The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Fuchs]

The presence of maybe a battalion's worth of old simple rifles is being counted as argument against the assertion that most Taleban don't come close to a decent WW2 sniper or MG team?

That seems to rather support my assertion.

You're talking of a fraction of the total enemy force, emphasize their survivability (only one aspect of competence) and hint at the potential of their outdated hardware instead of actually asserting that they come close.


I know that the hard body armour is a huge protection (in Afghan firefights), but nevertheless, a MG42 team or a WW2 sniper could relatively easily exact a higher toll on a patrol than the Taleban seem to do in about 99% of all engagements, even with much more personnel.
There's a reason why the Taleban kill almost no-one in firefights and on average only a few hundred per year (mostly with explosives).
They suck. They are so incompetent that their repertoire has been reduced to almost nothing, to little more than mining and harrassing. They aren't even close to the league of a regular, well-trained infantry force.


It's about time to face the truth; the Taleban are an enemy of marginal lethality.
It is extremely important to acknowledge this, for we would otherwise draw wrong lessons learned for later conflicts from firefights in Afghanistan.


Our infantry would be slaughtered Somme-style in the first weeks of a later conflict if it applied the standards and tactics/behaviour from Afghanistan. Unexperienced and untrained troops would probably have no worse first weeks than troops who confuse competent opposing infantry with Taleban-quality opponents.

[JMA]

The presence of maybe a battalion's worth of old simple rifles is being counted as argument against the assertion that most Taleban don't come close to a decent WW2 sniper or MG team?

That seems to rather support my assertion.

You're talking of a fraction of the total enemy force, emphasize their survivability (only one aspect of competence) and hint at the potential of their outdated hardware instead of actually asserting that they come close.


I know that the hard body armour is a huge protection (in Afghan firefights), but nevertheless, a MG42 team or a WW2 sniper could relatively easily exact a higher toll on a patrol than the Taleban seem to do in about 99% of all engagements, even with much more personnel.
There's a reason why the Taleban kill almost no-one in firefights and on average only a few hundred per year (mostly with explosives).
They suck. They are so incompetent that their repertoire has been reduced to almost nothing, to little more than mining and harrassing. They aren't even close to the league of a regular, well-trained infantry force.


It's about time to face the truth; the Taleban are an enemy of marginal lethality.
It is extremely important to acknowledge this, for we would otherwise draw wrong lessons learned for later conflicts from firefights in Afghanistan.


Our infantry would be slaughtered Somme-style in the first weeks of a later conflict if it applied the standards and tactics/behaviour from Afghanistan. Unexperienced and untrained troops would probably have no worse first weeks than troops who confuse competent opposing infantry with Taleban-quality opponents.

You are close to being spot-on.

As far as the shooting part of the war goes it is the least incompetent that wins.

That the Taliban are surviving in such great numbers despite the numbers of coalition forces in the country underlines your assertion (as I understand it) that the strategy, the tactics and sadly the standard of soldiering of ISAF is so poor as to make the Taliban appear to be masters of insurgency warfare.

It is all so very sad.

[Fuchs]

My exact point is a combination between the above, this
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9841
(especially the suppression thing) and a third phenomenon:

Imagine you've got a very irritating itching. That can annoy a lot and easily be considered an urgent problem, ruining your day.
Now imagine you get a gunshot wound in a leg. I bet you forget the itching immediately.
Well, WW2 was a gunshot wound, AFG is the itching. AFG is being taken seriously, TB are (only) being taken seriously for lack of a greater (and sufficiently obvious) problem.

The Taliban would not have been considered to be a noteworthy power in WW2, ranking perhaps below the Filipino guerrilla's level. Taliban small units wouldn't have been considered as serious force or even a tactical challenge either in 1940-1945.

The Taliban have been suppressed to a marginal degree of effectiveness (they have almost no usable repertoire and options left), and were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).



Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!

-----

In regard to Western competence in Afghanistan:
I'd like to see a statistic how many KIA and WIA were likely avoided by hard body armour alone (even before taking into account the consequences of a KIA/WIA on small unit actions and performance).
The reports don't seem to offer much good news about the performance of troops in absence of air or heavy weapons (arty/mortar) fire support.

We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.

[Ken White]

Taliban small units wouldn't have been considered as serious force or even a tactical challenge either in 1940-1945.

both the scale and social acceptance of violence in WW II are almost totally different when compared to the current fight in Afghanistan. While your statement is correct, it provides a comparison so bizarre as to be almost meaningless. It's tantamount to saying Berlin is larger and more sophisticated than is Lashkar Gah. Yep, sure is. Yet to the kid who hasn't seen more than a few small houses in his life, Lashkar Gah is a big city...

You're forgetting context.

...were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).

That is true and is a valid premise. It also part of the reason, along with their marginal military but absolutely superb population blending capability why they are problematic to western forces forced by political correctness to fight under significant handicaps.

Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!

We can agree on that. Frankly, I don't think that is happening except in the eyes of the ignorant news media and a few others who seem to have little appreciation for the terrain and type of fight there. Or those who base their opinions on other wars -- all wars are different. Quite different.

We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.

It's the war of the moment, so such attention is perfectly natural and this war then is not really a problem. Your comment on theory and fashions though do accurately reflect a real problem.

One that's bugged Armies around the world for many years. Why do you think "Generals always prepare for the last war" is such prevalent platitude...

[Fuchs]

You're forgetting context.

I disagree. You narrow down the context to a tunnel vision.

Taliban:
marginal opponents

army on the European model:
Able to create a big mess, and everybody who thinks in 'Taleban are tough fighters' terms is screwed in such a war.


I don't care whether an Afghan boy may think that some Afghan town is big. I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).
The Taleban are the equivalent of straggling soldiers on a disorderly retreat or low morale support troops in a pocket that's about to be eliminated.
Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.

We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.

[Ken White]

I disagree. You narrow down the context to a tunnel vision...Taliban:marginal opponents..army on the European model:
Able to create a big mess, and everybody who thinks in 'Taleban are tough fighters' terms is screwed in such a war.

I doubt that, Some will be screwed, no doubt -- most will not be, they'll adapt. Thus, I think you're the one with tunnel problems.

I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).

I'm not sure who told them about real wars; been my observation that isn't being done. As for the Talibs being real opponents -- they are to those who are there; those safely elsewhere can carp but it's unbecoming IMO. Still you're correct -- most have not seen a real war yet. What they may do when the encounter such a war is not known by you, me or anyone else. What history says they will probably do is adapt. Just like all those kids from many nations on both sides of World War II had to do -- most of them had never seen a real war either...

Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.

Easy to say from your computer. Less easy out there walking around in Platoon sized packets.

We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.

Sigh. No kidding. Nor would they in Korea or Viet Nam. Even in those post WW II scuffles, society was different, the rules were different and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger. WW II was even larger and it was an existential, all out war in a time of very different social mores, to compare it to the minor scuffle in Afghanistan in today's dipwad society with excessive niceness is just silly.

[Rex Brynen]

No kidding. Nor would they in Korea or Viet Nam. Even in those post WW II scuffles, society was different, the rules were different and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger. WW II was even larger and it was an existential, all out war in a time of very different social mores, to compare it to the minor scuffle in Afghanistan in today's dipwad society with excessive niceness is just silly.

Nor would they again, were the West fighting existential, full-scale wars. We're not. I doubt we will be any time soon (although that's not in itself a reason not to prepare them.)

We're sensitive to individual casualties now because we can afford to be. When we can't afford to be, we won't be. Israel is a case in point: when its military actions are limited and marginal to national survival, every casualty is the focus of intense national angst. Nonetheless, if the Syrians tried to roll across the Golan tomorrow, the IDF wouldn't hold back a bit.

[Fuchs]

...and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger.

That's why I referred to a DIVISION's daily report. A smaller force.


@Rex Brynen:

Years of uninterrupted peace in continental Europe before WWI:

for UK: 58
for Austria-Hungary: 46
for Italy: 46 (except if you count the actions against the Ottomans in 1913)
for Germany: 43
for France: 43
for Russia: 36

rating of small wars experiences of mentioned powers in 1913: A-C
rating of great war readiness of the mentioned powers in 1913 : D-F

description of the 1871-1914 period:
quick technological advance, huge growth of wealth, prosperous culture, greatly increased world trade, greatly improved physical and communication connections between countries (railroad, telephone)

[JMA]

In regard to Western competence in Afghanistan:
I'd like to see a statistic how many KIA and WIA were likely avoided by hard body armour alone (even before taking into account the consequences of a KIA/WIA on small unit actions and performance).

The reports don't seem to offer much good news about the performance of troops in absence of air or heavy weapons (arty/mortar) fire support.

I have a similar question which questioned KIA/WIA avoidance through the universal use of body armour. This I would wish to trade off again the resultant loss of combat mobility of dismounted troops wearing the the heavy stuff.

Is your question based on the effect a higher KIA/WIA incidence would have on troops morale and the respective nations 'will' to keep their troops in Afghanistan?

As to the effect on combat performance of a lack of air and other fire support I agree.

You take some kids out of London and stick them in a totally foreign environment half way round the world and don't give them the fire support needed to offset the lack of local knowledge and combat expertise then little wonder why a handful of Taliban can tie down and 'play' with whole companies at a time.

Yes the Taliban are refusing to take on the US forces head on and choosing to rather give way and let them pass and thereby living to fight another day. This is a sane decision IMO.

My personal assessment is that the Taliban are doing pretty well. Certainly the Brits are at the end of their tether and looking for a way out all because they have been unable to counter the Taliban tactics of IEDs and the odd ambush. I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.

[William F. Owen]

I have a similar question which questioned KIA/WIA avoidance through the universal use of body armour. This I would wish to trade off again the resultant loss of combat mobility of dismounted troops wearing the the heavy stuff.

What you "wish" is actually the debate. That's what the discussion has been focussed on. BUT- the issues come down to rigourous operational analysis, and feed back from theatre.
Having had a professional background in body armour design and testing, I can tell you that the issue is trade-offs, and the big areas for trade-offs is standards and coverage.
Body armour works. There is no doubt about it. Trade-offs are the issue.

I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.

I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.

[Fuchs]

The trade-off is itself dependent on the scenario.

Keep in mind the very much varying kill share of fragments and bullets. The fashionable hard body armour plates would probably be much inferior to a greater soft body armour coverage in more fragmentation-dominated scenarios.

Again, a topic where small war experience might lead to horrible long-term misunderstandings.
The Russian Permyachka kit is so far the only almost full coverage soft body armour known to me (excluding bulky EOD equipment, of course). There are probably dozens in existence, but they don't get even nearly the desirable attention because of the hard body armour frenzy of 2003 - ~2006.

MILITARY PROTECTIVE KIT (MPK) "PERMYACHKA"

In most armies in the world of modern means of body armor - helmet and flak jacket, and their total area of protection does not exceed 30 - 35% body surface area, thus remain unprotected limbs and face of the soldier. At the same time, statistical analysis of the causes of losses among military personnel during combat operations in modern conditions has shown that over 75% of them are on ballistic injuries, 80% of which are caused by the impact of fragments of shells, mines and grenades, more than half of these injuries have on the upper and lower limbs. These facts provide irrefutable evidence of the lack of protection, a fighter, equipped with a bulletproof jacket and traditional helmet. To address the comprehensive protection of a military personnel company "Kirisa" in conjunction with leading scientists and specialists of the Ministry of Defense developed MPK "Permyachka." This outfit a soldier of the XXI century is made of aramid materials, and provides a circular ballistic protection not less than 80% body surface area from low-speed fragments as well as protection against short-term exposure to open flame. The basis of the suit, depending on your choice of usage, make overalls or protective jacket and trousers. Torso of a soldier is protected by a more reliable light fragmentation vest, to protect vital organs from damage by bullets of small arms bullet-proof vest reinforced steel or ceramic armor, the other elements of the ballistic protection, part of a package - helmet and protective mask. In addition to the ballistic-protected equipment, set "Permyachka" incorporates elements of the camoflage (for summer and winter conditions), vest designed for easy placement of the weapons, ammunition and other items of equipment, raid backpack, etc. - a total of 20 items. Using the MPK in the military units of Joint Military Group that conduct counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of Russia confirms its effectiveness at protecting personnel and high ergonomics; According to the participants of tests, the use of MPK preserves ability to fight and the life of a real soldier in combat conditions.

[JMA]

What you "wish" is actually the debate. That's what the discussion has been focussed on. BUT- the issues come down to rigourous operational analysis, and feed back from theatre.
Having had a professional background in body armour design and testing, I can tell you that the issue is trade-offs, and the big areas for trade-offs is standards and coverage.
Body armour works. There is no doubt about it. Trade-offs are the issue.

This post of mine on another thread has relevance.

One aspect that appears not to be considered is that as the foot soldiers are 'overloaded' there should be a concern for the physical nature of the tasking given this limitation. In addition there should be a concern for to what extent the ability to maneuver in combat is degraded and the effect this has on the ability to kill the enemy. Returning to my point then that to send these Michelin men out on patrol is merely setting them up for failure.

I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.

History as presented is harsh and not always accurate, I know this from personal experience, but what have or are the Brits doing to dispel the erroneous impression that they are out of their depth in Helmand? I feel desperately sorry for the Brit squaddie and Tom for the impression being created that they are not up to it when the problem lies with how they are deployed and the restrictions placed upon them.

[JMA]

This response to Wilf of 19 June 2010 refers

This post of mine on another thread has relevance.

One aspect that appears not to be considered is that as the foot soldiers are 'overloaded' there should be a concern for the physical nature of the tasking given this limitation. In addition there should be a concern for to what extent the ability to maneuver in combat is degraded and the effect this has on the ability to kill the enemy. Returning to my point then that to send these Michelin men out on patrol is merely setting them up for failure.

From the The British Army Review Number 150 we read the following in the article Donkeys led by Lions:

We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.

OK, problem belatedly identified. Now wait and watch for the reaction...