into AFG).
Times change.
And here I thought your average Afghan male was supposed to be able to drop a goat at 1,000 yards with open sights. That was the story when I was growing up during the Reagan Administration, anyway.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Average probably not, but there were times when Enfield bolt action rifles and their copies dominated the popular Afghan armament. Those rifles were made for long-range rifleman fire, albeit not for single shots.
Greetings.
1.I just read from news that finnish army is going to replace traditonal 7-men infatry squad with new 9-men squad in light infatry battlegroups.
In Finland "basic" squad has consisted of
1.half-squad/gun group with
Squad leader
Machine gunner
Assistant machine gunner
2.half-squad with
Anti-tank guy with M72
Anti-tank guy with M72
Assistant squad leader
Assistant squad leaders buddy pair.
+possibly vehicle driver some times
All that is disclosed about new nine men squad is that it consist of 3 teams of 3 soldiers.
Educated quesses have been that squad will have "command team", rifle team and MG team and not three identical teams.
2.I have (maybe silly) question. Does land mines belong to standard equipment of infantry squads in armed forces of other countries?
I am asking this because here in Finland part of infatry squads standard equipment are 10-12 anti-tank mines.
Partial answer.
That would work, though I tend to think fewer but larger squads are better for sustained combat than more smaller squads. The trade off is in leaders trained, though...
The US Marines briefly had a ten man squad, three teams of three plus a Squad Leader; each team had an Automatic Rifle / LMG. Combat experience quickly led to the team size being increased to four men for a 13 man Squad.For the US, that was true in Europe World War II and it was true in the early days in Korea. In the Pacific Theater in WW II and later in Korea and in most of our wars since, we've gotten out of the habit due to lack of need. It's a METT-TC thing...I have (maybe silly) question. Does land mines belong to standard equipment of infantry squads in armed forces of other countries?
I am asking this because here in Finland part of infatry squads standard equipment are 10-12 anti-tank mines.
Finnish defense concerns make it perfectly understandable on that basis.
It shouldn't.
Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.
An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.
An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.
The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.
In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.
It shouldn't but in democracies, it does and will...
Agree with all you wrote. From the NCO leader standpoint, the size of the Squad makes little difference. The absolute number of them is only marginally an issue.
My too cryptic comment was aimed not at training NCOs, that's easy and even democracies can and do get that done in short time periods with few problems -- the issue is training Officers. Simply put, smaller Squads mean more Platoons, and thus more Companies and so more Battalions -- the latter two critical training and development positions for Officers in war or peace.
Training new Lieutenants is easy and we did it in '90 days' in WW II, seemed to work fairly well. However, at higher echelons, developing good commanders takes time and experience; more smaller units simply equals more opportunities to develop such experience in and for larger units.
Democracies will always have to sacrifice some efficiency and effectiveness for politically prescribed concerns and thus cannot undertake optimum training regimens -- particularly in peacetime...
So while I totally agree and have long advocated a Reichswehr - like approach for the US Army and Marines (i.e. raise the standard for entry and in training considerably among other things), the probability of seeing that happen is not good.
As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment. More applicable (I appreciate) for armies that pick fights overseas than those who defend only their homeland.
Take (Vietnam and Afghanistan) two examples for comparison where give the different enemy and the different terrain certain changes from the standard "Cold War" organisational structure of those times would have been beneficial in the particular theater.
It seems that despite all the talk of flexibility and of adapting to local conditions no significant changes seem to get made. Is this because commanders believe in the "one size fits all" approach where current organisations are forced to fit current operational circumstances or they have neither the interest nor the ability to make the necessary changes?
Watching a repeat of the series the Scots at War on the History Channel I note (from the parts on Afghanistan) that apart from a water overload, the insanity of lugging Javelin anti-tank missiles (at 40lbs for missile and CLU) and the obvious absurd weight of radio equipment for 2-3 km patrol much stays the same in terms of structure, weapons and equipment.
I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?
... and as I have mentioned before that most of the (mine protecting) vehicle mods could have been carried out in a local "factory" in Kabul (or suitable local place).
Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.
Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?
Probably problem at squad level leadership in FDF is that while corporals (and some times sergeants) who lead the infantry squads have gone through ~112 days long reserve NCO course, on other hand assistant squad leaders, who leads squad's four+ man assault element if situation warrants it and takes charge of squad if squad leader is absent or has fallen, is given no leadership training. Squad leader picks ASS.SL from one of 6 month rank-and-file guys appointed to his squad after basic training and at begining of specialisation training period (AIT? MOS?). Althought 4 months is propably long enough of time go through all squad members to choose for proper ASS.SL. Also proper attitude might compensate any deficiencies in training.
Only exception to this are MOUT infatry companies of Guard's Jaeger Regiment and some special and "special" forces units that have NCO as assistant squad leader.
Also on infatry squad compositions.
That new 9-men squad type will be used in so called regiona battlegroups, which are given specific area to do defence and delay actions. Operative brigades and battle groups will still use "traditional" 7+/-1-men squad.
My first thoughts when I read about this new squad structure was "if they want use nine men squad divided to half-squads, they should copy us army squad with tweaking or if they want three teams they should copy USMC. Are these kinds of thoughts arrogant as served neither in US army or marines?
And I have never received any sort of officer or NCO training or led even team sized unit (Only expection was one voluntary MOUT course for reservists. On second day in each squad everyone acted as squad leader in turns. When it was my turn to lead assault I felt like was pushed into arctic sea
Also how would I assemble 3x3 squad?
If only requirement is that it should be 3x3 I would go for
Squad leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62) rifleman (M72)
Team leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62) rifleman (M72)
Team leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62 rifleman (M72)
And best shot in squad is given scope
But if it has to be organized as command team, rifle team and MG team I would preferably go for
Command team: Squad leader, rifleman (with APILAS or MBT-LAW), rifleman(M72?)
Rifle team: Team leader, Designated marksman (either AR with rifle or dragunov), rifleman (with M72)
MG team: Team leader (with M72?), Machinegunner (PKM or LMG M62), and machine gunners assistant (withM72?)
...
Wall of text...
I hope my text makes sense.
More propably tomorrow. No I have to go sleep.
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